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(Abstract)
This thesis attempts to explain the nature of the Crown Colony 
constitution of Fiji. Hence it concentrates on the demands of the 
inhabitants of the Colony and the response of the rulers. The 
problem that confronted the rulers was a complex one in that, they nad 
to deal with the conflicting aspirations of three distinct communities. 
The nature of these demands for representation in the Legislative, 
Executive and Municipal Councils, are analysed in some detail as well 
as the steps that were taken by the administration in response. This 
thesis explores the reasons that motivated the political demands oi trie 
various ethnic groups and shows how far these were realized. Further 
the methods whereby the rulers reached their decisions, and their 
motives for these, are examined and commented upon. Thus the work 
endeavours to throw some light on political aspects of colonial 
constitution-making in a plural society by its discussion and analysis 
of the often conflicting interplay of the political aspirations of the 
contending etnnic groups.
Since tne issue of the franchise in Fiji was largely a struggle 
for political rights first for Europeans and then for Indians, these- 
two groups receive the greatest attention. Chapters I and II discuss 
European efforts to obtain the franchise and then on receipt of it to 
consolidate the political position of the community. The original 
European intention of obtaining democratic representative government 
is modified when Indians begin to agitate for political rights. The 
next two chapters (III and IV) discuss tne Indians’ political 
awakening and the Government1s efforts to enfranchise' them. The 
discussion in Chapter IV highlights the constraints upon the 
Government in enfranchising the Indians. The dissatisfaction 
(Chapter V) cf some Indians with the nature of the franchise granted 
Lo them opens a new source of conflict, the constitutional implications 
of which are discussed in Chapters VII, VIII and IX.
Since the Fijians were not the proponents cf constitutional change 
they receive considerably less attention. But they cannot be ignored,
2as their presence and rights were the crucial determinants in the 
process of political change in their native land. Hence tin •_> are the 
subject of Chapter Vi which concentrates on describing and explaining 
Fijian aspirations and reactions. But the chapters that follow also 
take full cognizance of the Fijian point of view and assess its impact. 
Seen from this dimension the thesis studies European-Indian political 
goals in relation to the native position and the doctrine of the 
paramountcy of Fijian interests which was in existence in this 
Pacific colony much earlier than it was enunciated in 1923 in Africa.
Chapters VII, VIII and IX are essentially concerned with the 
consequences of the enfranchisement of the Indians. the Indians found 
the communal franchise granted to them inadequate. Instead they 
demanded a common franchise (one man one vote) and they pursued 
this with a single-mindedness that split their own community ana 
angered and frightened both Europeans and Fijians. Chapter VII, on 
Muslim separatism illustrates that c mimon roll was as unpalatable to 
a significant Indian minority as it was to Fijians and Europeans. Ihe 
reaction of the anti-common roll elements including the colonial 
regime was to seek the total abolition of the elective principle, both 
in t.he Municipal boards of Suva and Levuica and in the Legislative 
Council. Chapters VIII and IX detail the steps towards constitutional 
retrogression and attempt to fathom the reasons behind the action.
While the municipal franchise was abolished the compromise authorized 
by the Secretary of State for the Colonies preserved the elective 
principle in the Legislative Council though nomination of candidates 
by the Governor was re-introduced. Chapter IX concludes witn an 
examination of demographic and economic factors that aroused Eur>pean 
and Fijian anxiety.
The Conclusion (Chapter X) briefly sums up what the earlier 
chapters have discussed in considerable detail. It admits that the 
colonial regime was prepared to grant communal franenise to both 
Europeans initially and to Indians later. The Government was, moreover, 
'willing to allay the fears of minorities such as tne Europeans and 
Muslims. But it was unwilling to concede to a common franchise 
demanded by a vocal section of the Indian community because this was 
repudiated by a majority of others as it presaged Indian political 
domination which threatened the very basis of colonial policy in the 
colony. In all its decisions the regime remained true to its original 
undertaking that in Fiji, Fijian interests were paramount.
PREFACE
FIJI became a British Crown Colony on 10 October I87I1. It was the 
consequence of problems created by the encroachment upon Fijian 
society and its habitat by Europeans. Though contact between 
Fijians and Europeans began in the late eighteenth century and 
continued thereafter it was not until the late eighteen sixties 
and the early seventies that Europeans began to flock to the shores of 
these islands with the intention of settling permanently and 
indulging in western economic pursuits which put a premium on 
Fijian land and labour. Most of these settlers were British but there 
existed no legal forms whereby Britain could exert her authority 
on the activities of her sons domiciled in this foreign archipelago.
If Westminster was concerned so were the Fijian leaders. Their 
people and their way of life were becoming involved in the processes 
of change that accompanied culture contact. Fijian society at the 
time, to generalize and ignore regional variations, was character: zed 
by a hierarchical structure with political power vested in the person 
of an autocratic chief. To him and his person suujects owed 
allegiance and fealty and he in turn was their spokesman, guide and 
leader, though not priest, as this function belonged to another 
individual. Though the hereditary principle existed in the nomination 
of chiefs this could be overlooked if a rival claimant possessed 
outstanding qualities of leadership which outshone those of a weak 
heir likely to be a liability rather than an asset to the tribe. In 
the late nineteenth century chiefly rule, in the politically 
significant ’states’, such as Bau, Cakaudrove and Lau, was at its 
height and. those in command showed, consternation at the arrival of 
Europeans in search of land, for trinkets and labour for not much more. 
Not only chiefly status but the whoio ethos of Fijian life seemed 
endangered. From such a catastrophe the chiefs searched for 
protection. Both the tovata system and the Cakobau Government 
(I87I-73) were attempts to reconcile European and Fijian interests so 
as to accommodate the invader without destruction to the indigenes.
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Eoth failed because European interests found, restraints distasteful 
and the Fijian political system was inadequate for its people's 
safety in the new situation of flux.. Thus the Fijian chiefs 
requested British annexation which after much reluctance from the 
latter arrived in I87I*.
The reluctant guardians undertook to protect the Fijian people 
but into the 'dual' society, the exigencies of policy made them 
introduce a third element, Indian British subjects as labourers. In 
obtaining Indians for Fiji, the Government in its correspondence 
according to the Sanderson Committee, had recognized 'the value of 
Indians as permanent settlers' and had been 'willing to concede them 
the enjoyment of equal rights'. (See Chapter III, p.69.) But the 
European settlers, predominantly of Anglo-Saxon stock and conformists 
to the belief of the time, saw themselves as superior in intellectual 
and cultural terms and in accordance with practices elsewhere, 
especially neighbouring New Zealand and Australia, expected a British 
regime not to subordinate their aspirations to those of subject races. 
The regime, however, interpreted its duty to be pronounced in the 
Deed of Cession, which its Governors regarded as a charter stating that 
Fijian interests were its paramount concern. Here lay the first 
problem of constitution making: how to reconcile what heterogeneous
groups deemed their rights without betraying promises.
Basic to the political problems of a plural society is the differing 
numerical strengths of the components in its population. In Fiji uhe 
difficulty was compounded by the continuing decline of the indigenous 
population from 187U until 1905; there was a slight improvement for 
the next few years until the influenza epidemic of 1918 which affected 
all communities in Fiji but struck hardest at the Fijians of whom 
somewhere between 5*000 to 7,000 died in two months. Thus in 1919 
the Fijian population sank to its lowest level, an estimated 83,000. 
Though it improved thereafter Fijian numerical superiority was being 
undermined by the rapid growth of the Indians. Meanwhile the 
Europeans showed very slight increases and by 1936 they were 
numerically overtaken by the Part-Europeans who were in t-he same 
electoral category. But most significant was the demographic grovrth 
of the Indians which was transforming Fiji into a multi-cultural 
country. Further, these Indians were no longer migrants, they were
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becoming, at least after 1920, if not earlier, permanent settlers.
Their children increasingly saw Fiji as their own home; the number 
of Fiji-born Indians had risen from 27.U8% in 1911 to 71.5»9% in 1936. 
Fiji-born among Europeans had also grown in the same period from 28.82% 
to 36.67%. Whereas in I87U, Fijians had invited Britain to guarantee 
for them their survival in their own native land amidst threats from 
a small but active European element, in the twentieth century they 
were progressively being forced to share their patrimony, gradually 
diminishing, with rapidly multiplying Indians. The new circumstances, 
for the Fijians and Europeans toe, seemed to presage an Indian take-over.
The disparity of numbers and ratio was further compounded by 
differences in the standard of living and levels of western education 
which was a crucial criterion in the ability to manage western political 
institutions. The Indians, numerically the largest component, were 
the most disadvantaged when it came to adult literacy,which for them, 
was 13.32% in 1936. (See Appendix VI for Literacy Rates of the 
various components of Fiji’s population.) Europeans found it 
intolerable that they should run the risk of being governed by such 
a community; therefore they opposed any political modus vivendi that 
might make this a possibility.
Fears of Indian political supremacy can be best understood if the 
economic background of the period under study is outlined. Changes 
in the economic environment had their implications for political 
development especially when they altered and affected relationships 
between the communities. And at the outset it ought to be noted that 
the colony’s economy was dependent upon Fijian land, European capital 
end Indian labour. Further the economy possessed an agricultural 
base.
European capital initially found expression in plantation 
agriculture and commerce. With the advent of the C.S.R.Company 
in 1882 and its expansion and establishment of a monopoly it became 
the single most important manifestation of European capital. Besides 
it controlled the industry that was the lifeblood of Fiji. The 
depression of the 1880‘s severely hurt the planters and drove many 
into insolvency. Those with finance who remained 'could do well enough 
in planting' but the reality of the nineteenth century was that 'when 
money was actually made in Fiji it came,not from plantations, but 
from trading with Fijians at a high marK-up'. (Scarr 1972:122.)
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In the twentieth century the condition of the planters improved, but 
temporarily. The years immediately preceding and including the war 
were boom years. Thereafter conditions deteriorated culminating in the 
economic depression which began in 1929. In Fiji the Europeans were 
among those who suffered most severely as a result. (See pp.2?’Or71.)
A consequence of the economic changes mentioned above was the 
change in occupational orientation of the European population. Their 
source of livelihood was no longer predominantly dependent upon the 
plantation; they were moving into the towns, into commerce and into 
administrative positions in the private sector and to a lesser degree 
in the Government which continued, to be expatriate dominated. The 
shift to towns, especially Suva, had important political implications 
as this study elaborates. Later the influx of the non-Europeans into 
Suva, aroused a reaction. (See Appendix III for demographic changes.)
While the European position in the economy was changing in focus 
that of the Fijians was altering very slowly. Throughout this period
they continued in their traditional vein though a smal percentage 
moved out of their villages to seek occupation elsewhere. According 
to the 1911 Census this group, including children and unemployed 
represented 6.22% of the total indigenous population; in 1921 it rose 
to 8.16% while by 1936 it had declined slightly to 7.39%. From 1925» 
onwards Fijians evidenced a move towards settling as farmers on their 
own land. But generally their communal life based on subsistence 
agriculture persisted. (See Chapter VI for a discussion of the 
Fijian position). They ’were mostly occupied in growing their own 
food, .although in the coastal areas of Viti Levu and Vanua Levu and in 
other outer islands copra -was their mainstay. In the interior of 
Viti Levu. banana cultivation was important. A few were involved in 
the sugar industry; by 1936 some 1,131 Fijians were growing sitgar cane 
on a commercial basis, according to the Stockdale Report. In 
comparison with the other communities their role in the cash economy 
was minimal except as consumers; in fact they were conspicuously absent 
from it. Though they were the largest landowners they were non­
competitors in agriculture with other ethnic groups in the colony.
Their greatest asset was land; its possession was essential to their 
survival. In an agricultural economy its availability was a crucial 
issue and problems surrounding it inevitably acquired political
Vovertones. As landowners they were sensitive to the politics of the 
land and mindful of their rights but showed considerable generosity 
in their willingness to make it available, provided their future was 
safeguarded, for limited leases as the resolutions of the Council of 
Chiefs in 1933 and 1936 illustrated.
It was the Indians who showed the greatest vitality and 
diversification in the colony’s economy. Indians who decided to 
remain in Fiji after having served their indenture, did so with a 
desire to prosper. Their quest for political rights was linked with 
their ambitions for material advancement. The place they sought in 
the Fijian sun was both political and economic. Their diversity 
is amply illustrated by their occupational distribution, especially 
when it is related to that of the others. (See Appendix V.) Certain 
features, however, need emphasis. Indian diversification began very 
early with the labourers who had completed their indenture. The 
Immigration Report of 1886 showed that business licences were issued 
to Indians: 21 to hawkers, 3 to bakers, 21 to retailers. According
to the 1896 Report there were 1U2 hawkers, 89 retail storekeepers, 
and 19 possessed both wholesale and retail licences. By 1911* h% 
of the employed Indians were in commerce and competing successfully 
with Europeans. (Mayer 1963:29.) They were quick to invade the 
European preserve of commerce and this trend intensified with time. 
Later they were to clamour for education and with it for white-collar 
jobs. The majority, however, found the land the most remunerative 
source of income. Here too they began quickly to compete with 
European sugar cane growers. 'with fewer wants and a frugal style of 
life and longer hours in the field, and largely dependent on their own 
toil they could manage and survive on smaller returns to their 
investment than the Europeans. When the labour shortage in the second 
decade of the twentieth century ended the plantation era in the sugar 
industry and forced a reorganization therein, it was again the Indians 
who played the crucial role in the C.S.R.Company*s scheme of the 
’small farmer system’. Their success is attested by the fact that 
they became overwhelmingly the dominant producers of sugar cane.
Tney had in fact replaced their former masters - the servant had been 
quick to cast off dependency. Since the C.S.R. was an efficient and 
exacting task-master it put the onus cn the Indians to keep pace
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with its requirements in order to succeed. Besides Indians saw 
sugar cane as the most profitable crop and they invariably chose it 
rather than engage in growing another for commercial purposes.
Company pressure and the Indian will to survive and prosper made for 
advancement. Yet profitability in the sugar industry also posed 
problems. Bad relations between Indians and the Company carried over 
from the indenture days - suspicion and distrust prevailed on the 
Indian side while the Company failed to recognize the need for a new 
outlook in its attitude towards Indians who had become free labourers. 
The price of cane and wages of labourers were often bones of contention: 
the Indians always felt they were not receiving their fair share 
while the Company argued that it provided, the best that could be offered 
in the circumstances of vacillating markets and intense competition 
from places such as Java where labour was considerably cheaper.
Another cause of Indian uncertainty involved leases. From 1912 
to 1922 C.S.R.Company tenancies were for 5 years and thereafter for 
10 years with provision for renewals. Tenants deemed this 
unsatisfactory especially when there remained the risk of eviction. 
According to Ayodhya Prasad, a farmer and unionist, wmo founded the 
Kisan Sangh (Farmers' Union) in 1937, the Company was frequently 
ruthless in this respect.(Pr&sad 1962jU6 •) As agriculturalists the 
availability of land was an important consideration for Indian farmers. 
After 1920 there were persistent demands for longer leases, especially 
on Fijian land. These pressures along with Indian economic expansion 
brought anxiety among Fijian leadership who feared Indian encroachments 
upon their own position. Thus Indian economic involvement threatened 
not merely Europeans by competition but impinged upon the Fijian 
position as well. And the political contest for the franchise ought
■----4to be seen against this background*
The economy of the colony developed in a social environment of 
inequalities which also affected constitutional change. There was in 
Fiji no firm policy of racial segregation or colour bar but race w^ as a 
crucial criterion in certain situations. (See footnote 33* p.299.)
Again it was the Indians who expressed the greatest indignation against 
these practices. They sought equality and argued that all forms 
of debarrment and segregation gave them an inferior status. The 
Indian attitude was also formed by what it considered the neglect and 
slowness of the Government in providing adequate facilities for
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Indians. It was not until 1916 that the first government school for 
Indians was established. The government, however, was prepared to 
grant financial assistance to mission schools and those run by 
Indians themselves but the Indians always demanded more. Indian 
dissatisfaction was often aggravated by pronouncements such as that of 
the C.S.R.Company to the Education Commission of 1926. (C.P.1*6/26.)
The Company opposed e education that would 1 create a Babu class with 
a desire for clerical or indoor work in the towns1; the desire was to 
keep Indians as agriculturalists not to train them for white collar 
professions.
In the colonial environment the superiority of all things 
European was an accepted article of faith as was the privileged social 
position of the Europeans; any questioning of these rules or calls 
for equality from non-Europeans aroused anger. Indians proved 
vocal in their complaints against inequalaties which the regime 
condoned. While the Fijians were prepared to accept European 
guidance (see Chapter VI) Indians resented the Europeans’ status and 
wanted an equal voice in the administration of the Colony. Their 
quest for the franchise was partly directed towards this goal. While 
Fijian leaders in the period remained content to allow British 
Governors to decide on the pace of political development their Indian 
counterparts clamoured for changes. And this background of Indian 
assertiveness, European reaction, Fijian anxiety and the dictates of 
government policy and obligations set the scene for the determination 
of the nature of the franchise for Fiji.
NO studies of political change in Fiji between 1900 and 1937 have 
hitherto been undertaken. Carl Rosberg in his thesis (1951*) on 
communal representation did consider Fiji along with Kenya and Ceylon 
but his work relied solely on published material and briefly glanced 
at events beyond 1937. Despite his pertinent comments on the nature 
of communal representation he made no attempt either to examine in
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any detail how the various communities were enfranchised or to study 
the processes that brought about constitutional change in Fiji.
This thesis attempts to explain the nature of the Crown Colony 
constitution of Fiji. Hence it concentrates on the demands of the 
inhabitants of the Colony and the response of the rulers. The 
problem that confronted the rulers was a complex one in that they had 
to deal with the conflicting aspirations of three distinct communities. 
The nature of these demands for representation in the Legislative, 
Executive and Municipal Councils, are analysed in some detail as well 
as the steps that were taken by the administration in response.
This thesis explores the reasons that motivated the political demands 
of the various ethnic groups and shows how far these were realized. 
Further the methods whereby the rulers reached their decisions, and 
their motives for these, are examined and commented upon. Thus the 
work endeavours to throw some light on political aspects of colonial 
constitution-making in a plural society by its discussion and analysis 
of the often conflicting interplay of the political aspirations of the 
contending ethnic groups.
Since the issue of the franchise in Fiji was largely a struggle 
for political rights first for Europeans and then for Indians, these 
two groups receive the greatest attention. Chapters I and II discuss 
European efforts to obtain the franchise and then on receipt of it to 
consolidate the political position of the community. The original 
European intention of obtaining democratic representative government 
is modified when Indians begin to agitate for political rights. The 
next two chapters (III and IV) discuss the Indians' political 
awakening and the Government's efforts to enfranchise them. The 
discussion in Chapter IV highlights the constraints upon the Government 
in enfranchising the Indians. The dissatisfaction (Chapter V) of some 
Indians with the nature of the franchise granted to them opens a new 
source of conflict, the constitutional implications of which are 
discussed in Chapters VII, VIII and IX.
Since the Fijians were not the proponents of constitutional change 
they receive considerably less attention. But they cannot be ignored, 
as their presence and rights were the crucial determinants in the 
process of political change in their native land. Hence they are the 
subject of Chapter VI which concentrates on describing and explaining
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Fijian aspirations and reactions. But the chapters that follow also 
take full cognizance of the Fijian point of view and assess its impact. 
Seen from this dimension the thesis studies European-Indian political 
goals in relation to the native position and the doctrine of the 
paramountcy of Fijian interests which was in existence in this 
Pacific colony much earlier than it was enunciated in 1923 in Africa.
Chapters VII, VIII and IX are essentialy concerned with the 
consequences of the enfranchisement of the Indians. The Indians found 
the communal franchise that was granted to them inadequate. Instead 
they demanded a common franchise (one man one vote) and they pursued 
this with a singled-mindedness that split their own community and 
angered and frightened both Europeans and Fijians. Chapter VII, on 
Muslim separatism illustrates that common roll was as unpalatable to 
a significant Indian minority as it was to Fijians and Europeans. The 
reaction of the anti-common roll elements including the colonial 
regime was to seek the total abolition of the elective principle, both 
in the Municipal boards of Suva and Levuka and in the Legislative 
Council. Chapters VIII and IX detail the steps towards constitutional 
retrogression and attempt to fathom the reasons behind the action.
Racial inequality lay at the root of the brand of colonialism 
which developed in Fiji and affected constitution-making in the Crown 
Colony. This element, pervasive in the system of British rule, 
stirred strong emotions, both in those who held to it as a dogma and 
those who denounced it as an intolerable injustice. In this study it 
is considered frequently and critically - frequently, because it 
influenced decisions and sometimes constituted, an area of collusion 
between European rulers and. settlers; critically, because the writer 
has no sympathy for racism, a viewpoint which is undoubtedly injected 
into the writing and for which no apology is made.
Just as Europeans drew inspiration from their brethren in other 
colonies so did the Indians find encouragement from the country of their 
origin and their compatriots in other parts of the Empire. In 
particular, the position of Indians in Kenya merits mention. But the 
concern of this thesis is essentially with Fiji and comparisons with 
Kenya and Imperial history generally are employed only when they help 
to elucidate and. explain an issue or an incident under discussion.
The part of Fiji in the broader context of imperial history is left 
to the conclusion. Only where external events have a direct influence
Xon the Fijian scene are they discussed. Thus the impact of events in 
India and the role of the India Office on constitution-making in Fiji 
are granted appropriate emphasis.
The franchise in Fiji was a subject not confined to representation 
in the Legislative Council. It was related to a struggle between 
Europeans and Indians to control the municipal councils of Suva and 
Levuka. Suva, the capital, and the centre of European entrepreneurial 
power, as well as their chief residence thus assumes great significance. 
Levuka tended to follow political trends that originated in Suva in 
terms of municipal franchise. Hence this subject has been granted its 
due space in the thesis. The issue of the franchise was a quest for 
power and equality, to have confined it solely to the Legislative 
Council would have solved only half the problem. To have won in one 
place and lost in another would have been no victory at all.
In Fiji’s history the period 1900 to 1937 was important in that 
it saw: the introduction of communal franchise, European efforts to
obtain self-government and then a retreat from this position to seek 
the reintrcduction of nomination with the emergence of Indian political 
militancy, the alliance between European and Fijian, the determination 
of the colonial administration to maintain its policy of paramountcy 
of Fijian interests. All these factors established by 1937 were to 
be crucial in the later constitutional advancement of Fiji from a 
colony to an independent state. These factors were largely 
responsible for the period of constitutional stagnation until 1963«
(See Appendix X for a note on constitutional change after 1937)« And 
they were equally prominent both in rapid changes that occurred in the 
next seven years and in determining the nature of the constitution that 
heralded the end of colonial tutelage without communal strife in 1970.
No appreciation of the recent constitutional and political events can 
be adequately made without an awareness of the processes involved in the 
momentous decisions on the issue of franchise during the years 1900 
to 1937« If the study of the past enables in us a better understanding 
of the present, then this is sufficient justification for the present 
study.
No other country in the Pacific, apart from Papua-New Guinea, 
perhaps, is bedevilled by the constitutional dilemma that confronted 
and still confronts Fiji. Though Fiji was a small British colony,
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poor in wealth and distant from Whitehall the magnitude of its 
constitutional problems were among the more complex ones that 
British politicians had to consider. Hence a study of this 
archipelago permits us to examine yet another facet of that 
controversial subject of our times, colonialism.
To the writer, Fiji means home, and he belongs to one of the 
communities involved in the story of the following pages. Though he 
denies'conscious bias he does not deny involvement. And an Indian 
viewpoint may be evident; the reader alone can judge the degree of it, 
but that judgement in turn will be coloured by the reader's own 
predilections.
A participant has certain advantages. My long and continuous 
contact with Fiji has permitted me to incorporate in this work 
discussions with individuals and observations made over years of 
residence there. It has put me in a position to pick up chance 
remarks and to listen to conversations where grievances were aired 
or the Government condemened or the rare official given even rarer 
praise. Frequently the 'facts' of the speakers might have been 
garbled or incorrect but listening to them permitted an appreciation 
of their sentiments and for research this was no more hazardous than 
taking notes at formal interviews characterized by self-justification 
and rationalization of past action.
For collection of information from Indians my knowledge of Hindi 
saved me from the dangers inherent in using interpreters and gathering 
data other than at first hand. However, my insufficient acquaintance 
with Fijian deprived me of a greater breadth in discussion with 
members of that community and limited me to those who understood 
English. If there are advantages for the local historian there are 
disadvantages too. Because he belongs to a particular group others 
sometimes tend to be cautious or reluctant to provide him with the 
information he is seeking. Sometimes he may be deliberately misled. 
These difficulties, encountered by all historians, are perhaps 
particularly acute for the locally-born historian of Fiji who must 
constantly, when researching and writing, keep up a guard against 
the bias likely to enter his work as a result of his formative years 
being spent in a particular ethnic and cultural milieu.
My tenure as full-time Secretary of the Alliance Party of Fiji 
from May 1969 till February 1970 provided me with the rare first-hand
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opportunity of observing the workings of local politics at very close
range. This experience proved invaluable in trying to fathom the
motives of individuals, and this might explain my reluctance to be
persuaded by the stated case of politicians and their supporters in
their efforts to justify their actions and to secure their ends.
Besides it is the historian's task to attempt to probe the re'asons
behind a statement or action and not rely purely on the words of
colonial politicians or officials. The dangers in critically assessing
the record, the matrix in which the official view is set? are summed
up best by the late Professor Davidson:
...the many overtly academic works that reveal unintentionally 
the writer s belief in the virtues of colonial rule. The 
policies of the governors, usually adequately documented, emerge 
as sensible and high-minded and the reactions of the governed, 
often little understood, as stubborn and misguided..
(Davidson 1968:3.)
Since the type of writing that Professor Davidson castigates still 
persists it is essential that the point of view of the governed should 
be understood and appreciated. And this can perhaps best be 
imaginatively engaged with by those who belong to this category.
The writer's investigations have led him to conclude that colonial 
rule was not always high-minded; benefits that might have accrued 
from it occurred largely in spite of it, not because of it. Secondly 
there was often a considerable difference between the pronouncements 
in London and the practices of officials in the colonies. In Fiji, 
this was shown by the reliance which some Governors placed on the 
advice of local European politicians. Instances of this association 
are highlighted in this study in order to amplify this aspect of 
colonialism in operation.
IN writing this thesis I have incurred many debts which I must 
acknowledge.
The late Professor Jim Davidson and the Australian National 
University provided the opportunity which made this study possible. 
Professor Davidson also read and commented on drafts of Chapters V and
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VIII. He had intended to do the same for Chapter IX. His
kindness enabled me to suspend my scholarship from 1 July to 31 
31 December 1972 so that I could accept a visiting lectureship in 
History for a semester at the University, of the South Pacific in Suva.
In Fiji* the National Archivist, Mr.S.Tuinaceva, made readily 
available the material in his care and willingly gave up his time to 
answer my nmerous queries. Members of his staff were equally 
obliging whether in searching for files, usually at very short notice, 
or in microfilming documents.
To my colleagues at the University of the Sc th Pacific in Suva, 
Professor Walter Johnson and Dr. John Chick, my special thanks. Their 
criticism and advice was willingly and generously given at a time 
when I had great need of assistance. My thanks also to Mr. Salim Buksh 
of the U.S.P.Library for locating material.
My thanks are due to others in Fiji who willingly answered my 
questions and tolerated my prying. By their own wish they remain 
anonymous.
The National Library of Australia in Canberra obtained on 
microfilm from the Public Records Office, London, the C.0.83 series 
for the years 1921-iO.
Dr. K.L.Gillion of the University of Adelaide read drafts of 
Chapters IIIj IV and VII and provided helpful criticism.
Doug Munro kindly lent me the manuscript of his article on 
’Island. Confederation and George Westbrook’. Paul and Jenny Alexander 
generously lent me their typewriter for the master copy.
Keith Mitchell drew the map and Mrs. Rosamond Walsh and Mrs. Rita 
Matthews typed the final draft of some of the chapters.
I owe most to my two supervisors, Dr. Deryck Scarr and Dr. Peter 
Corris for assistance with the writing. Besides providing 
encouragement they patiently read the various drafts making 
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ITHE INTRODUCTION OF THE FRANCHISE
SHORTLY before Fiji was ceded to Britain, Lord Carnarvon, the 
Secretary of State for the Colonies, stated in the House of Lords: 
'Looking at the past history and the future of these Islands, I 
should say that a Crown Colony of a rather severe type in form 
should be adopted.’1 After 18?U this dictum proved particularly 
true on the issue of constitutional reform. It was the policy of 
the first substantive Governor, Sir Arthur Hamilton Gordon 
(1875-80), that achieved this result. Gordon interpreted his duty 
as a mission to safeguard and guarantee the rights and status of 
the Fijian people in their native land. For him, the Deed of 
Cession whereby the majority of the Fijian chiefs, and through them 
their people, surrendered their autonomy to the British Crown, 
became a covenant wherein was enshrined the paramountcy of Fijian 
interests. For their part, the Fijian chiefs, and through them 
their people, regarded the document in similar lighu. Gordon by 
his land and labour policies and by his deliberate association of 
the Fijian chiefs in the government of their people laid the 
foundation for mutual trust between the alien ruler and his 
indigenous subjects. Gordon's successors, especially 
Sir John Bates Thurston, consolidated his objectives. Thus it 
can be claimed that by the end of the nineteenth century the 
paramountcy of Fijian interests had become an unassailable pillar 
of colonial rule in Fiji.
But this was not achieved without challenge. The European 
settlers, overwhelmingly British, whose acitivities had been 
responsible for cession, proved indignant and intransigent. They had 
expected British rule to usher in utopia where land and labour 
would be plentiful and cheap and they would receive British 
political institutions which would enable them to fashion their
1 cit. Davidson 1966:165.
2d e s tin y  w hile  th e  n a tiv e s  became t h e i r  s u b je c ts .  Gordon saw i t  
o th e rw ise . He had scan t use fo r  th e  s e t t l e r s ;  he saw them as 
o b s ta c le s  and would have been joyed had th ey  removed them selves 
elsew here and l e f t  him to  pursue h is  m ission  u n o b s tru c ted . H is 
land  p o lic y  fo rbade th e  a l ie n a t io n  of F i j ia n  lan d ; h is  lab o u r 
p o lic y  and n a t iv e  ta x a t io n  scheme d r a s t i c a l l y  c u r ta i le d  and 
sev e re ly  r e s t r i c t e d  th e  a v a i l a b i l i t y  of F i j ia n  la b o u r to  work on 
European p la n ta t io n s .  The F i j i a n  c h ie fs  supported  h is  e f f o r t s .
As f o r  dem ocratic  p o l i t i c a l  in s t i tu t io n s *  th ey  d id  n o t a r r iv e .
In s te a d  th e  au tocracy  o f a crown colony run by a Governor w ith  a  
L e g is la tiv e  and Executive Council o f o f f i c i a l s  was everywhere ev id en t
There was* however, a  concession . An ord inance passed  in  
A p ril 1877 c re a te d  th e  p a r t ly  e le c te d  M unicipal Board o f Levuka.
The members o f th e  board were a warden (appo in ted  by th e  G overnor), 
th e  S tip e n d ia ry  M ag is tra te  of th e  d i s t r i c t ,  two persons nom inated 
by th e  Governor, one o f whom had to  be a m edical o f f i c e r ,  and s ix  
o th e r  persons e le c te d  by th e  r a te p a y e rs .  Every ra te p a y e r  had 
one vo te  f o r  every  tw enty s h i l l in g s  pa id  by him in  r a t e s .  W ith 
th e  removal o f th e  c a p i t a l  from Levuka to  Suva, a  new town came 
in to  being  and a new o rd in an ce , No.V o f 1883, was en ac ted .
The number o f ra te p a y e rs  in  a town determ ined th e  s iz e  o f i t s
town board : a town w ith  between 300 and 600 ra te p a y e rs  bad a
board o f s ix  members; one w ith  600 to  2,000 had e ig h t  members; and
one w ith  over 2,000 had te n  members. The f ra n c h is e  was d e fin e d  by 
2
Clause 1lu Any male l iv in g  in  th e  town who f u l f i l l e d  th e  
req u ire d  q u a l i f ic a t io n s  and who was ’a n a tu ra l-b o rn  o r 
n a tu ra liz ed *  B r i t i s h  su b je c t could e n ro l as an e le c to r .  The warden
2 'The occu p ie r o r owner of ra te a b le  p ro p e rty  w ith in  th e  town s h a l l
be e n t i t l e d  to  cum ulative v o te s  in  th e  fo llo w in g  manner:
1. When th e  annual value o f p ro p e rty  assessed  does no t exceed 
tw e n ty -fiv e  pounds he s h a l l  be e n t i t l e d  to  one v o te ;
2. VJhen th e  annual value o f p ro p e rty  a sse ssed  i s  over tw en ty - 
f iv e  pounds and does n o t exceed sev e n ty -f iv e  pounds he 
s h a l l  be e n t i t l e d  to  two v o te s ;
3. When th e  annual va lue  o f p ro p e rty  assessed  i s  over sev en ty - 
f iv e  pounds and does n o t exceed one hundred and f i f t y  pounds 
he s h a l l  be e n t i t l e d  to  th re e  v o te s ;
li. When th e  annual value o f p ro p e rty  assessed  i s  over one
hundred and f i f t y  pounds he s h a l l  be e n t i t l e d  to  fo u r  v o t e s . '
3was chosen annually by the ratepayers from those already elected to 
the town board. Auditors were also appointed by election.
In constitutional terms the significance of the elected 
municipalities lay in that the franchise stipulated property not 
race as a qualification to vote. Moreover all the names of those 
who qualified were registered on a common roll. Initially these 
were Europeans but as the nineteenth century moved towards its end, 
this monopoly began to be eroded, albeit.' extremely slowly.
For the Europeans this limited franchise proved inadequate.
They chafed, protested and sought redress. Their agitation took
3the form of demanding federation with neighbouring colonies.
New Zealand was approached in 1883 and 1885 and Victoria in 1887• 
Enthusiasm in Fiji was confined to a minority and aroused 
insignificant response in the colonies with whom federation was 
sought. The Fiji colonists hoped that by federating with one of 
these colonies they would inherit their political institutions 
wherein settler wishes held sway. Thus the Europeans in Fiji 
would become masters in their own home and not tenants at will of 
a colonial Governor. But Whitehall refused to countenance such 
a device it was unwilling to transfer the control of a large native 
population to the whims of a minority. Again the doctrine that 
in Fiji, Fijian interests had primacy of place was being reiterated.
These rebuffs settler politicians treated as temporary setbacks. 
And in 1900 federation with New Zealand again reared its head and 
found support from New Zealand's Premier, Richard John Seddon, a 
man with imperialist dreams in the Pacific. Unlike the previous 
attempts, the movement for federation in 1900 attempted to attract, 
although unsuccessfully on the whole, Fijians with promises to 
remove inconvenience caused them by the prevailing native 
policy of ruling according to Fijian customs especially through the 
indigenous chiefs, some of whom became, after Cession, paid servants 
of the Crown. The leader of the federationists at this time,
Humphry Berkeley, was able to obtain some support from native 
dissidents but only from malcontents who were insignificant and whose
3 For a study of the Federation Movement in Fiji, 1880-1902, see 
Ali 1969.
hgrievance against the ruler was a personal one, such as dismissal
from the service for negligence or defalcation, the most common
failing of Fijian civil servants. The Governor, Sir George O ’Brien,
who had a personal antipathy towards Humphry Berkeley and his
brother the Chief Justice, over-reacted to the whole situation,
including the involvement of Richard Seddon. Fearing a possible
native uprising that might threaten British rule in Fiji, he took
stem measures and made severe pronouncements. These, on the
one hand offended Seddon and on the other aggravated O ’Brien's
already strained relations with the Berkeleys and their friends.
And though the attempt to federate Fiji with New Zealand in 1900
failed, O’Brien's heavy-handed actions led to a change in the
Governorship with the appointment of Henry M.Jackson as his
replacement. Whitehall felt this necessary because ’serious
political as well as personal and social difficulties recently
arisen in Fiji, /"make ±t._7 desirable that the Governor should be
a tried administrator and also a man of tact and discretion in
dealing with social matters of an unofficial nature'.^ In practical
terms it meant someone who did not come into open conflict with the
European colonists. Of these men O’Brien was largely contemptuous,
and therefore, unfavourable to their requests for constitutional 
£change. The settlers saw Fiji as the country of their permanent 
abode and felt that they too should possess Anglo-Saxon 
institutions which permitted them a voice in the control of their 
own affairs. Being in close proximity to the self-governing 
dominions of Australia and New Zealand, they sought similar 
representative institutions. It is certain that had New Zealand 
been in the same constitutional strait as themselves, i.e. a crown 
colony dominated by an autocrat appointed and controlled by 
Whitehall, they would not have sought federation with it. By 
becoming a part of New Zealand they thought they would obtain an 
identical constitution. But they were too few in number, in a 
colony where the coloured population outnumbered them by no less 
than 10 to 1, for their wishes to prevail. Nor did they and the 
colony possess adequate resources to be able to work representative
1; Draft C.O. to Treasury, 18 May 1902; C.0.83/73. Only those 
despatches initially read on microfilm in the National Library 
of Australia are given the C.O.83 series reference number.
5 O'Brien to Anderson, Private, 1 Oct. 1900; C.O.83/71.
$institutions successfully. Besides, this form of government was 
anathema to those interests which kept Fiji economically solvent, 
that is, the sugar companies, especially the Australian giant, the 
C.S.R.Company. The success of their business in Fiji was dependent 
on a cheap and plentiful supply of labour imported from India which 
would have been curtailed by India had Fiji become a ’white1 
dominion. A viable colonial economy which made no demands on the 
British taxpayer was, for Whitehall, more important than placating 
white colonists. It was for this reason that the C.S.R.Company 
was consulted when Jackson recommended changes. In fact the 
directorate of the company had explicitly requested earlier that 
its voice be heard in any proposed changes to the colony's 
constitution.^
After the conflict with O'Brien, the arrival of Jackson in the
colony was welcomed by the European settlers. Though Jackson was
no radical in settler terms, he was nonetheless willing to listen.
He had been asked by the Colonial Office to consider and report on
Seddon's suggestions for a more liberal constitution for the
Europeans in Fiji. Jackson saw no difficulty on this point and7so advised Whitehall.
For their part the Europeans were willing to show a spirit of 
compromise. They recognized the futility of fighting the Governor 
and decided on co-operation. Their first step was taken after one 
of their number, James McConnell, a planter from Taveuni and 
formerly member of the Assembly in the Cakobau Government in 
1871-187U, had a discussion with Jackson and reported to his 
compatriots that the new man at Government House was not adverse 
to political change. Consequently a meeting, not of the public 
as was the habit previously, but an exclusive one of 'those havingg
large interests in the Colony' was called at Suva. The meeting 
devoted itself to the task of improving the political position 
of Europeans only. Its opinion was that the Crown Colony system
6 Enel. O’Brien to C.0.89, 27 0ct.1900; C.O.83/71.
7 Jackson to C.O.39, 2k Apr.1903; C.O.83/76.
8 The Report of the meeting was given in W.P.H. 30 Jan.1903. The 
meeting was held on Wednesday afternoon 2Ö Jan.1903 in the office 
of the Union Steamship Company and the following were present: 
S.L.Lazarus (Chairman) businessman, D.Calder (Acting "warden of 
Suva), Hon.W.Burton (Manager, Bank of New Zealand), J.H.Garrick, 
H.Shaw, H.M.Scott, E.A.Benjamin, T.Fitzgerald, G.L.Griffiths,
A.Barker, F.J.Barnett, J.McConnell, and R.Morel (of Navua).
Gwas s u i ta b le  f o r  th e  F i j ia n s  and In d ian s  and Europeans should 
n o t i n t e r f e r e  in  th e  governance of th e se  two ra c e s , who should 
rem ain under th e  d i r e c t  c o n tro l of th e  c o lo n ia l  regim e. S e lf -  
government was th e  b i r t h r ig h t  o f Europeans o n ly , w hile  th e  
co loured  ra c e s  needed an a l ie n  w hite  m aste r. A p e t i t io n  was 
q u ick ly  drawn up and subm itted  to  th e  Governor w ith  s ig n a tu re s  
from Suva w hile  a n o th e r , id e n t ic a l  in  com position , was 
c ir c u la te d  around the  Colony.
The p e t i t io n e r s  sought th e  f ra n c h is e  f o r  male a d u lts  born o r
n a tu ra l iz e d  B r i t i s h  s u b je c ts ,  and n o t In d ia n s , F i j ia n s  o r o th e r
P a c if ic  I s la n d e r s .  E le c to rs  should be ab le  to  read, and w rite
rudim entary  E ng lish  and must have liv e d  in  th e  Colony fo r  two
y ea rs  and possess a p ro p e rty  q u a l i f i c a t io n ,  e i th e r  f re e h o ld  o r
le a se h o ld , o f £20 p e r  annum, o r an income of £120 p .a .  derived  from
any p ro fe s s io n , t r a d e ,  b u sin ess  o r c a l l in g .  An in te n d in g
cand ida te  had to  have f u r th e r  q u a l i f ic a t io n s  o f having p ro p e rty ,
f re e h o ld  o f th e  annual va lue  o f £500 o r a c tu a l  v a lu e  o f £500 o r
le a se h o ld  valued  a t  £100 p .a .  o r  a y e a r ly  income o f £200. The
c o lo n is ts  asked f o r  th e  r ig h t  to  e le c t  12 members to  th e
L e g is la t iv e  Council and s t ip u la te d  th a t  i f  on ly  9 s e a ts  were g ran ted
then  th e  Colony s h a l l  be d iv id ed  in to  seven e le c to r a te s .  F u r th e r ,
th ey  suggested  th a t  th e  e le c te d  members o f th e  L e g is la t iv e  Council
should choose two from t h e i r  m idst to  s i t  on th e  Executive C ouncil;
o
a p ro p o s itio n  r e je c te d  by both Jackson and th e  S e c re ta ry  of S ta te .
What th e  c o lo n is ts  were seek ing  was tantam ount to  
re p re s e n ta t iv e  i n s t i t u t i o n s  ak in  to  th o se  p re v a il in g  in  th e  w hite  
dominions o f A u s tra la s ia .  This was more th an  even Jackson could  
concede, a lth o u g h , u n lik e  h is  p red ecesso r O’B rien  o r W .L .A llardyce, 
he was p repared  to  recommend th e  in tro d u c tio n  o f th e  e le c t iv e  
p r in c ip le .^ 0 O 'B rien  had e a r l i e r  d ism issed  th e  European
9 Jackson to  C .0 .39 , 2h Apr. 1903; C.0 .8 3 /7 6 . C .O .to Jackson 51>
8 Ju ly  1903. F .R .G .1905:105-109. No C .0.83 s e r ie s  re fe re n c e  
number i s  c i te d  a f t e r  despa tches consu lted  in  th e  N a tio n a l 
A rchives o f F i j i .
10 A lla rd y ce , as O ff ic e r  A dm inistering  Government in  th e  in te r lu d e  
between O 'B r ie n 's  d ep a rtu re  and Ja c k so n 's  a r r i v a l ,  had ad v ised  th e  
C o lon ia l O ffice  a g a in s t  any c o n s t i tu t io n a l  change. A llardyce
to  C.0 . 16, 1 Mar. 1902.
7population generally as a non-productive component and hence 
undeserving of the franchise. He wrote that under the existing 
circumstances if the vote were to be extended on the basis of 
contribution towards productivity it would mean 20 Fijian members 
in the Legislative Council representing the largest landowners in 
the country, 12 seats for the sugar companies, 2 for private 
planters, 1 for Suva and Levuka and 1 for free Indians, Polynesians 
and half-castes.^ Not only was such a scheme impractical it 
displayed a total disregard and sympathy for European aspirations.
But,although the franchise question was fraught with difficulties,
Jackson was prepared to compromise. First, there was an important
minority among the settlers, led by the Senior Unofficial (nominated)
Member of the Legislative Council and including some of the largest
12commercial interests, which preferred the status quo. While this 
element could not be ignored because of their economic position, 
nor could the wishes of over three hundred petitioners be ignored for 
the sake of a very small minority, no matter how important otherwise. 
The settlers had to be given some representation but it was common 
knowledge that local Europeans especially the small planters, both 
in sugar and copra, were openly hostile* towards the sugar companies 
which they frequently labelled as foreign and monopolistic and to 
whose whims, it was claimed, the government succumbed to the 
detriment of local interests. Obviously reconciliation was essential.
One solution was to give representation to the sugar companies.
The Director of the C.S.R.Company, Edward Knox, was the obvious 
person to approach and correspondence with him begun by O ’Brien was 
renewed by Jackson. In the beginning Knox had stated that though 
the existing constitution was not an ideal one, satisfactory 
modification could be made 'provided the unofficial members of the 
Council were elected by the landowners and ratepayers instead of 
being nominated by the Governor, and such members had the right to 
veto any expenditure - at all events pending reference to the 
Colonial Office: " O'Brien found the recommendation who3.1y 
unacceptable. Knox tried to convince Jackson later of the value of
11 O’Brien to C.0.7ii, 22 Sept.1900) C.0.83/71.
12 Jackson to C.0.7i|5 22 June 1903.
13 Enel. O'Brien to C.0.Ö9, 27 Oct. 1900.
3th e  second p a r t  o f h is  suggestion  b u t he too  saw d i f f i c u l t i e s  
in  i t . * ^  The d is ta n c e  between London and F i j i  was a problem b u t 
th e  cab le  system could  overcome t h i s  d i f f i c u l t y .  F u r th e r th e  
Governor could be given powers to  o v e rrid e  th e  ve to  i f  he f e l t  t h a t  
th e  de lay  caused by i t  could  be d e tr im e n ta l to  p u b lic  i n t e r e s t .  
However, Jackson was hopefu l th a t  e le c te d  members would be le s s  
l i k e ly  to  r e s o r t  to  such o b s t r u c t io n is t  t a c t i c s  th an  th e  e x is t in g  
nominated ones; l a t e r  behav iour in  Council a f t e r  190^ d id  n o t prove 
Jackson c o r r e c t .  But th e re  was th e  r i s k  b h a t i f  e le c te d  members 
could tem p o ra rily  oppose th e  money v e to , th ey  could use t h e i r  
power to  q u estio n  p e rso n a l emoluments o f unpopular o f f i c i a l s .  The 
whole is su e  was hedged w ith  danger and th e  q u e s tio n  o f supremacy 
in  money m a tte rs  o f th e  r e p re s e n ta t iv e s  of th e  people  was n o t 
s e t t l e d  in  B r i ta in  i t s e l f  t i l l  1911.
The su g g es tio n  th a t  th e  d i r e c to r s  o f th e  two companies, C .S.R. 
and th e  F i j i  Sugar Company, j o i n t l y  e le c t  a r e p re s e n ta t iv e  was 
u n accep tab le  to  Knox because a  person  so chosen m ight be regarded  as
a d e leg a te  r a th e r  th an  a re p re s e n ta t iv e  o f the  com panies, th e reb y
19d im in ish ing  h is  in f lu e n c e . Also th e  a l lo c a t io n  of a  s e p a ra te  s e a t  
f o r  th e  sugar in d u s try  could g ive rise - to  th e  co n ten tio n  th a t  th e  
i n t e r e s t s  o f th e  Colony and th a t  o f th e  sugar in d u s try  were n o t 
in te rd e p en d e n t, th a t  th e  form er were being  subo rd ina ted  to  th e  l a t t e r .  
Knox’s coun ter su g g es tio n  was th a t  th e  s e a t be f i l l e d  e i th e r  by 
nom ination o f th e  Governor o r vo te  o f th e  C ouncil, on th e  
und ers tan d in g  th a t  such a member be ab le  to  speak w ith  a u th o r i ty  
about th e  workings o f s u g a r-m ills  and la rg e  p l a n t a t i o n s . ^  Although 
Jackson d id  n o t agree w ith  Knox's reaso n s f o r  r e je c t in g  h is  method, 
he decided  n o t to  fo rc e  th e  i s s u e .  But he found Knox’ s 
a l te r n a t iv e  im p ra c tic a b le  because nom ination by th e  Governor o f a 
re p re s e n ta t iv e  f o r  th e  sugar in d u s try  would re k in d le  e a r l i e r  
o b je c tio n s  to  t h i s  system  and secondly  i t  was most u n lik e ly  t h a t  th e  
n ew ly -e lec ted  members would agree to  make such a s e le c t io n .  To
1U Jackson to  C.O.Conf. 28 Jan . 1903; C.0 .8 3 /7 6 .
1f> Jackson to  C.0.39* 2k Apr. 1903; C.0 .8 3 /7 6 . Jackson to  C .0 .116 ,
7 O ct. 1903. F .R .G .1905 j 1 0 £ ff .
16 Jackson to  C .0 .116 , 7 O ct. 1903.
9ensure that the sugar companies were not altogether left out Jackson 
decided to give the franchise to those C.S.R.Company employees who 
earned £120 p.a. or more. This would enable sugar interests to 
influence the election of at least one of the three representatives 
allocated to those engaged in agriculture. This was a last resort 
measure. Earlier Jackson had temporarily thought of thi^line of 
action along with an annual income qualification of £1^0. Knox 
himself had been dubious of its value; most of his officers in 
Fiji were Australians who, as a group, resented (and thus ignored) 
the advice of their employer in such matters. And Jackson then saw 
no reason for extending the vote to the Company's staff of whom 
he wrote:
They have no stake in the Colony, pay no rates or taxes, since 
they live in quarters on the Companies' Estates, and if they 
give up their employment here they would quit these islands, 
and it seems better to limit the voters to those who have a 
real interest in the colony. 18
The Governor's description of this class as birds-of-passage was in
harmony with the feelings of local white settlers on the subject.
Later there were expressions of resentment when the new constitution
was published and it was discovered that this element had been
enfranchised while other permanent citizens had not. 19
Early in the discussions with the Colonial Office on the franchise
issue Jackson had had to discount the tentative recommendation of the
former on the method of bestowing representation. The Colonial
Office had suggested the possibility of giving seats in the
Legislative Council to the Wardens of Suva and Levuka. The
Executive Council, comprised wholly of officials, had no objection
to it and had even gone to the extent of recommending to the
Governor that the quality of advice likely to be had from an elected
unofficial element would probably not be as good as that obtained
20from the currently nominated me'mbers. They were also wary of
difficulties regarding representation of Europeans outside Suva and
17 Jackson to C.O.Conf. 28 Jan. 1903; C.0.83/76.
18 ibid.
19 W.P.H. 22 Nov. 1901*.
20 Jackson to C.O.Conf. 28 Jan.1903
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Levuka as w e ll as o f n a tiv e  i n t e r e s t s  o b ta in in g  a vo ice  in  th e
C ouncil. At th e  same tim e th ey  advised th e  Governor th a t  a l l
u n o f f ic ia ls  ought to  be e le c te d  because i f  some were e le c te d  and
some nom inated th e  p u b lic  would n o t be s a t i s f i e d  and Government
would be open to  in c e s s a n t charges o f a ttem p tin g  to  pack th e  
21C ouncil. The seven u n o f f ic ia l  members of th e  e x is t in g  C ouncil, 
a l l  re p re se n te d  commercial i n t e r e s t s :  Murray, th e  Managing D ire c to r
o f th e  F i j i  Sugar Company; B urton, Manager o f th e  Bank of New 
Zealand; Gemmell-Smith lo c a l C.S.R.Company Manager; a l l  were 
unanimous in  t h e i r  view th a t  th e  in c lu s io n  o f th e  warden would . 
s a t i s f y  nobody, and th a t  the p r in c ip le  o f e le c t io n  was th e  on ly  
u lt im a te  answer.
There were o th e r  d i f f i c u l t i e s  as w e ll .  The geography o f th e  
a rc h ip e la g o , and th e  sp arse  d i s t r ib u t io n  of th e  sm all European 
p o p u la tio n , excep t f o r  a la rg e  c o n ce n tra tio n  in  Suva, caused 
c o n s te rn a tio n . The magnitude o f th e  problem depended upon th e  
number o f members to  be e le c te d . O r ig in a lly  Jackson though t th e re  
m ight be e ig h t o r n in e ; and th re e  could  come from Suva and Levuka, 
re p re se n tin g  th e  p ro fe s s io n a l and b u s in e ss  c la s s e s ,  two (o r  th re e )  
re p re se n tin g  th e  p la n te r s ,  one re p re se n tin g  fo re ig n  c a p i t a l  in v e s te d  
in  th e  sugar f a c to r ie s  and two F i j i a n s .  The end r e s u l t  was s ix  
members f o r  th e  European community and two f o r  th e  n a t iv e s .  Of 
th e  s ix  e le c te d  European s e a ts ,  two were a l lo c a te d  to  Suva and one 
to  Levuka, and th re e  went to  p la n te r  i n t e r e s t s  s c a t te r e d  th roughout 
th e  colony.
The f o r e s ig h t  of Jackson gave th e  F i j ia n s  two s e a ts  in  th e
L e g is la tiv e  Council even though th e  men chosen were e s s e n t i a l ly  th e
re p re s e n ta t iv e s  o f a t r a d i t io n a l  e l i t e .  But o th e r  non-Europeans
were le s s  lucky  in c lu d in g  22,790 In d ia n s  who were B r i t i s h  su b je c ts
22no le s s  th an  any o f th e  o th e r r e s id e n ts .  And on ly  9*776 o f
th e se  In d ia n s  were inden tu red  la b o u re rs  s t i l l  se rv in g  t h e i r  
23c o n tr a c ts .  Jackson had w r it te n  and th e  S e c re ta ry  o f S ta te
21 M inutes Ex.Co. 2h Jan . 1903.
22 F ig u res  o f In d ian  P opula tion  e s tim a te  as on 31 Dec. 1901;. 
F .R .G .1905:630.
23 F .R .G .1905:6U6.
11
acquiesced  w ith o u t comment:
I  do n o t th in k  i t  n ecessa ry  to  p rovide re p re s e n ta tio n  f o r  th e  
In d ian  and P o lynesian  elem ent, which has shown i t s e l f  very  open 
to  c o rru p tio n  a t  th e  m unicipal e le c t io n s ,  and whose i n t e r e s t s  
I  would safeguard  by ap p o in tin g  th e  A gent-G eneral an 
o f f i c i a l  Member o f C ouncil. 2k
At th a t  s tag e  th e re  was some d i s s a t i s f a c t io n  w ith  th e  conduct of
m unicipal e le c t io n s  and th e  Towns Ordinance was under c o n s id e ra tio n
’w ith  a view to  se c u rin g , among o th e r  th in g s ,  g re a te r  p u r i ty  in  th e
e le c t io n s ,  which w i l l  in  th e  fu tu re  be under su p e rv is io n  o f th e
25
Government’ . But th e  ex ac t n a tu re  o f th e  c o rru p tio n  rem ained vague.
Judging from what was s a id  some y ea rs  l a t e r  in  o rd e r to  exclude In d ian s
from th e  m unic ipal r o l l ,  i t  invo lved  th e  purchase o f v o te s  by v a rio u s
inducem ents. J a c k so n 's  judgement in  th e  m a tte r  can h a rd ly  be
d esc rib ed  as im p a r t ia l ,  r a th e r  in  an a ttem pt to  p la c a te  European
opin ion  i t  seems th a t  he f e l l  p rey  to  i t s  p re ju d ic e s .
The new C o n s ti tu tio n  was p u b lish ed  on 10 O ctober I 90J4,  th e  day o f
a r r iv a l  o f Ja c k so n 's  su ccesso r, S ir  Everard im Thum , though th e
s e t t l e r s  had been to ld  o f th e  number of t h e i r  e le c te d  r e p re s e n ta t iv e s
e a r l i e r  through th e  lo c a l  p re s s .  T h e ir re c e p tio n  o f t h i s  news,
however, was n o t ve ry  fav o u rab le  because what was given f e l l  sh o rt 
27o f e x p e c ta tio n s .
To understand  s e t t l e r  c r i t ic is m s  th e  q u a l i f ic a t io n s  f o r  e le c to r s
and can d id a te s  ought to  be s ta t e d .  An e le c to r  had to  be th e  son o f
p a re n ts  o f European d e sc e n t; a B r i t i s h  su b je c t by b i r t h  o r
n a tu r a l iz a t io n ,  21 y e a rs  o f age, r e s id e n t  in  F i j i  f o r  tw elve
consecu tive  m onths, and possessed  o f le a se h o ld  o r f re e h o ld  o r  both
in  F i j i  worth £20 p .a .  o r an annual income of n o t l e s s  th an  £120.
For those  who w ished to  q u a lify  to  be e le c te d  as p l a n t e r s ’
re p re s e n ta t iv e s  th e  fo llo w in g  was s ta te d :
Three members by persons du ly  q u a l i f ie d  as e le c to r s  as h e re in  
befo re  p ro v id ed , who are  engaged, e i th e r  on t h e i r  own b e h a lf  o r  
in  th e  employ of o th e r  p e rso n s , in  th e  c u l t iv a t io n  o f lan d  o r th e  
management o f farm s w ith in  th e  Colony of n o t l e s s  th an  100 a c re s  
in  e x te n t ,  o r in  th e  p ro d u c tio n  and m anufacture o f su g ar, 
p rovided  th a t  th e  annual s a la ry  o r wages d e riv ed  from such 
employment be n o t le s s  than  £120.
2k Jackson to  C.O.39, 2k A p r.1903; C.O.83/ 76. F .R .G .1905:107.
25 Jackson to  C.O.Conf. 28 Jan . 1903; C.O.83 /76 .
26 W.P.H. <\k Aug. 1903.
27 F .T . 26 O ct. 190U; W.P.H. 21 O ct. 190h.
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T his p rov iso  had th e  e f f e c t  o f keeping w ithou t th e  f ra n c h is e  those
sm all p la n te r s  who had p ro p e r t ie s  of le s s  th an  100 a c re s . The
ex ac t number excluded i s  d i f f i c u l t  to  de term ine; accord ing  to  th e
1906 p o p u la tio n  e s tim a te  th e re  were 1,237 European a d u lt  m ales in
th e  colony, of th e se  81*2 l iv e d  o u ts id e  th e  c a p i t a l  b u t only  319 in
28a l l  q u a l i f ie d  f o r  th e  p la n te rs*  r o l l .  A ll th o se  who liv e d
o u ts id e  Suva and Levuka and were n o t engaged in  a g r ic u l tu r e ,
European shopkeepers, tradesm en, m in is te rs  o f r e l ig io n  and o th e r
re s id e n ts  n o t invo lved  w ith  th e  c u l t iv a t io n  of la n d , were a lso
w ithou t th e  f r a n c h is e . What made i t  more g a l l in g  was th a t  t r a n s ie n t s
employed by th e  sugar companies could e x e rc ise  some in flu en c e  by
t h e i r  v o te  in  th e  c o n tro l o f th e  a f f a i r s  o f a  coun try  th a t  was no t
t h e i r  home b u t only  a source of income w hile  perm anent c i t i z e n s ,
some descended from p io n eers  who made F i j i  B r i t i s h ,  remained
deprived  o f t h e i r  b a s ic  r ig h t  of c i t iz e n s h ip .  There was dismay
and an x ie ty  t h a t ,  ou t o f an e le c to r a l  r o l l  o f 350 to  1*00 in  th e
country  d i s t r i c t s ,  as many as 250 m ight be sugar people th u s  ab le  to
29dominate th e  p o l l  to  th e  d e trim en t of o th e r  lo c a l  i n t e r e s t s .
Everard im Thurn enqu ired  from th e  C o lon ia l O ffice  w hether i t  was
in tended  to  w ithho ld  th e  f ra n c h is e  from a l l  m is s io n a r ie s ,
s to re k e e p e rs , m erchants and p ro fe s s io n a l  men and o th e rs  o u ts id e
Suva and Levuka and who earned  n o t le s s  than  £120 an n u ally  b u t d id
n o t have farm s o f n o t l e s s  than  100 ac res  o r were n o t connected w ith
30su g ar; W h iteh a ll r e p l ie d  in  th e  a f f irm a tiv e . The e le c to r a l  r o l l
could have been even f u r th e r  reduced had n o t th e  Governor given a
very  l i b e r a l  in te r p r e ta t io n  to  th e  phrase 'u s u a l p lace  o f b u s in e s s '
31and l e t  i t  imply p lace  o f re s id en ce  as w e ll .  Had he notodone so 
th en  b u sin ess  men such as bankers and m erchants, whose o f f ic e s  were 
s i tu a te d  in  th e  tow nships o f Suva and Levuka b u t whose homes la y  
beyond th e  m unic ipal b o u n d arie s , would have been excludexLas w e ll.
I f  some stood  r e je c te d  o th e rs  rece iv ed  more th an  one vo te  because 
m erchants and d i r e c to r s  o f firm s re s id e n t  in  th e  new and o ld  c a p i ta l s  
o f F i j i  in v a r ia b ly  had in t e r e s t s  in  p la n ta t io n s  o f some k in d .
26 The C yclopedia o f F i j i  1907:21*. F.R .G .1905 :7 -17 .
29 W.P.H. 21 O ct. 190U, 22 Ncv. 1901*; F .T . 26 O ct. 190l*.
30 Im Thurn to  C.0.111*, 1i* Nov. 1905. W.P.H. 22 Nov. 1901*.
31 Im Thurn to  C.0.111*, 11* Nov. 1905.
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Originally it had been intended in the Letters Patent to give the
vote to only those residents of these two towns ’other than persons
engaged in the cultivation of the land' but Governor Jackson had
drawn the Colonial Office's attentions to the implications of such a
32requirement and the words were deleted.
Though not all the European settlers were happy with the new 
constitution which had introduced the elective principle, most 
regarded it as an improvement on the old whereby the Governor 
nominated the unofficials. The old system, they felt, 
subordinated their interests and aspirations to the will of an 
autocrat. But the new constitution limited the franchise to 
Europeans only; barely 2,liU0 Europeans were permitted to elect 
6 members; from 92,000 native Fijians a tiny elite (of less than 
one hundred) could forward the names of not more than 6 of their 
class and from these the Governor would nominate two as their 
representatives, from 22,000 Indian British subjeets there were to 
be none. This was an unbalanced constitution and its legacy was 
both European over-representation and the acknowledgement, albeit 
tacit, of the supremacy of the European in the political arena of 
the Colony. The corollary proved to be European resentment when 
this dominant role \*Tas questioned and threatened by others seeking 
parity. Its imbalance and the total neglect of the Indian sowed 
seeds of future strife. In the case of the Fijians the gentlemanly 
method of selection possibly avoided discord among chiefs and 
commoners which might have resulted if that society had been 
subjected to an election campaign. But the elective principle and 
the likelihood of challenge from riva]s trying to woo the support 
of the people would have certainly aroused many a traditional leader 
out of apathy and given him incentive for greater concern for his 
people. Equally the lax and indifferent would have become 
casualties; swept aside to be replaced by others, some of common 
stock. The fate of the Fijian people might have been different 
but certainly for the better. They had before Cession known how 
to choose between men, aided by the rule of the club certainly but 
this did not negate their ability to differentiate between what was 
beneficial and what was harmful, they knew this even before the
32 Jackson to C.0.116, 7 Oct. 1903. F.R.G.190£:119.
missionaries arrived with their wares. After thirty years of 
British rule the elective principle could have been extended to them 
by giving them a greater voice in the affairs of their own country5 
they could have become participants and equal partners in 
government instead of onlookers to the squabbles between cautious 
officials and ambitious colonists. In I90I4. an opportunity for 
early training was missed. There is, of course, the argument that 
had the British permitted the Fijians to choose their representatives 
by election, they would have had to grapple with the problems of 
disappointed chiefs rejected by their people. This could have led 
to the erosion of chiefly status. But such was contrary to the 
British policy - rigidly pursued in Fiji - of the preservation of 
the chiefly caste and of ruling through them.
Whatever their criticism of the new constitution the European
settlers decided to make full use of the new opportunity to choose
their new representatives. When nominations closed Levuka had only
one candidate, Captain David Robbie, a fifty-six year old former
sailor now turned merchant; he was thus declared elected. But
elsewhere competition was keen; in Suva there were nine aspirants
for the two seats; and seven offered themselves for the three
positions of planters' representatives. None of the men seeking
election to the colony's first elected legislature had been born
in the colony, although most had been some years in the country and
a few had come in those hectic days before Cession. The type of
franchise granted had been communal. It was confined to Europeans
who alone could participate in the elections both as voters and.
33candidates.
33 The candidates were: Suva: L.E.Benjamin, L.E.Brown, J.Callaghan
Dr.G.Fox, L.Griffiths, S.L.Lazarus, W.McRae,*  H.Marks,* 
A.H.Ogilvie. Planters' Constituency: A.A.Coubrough,*
J.H.Garrick, J.McConnell, J.Murray,* E.F.Powell, H.Shaw,
J.B.Turner.*
* Successful Candidates.
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THE constitution was, obviously, the first issue for the candidates 
to cut their teeth on* Much was made of the fact that certain 
Anglo-Saxons had been deprived of their birthright by the restricted 
nature of the franchise. Because those in the country had 
specifically been omitted those standing in the planters' electorate 
were especially indignant. Accusations were made that Suva had been 
favoured over the more important rural sector.3^ On the other 
hand men like Marks thought the present system with its 
limitations was one to test them; and if they proved capable, then 
more liberal reforms would result.
All were combined in opposition to the cadet system, as it was
known. They were all in favour of recruiting local European youths
for the civil service instead of importing them from England on
salaries beyond their ability.33 Allied to this question was the
advocacy for greater educational facilities for European children.
It was generally thought that the missions, which were considered
to havo done an excellent job, should be given government assistance.
Coubrough, for instance, told his audience that every centre of
population should have an elementary school at government expense
and that there ought to be an institution for higher learning in Suva
to train local youths for jobs in the civil service.36 Unlike the
others, Marks favoured the extension of education to blacks as well
as whites; some doubted whether, once educated, the Indian would 
17an agriculturist. '
3k W.PoH. 2h Mar. 1905.
35 J.B.Turner argued that local youths had as much intelligence as 
those from Britain. Besides it cost the Colony £10 in passage 
money plus £200 p.a. in salary for these whereas a local boy 
received only £50 p.a. W.P.H. 21 Mar. 1905.
36 28 Mar. 1905.
37 Marks* retort was: ’You cannot make a silk purse out of a sow’s
ear!* He claimed to have studied the history of the Indian race 
and was certain that the Indian who came as a labourer must remain 
as one. This was despite the remarks of his questioner,one Smith, 
that ’these Indian children are from a higher and more advanced 
race than many of the whisky swilling white one*. W.P.H.21 Mar.1905.
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The two most v i t a l  is su e s  were lan d  and la b o u r . N a tu ra lly  th e  
p l a n t e r s ’ c an d id a te s  were most v o ca l on th e se  b u t th ey  d id  n o t have a 
monopoly, n o r n e c e s s a r i ly  were t h e i r  arguments b e s t  f o r  th e  purpose. 
Every a s p ir a n t  dw elt a t  le n g th  on th e s e , and each clamoured f o r  
g re a te r  a v a i l a b i l i t y  of both  b u t in  c e r ta in  d e ta i l s  th e re  were 
d if f e r e n c e s ,  over lan d  p a r t i c u la r ly .
At Cession a l l  a l ie n a t io n  o f F i j i a n  land  had been p ro h ib i te d . 
T h e re a f te r  i t  became th e  cry  o f every  s e t t l e r ,  w hether m erchant o r 
p la n te r ,  th a t  th e  n a tiv e  had too  much la n d , and th a t  th e  su rp lu s  
should  be p u t on th e  open m arket f o r  s a le .  "While Governors O 'B rien  
and Jackson agreed w ith  th e  f i r s t  p a r t ,  and im Thum w holly w ith  th e  
s e t t l e r  argum ent, by th e  tim e o f th e  e le c t io n  G ordon's lan d  p o lic y  
rem ained s u b s ta n t ia l ly  u n a lte re d . A ll p o ss ib le  developm ent was 
equated  w ith  land  and th e  p re v a il in g  p o lic y  was c a s tig a te d  as 
re sp o n s ib le  f o r  th e  lack  o f p ro g re s s . The g en era l European b e l i e f  
was th a t  Gordon had f a l s e ly  in te r p r e te d  bo th  th e  Deed o f Cession and 
F i j i a n  custom ary lan d  te n u re  in  re tu rn in g  a l l  lan d  to  th e  n a t iv e s
- j O
when th ey  su rren d ered  t h e i r  coun try  to  th e  B r i t i s h  so v ere ig n . They 
argued th a t  th ey  were n o t seeking  to  dep riv e  th e  F i j i a n  o f th e  la n d ; 
he could have as much as he wanted b u t w hat was beyond h is  own needs 
he must n o t l e t  l i e  w aste and dep riv e  o th e rs  of i t s  u s e . A 
c o ro lla ry  to  t h i s  l in e  o f though t was th a t  development was only  
p o s s ib le  th rough th e  in f lu x  o f European s e t t l e r s  in to  th e  is la n d s  
b u t th e se  could n o t and would n o t come u n le s s  a  p l e n t i f u l  supply o f 
fre e h o ld  lan d  was e a s i ly  p ro c u ra b le . Again Henry Marks in  h is  »• 
e le c t io n  add ress summed’up th e  s e t t l e r  c a se . The F i j ia n s  vrere a 
dying ra c e , t h i s  had been th e  predicam ent o f a l l  n a tiv e  ra c es  th a t  
had come in to  c o n tac t w ith  th e  Europeans and th e  co n tin u in g  d e c lin e
38 One can d id a te , Dr.Fox d isag ree d  w ith  h is  c o m p a trio ts . He
contended th a t  a t  Cession F i j ia n s  d id  n o t su rre n d e r th e  ownership 
o f t h e i r  land  b u t gave supreme m a taq a li i n t e r e s t  in  i t  to  th e  
Queen. This was d i f f e r e n t  from ownership b u t i t  n o n e th e le ss  
gave th e  C o lon ia l Government power to  have immense in flu en c e  
over i t s  use and th e  F i j ia n s  would n o t d is re g a rd  a g o v e rn o r 's  
advice on th e  s u b je c t .  His argument he claim ed was based on 
in fo rm atio n  given to  him by th e  man who had in te rp re te d  th e  
E ng lish  words o f th e  Deed o f Cession to  th e  F i j i a n s .
W.P.H. 17 Mar. 1905.
39 W.P.H. 21 Mar. 1905-
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o f th e  F i j ia n s  d e sp ite  every  care o f m edical men and m is s io n a r ie s  
meant th ey  to o  were doomed. So a N ative Lands Department should 
be e s ta b lis h e d  d i s t i n c t  from th e  N ative O ffice  and i t  should assume 
c o n tro l over a l l  su rp lu s  lan d s  and re n t  i t  ou t a t  r a te s  low enough 
to  enable a p p lic a n ts  to  c u l t iv a te  i t  p r o f i ta b ly .  Money from re n ts  
would be re tu rn e d  to  th e  F i j i a n s .  A lan d  ta x  on a l l  lands 
in c lu d in g  th o se  o f n a tiv e s  should be imposed in  o rd e r  to  pay f o r  
improvement o f communication n ecessa ry  f o r  opening up la n d . But 
n o t a l l  were agreed on t h i s  a sp e c t, e s p e c ia l ly  th o se  s tan d in g  in  th e  
p la n te r s ' c o n s ti tu e n c y . McConnell favoured  a lan d  ta x  rang ing  from 
3gd to  1 / -  p e r a c r e . ^  Coubrough though t i t  would be im p ra c tic a b le ; 
v e ry  la rg e  sums would have to  be expended to  survey  a l l  th e  w aste 
lan d s  b e fo re  any ta x  could  be le v ie d ,  and i t  would be y e a rs  b e fo re  
th e  c a p i t a l  spen t would be re tu rn e d  and th e  v en tu re  become 
p r o f i t a b l e I n s t e a d  a lo c a l  ta x  could be c o lle c te d  from 
p ro p r ie to r s  f o r  th e  upkeep o f roads which passed  through surveyed 
la n d s . The e x is t in g  arrangem ent was n o t b u s in e s s - l ik e  because th e  
Government was n o t even charg ing  th e  F i j i a n s  5% as o rd in a ry  commission 
f o r  se rv ic e s  rendered  to  them as reg a rd s  t h e i r  la n d . Moreover th e  
colony was in  d eb t and i t  was th e  m oral o b lig a t io n  o f th e  F i j i a n  to  
h e lp  l iq u id a te  i t ;  consequen tly  he ought to  p a r t  w ith  h is  land  
to  h e lp  w ith  th e  repaym ent.
With lan d  went th e  q u estio n  of la b o u r , f o r  lan d  w ith o u t lab o u r 
was unworkable and lab o u r w ithou t lan d  was su p e rflu o u s . Labour had 
to  be p l e n t i f u l  and cheap and th e  obvious source was In d ia . But 
c e r ta in  r e s e rv a tio n s  were a ire d  about In d ia n s . There were f e a r s  
t h a t  i f  th e  In d ia n s  moved in to  th e  f i e l d  o f commerce, th ey  would 
squeeze out th e  European shopkeepers. Coubrough f o r  in s ta n c e  
in s i s t e d  t h a t  th e y  must f in d  'means o f co n fin in g  th e  w ily  c o o lie  
to  th e  s ta tu s  o f a g r ic u l tu r a l  la b o u re r  and n o t a llow  him to  compete 
in  any way w ith  th e  m ercan tile  com m unity'. In d ia n s  were wanted 
b u t only  as l a b o u r e r s .^
These were th e  m ajor is s u e s  and every  can d id a te  had som ething to  
o f f e r  h e re . But th ey  d id  n o t a l l  make th e  same im pact on th e  v o te r s ,
UO W.P.H. 2L Mar. 1905.
h i W.P.H. 28 Mar. 1905.
U2 W.P.H. 28 Mar. 1905.
U3 W.P.H. 21 Mar. 1905.
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some had d i f f i c u l t y  in  fo rm u la tin g  p o l i c i e s ,  judg ing  from t h e i r  
s u p e r f ic ia l  comments* I t  proved e a s ie r  to  c r i t i c i z e  th e  government 
f o r  i t s  shortcom ings th an  to  p rov ide  p o s i t iv e  a l t e r n a t iv e s .  Some, 
however, managed th e  ta sk  w e ll, Marks b e s t  o f a l l .  His p o lic y  
speech was le n g th y , touched on a l l  th e  is s u e s  and gave th e  im pression  
o f being  conversan t w ith  a l l  i t  han d led . For in s ta n c e , on is su e s  
in v o lv in g  f in a n c e , such as g r a n t- in - a id ,  t a r i f f ,  sugar monopoly, 
h is  b u s in ess  acumen enabled  him to  p rov ide  d e ta i le d  and s p e c if ic  
su g g es tio n s .
A re c u rr in g  theme in  s e t t l e r  p o l i t i c s  s in ce  C ession had been th e  
condemnation o f th e  n a tiv e  p o lic y  e s ta b lis h e d  by Gordon and 
c o n so lid a te d  a ss id u o u s ly  by h is  su c c e sso rs . European op in ion  
regarded  i t  as a f a i l u r e ,  which k ep t th e  F i j ia n s  in  bondage to  t h e i r  
c h ie fs  and customs and re ta rd e d  t h e i r  p ro g re s s . The n a tiv e  ta x a t io n  
scheme more th an  a l l  e ls e  was repugnant fo r  i t  invo lved  th e  
payment o f ta x es  in  k ind  and, acco rd ing  to  European c o n te n tio n , 
thw arted  th e  F i j i a n  from a cq u ir in g  th a t  a l l- im p o r ta n t  knowledge about 
th e  va lue  o f money. I f  he l e a r n t  t h i s ,  along w ith  th e  id e a  th a t  
th e  money he earned was h is  own and h is  c h ie fs  had no p r io r  claim s 
to  i t ,  th en  he would be p repared  to  work. T his argument emphasized 
th a t  th e  F i j i a n  was d isad v an tag ed , hence th e  d e s ir e  f o r  change, 
b u t i t  was only  o s te n s ib ly  a l t r u i s t i c ,  be ing  r e a l ly  s e l f - in te r e s te d  
designed  to  o b ta in  a cheap and ready supply of F i j i a n  la b o u r , th e  
very  th in g  th e  government measure was aimed to  r e s t r i c t .
In  Suva, th e re  was much p reo ccu p a tio n  w ith  an is su e  which drew 
l i t t l e  a t te n t io n  e lsew here . T his concerned th e  e a r ly  c lo s in g  of 
b u s in ess  houses; something l i k e ly  to  a f f e c t  th e  working man. Lazarus 
m entioned how he had made g re a t e f f o r t s  f iv e  y e a rs  b e fo re  to
o b ta in  e a r ly  c lo s in g  and a h a lf -h o lid a y  and Saturday  n ig h t c lo s in g  
b u t th e  o p p o s itio n  o f two firm s robbed th e  working man o f t h i s  
b e n e f i t . ^  His s tro n g  views on t h i s  su b je c t p o s s ib ly  c o s t him 
v a lu ab le  support and le d  to  h is  d e fe a t .  Those from th e  commercial 
s e c to r ,  such as Henry Marks, were o f th e  o p in io n  th a t  w n ile  th ey  
were happy w ith  b u s in e ss  hours o f 8 a.m . to  5 p.m. f o r  week-days 
and 8 a.m. to  1 p.m . on S aturday , i f  on ly  th e  w hite  shopkeepers 
observed t h i s  r e s t r i c t i o n  i t  would be u n f a i r  because In d ia n s  and 
Chinese c a r r ie d  on from d a y lig h t to  m idn igh t. U nless a l l  a l ie n s  
were a lso  com pelled to  c lo se  by dark  th e  id e a  was im p ra c tic a b le .
LU W.P.H. 21 Mar. 1905
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These then  wer3 th e  su b je c ts  th a t  concerned European v o te r s .
They were is su e s  th a t  d isp lay ed  a communal b ia s .  E very th ing  seemed 
to  be viewed from European eyes in  term s o f Eurcpean g riev an ces  
and a s p i r a t io n s .  The good of th e  European was equated  w ith  th e  
good of th e  co lony. Where re fe re n ce  was made to  th e  o th e r  r a c e s ,  
i t  was n o t f o r  th e  sake o f th e se  communities them selves b u t v is  a v is  
t h e i r  ro le  in  th e  p ro g ress  and p ro s p e r i ty  o f th e  European community. 
For in s ta n c e , th e  n a tiv e  p o lic y  was a f a i l u r e ,  n o t because th e  
F i j ia n s  may have found i t  so , b u t because th e  s e t t l e r s  found i t  
co n tra ry  to  t h e i r  p la n s . In d ian  lab o u r was e s s e n t i a l ,  b u t no 
d isc u ss io n  occurred  about th e  c o n d itio n s  under which th e  In d ia n s  
m ight o r m ight n o t wish to  work. I t  was assumed th a t  th e  term s 
o f fe re d , namely engagement through th e  in d en tu re  system , were 
s a t i s f a c to r y .  Whether In d ian  and Chinese e n try  in to  commerce m ight 
c re a te  g re a te r  com petition  and le a d  to  low p r ic e s  f o r  th e  consumer 
was i r r e l e v a n t .  The e s s e n t ia l  p o in t was to  re se rv e  t h i s  f i e l d  f o r
Europeans o n ly . W hether an in f lu x  o f th e se  two ra c e s  m ight be
u n d e s ira b le  f o r  th e  u lt im a te  good o f th e  F i j i a n  people  was ig n o re d . 
What was im portan t was th a t  th e  s e t t l e r s  needed cheap lab o u r which 
i f  u n a v a ilab le  lo c a l ly ,  had to  be p rocured  from abroad . Thus th e  
s e t t l e r s  would p r o f i t  and European gain  was th e  Colony’ s g a in , i t  
was unreasonab le  to  assume any th ing  d i f f e r e n t .
Land and lab o u r were v i t a l  to  th e  s e t t l e r s  hence th e se  loomed 
la rg e  in  th e  p o l i t ic k in g .  The c o n s t i tu t io n  was n o t as im p o rtan t on 
t h i s  occasion  excep t in  so f a r  as  c e r ta in  Europeans in  th e  co u n try  had 
n o t been en fra n ch ise d . But i t  d id  n o t m a tte r  th a t  over 20,000 
B r i t i s h  su b je c ts  who were In d ian s  were g iven no f ra n c h is e  a t  a l l .
They were n o t p a r t  o f th e  European community and championing t h e i r  
cause would n o t have won any v o te s , in  f a c t ,  would have f r ig h te n e d  
away su p p o rt. A ll th e  adverse fe a tu re ?  o f communal e le c t io n s  were 
e v id e n t: in  1905 w ith  th e  f ra n c h is e  r e s t r i c t e d  to  Europeans, i t  was
th ey  alone who had to  be convinced and on ly  t h e i r  d e s ir e s  which had 
to  be c a te re d  t o .  The lo n g e r th e  f ra n c h is e  was th u s  r e s t r i c t e d ,  
th e  lo n g e r th e  tendency to  humour t h i s  e x c lu s iv e  elem ent p re v a ile d .
On th e  colony-w ide le v e l  th e  r e s u l t  was a  p o la r iz a t io n  o f i n t e r e s t s ,  
and th e  emergence o f communal h o s t i l i t y  was aggravated  w ith  each 
e le c t io n  o f t h i s  ty p e .
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THE triumphant at the communal election entered the Legislative Council
as its first elected members to that body. In the course of his
opening address the Governor, Sir Everard im Thum welcomed them thus:
The value of the unofficial element consists in the fact that its 
representatives are often in a good position both to discern and 
propose the subjects most urgently needing the consideration or 
the Council, and to advise as to the best methods of dealing with 
these subjects; and this value of the unofficial element is 
naturally greater when it is in the hands of the elected rather 
than nominated members. hS
For the settlers watching from the outside the beginning may have 
promised greater things. For at the very first session of the 
elected council a Bill was introduced to sanction for the first time 
since 1879 the alienation of native land by sale or lease provided the 
transaction had the blessing of the Govemor-in-Council.^ The 
ordinance (VI of 190S) was designed to benefit all, settler and 
native alike, and to add to the prosperity of the Colony. Though 
the elected members wholeheartedly favoured the measure, it had been 
initiated not by them but the Governor himself. During the course 
of the debate they did not cavil with the basic principles though men 
like Turner wanted to go further and allow for the resumption by the 
Crown of all the lands of an extinct mataqali rather than permit it 
to be distributed to a related mataqali. He also wished, again 
unsuccessfully, to have all transactions concerning surplus lands to 
be between Government and the individual without contact with the 
natives. If the settlers appeared to have won the battle over 
Fijian lands, they certainly had not won the war by the passage of 
the new ordinance. Sir Arthur Gordon, now Lord Stanmore, was 
reluctant to accept this radical change which to him undermined the 
foundation of his policy in Fiji. His thunder in the House of Lords 
was largely responsible for the repeal of im T h u m ’s land legislation 
which lasted three years and saw the alienation of 10ii,1i|2 acres) 7of native land. Gordon’s anger had a sound basis, justified for 
example by the Navuso sale where the Fijians were permitted to sell 
outright a block of 800 acres for £1,S00 when they were receiving
US
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an annual r e n ta l  o f £1*15 from i t  and th e  le a se  s t i l l  had seven y e a rs
to  r u n . ^  One a u th o r i ty  thought t h i s  land  worth £U,000 to  £ 5 ,0 0 0 .^
I t  i s  very  d i f f i c u l t  to  exonerate  th e  G overnor’s h an d lin g  o f th e
whole a f f a i r ;  to  beg in  w ith  he a c ted  on advice t h a t  was q u e s tio n a b le
and came from a n o t w holly d i s in te r e s te d  p a r ty .  The money from
th e  sa le  was squandered and even had i t  been in v e s te d  i t  would n o t have
produced a re tu rn  o f £1*15 p .a .  Had such in c id en ces  become ty p ic a l
th e re  would have been severe  re p e rc u s s io n s . For th e  F i j i a n ,  lan d
was h is  l i f e - g iv in g  fo rc e  and none o th e r  than  S ir  John B ates Thurston
had warned e a r l i e r  th a t  th e  lo s s  o f t h i s  a s s e t  vrould arouse  a
c a ta s tro p h ic  re a c t io n  from th e  fo rm er. Only th e  s e t t l e r s  in  t h e i r
a v a rice  re fu sed  to  pay heed to  t h i s  sound adm onition. I t  was
fo r tu n a te  fo r  F i j i  t h a t  Lord Crewe p re fe r re d  Lord Stanm ore’ s
pronouncements to  im T hum ’s p re s s u re s . One i s  in c l in e d  to  th in k
th in k  th a t  im Thum ’ s a ttem pted  land  p o lic y  was u n n ecessa ry . I t  in
no way s u b s ta n t ia l ly  he lped  th e  F i j i a n .  I t  d id  n o t d r a s t i c a l l y
improve h is  p o s i t io n  s o c ia l ly  o r econom ically , in  f a c t  th re a te n e d
to  tran sfo rm  him from a landowner to  a la n d le s s  p e a s a n t. W hile
im Thum was r ig h t  in  assuming th a t  n a t iv e  p o lic y  and n a tiv e
lan d  were ’so c lo s e ly  and in e x tric a b ly 'w o v e n  as to  be alm ost
in s e p a ra b le ’ , he e rre d  in  h is  a n a ly s is  of th e  n a tu re  o f t h i s
r e la t io n s h ip .  There was indeed  a need to  re a p p ra ise  th e  o v e ra l l
goa ls  o f n a tiv e  p o lic y  fo rm u la ted  in  187U-75 which by 1905 was
c h a ra c te r iz e d  by s ta g n a tio n  r a th e r  th an  th e  o r ig in a l ly  in ten d ed
f l e x i b i l i t y  and a d a p ta tio n  to  changing s i tu a t io n s  w ith  th e  passage
o f tim e . The Europeans, in  f a c t  had exaggera ted  th e  demand fo r
la n d : in  th e  tw elve months ending 31 January  1906, 15,381}. a c re s  of
n a tiv e  lan d  had been le a s e d , 18,200 were taken  over by th e
government on a s o r t  o f p e rp e tu a l le a s e  and only  2, 19U a c re s  so ld
52to  n o n -n a tiv e s . What was so re ly  needed was n o t th e  s a le  o f n a t iv e  
lan d s  b u t a p o lic y  which co n cen tra ted  on showing th e  F i j i a n  people  
how to  u t i l i z e  t h e i r  lan d s  f o r  t h e i r  own advancement* Here im Thum  
was found w anting . When he e s ta b lis h e d  th e  A g ric u ltu re  D epartm ent,
1*8 F*T. 17 O ct. 1906. 
h9 W*PJI. 12 June 1906.
50 Im Thum to  C.0 .1 3 1 , 26 O ct. 1906; C.0 .8 3 /8 3 . C.O.M inutes in  
Des Voeux to  C .O .P riv a te  23 Jan . 1907; C.0 .8 3 /8 6 . The adv ice had 
come from th e  management in  F i j i  o f th e  C.S.R.Company which had 
had a le a se  on th e  lan d .
51 F .T . 11 O ct. 1905.
52 F .T . 12 May 1906.
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fo r  which he was much p ra is e d , i t  was o r ie n ta te d  to  c a te r  f o r  th e  
needs o f th e  European c u l t iv a to r s  r a th e r  th an  f o r  e le v a tin g  th e  
owners o f th e  la n d .
I f  th e  new land  p o lic y  was a v ic to r y ,  i t  was a tem porary  one, y e t
i t  enabled  th e  e le c te d  members to  show th e  v o te rs  t h a t  th e y  had
f u l f i l l e d ,  in  so f a r  as was p e rm itte d  them , a v i t a l  prom ise th e y  had
made a t  th e  h u s t in g s . On th e  q u estio n  o f th e  o th e r  r e l a t e d  is s u e
la b o u r, th e re  was no achievem ent. There was an a ttem p t by th e
Government to  secu re  from Queensland about 3,000 ’P o ly n e s ia n s ' which
a n e v ly -fe d e ra te d  ’w hite  A u s t r a l ia ’ had decided  to  ex p e l because o f
i t s  im m igration p o lic y  bu t t h i s  was f r a u g h t w ith  d i f f i c u l t i e s  and
33F i j i  re ce iv ed  on ly  1*27 la b o u re rs  from t h i s  so u rce .
On th e  q u estio n  o f th e  c o n s t i tu t io n  i t  was p o in te d  o u t t h a t  no 
m ajor changes would be considered  u n t i l  th e  p re se n t system  had been 
given a f a i r  t r i a l ,  b u t b e fo re  th e  end o f co u n c il th e  f r a n c h is e  had been 
extended to  th o se  who had been om itted  in  190lu The e f f o r t s  o f
S .L .L azarus who won a b y -e le c tio n  l a t e  in  1903 on th e  r e s ig n a t io n  o f 
Murray were p a r t i c u la r ly  p e r s i s te n t  6n t h i s  count.
But th e re  were se t-b ack s  to o . D esp ite  unanimous o p p o s itio n  
from th e  e le c te d  members th e  In d ian  Kemp P ro h ib it io n  O rdinance and 
th e  Towns Amendment Ordinance o f 1905* which p e rm itte d  in c re a s e s  in  
r a t e s ,  were passed in to  law . Some in d ig n a tio n  r e s u l te d  because th e  
p r o te s ts  o f th e  e le c te d  members were ig n o re d . They were o f th e  
op in ion  th a t  as th ey  re p re se n te d  th e  peop le  t h e i r  u n i te d  v o ice  should 
be given due c o n s id e ra tio n . In  th e  case o f th e  f i r s t  o rd in an ce , 
Government argued th a t  Marks was opposed to  th e  b i l l  because he was 
f in a n c ia l ly  in v o lved  w ith  th e  chem ist who im ported  hemp in to  th e
51icoun try  and th e  b i l l  th re a te n e d  h is  p o c k e t. I t  was ta k en  as  an 
example o f European s o l id a r i ty  in  m a tte rs  t h a t  a f f e c te d  them . At 
th e  C o lon ia l O ffice  such behav iour r a is e d  doubts as  to  th e  
s u i t a b i l i t y  o f g iv in g  even l im ite d  f ra n c h is e  to  th o se  who pursued
55such p a ro c h ia l g o a ls  so v ig o ro u s ly . Again i t  m ight be re p e a te d  th a t  
t h i s  communalism r e f le c te d  th e  type  o f f r a n c h is e  im posed by th e  B r i t i s h
£3 BhT. 13 O ct, 1906.
51i Im Thum to  C .0 .1 lt0 , 1 Nov. 1905; im Thurn to  C.O.Conf. 1 Nov. 
1905; C.O.83/81 .
55 C.O.Minutes im Thum to  C .O .136, 3 Nov. 1906; C .O .83/83
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Government. In the case of the hemp prohibition legislation the 
settlers argued that the ordinance interfered with an Indian customary 
practice and would endanger the supply of labourers who would not wish 
to migrate to a country that forbade such a luxury. Once more 
the problem was viewed from the point of European needs.
Though they represented the one community the six elected 
members did not unite on all issues. There was already the division 
into town (Suva and Levuka) and country (planters') electorates 
but too much must not be made of this because many interests over­
lapped. McRae as a bank manager whose institution loaned money 
to planters could not divorce himself from issues which affected 
them. Marks a merchant in Suva was also a landowner with money 
invested in plantations. He could not play Dr. Jeckyll and Mr Hyde 
within his own financial empire. Nor could Lazarus, Suva business 
man but a planters' representative, devote himself solely to the 
demands of his constituents at the risk of his own pocket. After all, 
they were not being paid to be in politics; for their involvement 
in the Council they received no remuneration, they had to ensure 
that the master who fed them was not neglected for the sake of those 
whom they claimed to serve altruistically. Perhaps Turner and 
Coubrough could be more single-minded. At least they acted thus
on the question of the ordinance introduced by Marks for the early
57closing of shops and to regulate the hours of employment. Within 
the community itself there was some difference over the issue but 
Marks assumed that it would disappear once all, including large 
Chinese and Indian shops, were made to abide by the provisions of 
the law. Though not disagreeing with the bill itself, both Turner 
and Coubrough unsuccessfully sought its postponement till the 
October session but Marks refused to withdraw it. These two sought 
the delay because European shops in the country were particularly 
liable to suffer from competition from little Chinese and Indian 
shops which were springing up around the countryside and were 
controlled by an individual living by himself on the premises (as 
in the case of the Chinese) or were run as a small family venture as 
by Indians.
The most controversial issue that divided the elected members was
56 JVT. 18 O ct. 1905.
57 F.T. 16 May 1906.
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the new customs tariff bill which in 190S was to become a major election
issue. Here Marks and McRae stood aligned with the officials and
against their colleagues for they had served as members on thec^o
Customs Commission of 1907.
The Commissioners set out ’to reduce the duties on such articles
as seemed to them unduly heavy or to press excessively on any portion
of the community, and to add to the free list those items which it
Coappeared expedient to exempt from duty*. Therefore the existing 
tariff on the following was reduced: boots and shoes; boxes and
trunks; drapery; fencing wire; hats and caps; and kerosene.
In order to remove the ensuing deficit in the revenue duties were 
imposed to fall on those members of the community benefitting most by 
the reductions taking into account their ability to pay and achieving 
a fair distribution of the tax over the whole population. Most of 
the increased duties fell on foodstuffs.^
The Commissioners were all Europeans, not even a Fijian chief 
was included in their number, let alone a representative from the, at 
this stage leaderless, Indian community, and their mi.sconceptions 
and bias were obvious:
Your Commissioners would observe that Indians and Fijians benefit 
to the greatest extent by the reductions which they propose, 
especially in regards to boots and shoes, drapery, hats and caps, 
and kerosene; that there is no obvious reason why their taxes 
should be reduced, especially bearing in mind, that, in 
proportion to their means*1 the East Indians contribute little 
at present to the general revenue, while the circumstances of 
the Fijians are very affluent now in comparison with their 
condition when the existing tariff was framed.
Not many Fijians wore caps and hats or boots and shoes. The same
£8 The members were A.Ehrhardt, Acting Chief Justice, as Chairman and 
the others were W.Sutherland, Ross, Coates, Marks, McRae, 
A.B.Joske, P.A.Morris, the last two being local merchants.
The report was published as C*P.1U/190Ö.
59 C.P.1V1908.
60 The Commissioners explained: ’Your Commissioners have not been
unmindful of the reasons generally advanced against taxation of 
these articles nor of the incidence of the fresh impositions.
But in the peculiar circumstances of Fiji, where the industries 
are practically in the hands of a small proportion of the 
residents, it is, in our opinion, essential to tax these 
articles if a fair distribution of taxation is to be realized.’ 
C.P.1U/1908.
perhaps only very slightly to a lesser degree, could be said of Indians. 
No doubt the reduction on kerosene from 9d to lid per gallon would have 
been a boon and it still was when the Governor’s suggestion was 
adopted by the Legislative Council to make the new price not lid but 6d 
per gallon. Of drapery, the gain was not restricted to these two 
communities. The remarks of the Commissioners illustrated their 
ignorance of the two communities which with urban living had little 
contact. They claimed that their own community was the one most 
heavily penalised but it could sustain 'the small increase proposed' 
because of reductions elsewhere and of the general prosperity of 
the Colony at the time.
Marks and McRae were to argue in similar vein in the Legislative 
Council.^ Marks saw no reason why the working man should escape 
such taxation for there was no intention to give him 'a free
/  A
breakfast-table'. Not the housewife but the bakers, shopkeepers 
and merchants were affected by the duty in flour. He took the view 
that items such as butter, $iee, rice, dhall and grain should be 
taxed because these could easily be produced locally and ought not to 
be imported. Even biscuits could be manufactured locally. None 
would quarrel with this contention, in.fact, had Marks' advice been 
put into practice the country would have benefitted tremendously.
But those affected by the tariff increases were not the ones able to 
rectify the position by the means proposed. For example, the 
C.S.R.Company would not have permitted its tenants to grow rice on 
its lands; it had the monopoly of transport on Viti Levu and could 
refuse to freight certain commodities.
•Turner was to argue that it was the working man who was most 
aifected and this included Fijians and Indians. ^ Lazarus maintained 
that the duties on foodstuffs fell on an already overtaxed category 
and added to the cost of living.^ As to the reference to prosperity 
in the Colony, this was not widespread but confined to 'shareholders
61 L.C.Debates First Session 1907rUU~^7•
62 ibid:Ii9.
63 ibid:li7.
6ii ibid:lj6.
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of large companies and estates, business firms, and proprietors of
large agricultural and pastoral holding and some small ones’.
Coubrough pointed out that the Indian labourers’ wage was a fixed
one and if the price of his food rose then he would be affected by 
66it. The impression that the Europeans were championing Indians 
and Fijians in this instance is false. The tariff increases 
affected Europeans no less and there was no conflict of interest 
between communities. Secondly if labourers were affected then the 
effects would be passed on to the Europeans: there would be a
possible decline in their availability as well as pressure to 
increase their wages.
YJhatever their motives there were strong protests from these
members. And they did not fall completely on deaf ears. The
Governor during the debate commended the work of the commissioners
and accepting their basic principles but considered modification 
67necessary. Kerosene was not to decrease from 9d to i;d but to 6d 
per gallon. Im Thum suggested drapery be charged 15% duty instead, 
of 12^. These two alterations would increase revenue and permit 
corresponding reductions elsewhere. He proposed to keep the duty on 
flour but to forego recommended charges' on bacon and hams, biscuits, 
butter and ghee, and rice. Nor did he overlook a suggestion by 
Turner earlier to tax spirits which the Commissioners, because of a 
lack of unanimity among them, had refrained from doing. These were 
accepted though Turner wished for greater duty on spirits and 
for biscuits to be put on the duty-free list.
Though it was 2iot expected that the elected members would fulfil 
all their election promises, they had not done too badly. They 
appeared to have obtained all they wished to regarding land and the 
constitution. On labour their position was no worse than it had been. 
The only major difficulty had been the customs tariff and, 
embarrassingly for them, this came at the end of their term when they 
must shortly face their electors whose pockets had. been hit. How 
well they had performed would in the end be judged by their success 
or failure in the elections of 1908.
65 ibid.
66 ibid:i|8.
67 ibid:5U-56
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THE POLITICS OF CONSOLIDATION
II
THE elections of 1908 aroused no less interest than those of 1905.
For the electors they were an opportunity to pronounce judgement on 
their first elected representatives. The issues were in general
no different from those of 1905; land, labour, economic development,
1fear of the influx of the Chinese into Fiji, and tariff. The
politicians were a mixture of old and new faces. And the new
fared better than the old. There was a reaction against the old;
five sought re-election but only one proved successful. In Suva,
Marks finished at the bottom of the poll. He was held responsible
for the increase in customs tariff; he was aware of this as he went
2to great lengths during his campaign to justify what had been done. ' 
Turner -was rejected by the planters who preferred to choose three of 
their own kind rather than make room for even one Suva-based 
politician of independent means. These were the failures; but 
both Marks and Turner were victorious at later elections and the 
former, especially, was to enjoy a long membership of the 
Legislative Council. Of the successful in 1908, two were 
particularly important; Henry Milne Scott from Suva and John 
Maynard Hedstrom from Levuka. These two were the first Fiji-born 
Europeans to enter the Legislative Council. Both were able and 
already successful young men, one a lawyer, the other director of 
one of the largest commercial houses in the Colony. They were 
descendants of pioneers who had ricked their all in the islands and 
were of that rare group who had won through adverse circumstances to 
prosperity. Being Fiji-born had helped Scott and Hedstrom in the
1 W.P.H.Ii Feb.1908, 1Ü Feb.1908, 25 Feb.1908, 3 Mar. 1908,
TMar. 1908, 10 Mar. 1908, 17 Mar. 1908, 20 Mar.1908, 2h Mar. 1908.
2 W.P.H.2J4 Mar. 1908.
3 W.P.H. 7 Apr. 1908. Turner told his audience in Rewa that his 
term in Council had more than convinced him that the country 
districts required a man permanently resident in Suva. He was 
practically an idle man weLth no regular occupation to demand his 
time hence he could act as an agent of the people who required 
their affairs to be brought to the notice of the Government.
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e le c t io n s .  Hedstrom had a lre ad y  shown h is  w orth in  Levuka as warden
and p o l i t i c i a n  in  th e  town board th e r e .  And C aptain Robbie was no
match fo r  him; t h e i r  campaign speeches in d ic a te d  th e  g u lf between th e
two men.k S c o tt too  a t  h is  p u b lic  m eeting had amply d isp lay ed  h is
grasp o f lo c a l  p o l i t i c s  by h is  lu c id  ex p lan a tio n  of a wide range of
h
is su e s  which tro u b le d  h is  e le c to r s .  The C olony 's c o n s t i tu t io n  was 
one a sp ec t th a t  S c o tt emphasized as re q u ir in g  reform . Both he and 
Hedstrom w ere, from 1908 t i l l  t h e i r  d ep a rtu re  from th e  L e g is la tiv e  
Council in  1936, to  p lay  a d e c is iv e  and dominant ro le  in  th e  
course o f th e  C olony 's c o n s t i tu t io n a l  h is to r y .
Between 1908 and approxim ately  1920 th re e  is su e s  concerned 
th e  European re p re s e n ta t iv e s  in  t h e i r  qu est fo r  p o l i t i c a l  reform .
These w ere: to  in c re a se  t h e i r  numbers in  th e  L e g is la tiv e  C ouncil,
to  o b ta in  re p re s e n ta t io n  on th e  Executive Council and to  r e s t r i c t  
th e  m unicipal f r a n c h is e .  European a s p ir a t io n s  in  each i s  d iscu ssed  
in  co n sid e rab le  d e t a i l  to  i l l u s t r a t e  th e  methods th a t  Europeans 
employed to  c o n so lid a te  t h e i r  p o l i t i c a l  p o s i t io n .  The ep isodes 
a lso  e lu c id a te  th e  r e la t io n s h ip  between c o lo n ia l  ru le  and European 
p o l i t i c i a n s .
THE y ear 1908 was a busy one fo r  deb a tes  on th e  C o n s ti tu tio n  i n i t i a t e d
by th e  e le c te d  members. This occurred  d e sp ite  th e  G overnor's
announcement in  h is  message a t  th e  opening o f th e  new C ouncil:
I  have l a t e l y  c lo s e ly  watched th e  course o f th e  e le c t io n s ;  
and though t h i s  i s  n o t th e  tim e o r p lace  to  speak o f most 
of th e  le sso n s  which I  have le a rn ed  I  may say t h i s  -  th a t  I
1* VJ.P.H.3 M ar., 6 M ar., 20 Mar. 1908. 
5 W .P.H.2I1 Mar. 1908.
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have satisfied myself that no further change in the Letters 
Patent is immediately required. 6
Dr Fox was the first to disregard the advice when he sought to 
amend the Letters Patent by moving that Europeans who were conversant 
with the Fijian language should be elected by the indigenous people as 
their representatives. Kis belief was that Fijians would be better 
represented by Europeans than by their own people; he claimed that 
one of the natives was agreeable to his view. The Governor ruled 
that the Legislative Council had no power to alter the Letters Patentg
and Fox withdrew his motion. He did likewise with another motion
9which he intended to move to seek the franchise for women.
It was again Henry Milne Scott who voiced the feelings of his
colleagues and compatriots by moving a resolution calling for greater
representation. Since between 188U and 1893 the Legislative Council
had an unofficial majority (6 nominated unofficials to 9 officials
with the Governor having a deliberative and casting vote) Scott saw
no reason why in 1908 the elected members should not equal in
10number the ex-officio ones. As the Governor had acknowledged that
they had grown quickly in political terms Scott saw no reason why
they should not continue this progress especially if more elected
members enabled them to divide the Colony into electorates which would
provide better and more direct representation for country districts.
He referred to other colonies such as Bermuda, Cyprus, British
Guiana and Mauritius where elected representatives were in greater
proportion than in Fiji and sought the same for the latter. His
plea found no official support for his motion was defeated by 12
official votes to 6 elected ones. The Governor reiterated:
I do not think that, at the present time, in the present 
stage of the Colony’s development, we could get more than 
six elected members who, conveniently to themselves and 
conveniently to public business, could serve on the Council. 11
6 L.C.Debates 1908 First Session:2.
7 ibid:U3.
8 ibid:Idi.
9 ibid. At the Second Session in October despite im Thurn's earlier 
ruling, he sought to introduce a Bill -which would give the Council 
power to amend the Letters Patent without having to rely on the 
grace of the Secretaiy of State; his motion was lost. ibid.
. Second Session:21-22.1Ö ibid: 21«-25.
11 ibid:27.
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In his despatch to the Secretary of State on Scott’s motion
im Thurn restated his argument in more forthright language:
I honestly believe that there are not in the islands a 
sufficient number of suitable candidates to stand for a 
larger number of seats than are already allotted; and as 
regards the Official Members I am sure that already the 
seats are as many as can conveniently be filled. 12
1 3And Whitehall accepted the advice of its representative. The
elected members were not merely airing their own views, they had the
sympathy of their constituents. Those in the country districts were
particularly active. Led by James McConnell they had submitted a
petition to the Secretary of State through the Governor. x They
complained that the Government was excessiuly preoccupied with
town and commercial interests, especially those of Suva, at the
expense of the outer islands, including Vanua Levu. Secondly, as
a redress they sought greater political representation for those
who obtained a livelihood directly from land. Therefore, they
desired eight seats for the European colonists in Fiji and the
division of the Colony into eight electorates for the purpose. The
petitioners also felt that country areas should be represented by
those who resided there and not by townsmen.
There had been no change in im Thurn's attitude towards
increased European representation from that expressed the previous
1 5year, and he again advised London to refuse this demand. Towards
the introduction of electorates he was more favourable. He had
come to accpet the need as early as Scott's motion of October 1908
though at the time he was still uncertain how to achieve an
16equitable division. ' Then he had recognized that three members 
for an undivided constituency scattered through the islands meant 
that the latter were unable to consult their electorate as 
frequently as possible. He was prepared to recommend that the 
country districts be divided into electorates but he repudiated the
12 Im Thurn to C.0.129, 18 Oct. 1903; C.0.83/88.
13 C.O. to 0.A.G.16, 28 Jan. 1909; C.0.83/88.
1U Enel, im Thurn to C.O.207, 6 Dec. 1909; C.O.83/93. F.T.8 Dec.1909.
15 Im Thurn to C.O.207, 6 Dec. 1909; C.O.83/93.
16 Im Thurn to C.O.129, 18 Oct.1908; 0.0.83/88.
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view that they should be resident there because of the dearth of men
of ability in the Colony, most such men were Suva-based.
Consequently a Committee was formed by the Governor to report on
the subject; it recommended that the country districts be divided into
17three constituencies. Suva and Levuka remained as they were, and 
im Thum after consideration of the Committee's reports suggested 
the following electorates:
(1) Eastern comprising the Provinces of 
Lomaiviti (excluding Levuka), Macuata, Bua, Cakaudrove and Lau with 
165> voters according to the 1910 figures;
(2) Northern comprising the Provinces of Ra, 
Colo North and West, Ba and Nadroga with 1l*1 voters; and
(3) Southern comprising the Provinces of
Rewa (excluding Suva), Nausori, Serua, Naitasiri, Colo East, Tailevu
18and Kadavu with 1£1 voters.
Also, no one could be a candidate for one of these electorates unless 
he had resided there for at least 12 months before election day or 
received a clear income of £1^0 p.a. from land there belonging to 
either his wife or himself.
With this concession the constitutional debate did not come to •-
an end. Besides, the grant of electorates was a belated acceptance
of advice given by A.A.Coubrough, a planters' representative, three 
19years previously. Moreover the elected members were still 
determined to obtain an increase in their numbers.
In October 1912, once more a motion was moved, this time by 
Turner, calling for increased representation. He contended it was not 
possible for the six members to be present for every session of the
1? Im Thum to C.0.11*3, 29 June 1910. The Committee consisted of 
Dr.C.A.Brough (Acting Attorney-General) as Chairman,
W.Sutherland (Native Commissioner), I.McOwan (Inspector General 
of Constabulary), M.T.Dods(Registrar-General) and L.Brown, 
one of the elected representatives of the planters.
18 ibid.
19 A.A.Coubrough had unsuccessfully moved a motion to this effect in
the Legislative Council in October 1907. L.C.Debates Second
Session 1907:23-26.
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20Council. Like others* they sometimes wished to go abroad on 
business or to recuperate health and it wTas unfair to expect them 
to commit themselves in advance to remain in the Colony for three full 
years and sometimes for longer if they were re-elected. If they
v
had eight representatives then the Government could aLways be certain
of having at least six of them for every sitting of the Council.
Governor Jackson in his recommendations had preferred at least eight
and that was in 1905>; now in 1912 more of the country had been
opened up with more people needing representation hence two more
elected members would help. Scott in support added that eight
members would also give the Governor a larger number from whom to
choose two for the Executive Council. The other elected members
vrere in agreement with Turner and Scott. Also Turner made clear
that he expected a corresponding increase on the official side. But
he disagreed with the suggestion that substitutes might be named
for absentee elected members because the replacements might not
receive the approval of constituents.
Governor Sweet-Escott thought that the demand for eight elected
members was a modest one. When he wrote to the Colonial Office*
Sweet-Escott expressed himself in favour of Turner's motion
stating that circumstances had changed since im Thurn’s time and
21there would be no difficulty in finding suitable candidates.
Further* he did not think it was necessary to have a corresponding
increase on the official side; the presiding officer could be
given an original as well as a casting vote.
Initially the despatch received a cool reception in the
Colonial Office where it was felt that im Thurn’s dictum wTas still
valid* that is* Fiji had a small European population of indifferent
quality and it could not be easy to find sufficient suitable 
22aspirants. Yet when the despatch in reply was written the 
Secretary of State was willing to consider the Governor’s proposals 
with certain provisos: first* that official membership be also
increased by two; second* that the Legislative Council recommend the 
demarcation of electorates and third* as an alternative the elected 
members might choose substitutes to deputize for anyone among them
20 L.C.Debate 2h Oct. 1912 end. Sweet-Escott to C.0.326* 
22 Nov.1912; C.0.83/110.
21 Sweet-Escott to C.O. 326* 22 Nov. 1912; C.0.83/110.
22 Minutes, ibid.
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likely to be absent from the Colony for a long period.
The next step was the establishment of a Select Committee of the
elected members to recommend changes in the constitution. There was
some disagreement and C.W.Thomas submitted a minority report which
differed in one essential detail from that presented by Turner, Scott,
Hedstrom and Marks.^ Both rejected the idea of a substitute for
absent members-or of the need for an increase in official membership
commensurate with that of the elected side. The majority offered
an alternative of either 7 constituencies with 8 members or 5 with 9.
Thomas in his minority report agreed with the second alternative but
rejected the first which he desired modified. Where the majority
allocated one seat for the Northern division (stretching from Nadi
to Tavua in Viti Levu) Thomas felt that the area deserved two
because of population and capital invested. He did not think that
Nadroga, Colo, Serua and Nausori should comprise a separate
electorate of their own, rather they could be absorbed as part of
others. As a planter he wanted an increase in representation to
be bestowed upon his own class in the Western and Northern Viti Levu
23and Vanua Levu-Taveuni areas. The Legislative Council of 13 June
23 Draft C.O. to Sweet-Escott 1*3* 3 Feb.1912; C.0.83/110.
2l* Reports published as C.P.107/13.
23 The existing electorates and the various suggestions there with 
the number of electors in each in 1913:
23
Existing Majority Majority C.W. Thomas
Report Report
Alternative 1 Alternative 2
2 seats Suva 2 seats Suva 2 seats Suva 2 seats Suva
(253) (253) (253) (253)
1 Levuka 1 Levuka 1 Levuka 1 Levuka
(98) (98). (98) (98)
1 Northern 1 Vanua Levu 2 Northern 1 Vanua Levu
(190) (02) (190) (82 )
1 Southern 1 Eastern 2 Southern 1 Eastern
(196) (51) (196) (51)
1 Eastern 1 Southern 2 Eastern 1 Southern
(135) 05ii) (135) 0 9 6 )
1 Northern 1 Northern
(161) (76)
1 Western 1 Western
(71) o n . )
6 8 9 8
3h
1913 adopted the majority report by one vote which was supported by the 
four signatories while the two native members voted with Thomas; the 
official members refrained both from participation in the debate or 
from voting. Though the Fijian members voted with Thomas they did 
not voice their comments. During the debate the elected members 
repeated their old arguments for increased representation. Thomas 
in his remarks'introduced the same contention when he advocated the 
franchise for those of European descent and the Indians. From 
Turner and Marks he received the reprimand that Indian interests 
were adequately safeguarded by the officials.
The Governor in his despatch was inclined towards Thomas1
electoral divisions but was only willing to recommend the increase
of one elected member with a similar addition on the official
benches. The small number of electors influenced his decision
and this became the reason that the Colonial Office adopted in
27explaining why it would grant only one more elected member.
Apparently this satisfied all concerned in Fiji. So by 191b 
Europeans were still the only community with the right to elect their 
representatives. The franchise was very much the privilege of the 
Europeans. They might have been satisfied with what they had gained 
but their will was checked from having its own way completely by the 
presence of an official majority which could enforce the intention of 
the colonial ruler. The Fijians continued to have their two chiefs 
chosen by the Governor on the recommendation of the Council of Chiefs. 
Besides they could rely on the protection of the official majority.
Thus the safeguard on the Fijian position endured while the Europeans 
continued to increase their position of having a voice in the 
Legislative Council in order to influence the government in their own 
interests.
Yet a voice in the Legislative Council provided opportunity only 
for comment on policies already formulated. It was equally important 
to be able to help draft policy. And this necessitated representation 
in the Executive Council. Thus in the first session of the new
26 Sweet-Escott to C.0.303, 7 July 1913; C.0.83/113'.
27 C.O. to Sweet-Escott 326, 30 Sept. 1913; C.O.83/115.
28 Sweet-Escott to C.0.b8l, 22 Nov. 1913; C.O.83/117.
Legislative Council in May 1908, Henry Scott moved a motion seeking
unofficial representation in the Executive Council. Though all the
elected members supported him he alone made a lengthy speech stating
29the reasons for his request. He argued that such representation“- 
would bring the Government into closer touch with the people. As the 
Executive Council was directly involved in decisions concerning the 
important matters in the country, unofficial advice therein was 
essential. Other colonies such as Mauritius and Hong Kong had 
unofficial members in their Executive Council hence there was no 
reason why Fiji ought not be have the same privilege. He 
concluded:
Once the elective principle has been recognized there can 
be no doubt that in the end Responsible Government will follow”, 
and when the people prove to the powers that be that they 
are in a position to govern themselves then the Constitution 
will be altered. This is only a step in that direction. 30
When the motion was put to the vote it was defeated by 11 votes to
7; only the six European members and Ratu Jone Madraiwiwi favoured it.
31Governor im Thurn opposed the motion for three reasons. First, 
there was no precedent of other colonies having elected members in 
their Executive Councils; where unofficial representation existed, 
the men were nominees of the Governor. Second, the Letters Patent 
gave the Governor power to invite unofficials from time to time, when 
necessary, to air their views in the Executive Council on specific 
subjects. Third, im Thum contended that in the small European 
community of Fiji elected members were 'more or less interested in 
the common every-day business of the Council and have financial
•  •  I *5 Ointerests in the Colony which official members have not. This
last was amplified in the memorandum of the Attorney-General, sent
by im Thurn to the Colonial Office, along with Scott's motion:
We / i.e. Fiji_7 are too young and too small. The Colonial 
asset which consists of the intelligence, public spirit and 
practical knowledge of our leading men could as things are
29 L.C.Debates 1908 First Session;36-1*2.
30 ibid:37.
31 ibid: 38-1*1.
32 ibid:39.
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at present, hardly be drawn upon for this purpose without 
having to have recourse to some one who is personally 
and intimately interested in some or all of the important 
matters that come before Executive Council, such as land 
transactions, transport, supplies etc., etc. 33
Thus the Colonial Office found itself in agreement with the Governor
and was unable to oblige Scott because of 'the extreme scarcity of
suitable men for such a responsible and confidential position'.
But Scott refused to admit defeat. Three years later in
September 1911 he raised a similar motion and circumvented
earlier objections by suggesting that selection need not be
confined to elected members only, it could consider men of
n r*
capability outside the Council.p In Sir Henry May he found a
sympathetic Governor who told the Colonial Office that men
'sufficiently disinterested in local undertakings', such as managers
of the Banks of New Zealand and New South Wales, could be found for
the purpose. There were also others, who in his opinion, despite
being owners of estates or managers of local enterprises, could be
relied on to refrain from giving advice where their personal interests
existed. He emphasised that the advice of business men would prove
invaluable and better relations between officials and non-officials 
37would result.
There was some doubt in the Colonial Office as to the
38correctness of Sir Henry’s judgement on the subject. But Whitehall
33 Enel, im Thurn to C.0.131, 19 Oct.1908; C.0.83/88.
3h Minu t e s. ibid.
35 L.C.Debates 1911 Second Session:17-19.
36 May to C.O.Conf. 27 Apr.1912; C.0.83/106.
37 . ibid.
38 Minutes, ibid. Sir Henry May does not appear to have been over
popular in Whitehall for the Secretary of State minuted on one 
of the Governor's despatches on municipal affairs with the 
remarks: 'We seem to have found not only a new broom, but an
old bureaucrat in Sir H.May .... His only idea at the moment seems 
to be to upset or appeal against every decision he finds recorded 
in the files he has inherited. Festina lente is the motto for 
the new broom.' Minutes May to C.O.Conf. 3 Aug. 1911; C.0.83/102.
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was willing to wait and consider the views of the new Governor,
39Bickham Sweet-Escott. It even stated that it would be better 
to appoint two unofficials to the Executive Council and ’both be 
chosen, if suitable men are available, from the elected members 
of the Legislative Council’.
From Sweet-Escott no objection came, rather he recommended 
the appointment of J.B.Turner and Henry Scott as the first unofficial 
members to the Executive Council.^ In the Colonial Office it was
thought that the Governor might have chosen a business man as one
1 1of the members. Turner was seen as hostile to the C.S.R.Company, 
its representatives had so complained in the Colonial Office, while 
Scott was the Company’s lawyer; thus it was interpreted that 
Sweet-Escott might be attempting 'to balance two antagonistic elements’. 
Despite this, a telegram was sent to the Governor asking whether an 
equally suitable business man could be found for one of the two
h2positions. Consequently the Governor chose Henry Marks ’the
) ^largest merchant in /"the 7 Colony’ in place of Scott. The 
grant of unofficial representation in the Executive Council was a 
triumph for the efforts of Henry Scott though he himself was not 
nominated till 191U.
In July 191U Kedstrom and Crompton convinced Governor Sweet-
Escott that one of the two unofficial members in the Executive
Council should represent the country districts. The Governor felt
Hedstrom was the suitable man, Crompton agreed and so did Scott and
Marks, both of whom were currently in the Executive Council and one
of whom was likely to be omitted in the future. In selecting
Hedstrom the Governor described him as 'a man of marked ability
and temperate view’, possessing good sense and discretion, besides:
The firm of Messrs Morris Hedstrom Limited, of which Mr Hedstrom 
is Managing Director, has contributed £1,000 towards the cost 
of the Fiji Second Reinforcement, and I am greatly indebted to 
Mr Hedstrom for the support in Education matters that he has 
given me in the Legislative Council as a member of the 
Board of Education. hi
39 C.O. to O.A.G.Conf. 5 July 1912; C.0.83/106. 
k0 Sweet-Escott to C.O.Tel. 6 Sept. 1912; C.O.83/109. 
i|1 Minutes, ibid.
U2 C.O. to Sweet-Escott Tel. 9 Sept. 1912; C.O.83/109.
hi Sweet-Escott to C.O.Tel. 10 Sept. 1912; C.O.83/109.
Uh Sweet-Escott to C.O.Conf. h Aug. 1917; C.O.83/138.
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And Marks was preferred to Scott as the second member, the reason
Sweet-Escott gave in a private letter:
It would have been impossible to have passed over Marks 
especially after his gift of £10,000 to meet the expenses 
of the Native Labour Detachment, although I have not 
referred in my despatch to that point, contenting myself 
with Marks’ clear seniority over Scott. 146
The omission of Scott caused a furore, initially engineered by
himself; petitions of protest were submitted to the Governor to be
sent to the Secretary of State calling for the appointment of Scott
as a third unofficial member to the Executive Council - all to no
) 7avail. Two years later when Marks was replaced by Scott, the
former sent in a lengthy complaint to Sweet-Escott’s successor,
Sir Cecil Rodwell reminding the Governor of his past unparallelled
generosity towards the Colony, his continuing loyalty and stating
h8that his being overlooked was not in the best interests of Fiji. 
Again the protest brought no change and Rodwell informed Marks that 
he favoured periodical change in the unofficial representation to 
the Executive Council. But the Governor’s reason is not beyond 
question: Turner served only for two years, 1912 to 191lij Hedstrom
after his nomination in 1918 enjoyed an uninterrupted stay till his 
retirement in 1936 while Scott and Marks served for long periods.
The only valid excuse that might be given was that in a small colony 
there was a shortage of able men. Politically aware European 
settlers viewed the appointments to the Executive Council as an 
important privilege which gave spokesmen for their various interests 
a voice in the Colony's administration. Hence in 1923 when 
Hedstrom and Marks, both directors of the same commercial company, 
were nominated for the position there was colony-wide agitation and 
the other elected members registered objections in the Legislative
\\S ibid.
ij6 Sweet-Escott to Fiddes, Private, 2 Jan. 1918; C.0.83/1U1•
ii? Sweet-Escott to C.0.1, 2 Jan. 1918; C.0.83/1U1 . Sweet-Escott
to C.O.Conf. 17 June 1918; C.0.83/1U2.
Il8 Marks to Rodwell, 8 Sept. 1920 Enel. Rodwell to C.O.Conf.
15 Sept. 1920; 0.0.83/1^2.
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1,0Council. Those chosen to sit on the Executive Council took equal
pride in the honour. Because it enhanced their status they were
sensitive if and when someone else was preferred to them.
The last paragraph of the draft despatch advising the
representation of unofficial Europeans in the Executive Council read:
I shall also be glad if Sir E.B.Sweet-Escott will furnish me 
with his views as to the desirability of appointing a native 
as a member of the Executive Council. SO
But these words were deleted from the final copy. Had the despatch
included this enquiry the Governor’s reply might have been
interesting and the Fijians might have obtained a direct voice in
what was the chief decision-making council in their country. Since
this was not the case, they had no membership in this council till
the nineteen forties.
In 1905 Europeans who were qualified cast their votes to select 
their representatives in the Legislative Council. And from 1912 
the Governor was permitted to choose two of these elected members to 
participate in the deliberations of the Executive Council. These 
were gains for the settlers. But they felt that new advantages 
ought to be strengthened by the consolidation of existing power.
Moreover in the first decade of the twentieth century they still had 
visions of turning Fiji into a colony where their will determined its 
destiny. They resented any real or seeming encroachments upon their 
position. It was this mode of thinking that made them wish that the 
municipal franchise was not eroded in any manner that might nenace their 
monopoly. It was this that motivated their politicians on the
subject. For the Legislative Council they chose their own
representatives by direct elections, on the Executive Council they 
alone had unofficial representatives. In the municipal council 
they were the dominant electors by far and European councillors had
h9 C.S.O. I41*01/23. Rodwell to C.O.Conf. 10 May 1923.
F.T. 27 Apr. 1923« In the Legislative Council no debate took place 
despite the request of the elected members other than Hedstrom 
and Marks. However, the elected members were permitted to 
briefly express their views on the subject but the Governor 
sided with his two nominees. (L.C.Debates 1923:101—1CU.)
SO Draft C.O. to O.A.G.Conf. 5 July 1912; C.0.83/106.
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a monopoly. Yet th ey  found no room fo r  complacency here  p a r t i c u la r ly  
reg ard in g  Suva, th e  c a p i t a l .
To understand  th e  t a c t i c s  used by Europeans to  en trench  th e i r  
p o l i t i c a l  power in  th e  m u n ic ip a li t ie s  i t  i s  e s s e n t ia l  to  t ra c e  
European concern on th e  is su e  o f m unicipal f ra n c h is e  from the  
beginning  of th e  tw e n tie th  cen tu ry . The s ta r t in g  p o in t m ight be the  
in te r im  a d m in is tra tio n  of W illiam  Larnond A llardyce  in  th e  in te r v a l  
between th e  d e p a rtu re  o f Governor S i r  George O’B rien  and th e  a r r iv a l  
o f h is  su cc e sso r, S ir  Henry Jackson . In flu en ced  by s e t t l e r  p re s su re s , 
on m unicipal f ra n c h is e  p a r t i c u la r ly ,  A llardyce appoin ted  a commission 
to  co n sid e r p ro p o sa ls  f o r  th e  amendment of th e  towns o rd in an ces!o f 
1885, 1891 and 1892. S e t t l e r  p re s su re  may have been th e  r e s u l t  of 
demographic changes. S ince 1891 th e  g re a te s t  in c re a se  in  th e  
European p o p u la tio n  had been in  Suva, where t h e i r  numbers had 
in c re a se d  from 8U3 to  1,073 out o f a t o t a l  of h,735 in  1901. But 
t h i s  was being  o f f s e t  by th e  in f lu x  of In d ian s  and F i j ia n s  who 
numbered 1,728 and 701 re s p e c t iv e ly .  Suva as th e  p re se rv e  of 
European commerce and re s id en ce  was u n lik e ly  to  p e r s i s t  f o r  long .
That they  would become a num erical m in o rity  was obvious to  th e  
Europeans, what th ey  d id  n o t w ish was a s im ila r  re d u c tio n  of t h e i r  
vo ice  in  th e  c o n tro l of m unicipal a f f a i r s .  They wanted to  
m ain ta in  t h e i r  dominance.
The Commission appo in ted  by A llardyce  c o n s is te d  of J .H .G arrick
(a  lo c a l  la w y e r -p o l i t ic ia n  who had served as A tto rney-G eneral in
th e  e a r ly  days o f B r i t i s h  ru le )  and th e  Wardens o f Suva and Levuka.
I t s  ta sk  was to  co n sid e r w hether th e  r ig h t  to  vote ought to  be
r e s t r i c t e d  to  those  who could read  and w r ite  e lem entary  E nglish
and to  th o se  whose p rem ises were valued  f o r  r a t in g  a t  £16 p e r  annum
51o r o v er. The Commission, however, w hile a ccep tin g  th e  suggested  
l i t e r a c y  q u a l i f i c a t io n ,  ra is e d  ra te a b le  p ro p e rty  value  f o r  f ra n c h ise  
to  £20 p .a .  But i t  f a i l e d  to  agree  th a t  th e  members o f th e  Suva 
and Levuka Town Boards should re p re se n t d i f f e r e n t  c la s s e s  o f e le c to r s .  
Recommendations had been made to  th e  Commission th a t  non-Europeans 
should choose s e p a ra te ly  two re p re s e n ta t iv e s  o f t h e i r  own and th e se  
could be e i th e r  Europeans o r  non-Europeans p rov ided  th e  l a t t e r  could
51 Correspondence R e la tin g  to  Proposed Amendment o f th e  Towns 
Ordinance o f 1885, 1891 and 1892 (1902-1903).
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speak English. European voters alone were to elect the warden.
Both propositions were rejected by the Commission, which wished to 
persist with the common franchise in municipal government as 
stipulated by the original ordinance. Where amendment was 
necessary it could be achieved within the existing framework by an 
increase in property and education qualifications.
Allardyce' informed the two town boards that the Government was
prepared to view favourably the advice of the commissioners to raise
the qualifications which would apply without discrimination to ail dpratepayers. Despite this no action could be taken until the 
arrival of the new Governor, Sir Henry Jackson. In turn, Jackson 
chose to defer the issue and leave it to his successor, Sir Everard 
im Thum and until the newly-elected Legislative Council had members 
from Suva and Levuka. Though he delayed action Jackson had 
nonetheless made a significant comment on the subject of municipal 
elections when he accused Indian and Polynesian voters of corruption. 
Unfortunately he failed to elaborate on the nature and extent of the 
alleged corruption, how it worked and who manipulated. Later 
European members of the Legislative Council supplied their version.
Events took a different turn under-im Thurn. Officials did not 
concur with the attitudes of either Allardyce or Jackson. The 
Agent-General of Immigration, R.M.Booth, was against a literacy 
qualification. The Attorney-General, Ehrhardt, opposed change
that was 'proposed not so much in the interest of education as with 
a view to excluding Indian and Chinese ratepayers'. The Governor 
and his Colonial Secretary agreed. The Colonial Secretary even 
advocated the abolition of the education rate as the Commission had 
recommended because small householders and occupiers being persons of 
slender means were unfairly defraying the cost of education of the 
rich. When the Executive Council decided that the whole subject be 
dropped the municipal situation’reverted to the position before
52 ibid.
53 F.R.G.1905:107. 
C.S.0.1183/02.
55 ibid.
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Allardyce's action. The issues and their implications, however, were 
far from dead.
Allied to the municipal franchise was the overall question of
the performance of the two town boards. Involved in this was
finance. To alleviate the difficulty the Government passed an
ordinance (XV of 1905) granting the boards of Levuka and Suva the56power to raise their general rate from 1/- to 2/- in the £. The 
six European members protested thereby raising doubts in the Colonial 
Office whether the introduction of the elective element in the Fiji
57Legislative Council had been premature. The Governor contended 
that the boards had run into debt through bad management because in 
Suva, in particular, responsible citizens took scant interest in 
the business of running their town, and as ratepayers refused to 
accept government control, and with it cheap and effective
58management, there was no alternative but to raise the rates. This
59indifference was most evident in the municipal elections.
After his election to the Legislative Council in 1908 J.M.Hedstrom, 
formerly Warden of Levuka, and now7 its elected member, took up the 
municipal question in his new role. His argument was that 
legislation passed in 1883 was, after twenty-five years, obsolete. 
Municipal legislation in Britain and neighbouring New Zealand took 
cognizance of new trends and Fiji ought to do likewise especially as 
the function of the tvro ports had expanded and diversified and the 
work of their boards was no longer confined to merely constructing 
roads and bridges. Therefore, he called for 'more liberal municipal- 
legislation, granting wider powers of self-government and increased 
revenues to the municipalities'. Government responded by accepting 
the motion and promising to set up the inevitable committee to 
investigate and recommend amendments. The request of Hedstrom,
56 Im Thurn to C.0.136, 30 Oct. 1905.
57 ibid.
58 ibid.
59 After an election for two auditors for Suva, wherein only a total of 
180 votes were cast, the Fiji Times, 20 Nov.1906 commented 'our 
ratepayers are very apathetic in municipal matters'.
60 L.C.Debates 1908:149-52. F.T.23 May 1908.
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supported by his elected colleagues, was part of a Europea: demand for
a greater voice and control in the affairs of the country.
Out of this came the very comprehensive Municipal Institutions
Ordinance, XXV of 1909. It had been endorsed by a public meeting in
61Suva and had an easy passage in the Council. For the purpose of
this study the relevant clauses were 6 and 26. " Had the possession
of a wide ranging municipal ordinance been the only goal of the
European politicians they would have concentrated on its operation.
Within six months, before the ordinance had had a fair trial,
J.B.Turner sought to restrict the coloured vote:
There are 305 names of coloured persons on the electoral roll. 
About 95 are coolies. Eighty per cent of these coloured 
people can neither read, write nor understand English. 63
Hedstrom in support maintained that the coloured electors knew very
little about voting and were 'certainly easy to influence and . . .
open to corruption'. Scott described having seen two coloured
electors arriving at the poll with instructions to vote for particular
candidates without even knowing what the contest was about. For
him it was irrelevant that the proposal did 'savour slightly of class
legislation' for 'it will be the means of ensuring that the better
class is represented in the council as the men will be elected by
61 FYT. 6 Nov. 1909.
62 Clause 6: '(1) Subject to the provisions of this Ordinance
there shall be for the government of every town a council which 
shall consist where the population of ratepayers amounts to -
(a) Under six hundred of six members to be elected as 
hereinafter provided;
(b) Over six hundred but not exceeding two thousand of eight 
such members;
(c) Two thousand and upwards of ten such members.
(2) In addition to the members above provided for if 
shall be lawTful for the Goyernor if the Council is in receipt of 
any funds from the general revenue of the Colony by virtue of 
subsections two and three of clause fifty-one hereof to appoint 
additional members as follows:-
When the Council consists of six elected members two;
When the Council consists of eight elected members three; 
When the Council consists of ten elected members four.
(3) Such members shall hold office for three years 
and may thereupon be re-appointed by the Governor.'
Clause 26: granted votes to occupiers, lessees and owners in the 
manner identical to Clause II4 of Ordinance V of 1883 cited as 
footnote 2 p.2.
63 L.C.Debates 1910:32.
6ii ibid.
hh
69the better class of voters'. J.B.Turner summed up the case:
I refer, Sir, to your message today, in which yon say that 
Indians and others are densely ignorant. Quite right, they 
are, and that is why they should not vote. No man would 
lower himself to ask some of the people who vote for the town 
councillors for their votes. Under the present system you 
will not get the best man to fill the important positions on 
the town councils. 66
As a concession he was prepared to make the educational test
applicable even to whites. The racial arrogance - that it was
beneath the dignity of the white man to seek political support from
a coloured person - was unconcealed. Rather than have the white man
discard this attitude, the legislature should disenfranchise the
coloured. On the Governor's promise to consider the issue in
October when the amendments to the ordinance would be reviewed,
Turner withdrew his motion. This was not the first intrusion of
colour and race prejudice into local politics. What was new,
however, was the Government's willingness to tolerate and condone
overt prejudice while at the same time denying that it was so doing.
In November 1909* Dr.Fox, supported by Henry Scott, had moved:
That for the safety of the public health in Suva, it is 
desirable that a segregated area should be acquired by the 
Government, and that all natives should be required to live 
outside the town boundary except those in actual employ of 
the white residents as servants. 6?
Scott pursued the subject at the next session in a question asking
what steps the Government had taken to implement residential
68segregation. The Government was not prepared to take any action at 
69that time. In May 1910 letters from Dr. Fox and the Town Clerk, 
W.Good, of Suva had called for legislation to prevent Fijians and
69 ibid.
66 ibid:33.
67 FFT.10 Nov. 1909.
68 L.C.Debates 1910:11.
69 ibid:12.
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70In d ia n s  e re c t in g  houses in  a reas  occupied by Europeans. Good
m ain ta ined  th a t  th e  Town Board had no power to  th w art t h i s  and w ished
f o r  a re as  to  be s e t  a s id e  fo r  In d ian  and F i j ia n  houses. Sympathy
e x is te d  fo r  such a demand and th e  Executive C ouncil, on 10 June 1910,
71adv ised  in  favou r of r e s id e n t i a l  seg reg a tio n . But Governor im Thurn 
re fu sed  to  pass th e  a p p ro p ria te  l e g i s l a t i o n ,  fo r  in  h is  view 
n a tiv e  houses were n o t th e  only  in s a n i ta r y  d w e llin g s .
In d ian s  in  Suva, l ik e ly  to  be most sev e re ly  a f f e c te d ,  were 
alarm ed both  by th e  d esigns to  d is e n fra n c h ise  them and by the  Suva 
M unicipal B oard 's  re s o lu t io n  c a l l in g  fo r  l e g i s l a t i o n  fav o u rin g
72
r e s id e n t i a l  s e g reg a tio n . A p e t i t io n  was d ra f te d  d e p re c a tin g  th e
above in te n t io n s  and re q u e s tin g  In d ian  re p re s e n ta t io n  in  th e
73L e g is la t iv e  C ouncil. The In d ian s  complained th a t  though t h e i r  
numbers approxim ated to  th o se  of th e  F i j i a n s ,  th ey  had no members 
in  th e  L e g is la tiv e  Council w hile  th e  l a t t e r  had tw o. They wanted 
'th e  r ig h t  to  e le c t  two E nglish  gentlem en to  re p re se n t /""them 7 in  th e  
C o u n c il '. The au tho r of th e  d r a f t  p e t i t i o n  and o f th e  concept of 
European re p re s e n ta t iv e s  f o r  In d ian s  was an e x - c iv i l  s e rv a n t, 
G .A .F.W .Beauclerc. There was no response from th e  Government to  
B e a u c le rc 's  su g g es tio n . But on th e  m unicipal q u e s tio n , the  
A tto rney -G enera l, E hrhard t adv ised  th e  Government a g a in s t  'making any 
d i s t in c t io n  on th e  ground o f c o lo u r ' because an i l l i t e r a t e  person  who 
p a id  r a te s  was e n t i t l e d  to  vo te  as mu^h as one who could  w r ite  . '
Eyre Hutson, th e  C o lon ia l S e c re ta ry , added th a t  s u f f i c i e n t  f a c i l i t y  
and o p p o rtu n ity  had no t been prov ided  to  enable co lou reds to  o b ta in  
an adequate knowledge of E n g lish . But Governor im Thurn was le s s  
c a te g o r ic a l  and was n o t s a t i s f i e d  th a t  th e  e le c to r a te  would n o t be 
swamped by coloured  v o te rs  who, he th o u g h t, had 'a b s o lu te ly  no concept
70 C.S.O. 3818/10.
71 Ib id .  M inutes Ex.Co. 10 June 1910.
72 C.S.O. 1*608/10.
73 ib id .  The p e t i t io n  does n o t appear to  have
signed  by th e  In d ia n s . B eauclerc subm itted
been c i r c u la te d  o r 
th e  d r a f t .
lb ib id .
75 C.S.O. 1*281/10.
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of their responsibilities in that respect'. On the franchise,
im Thurn did not display the same firmness as on residential 
segregation.
Temporarily the issues of the franchise and segregation sank into 
insignificance as the elected members became embroiled with the 
Government over official representation in the Municipal Council 
without a regular financial contribution from the former. The 
town boards had welcomed government representation and some 
financial control in return for aid but when the Secretary of State 
vetoed the latter the argument for the former was destroyed.
Anxious that the elective principle and the voice of the people 
through their representatives should not be diminished and eroded 
by the introduction of official influence without the quid pro quo of 
monetary grants, the European members threatened to resign. A 
major conflict on a constitutional- principle seemed in the making.
Strife was averted when Whitehall agreed to dispense with official 
nomination. As a safeguard, a clause was inserted providing for
«“> ry
dissolution of a town council by the Governor in certain contingencies. ' 
If anything the settler politicians had once more won a point.
The franchise issue was still alive and revived wifa vigour 
after a keenly contested municipal election in Suva in July 1911*7 o
The results deserve notice:
(-* Candidates of newly-formed Municipal Progressive Association 
originally called the Vigilance Committee.)
The defeat of Scott was ominous. His ego hurt, his status and
standing in his small community not allowed to increase if not
diminished, his pride injured, he found the obvious scapegoat in the
coloured vote which he determined to eliminate with redoubled pressure.
Equally determined was the Municipal Progressive Association as one of
76 Major to C.O.Conf. 29 Oct. 1910$ C.0.83/97.
77 L.C.Debates 1910, Third Session:2.
78 F.T.29 July 1911.
H.Marks 
W.H.Johnson* H.M.Scott 
J.Harper* 
Informal
295 Elected 
291 Elected
226
218
1
1*7
its candidates had also suffered defeat. Though its guiding lights,
men like Dr.Fox and W.H.Cuthbert, did not belong to the highest
echelon of European society, they nonetheless shared kinship of
views when it came to the coloured vote. The Association sought an
audience with the new Governor, Sir Henry May, on the subject.
Thereafter, it reported that Sir Henry favoured restriction either
by rating or education to curtail illiterate Indians and Fijians
79from swamping the polls.
Henry May, strong-willed and subscribing to the racial outlook
of the times, possessed very definite views on the municipal question.
Suva, he described as ’in a very insanitary c o n d i t i o n ' N e x t  he
was opposed to municipal institutions in crown colonies. Hong Kong,
whence he came and to which he was to return as Governor, was, in
his opinion, a lot better than Singapore, Penang and Colombo all of
which had municipal councils inspected by him for comparative 
81purposes in 1895»
For Suva there were two alternatives: either wait for an
improvement or wait until degeneration made government intervention 
essential thereby rendering possible a complete takeover. He found 
that Scott, Marks and Turner favoured official representation in the 
council in return for government assistance for the maintenance of 
Victoria Parade (then the main street of Suva), costing approximately 
£200 p.a. On the qualification of voters he told the Secretary of 
State:
Under Section 20 of Ordinance XXV of 1909 the franchise is 
given to any occupier of any rateable property. This 
qualification is far too low and results in many quite ignorant 
and illiterate Fijians and Indians and Melanesians being armed 
with votes which they do not know how to use for they have no 
knowledge of the duties and responsibilities required of a 
municipal councillor. 82
He sought the franchise for those whose property was valued at not less 
than £25> p.a. While this would purge the roll of objectionable voters, 
it would ’not disfranchise Indian and Chinese storekeepers and others 
of the same races who are educated sufficiently to know how to use their
79 FFT.10 Aug. 1911, 7 Sept.1911.
80 May to C.O.Conf. 3 Aug.1911; C.0.83/102.
81 ibid.
82 ibid.
votes'. Further, the ordinance ought to be so amended as to include 
in the municipal councils the Commissioner of Works, the Chief Medical 
Officer, and one other official nominated by the Governor. The town 
engineer was to be a member of the Public Works Department and the 
Governor's nominee. Under the circumstances this might have been 
a worthy compromise and placated local opinion. The Secretary of 
State refused -to sanction May's proposals for the reconstitution of
O  ^
the municipality of Suva. Firstly, it was too soon to change the 
ordinance unless it could be proved to be 'quite unworkable'.
Secondly, the claims of the property owners were adequately 
safeguarded by allotment of additional votes for those with 
rateable property in excess of £25 p.a. Thirdly, he did not think 
that the objection that the present voters were ignorant and 
illiterate was met by requiring not an educational test but a 
property qualification especially one as high as the annual value 
of £25. Most importantly, the Secretary of State did not repudiate 
the concept of an educational test.
May, favouring residential segregation for what he described as 
sanitary reasons, and wishing to gauge local opinion, sent a circular 
letter to 109 property owners in Suva; . 93 of these favoured the 
reservation of areas for whites, 1 opposed it, and 15 did not reply
O )
mainly owing to absence from Fiji. Of 9 Indian freeholders, 5
approved May's plan. A Chinese merchant was equally favourable
because the proposals would not affect 'Chinese living in European
fashion'.^ Europeans generally appeared to support Sir Henry May.^
Dyson Blair, the Commissioner of Lands, demarcated the European area
B7comprising the commercial centre of Suva, and adjacent streets/
By this means non-European businessmen, who kept small shops and 
lived within the premises would be excluded. Thus European 
business interests, which were chafing.:under increasing competition 
from Indians and Chinese, would’ be able to resume their past monopoly.
83 C.O. to May Conf. h Oct. 1911; C.0.83/102.
8ii May to C.O.61, 17 Feb. 1912; C.O.83/105.
85 c.s.o.3671/11.
86 ibid. F/T.25 July 1911.
8? Enel. May to C.0.61, 17 Feb. 1912; C.O.83/105.
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It might not be an exaggeration to suggest that Sir Henry May,
perhaps unwittingly, was aiding a conspiracy designed bo make Suva
the exclusive preserve of the white merchant. The Colonial Office
refused consent. It was minuted there that such legislature would
be repugnant as at that stage Whitehall was insisting Hath tiresome
iteration to the self-governing Dominions the objectionability of
88distinguishing between Europeans and other sorts of persons’.
The attempt to achieve residential segregation by legislation was 
destroyed, once and for all. But this is not to imply that 
henceforth segregation by other devices was not practised in Suva.
Europeans, generally apathetic on municipal matters, were 
jolted when in May 1912, they discovered that one of the four 
nominated for the forthcoming town council elections was a Chinese, 
Ming Ting. European feeling was summed up by a correspondent to 
the press:
I cannot say much for :the nominators’ choice, especially when 
I see amongst them a Chinaman nominated by three so-called 
Britishers and an Indian (good mixture]). Poor Fiji! What 
are you coming to?
Mr Editor, I cannot think this nomination is seriously 
meant, and it is a very bad advertisement for Fiji. 89
The writer hoped that the affair would be treated as a joke as two of
90Ming Ting’s nominators assured him it was intended to be.
T.F.Hirst e.xplained how he had come to nominate Ming Ting and
91publicly disclaimed his willingness to support him. Hirst claimed 
that he had been stopped on the street by two men who had the 
reputation of being practical jokers. They sought his signature as 
they were trying as a practical joke to get Ming Ting to stand for the 
Council. Being in a hurry and thinking that the paper was a 
farcical/petition to Ming Ting,he signed it. He was surprised and 
disgusted when he saw his name as one of Ming Ting's nominators, 
particularly when the names of the two who had obtained his signature 
were missing. This was refuted by James Callaghan who contended that
88 C.O.Minutes. ibid.
89 FfT. 1 June 1912.
90 Ming Ting"was nominated by James Callaghan, T.F,Hirst, G.Taylor, 
H.G.Walter and Muthan (an Indian). F.T.30 May 1912. None of 
the Europeans can be described as belonging to the upper crust 
of Fiji's snobbish settler society.
91 F.T. 1 June 1912.
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he had been present when Hirst signed and Hirst had needed no
92inducement, being very enthusiastic about it. Callaghan went on
to state that Ming Ting was a naturalized British subject who had
never been slow to contribute to local requests for charity. Besides
he had brought into the Colony a considerable amount of money which
was invested in land and houses in Suva. As he was on the municipal
roll there was no reason why he was unworthy of being a councillor.
Another nominator, George Taylor, was equally adamant in defending 
93his choice.
To those who had treated King Ting's nomination as a joke, or
had been offended by it for purely racial reasons, election day
9librought an even greater surprise. The result:
Ming Ting 11*8
W.W.Barker 87
T .Hunt 69
G.A.F.W.Beauclerc 68
Informal 15
3^7
That there were only 387 votes was in itself an example of not 
inconsiderable indifference. There were on the Suva roll 330 
European voters having 795 votes, and 17b non-Europeans (i.e. styled 
native) with 220 votes.^ The Europeans were in a majority by far 
and on these figures there was no possibility of their being 
swamped by non-Europeans.
Though indignant the press admitted that Ming Ting had been 17 
years in Suva and was 'one of the largest property owners in the 
town, and bears a reputation as a highly successful man of business, 
whose word is his bond'. Ming Ting’s victory had rubbed salt into 
the wound of Anglo-Saxon pride. The real reasons behind his victory
and the defeat of the other candidates (all Europeans) were ignored.
96The mass vote of Indians for Ming Ting was held responsible. The 
victory of the Chinese merchant-was to be the pretext upon which to 
disenfranchise Indians.
92 ibid.
93 F .T . l i June 1912.
9h F . T . 6 June 1912.
95 ibid.
96 ibid.
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Indeed Ming Ting’s victory did arouse European voters. At an
election barely a fortnight later, where there were four contestants,
97616 votes were cast. At another election in the following month
the poll again improved. Here two of the candidates were Henry Scott
and John Maynard Hedstrom, both of whom made clear from the outset
that as they were busy men and forced against their will to stand,
98they would not canvass for votes. One of their rivals, J.A.Mackay,
on the other hand, was backed by a strong committee determined to
99work for his victory. Mackay made known that his object was the
betterment of residential areas, of ’dwellings of the less influential 
ratepayers' like himself. ^  He added: 'And I have a fair
experience of what we may expect from a socially selected council, 
one that is dominated by selfish money power.' No doubt the jibe 
was directed at Scott and Hedstrom. Mackay's attempt to woo 'the 
working class' paid dividends.
A.J.Mackay 337 votes Elected
H.M.Scott 215 Elected
J.M.Hedstrom 193
T.L.de Francoeur 6h
Informal 10 •
819
*h Scott had also won, a racial explanation 1 101
97 PVT. 18 June 1912.
98 F.T. 9 July 1912.
99 PVT. 13 July 1912.
100 PVT. 16 July 1912.
101 'We find that 337 votes were cast fcr Cr Mackay and i|08 for
Messrs Scott and Hedstrom: if we give to each party half of
the votes recorded in favour of Mr de Francoeur the democratic 
vote is 71 in arrears. Now there is hardly any doubt that a 
majority of the coloured voters who, judging by the informal 
ballot papers at the election for auditor, totalled about fifty - 
favoured Cr Mackay, because he was the only candidate who to any 
extent directly asked them to record their votes by adopting the 
usual method at txOese elections - namely, that of sending cabs
to bring voters to the poll. And as these people cannot by 
any stretch of the imagination be said to 'endorse' any 'policy' 
or to know or care anything of any 'policy' 'decisive endorsement’ 
is largely discounted. These are facts that no argument, no 
sophistry can upset, though they cannot affect the position that 
Cr Mackay is at the head of the poll and by a very large majority.' 
(F.T. 18 July 1912.)
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Once elected to the Municipal Council Scott acted quickly in
introducing a motion on 6 September that the Government be approached
to amend the Municipal Institutions Ordinance of 1909 by making an
102education test compulsory for alien voters. Two councillors,
Good and Mackay, suggested as an amendment that the proposed test
be applicable to blacks as well as whites so as to remove the racial
inference. Johnson, who had seconded Scott's motion, retorted that
there was a very great difference between an illiterate white man
and his black counterpart because many of the former possessed
intelligence and knew what they were about, unlike the latter.
Scott was unprepared to accept the amendment because his motion was
intended to be in line with views earlier expressed by the
Government. Cn the promise that he would inform the Government of
their sentiments, Good and Kackay withdrew their proposal. Scott's
original motion was adopted unanimously. Cuncillor Ming Ting was
at the meeting and lodged no protest. It was also agreed that
Turner (the Mayor) and Henry Scott would meet the Governor for the
purpose on behalf of the Council.
Later Turner reported to the Council that while the Governor did
not commit himself he gave the impressipn that 'if the matter was
laid before him in due form and at the proper time, he would consider 
103it favourably'. ' And the Governor had asked Scott to draft a short
bill incorporating his intentions. The Bill, seeking to amend
section 20 of Ordinance XXV of 1909 by inserting the words 'and who
can read, write and speak the English language shall be entitled to
vote' was presented to and approved by the Suva Municipal Council at
its meeting of 2 October. Anyone, irrespective of race, could be
required to undergo the education test at the discretion of the Mayor.
Arbitrary powers were thus being granted to the Mayor currently
J.B.Turner who was not famous for impartiality towards the darker races.
The Bill was introduced in the Legislative Council on 25 October
105by Henry Scott with a reiteration of the old arguments. He
pleaded that the Bill be accepted without amendment; otherwise it
102 F.T. 7 Sept. 1912.
103 F.T.19 Sept. 1912.
10h FVT. 3 Oct. 1912.
105 L,C.Debates 1912:92-100.
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would be better withdrawn and referred to the Secretary of State. _ It 
provided the Mayor of Suva the opportunity to state categorically 
that he was ’appealing to the white people to keep this town a white
106town'. The Colonial Secretary countered that those likely to be
disenfranchised had not been given the opportunity to acquire.>an
adequate knowledge of English:
My opinion is that ample provision should be made for 
interpretation and for translation of electoral documents 
into the vernaculars of the people voting, if necessary. 107
His amendment was lost by 9 votes to 8. In the free vote, which
the Governor had authorized at the request of the elected members, all
but two officials and one of the Fijian representatives, Kadavulevu,
voted with the Colonial Secretary. On the other side were the six
European elected members, the Native Commissioner, the Registrar-
General and Jone Madraiwiwi. The vote of Madraiwiwi was crucial.
By supporting those he did, he wras not merely restricting Indians but
acting contrary to the interests of those he purported to represent.
There were no further obstacles as the Bill passed through the
committee without amendment and was read a third time and passed.
Governor Sir Bickham Sweet-Escott announced that he would reserve
the Bill for His Majesty's signification.
In his despatch to the Secretary of State the Governor
recommended the approval of the Bill for reasons which had been
100clearly explained by its advocates. At the same time Sweet-Escott
told the Colonial Office the Government took no responsibility as the 
Bill had been drafted by Scott. He also enclosed a petition against 
the Bill from those likely to lose their privilege. Among the 
signatories were Ming Ting, and a Samoan pastor. The deputation, 
that had also come to the Governor to seek redress, had been sent away 
with the explanation that nothing could be done as the Bill was before 
the Secretary of State. Sweet-Escott described the deputation as 
consisting 'of respectable if not very responsible persons, but it 
could hardly be regarded as representative of the non-European 
population'.
106 ibid:96.
107 ibid:98.
108 Sweet-Escott to C.0.3lili, 16 Dec. 1912; C.0.83/110.
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On receipt of the Governor’s correspondence at the Colonial 
Office lengthy minutes were written though most of these were concerned 
with whether the Bill was a private member’s bill or a private bill, 
as Fiji’s Attorney-General had advised, and the technical implications 
involved. But two important points were made. First, that in 
Ceylon ballot papers contained the names and descriptions of 
candidates in English, Singhalese and Tamil, all attended to by the 
municipal council itself. And that it was in the interests of the 
aspiring candidates to ensure that their constituents understood the 
election procedure. Second, the test proposed, i.e. an ability to 
read, wTite and speak English, was considerably more than having a 
knowledge of English. Experience in the East had shown that there 
were important merchants trading with Europe who could speak English 
for purposes of their business but could not read and write it. By 
inference the Fiji proposals would disenfranchise such significant 
men. Generally, in the Colonial Office there was a consensus that 
a good case had not been made for the imposition of the stringent test. 
Suspicion also existed about the real motives of Scott and his 
colleagues. It was seen as an attempt to disenfranchise Indians and 
Chinese shopkeepers as a consequence of'Ming Ting’s victory in 1911. 
Hence the Colonial Office refused to sanction the Bill despite 
Sweet-Escott's recommendation.
Refusal was not accepted as final defeat in Suva. Early in 1913
J.B.Turner resigned as mayor and opinion was that he was opposed to
anyone but a European sitting as a member in the Municipal Council
though he had remained in his position for several months after
109Ming Ting’s election. And when Ming Ting’s tenure expired in
December 191h he quietly withdrew "without seeking re-election. Had 
he chosen to contest his seat an interesting fight might have ensued*. 
Perhaps he realized that defeat was certain. If he so reasoned his 
logic "was sound. European interest in the municipal contests was on 
the increase and they strongly outnumbered the coloured voters. For
109 FIT. 13 Jan. 1913, 3 July 1913.
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an election in May, 1057 votes had been cast. At the time
Europeans possessed 773 votes and Indians and others Uh3>y a total of 
1216. It was the opinion of the Fiji Times that no Fijians had 
voted, but four Polynesians had done so and the Indian vote had been 
particularly strong. The elections of November 191U to fill three 
vacancies at which King Ting would have been required to seek
111.ection we're again closely fought.
W.H.T.Smith I4OI4 Elected
J.A.Mackay 389 Elected
W.H.Johnson 311 Elected
D. J.Drake 279
W.W. Barker 260
R.N.Ginn 182
Informal 17
1,81*2
And on the same day 301 voted Pearce for auditor and 2l|8 for H.Taylor, 
while there were 130 informal votes. The municipal roll at that 
stage had 680 ratepayers, 339 Europeans and 3b 1 coloureds. Though 
there were two fewer Europeans on the roll than coloureds, the former 
possessed a greater number of votes and* therefore greater power to 
influence the outcome of elections. Of these 205 Europeans (about 
60/o of them) and 117 coloureds (barely 3h%) voted. According to 
the Fiji Times, 105 coloured votes went to Mackay, 68 to Barker, 39 
to Ginn, 8 to Smith, 1 to Johnson, while Drake received none.
Assuming these figures to be correct, 117 coloured ratepayers cast 221 
votes. Therefore 205 Europeans were responsible for the remaining 
1,621 votes. Again assuming that the figures of the Fiji Times were 
correct, it is possible to calculate the likely results if the Indian
110 The results were: F.E.Riemenschneider 330
W.P.Marr 260 
A.T.Hay 239 
J.H.Butler 220 
Informal ___5
17Ö57
(F.T.5 May 191U.)
111 F.T. 10 Nov. 191U.
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votes were removed:
W.H.T.Smith hoh - 8 - 396*
J.A.Mackay 389 - 105 = 281;*
W.H.Johnson 311 - 1 = 310*
B.J.Drake 279 - 0 = 279
VI .VJ. Barker 260 - 68 = 192
R.N.Ginn 182 - 39 = 1U3
(* Would have been elected.)
No significant change would have resulted. Mackay would have slipped 
from second to third place and the difference would have been close 
between him and Drake, Apart from Mackay the only two others who 
received any noticeable support from the coloureds were Barker and 
Ginn who finished at the bottom. To many Europeans, a quest for 
Indian votes, was contemptible. And Mackay when thanking his 
supporters was told by an interjector to thank the Indians. His 
retort was that Britain had accepted Indians at the Front during 
the current war and he was not ashamed of the Indian votes he had 
received.
At this stage European politics in* Suva was split into two
factions. One comprised Mackay, a man in his late twenties,
11 2a small storekeeper on the Nabukalou Creek. This element was
opposed to the very prosperous social elite, the type acceptable at 
Government House, and headed by John Maynard Hedstrom, managing 
director of one of the largest trading houses in the country, Henry 
Milne Scott, the leading lawyer of the town, who had on occasions 
acted as Attorney-General previously, and J.B.Turner, a wealthy 
business man and landowner, not as distinguished as the other two 
mentioned, but vocal and ambitious. The division was based, oneclass. 
That headed by Mackay claimed to speak for the working class and 
posed as rebels against the establishment which was accused of 
self-interest and indifference to the grievances of lesser men.
Lacking the respectability and prestige of the older and more 
prosperous elite, Mackay and his colleagues were prepared to use 
the Indian vote to obtain a voice and influence for themselves in
112 Enc] - Sweet-Escott to  C.0 .3 5 6 ,  1 Dec. 1916.
the Municipal Council. Those against whom such tactics were 
employed found the situation reprehensible. Europeans were 
permitted to have their differences but the losers considered it 
bad taste to employ non-whites to tilt the balance in an all-white 
quarrel.
After each election the usual complaint was made of the role of 
Indian voters. But after rebuffs from the Colonial Office an 
endeavour was made to clarify the settler viewpoint. It was 
emphasized that the objection was not to Indians as such but to the 
fact that a great majority of them were illiterate and thus
113susceptible to exploitation by 'an unscrupulous electioneer'.
The remedy proposed for the malaise was not the control of the 
unscrupulous electioneer but the elimination of the illiterate voter.
In Sweet-Escott the Europeans of Suva had a Governor very 
sympathetic towards their aspirations and were encouraged to try a 
change of tactics. A petition from 83 ratepayers were presented 
to the Governor with complaints about neglected roads and poor 
sanitary service, suggesting that the Colonial regime invoke its
emergency powers and resume administration of local government by
1 1 1dissolving the existing Council. The Executive Council favoured
a commission of inquiry into the matter. But its two unofficial 
members, Marks and Scott, advised that no reply be given till a 
report had been produced by the commissioners. This was 
unacceptable to the majority whose advice the Governor followed in his 
reply that an inquiry would be instituted. Both Henry Marks and 
Henry Scott were amongst the petitioners who included J.B.Turner 
and other prominent business men. By discrediting the existing 
Council as incompetent the petitioners hoped to put power into the 
hands of those they would be able to influence more readily. The 
Mayor at the time was Dr. Brough, an ex-civil servant unpopular with 
local European opinion. The device of petition <was intended more 
for the purpose of removing Brough and his supporters than 
eradicating any real evil.
The new strategy was to demand that qualifications for the 
municipal franchise be similar to those for the Legislative Council. 
Sir Bickham Sweet-Escott reiterated the case to the Secretary of
113 FfT. 1U Nov. 191U.
11U Sweet-Escott to C.0.393, 30 Oct. 1911±$ C.0.83/121.
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State, adding that prominent citizens refused to participate in 
municipal elections because they were certain to be outvoted by the
115ignorant coloured vote. Sweet-Escott explained that he was
reluctant to advocate this unless the restricted franchise was certain 
to improve the conduct of municipal affairs. He did not think 
anything would be achieved through investigation by a commission of 
inquiry. In fact, it would split Suva into two camps, and the 
larger group would support the Council. Also it was unlikely that 
some of the petitioners would be prepared to make public statements 
of complaint. This in itself was an admission by Sweet-Escott that 
only a minority was dissatisfied with the Council, and by inference 
the Governor appeared to be on their side. In his explanation for 
the deplorable state of Suva he did not blame the Council totally.
There were other contributing factors: the heavy rainfall in Suva
during the previous six months; damage caused by motor traffic 
during the last two years; upheaval of streets for the purpose of 
laying down water pipes; inadequate finance; and the recent labour 
shortage. He denied that a less liberal franchise would achieve 
any improvement. Nor did he regard ’an elected body as the best 
instrument that can be devised for the economical and efficient 
administration of the municipal affairs of a typical town like Suva 
where there is no leisure class as there is in European towns, in 
which municipal administration is not always unsuccessful’. He 
described debates in the Municipal Council as contentious and 
acrimonious, and found Dr. Brough taking little part in supervising 
administrative duties. Yet Sweet-Escott was unwilling to take over 
control of the municipality unless pressed by a majority of voters.
But he had earlier admitted that a majority might not favour this 
step. Under the circumstances he wondered whether the Secretary of 
State would authorize an initial loan of £20,000 plu.s further sums for 
installing an electric light system and a fire brigade. In return, 
three officials would be appointed to administer Suva as ’such an 
arrangement would be accepted as satisfactory both by the supporters 
and the opponents of the present Municipal Council’. Later in another 
despatch the Governor argued that a Board of Commissioners was the best 
solution provided the Secretary of State could authorize the
115 ibid.
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stipulated loan. If this were not possible then the Secretary of
117State ought to approve the course favoured by Scott. In the
Colonial Office there was some division of opinion. One view was 
that the situation was not as bad as Scott and his friends painted it 
and there was no reason for approving a bill earlier repudiated 
because of its underlying principles. Another found the appointment 
of a Board of Commissioners as the best solution in a colony lacking 
enough capable persons. Finally, the Secretary of State’s own 
decision proved crucial:
I should prefer to leave the elected municipality somewhat 
longer; but I would not object to the same educational test 
for Municipal as for Legislative Council voters, but of course 
the property qualification must not apply. 118
So it was conveyed to Fiji that the electoral character of the
municipality must not be abandoned, and an education test was
119therefore authorized.
The necessary Bill was introduced by the Attorney-General in
July 1915 as the issue now had the blessing of the Government. He
specifically emphasized that the legislation was not directed against
1 20the Indian community. Before the debate the Levuka Municipal
Council had suggested the amendment be •'and who can read, write or
speak the English language’ thereby leaving franchised those
1 21ratepayers ’who have a colloquial knowledge of English'. No such
1 22compromise was offered by the Suva Council. Again it was the
116 Sweet-Escott to C.O.lj.25* h Dec. 1 91U5 C.0.83/1 23.
117 There had been yet another debate in the Legislative Council on 
17 Nov. I9IU on the subject.
118 C.O.Minutes. Sweet-Escott to C.0.1^ 25, h Dec. 191U; C.0.83/123.
119 C.O. bo Sweet-Escott I4.8, 18 Jan. 1915*
120 L.C.Debates 1915:90. He added: ’They still have the right but
must qualify to exercise that right. From what I have read on 
the subject, and heard in this Council, I gather that a certain 
class of Indian now possessing the right of franchise had, at 
election time, flagrantly abused the trust and confidence imposed 
in him. It is true, that some step should be taken to remedy 
this outstanding evil.’ ibid:91.
121 C.S.O. 5687/15.
122 A public meeting had been held in Suva and between 110 and 120 
persons turned up including coloured and non-ratepayers. A 
large majority approved the proposals but no Indian or coloured 
ratepayers voted. C.S.O. 5715/15•
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intransigent Scott who successfully opposed the suggestion from
Levuka. For him a colloquial knowledge of English was not enough
as this would cause confusion at the polls if voters could not 
123read or write.
If Europeans were placated, Indians were incensed as they were to
be the ones most adversely affected. In the granting of the franchise
for the Legislative Council they had been ignored and now some of
those with municipal franchise were to be largely eliminated from the
roll. "What minimal influence they possessed would be eradicated.
With their petition seeking the disallowance of the Bill, they
submitted 'that all difficulties might be overcome were proper
arrangements made for the employment of interpreters, and were we
protected from the improper interference of white men interested in 
1 2lielections'. Their plea was in vain. When the election came
1li Indians who had still retained their franchise despite the change
in law protested that because of injustice to their compatriots they
would refrain from exercising their rights unless restoration was 
1 25made. Once more the response was negative.
They sought aid 3?rom abroad. They asked unsuccessfully for
assistance from the Indian Congress Committee in London, and from
the nationalist leader Pundit Malaviya in Allahabad to help block
the new legislation. The Government of India also protested.
It quoted the literacy rates of the various racial components in
Fiji from the 1911 Population Census (9.U% for Indians, 36.5% for
Europeans, 5U% for Half-Castes, 52.8% for Fijians and 58% for
Rotumans) and concluded that the Indians would be the worst 
1 27sufferers. Until the educational needs of Indians had been
adequately met the measure was not free from objection and the 
Indian Government felt 'constrained to point out that wealthy and 
respectable Indian traders and property holders will have a
123 L.C.Debates 1915292• Scott also complained that the Bill had
come too late.
12l| A petition of 129 Indians, 120 of them ratepayers was printed 
in C.P.67 /15 . C.S.O. 5773/15.
125 C.S.O. 10819/15.
126 C.S.O. C51|/15.
127 1.0. to C.O. 23 Feb. 1916; C.0.83/13U.
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legitimate grievance if a more active policy for the extension of the 
necessary educational facilities to their children is not pursued, 
and every effort is not made for the removal of the disability now 
imposed on the Indian community'.
An important argument for change had been that it would encourage 
participation from candidates of high calibre. The results in Suva 
failed to substantiate this contention.
W.H.T.Smith U77 Elected
J.Wishart 382 Elected
F.E.Riemenschneider 367 Elected
J.H.Millett 36U Elected
H.M.Scott 336 Elected
W.H.Johnson 330 Elected
J.A.Mackay 320 Elected
W.A.Miller 315 Elected
W.Wilson 293
E.F.Taylor 275
L.E.Brown 27U
S.G.Sturt 271
W.Good 218
C.S.Green 77
Of the eight elected, 5 had previously sat on the Council, Only
Wishart, Miller, and Millett were new-comers. Mackay, who had been
the subject of much abuse, won again; there was no substantial
difference between him and Scott. Out of 368 European electors 255
had exercised the franchise and utilized 608 ballot papers; of the
coloured vote of 35 j one Fijian 'and one Indian recorded 3 votes making
128a total of 611 ballot papers of which 23 were informal. Nor was
1 29there any startling change in Levuka. At the Colonial Office it
128 C.S.O. 10317/15.
129 C.S.O. 10500/15.
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1 30was noted: ’Probably the alteration in the franchise had no effect.’
By 1915 then the Europeans had consolidated their political
(power. They possessed considerable voice to influence policy in their 
own favour provided this did not menace British obligations towards 
the Fijians. In fact Government was prepared to collude with 
Europeans to a degree to protect them as well. But their position 
was not to remain unchallenged. Judging from their efforts to 
restrict the municipal franchise by a stringent education test they 
were aware of the challenge to their authority. They were 
particularly worried about the Indian population, rapidly increasing 
and diversifying its involvement in the colony they were making their 
new home.
130 C.O. Minutes. Hutson to C.O. b7h} 29 Dec. 1915; C.0.83/128.
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INDIAN POLITICAL AWAKENING
III
INDIAN migration to Fiji began in 1879. Thereafter until 1916, some 
62,837 Indians came as indentured labourers.^ The Indians' first 
contact with the Colony was as labourers under this system and their 
first impressions of the country were developed over that period of 
five years when they were legally assigned to a planter, in most cases 
on the estates of the C.S.R.Company. Their treatment here was 
crucial in determining their behaviour and relationships with 
Europeans and the Government afterwards.
How the Indian regarded the indenture system can be illustrated
from the account of Totaram Sanadhya, who after serving his five years
2remained in Fiji for another sixteen. In his view the indenture 
system had replaced slavery to cater for the white man's need of cheap 
labour. The Negro refused to be ensnared a second time so European 
glances were cast towards India and China as alternative sources. 
According to Sanadhya, Indians were worked like animals with the planters 
benefiting from the fruit of their toil'while the Government remained 
indifferent to their plight. Awakened at h a.rn., they had to work for 
10 hours a day for 5 days and for another half-a-day on the sixth, all 
the time mistreated by overseers. Tneir employers, especially the 
C.S.R.Company, were flint-hearted without a trace of compassion, seeing 
their labourers as their mules and oxen. Throughout Sanadhya's pamphlet
1 The indenture system in Fiji is adequately treated in K.L.Gillion, 
(1962). It is not intended to reconsider the subject here but 
merely to emphasize its impact on the Indians themselves and how 
it influenced their political behaviour. A very readable account 
of the system is found in W.Gill, (1970), which describes the 
author's reminiscences as a C.S.R.Company overseer in the last 
days of indenture.
2 Totaram Sanadhya 191U^ a short pamphlet in Hindi.
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this analogy between labourer and beast is frequent. And the 
comparison appears reasonable in the light of the reminiscences of 
Walter Gill.^ No person who went through these wished for a second 
dose if he could avoid it, and this might explain why extremely few 
re-indentured on the expiry of their first term. An indentured 
labourer who had come to Fiji in 1911 and was still alive in 1970 
concluded after relating his experience under the system: 'They
were hard days for us and I am glad that time will not bring them 
back again.'
The experience of the indenture system was without question the 
most important single factor in determining Indian political 
behaviour. As Burton Benedict found in Mauritius, so in Fiji its 
memories and their legacy linger to the present.^ Had the 
labourer been repatriated to India at the end of his contract the 
Colony would not have been left with such a heritage. Instead he 
had the option of settling in Fiji or of waiting another five years 
after the expiry of his contract for repatriation at government 
expense. Altogether 25>,61*5 out of 62,837 Indians were repatriated
7under this agreement during the indenture period. Even though 
some of those repatriated (the exact number is unknown) later 
returned to Fiji, those who left permanently represented a significant 
proportion. This was a reflection on both the conditions within 
the Colony and on the system itself. „-.Yet, the majority remained 
in Fiji and for these, despite the rigours of the past, the Colony 
offered them prospects in the future as 'free' men.
3
3 Indian politicians even today speak thus of the indenture system.
It is wrong to think they are fabricating, this is what they have 
been told by those who experienced the system. A friend once told 
me of having seen whip scars on his father's back put there by a 
white C.S.R.Company overseer. Another related of having seen an 
old man with the scars of fetters on his feet. Over the course 
of years whenever I have heard people speak of indenture (girmit 
as they call it) they always spoke of woe and suffering. The 
Girmit Festival started in 1968 in Suva and is now held annually; 
one can see a few of these former indentured labourers and speak 
to them of their experiences.
1* W.Gill 1970:38,6£.
5 Harigyan Somalia in the F.T. 17 Mar.1970.
6 Benedict 1961:23.
Mayer 1963:21*.7
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THE birth of Indian politics in Fiji was associated with the system 
that brought them to the Colony. It had nothing to do with 
government, or opposition to it, rather it was an attempt to seek 
redress from what was found irksome in the indenture system. And 
perhaps the first action occurred about December 1880 when a number 
of Indians on the Sahl Estate at Naitasiri refused to work and 
'created a disturbance giving considerable annoyance and causingQ
serious loss to the employers'. In their defence the labourers
argued that they had not been engaged to do task work. The
Stipendiary Magistrate described the incident as a test case in court
as to whether labourers were to dictate terms to their employers or9to be governed by them. The question of tasks was the major issue 
in indenture politics. Over-tasking was the cause of the strike of 
300 labourers in 1886 at the C.S.R.Company's Navuso estate. From 
the beginning to the last days strife between employers and their
labourers often involved the question of what constituted a fair
11task. An official reporting to the Colonial Secretary described 
the labourers as:
a people who know that the sole cause of their presence in the., ^  
Colony is to work. Coolies know .that they came here to work.'
Knowing fully their expected role, not all Indians were prepared to
tolerate its miseries, at least some sought to improve their working
conditions. The disputes of 1386 in Koronivia, 1899 in Ba, 1903
in Labasa (involving the Pathans) provide apt illustration.
This is also borne out by perhaps the first recorded public
utterance of the Indians in Rewa and Suva in 1887, although here both
'free' as well as indentured labourers were involved. The Rewa
meeting was held for the purpose of ventiliating grievances and
1 3seeking the means of redress. There were three specific 
complaints: first, that many of them were already 'free' and more
would shortly join that group but land was unavailable for settlement$
8 C.S.0.W81,588/81.
9 ibid.
10 Gillion 1962:83.
11 C.S.0.1300/81,10^0/86,U;3/87,2315/88. Gillion 1962:108-110.
12 C.S.0.1107/86,3U81/87.
13 PVT.27 Aug.1887.
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second, the liquor prohibition ordinance was discriminatory and 
therefore objectionable; and third, interference which deprived them 
of opium was an infringement of their rights as British subjects.
As Government was to blame for this situation they would use no more 
dutiable goods, eschew rice, and live as far as possible on local food. 
This would enable them to save enough money to get them out of Fiji.
The Indians must have seen their position as desperate to resolve on 
such a course of action, especially when they knew that they could be 
repatriated after 10 years continuous stay and the first among them 
would qualify in 1889. Conditions on the Rewa were difficult, and 
a press report stated that in the first 8 months of 1887, 6U3 persons 
were brought from Rewa to Suva for trial and a very large proportion 
of these were Indians. 1
Another meeting was held a couple of months later in Muanikau,
where all the Indians living in and around Suva gathered one Sunday
13afternoon. Here the rates of wages were discussed but most of the 
time was spent on the question of loss of caste as a result of certain 
tasks that they were required to do. Labourers engaged in night work 
for the Town Board were stigmatized as a disgrace to their caste and 
urged to quit; they explained that they could not do so until their 
indenture had expired.
These initial meetings illustrate the nature of Indian politics 
in the early years. The issues discussed were recurring themes and 
became magnified with the passage of time. No single leader emerged 
yet. Rather it was the group which spoke, and led, and bore 
responsibility. A leader could be punished and eliminated by the 
employers or the authorities by the threat of being deprived of his 
means of livelihood; but a united group was not so easily disposed of; 
and pressure and persecution of it might lead to concerted action such 
as strikes on the part of its supporters. This is not to imply that 
'ringleaders' were not to be singled out and enabled to go about their 
business with impunity; solidarity gave greater protection.
Not all the discussions took place in public meetings.
Frequently there were smaller gatherings on Saturdays and Sundays where 
the Ramayan was read and communal matters discussed afterwards;
1li F^T.7 Sept. 1887 
15 F.T. 2 Nov.1887
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newspapers were circulated and collections taken up. In this way 
Indians maintained contact not only with each other but also with 
India and events there. However, they did not intend to plan 
uprisings or formet discontent in the Colony, as two C.S.R.Company 
officials tried to convey to their fellow Europeans, and thereby
17succeeded in frightening the white women of the Lautoka district.
Police constables attended some such.meetings in cognito and found no
evidence of plans for any insurrection though the sub-inspector of
police in Lautoka proposed to raid certain houses to confiscate
seditious literature. As official opinion had it:
there are too many breeds and castes of Indians in this district 
/ Lautoka 7, and their interests are too varied, for a rising to 
be successfully arranged without the matter leaking out almost 
immediately. 18
Indian meetings were not escaping the notice of other communities; 
dangerous interpretations were sometimes placed on innocent 
occurrences.
Some of these gatherings had a legal, even punitive purpose, 
but punishment was meted out among Indians themselves rather than
imposed on members of other races. A case in point was the
19'mock court' meetings held in Rewa during 1910. On one occasion
a man was forced to pay £6 to the father of a girl he no longer
intended to marry or to provide a dinner at his own expense for a
number of people. If he failed to comply he was boycotted socially.
These proceedings were neither secret nor seditious but irksome to
those adjudged guilty. The police sub-inspector of Rewa wrote:
It seems to have been the practice amongst certain influential 
Free Indians in this district such as storekeepers, cane planters, 
sirdars of estates to hold secret council meetings which are 
split up so as to control different parts of the district with 
an appointed speaker. 20
Indian exploited Indian. Class conflicts were in the making.
Another report mentions a meeting of over a hundred Indian 
residents of Samabula, Muanivatu, Nasinu, Tamavua and the surrounding
16 C.S.0.2U56/09.
17 ibid.
18 ibid.
19 C.S.0.6937/10.
20 ibid.
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areas called by Duli Chand to petition the Governor for compensation 
to relatives of those involved in a recent accident at the Harbour 
Works in Suva. Peter Grant suggested that the petitioners should 
also press for higher wages and threaten strike action if their 
request was not met. Several of those present stated that they were 
poor men and could not afford to stop work. In view of Grant's 
action in 1920 perhaps he wished to stir these men against the 
authorities and then help suppress them by aligning himself with 
the Government, gaining the blessing of the latter at the expense of 
the poorer elements within his community. Obviously the working men
had little faith in Grant and the rejection of his advice indicates 
that his standing in his community was not high. He was 
recognized as a mischievous agitator motivated by self-interest. By 
1917 the influence of men like Grant was on the decline because of 
events of the preceding years.
The 190I4. Constitution, which denied the Indians the franchise
presented a new challenge. Hitherto no race had possessed elective
political representation in the Legislative Council. It would have
been futile for the Indians who had come essentially as labourers to
demand it for themselves. Besides, this privilege did not even
exist in India at that stage. But when the Europeans and Fijians
were given representation in the Legislative Council and the Indians
were excluded, the Indian community became aware of its political
status vis a vis the other races. Then in 1909 Indians in their
mother country were given the right to choose their representatives
to the Viceroy's Council. Any sense of innate inadequacy was thereby
removed. For Indians abroad the basis of their rights had been
22enunciated by Lord Salisbury's despatch of 1875. The relevant 
section read:
Above all things we must confidently expect, as an indispensable 
condition of the proposed arrangements, that the Colonial laws 
and their administration will be such that Indian settlers who 
have completed the terms of service to which they agreed as the
21 C.S.0.3558/17.
22 Sanadhya 191U:3
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return for the expense of bringing them to the Colonies, will 
be in all respects free men, with privileges no whit inferior 
to those in any other class of Her Majesty’s subjects resident 
in the Colonies. 23
But the Government of India was unwilling to accept the 'proposed 
arrangements' and involve itself in Indian emigration; it preferred 
an attitude of neutrality, neither encouraging nor discouraging those 
wishing to go abroad as labourers. And recruitment continued despite 
its abuses. By its rejection of Salisbury's proposals the Government 
had also jettisoned its conditions, so it might be argued. Yet the 
crux of Salisbury's despatch was that India should supply labour 
abroad. This continued until 1916 in Fiji. The neutrality of the 
raj in India was inconsequential because it neither stopped 
emigration nor hampered it. If, as some argued, Salisbury's 
conditions could be regarded as inapplicable because of India's 
rejection of his despatch, the statement of the Sanderson Committee 
was surely relevant:
The present Administration itself fully recognizes the value of 
the Indians as permanent settlers, and is willing to concede them 
the enjoyment of equal rights. The whole tenor of the 
correspondence between India and the Colony shows that it was on 
this condition that indentured emigration to Fiji has been allowed 
in the past, and any measures directed towards lowering the 
political status of the immigrants or reducing their economic 
freedom would jn our opinion, involve a breach of faith with 
those affected. 2k
In Fiji, equality in practice was non-existent. Indians had no 
representation in the Legislative Council while Europeans elected six 
members and Fijians indirectly chose two chiefs. Further, in 1915* 
through European pressure, they were virtually removed from the 
Municipal Roll. There were other disabilities imposed upon them, 
such as the discriminatory liquor ordinance. Hence there arose 
the necessity to fight for political rights. To be told that their 
rights as British subjects would not be curtailed and to find they 
were indeed denied them, that they were not equal with others, 
stirred Indians to strive for what they thought was rightfully theirs. 
This new awareness came gradually and was inspired certainly by a 
similar struggle in India at the turn of the century. The need for 
unity, for discussion among themselves and for leadership, all dawned 
upon the ex-indentured men as they felt the sting of continued 
discrimination even though freed of their bondage. It was the
23 Lord Salisbury, Public (Emigration) Despatch to India 39> 2k Mar.
187p . Xerox copy in the Alport Barker Library, Suva.
2k Cmd 5192:87.
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discovery of new needs, and the indignation with inequality of status
that led the more active among them to call on their counterparts in
India for guidance and assistance. One such cry was for a leader
from abroad, someone better equipped by education than themselves.
In the first years of the twentieth century from the ranks of the
ex-indentured Indians there were emerging leaders interested in political
affairs in a purer sense. Men such as J.P.Mahraj, Babu Ram Singh,
Ram Rup, and others, among them some locally-born, gathered around
Totaram Sanadhya and met frequently in Suva to discuss matters of 25Indian concern. These men, through Sanadhya chiefly, it seems,
were in close contact with leaders and happenings in India. Out of
this link and the meetings two positive steps resulted: the approach
to India and Gandhi for an English-speaking Indian lawyer for Fiji,
and the formation in 1911 of the British Indian Association aimed at
alleviating the conditions of the Indians.
Consequently D.M.Manilal, a lawyer who had hitherto championed
Indian rights in Mauritius arrived in Fiji in 1912. He was given27a tumultuous welcome at the wharf by the Indian people. He
informed the press that he had come to Fiji at ’the invitation which
had been extended to him some time ago by some of the time-expired
Indians here, and the object / was 7 to practise law’. It was
later reported that on a Sunday he went up the Rewa River and was
entertained at Naselai by Totaram, an Indian planter:
Hundreds of Indians, free and indentured, were assembled to 
welcome the learned Babu, and a large number of Fijians danced 
mekes in his honour and presented him with mats. 29
Judging from the manner in which he was received, much was expected
of Manilal. In fact, the Mauritian authorities had regarded him as
a mischievous agitator, however, the Colonial Office was unperturbed
30about his arrival in Fiji as it viewed him as irksome but harmless.
25 Gillion 1962:158.
26 It appears that A.C.Mayer's contention that this was the first 
secular association founded by Indians seems justified.
Mayer 1963:30.
27 fYT.5 Sept.1912. Gillion 1962:158.
28 IVF.5 Sept.1912.
29 L lT.19 Sept.1912.
C.O.Minutes to Sweet-Escott to C.0.235* 12 July 1915; C.0.83/126.30
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The arrival of Manilal in 1912 opened a new dimension in Indian 
politics. Henceforth they had their own champion who was willing to 
confront both the Europeans and the colonial regime. The Indian voice 
had to be heard, their grievances listened to, if not, assuaged.
Within a short time he became the spokesman of the Indians partly 
through his own efforts and partly because there was no one else to 
vie for that position. His advice was invariably accepted and his 
leadership followed without question by his supporters. His major 
contribution lay, not in making Indians aware of their disabilities, 
they had been fully aware of these themselves, but in showing them 
how these might be remedied. Indeed he was aided by the Indians 
themselves for without response from them his efforts might have been 
in vain. But his role was indispensable, without him local leaders, 
too aware of their own shortcomings of fluency in English and in 
dealing with Europeans, would have remained without direction and 
spent more time in self-pity than in efforts to remove what they saw 
as their fetters. He provided guidance for action because of the 
absence of dynamic leadership, a fact, which did not escape official 
comment« While his activities seemed to have been confined 
generally to an area stretching from Nausori to Navua with Suva in 
the middle, his reputation and influence apparently extended beyond 
that into the cane farming areas of Viti Levu and to Vanua Levu.
As he was a lawyer he originally sought redress through the courts
of law. Here he was kept busy by compatriots because other advocates
were providing unsatisfactory service. Often lawyers took retainers
from their Indian clients but failed to appear in court on their
behalf and when those victimised sought compensation through another
32solicitor he refused to take action against a fellow professional.
For his efforts to arouse Indians Manilal brought upon himself the 
ire of Europeans, including officials. He decried the 'regrettable 
tendency amongst Indians sometimes to exaggerate the wrongs done to 
them by Europeans as also a tendency many times to pocket insults 
given by Europeans to them quietly'.
It was Manilal who changed the name of the British Indian
31 C.S.0.8910/16.
32 C.S.0.7927/19.
33 C.S.0.10939/1 lu
3k Indian Settler May-June 1917 sU•
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Association to the Indian Imperial Association of Fiji and tried to
transform it into a representative voice of the Indian community. But
3<it never had widespread support. He had intentions of forming a
colony-wide organization. In January 1916 he informed the Acting
Agent-General of Immigration that the Indian Society of Fiji was in
the process of formation but it does not appear to have gone beyond that
stage. Though the intended society did not eventuate, its objects
epitomized the work that Manilal did himself or through the Indian
Imperial Association of Fiji. An aspect was involvement in the first
Indian journal, the bilingual (Hindi and English) Indian Settler which
lasted a very short time indeed and collapsed through a lack of funds.
37Gillion suggests that Manilal was its English editor for a time.
The journal claimed to be a ’medium for the advocacy of the Indian 
cause in Fiji’ with the achievement of the following goals; equality 
for Indians with other races and Indian unity, education, and defence 
'against imputation of encouraging slavery and demonstrate our
^  O
abhorrence of the /"indenture 7 system’. For the Government the
implication was that it would not be permitted to ignore any Indian
39grievance, real, or imagined. Frequent complaints were not likely 
to endear anyone to officials in a colony where the general belief 
was always that the interests of the Indians were more than adequately 
looked after
Officialdom and Europeans generally were even more infuriated by 
Manilal’s willingness to use external help to bring pressure to bear 
on the Fiji Government. For the purpose he utilized the services 
of the Imperial Indian Citizenship Association of Bombay, politicians
39 ' C.S.O.C29/19j 9310/19. The Agent-General of Immigration minuted 
in September 1919 that it had neither a large following nor any 
standing in the Colony and' its membership had shown a slight 
increase only during the recent strike of Indian motor car owners 
and drivers who regarded the Association as their mouthpiece.
36 C.S.O.10798/19.
37 Gillion 1962:199.
38 Indian Settler, Vol.I, No.1,Jan.1917.
39 C.S.0.307/16.
I4O ' . . . there is no part of the Empire where Indians may enjoy 
greater advantages and fewer disabilities than in this Colony.'
C.P.9/21.
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and the Indian press to publicize what he considered disabilitiesI i
imposed on Indians in the Colony. Yet his was not always 
destructive criticism. He recognized the value of Fiji as a region
h2for Indian settlement and encouraged migration from India.
There can be no doubt that ’the work of Doctor Manilal led to a
) ^reawakening of self-respect among the Indians’. It was only after
his arrival that Indians began protesting against the indenture systemlilj , .itself. In 1913 they organized a petition in protest. With his
support they gradually acquired confidence and became more vocal.
Manilal too was responsible in some way for Totaram Sanadhya’s 
campaign against the indenture system in India.^ But in any 
evaluation of Manilal's opposition to indenture two points ought to 
be noted. It was alleged that he himself kept indentured servants 
to the end and prosecuted one of them for desertion; and secondly, 
he accepted the money paid to employers on the abolition of the I n
system though he had described this recompensation as ’blood money’.
In his efforts to arouse Indian political consciousness Manilal
was helped by two other individuals. One was his wife Jaikumari Devi,
who, says C.F.Andrews, was ’loved for her great devotion to the poor,) Rand for her fearless patriotism’. The second person was C.F.Andrews,
who visited Fiji in 1915 and again in 1916 and went from house to house
h9in his investigation of the Indians’ plight. During his visits 
Andrews also started schools for Indians in rural areas in his efforts 
to alleviate one of their major problems. But it must be noted that
U1 Modern Review Feb.1916:197-199.
U2 Modem Review May 1911*: 566-568; Modern Review Mar. 1915:281
h 3 Prasad 1962:7-8. This work is in Kindi.
hk F.T.1 Mar.1913.
U5 Y/.P.H.21 Jun,1917.
k6 Gillion 1962:17U.
kl C.S.O.5087/20; Rodwell to C.O.206,28 Jul.1920; C.0.83/152.
1*8 Modem Review October 1920:382.
k9 Prasad 1962:8.
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Manilal*s success in getting the Indians to articulate their grievances 
against the indenture system was indispensable for the success of 
Andrews1 own mission. The work of the two was complementary, Manilal 
created the atmosphere in which Andrews could be accepted with trust 
and without suspicion or reservation. In turn Andrews was able to 
give publicity to those grievances against which Manilal,,was agitating.
In the field of politics Manilal*s greatest contribution lay in
instigating Indians to seek representation in the Legislative Council.
Thus a number of Indians from all the major centres in Viti Levu
petitioned the Governor that Manilal ought to be nominated as the
£0Indian representative. According to the Governor the petitioners
$1were men of 'some standing in the community*. Their petition bears 
quotation because it illustrates Indian reasons for the request:
(1) That we Indians have no member to represent us in 
the Legislative Council.
(2) That we understand that other British Colonies such 
as Trinidad, British Guiana and Mauritius have given 
Indians representation in their Councils.
(3) In the Legislative Council of Fiji even the Fijians 
have their two representatives and there seems to 
us to be no reason why the Indians who are more 
intelligent than the former, should not be represented.
(U) The Indians have proved themselves loyal and lav/ 
abiding subjects of the British Empire and if an 
Indian representative is added to the Legislative 
Council he will be of service in the administration 
of local affairs. 52
The information about the other colonies was certainly supplied by
Manilal but was inaccurate. There were no Indians in the Council of
British Guiana; they were eligible for election but hitherto had been
unsuccessful. Perhaps most revealing was the arrogant attitude
towards the Fijians. The prejudice sprang from ignorance resulting
from a lack of contact between the two races. Nonetheless the
response to the petition was favourable though the Governor was quick
to restate that Indian interests were as well catered for as they would
53have been if an Indian were in the Legislative Council. If an 
Indian with the necessary qualification could be found the Governor was
50 c.s.0.U365/l5,588ii/l5.
51 Sweet-Escott to C.0.235,12 July 1915; C.0.83/126.
52 Enel. ibid.
53 C.S.0.1i365/15.
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prepared to make the nomination but it was premature for such an 
caappointment. But if the Indian Government favoured the granting of 
the petition he would not object. The Colonial Office submitted the 
petition to India Office for comment with the reservation that 
difficulty might be had in finding suitable local Indians for the task. 
There was no deception in this, but the dearth existed because of 
government neglect in providing facilities for Indian education. It 
was decided by the Colonial Office that despite the justification for 
the petition no action ought to be taken immediately unless pressure 
came for it from the India Office.
This was indicative of a pattern. Indians in the Colony could be 
ignored and their requests shelved indefinitely. But if there was 
pressure from the India Office, then it had to be considered, if not 
satisfied. In its own turn the India Office planned its strategy 
according to exigencies in India and. its moves were dictated by the 
advice of the rulers of the sub-continent. In other words the fate 
of overseas Indians in such matters depended on India itself. If 
their aspirations threatened the British raj, if for instance, Indian 
public opinion championed their cause, and had to be placated then 
the despatch writers would be quick to pass the message to the India 
Office which would then bring pressures to bear by various means and 
degrees on the Colonial Office to alleviate the situation. If, on 
the other hand, nothing disrupted the tenor of the India Office or 
if the Colonial Office decided to turn a deaf ear or resort to 
delaying tactics then remedy might be distant or not forthcoming.
And indeed on this occasion it was the India Office, acting on the 
suggestion of the Government of India, which transmitted to the 
Colonial Office the advice to provide Indian representation in the 
Fiji Legislative Council.^ Once the Indian Government had been 
informed of the correspondence -it noted that the Fiji Letters Patent 
did not provide for the nomination of unofficial members whether 
Indian or European although the latter could vote and be candidates for 
the Legislative Council, while other races were debarred from this
Sh
55
56
C.s.0.588^/15.
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privilege so that ’it would appear that Indians in Fiji are under a 
political disability to which they are not subject in any other 
colonies which recruit Indian labour’. The removal of this 
disability was demanded but it was added that parity with Fijian 
representation would not be insisted upon since there would be 
difficulty in finding a suitable person. The Indian Government was 
realistic in its approach:
Moreover in the present state of education among the Indian 
immigrants, it appears that nothing more than a theoretical 
equality would be secured by throwing elections open to 
them, nor do the petitioners themselves ask that they should 
be admitted to the privilege of taking their chance at the 
polls. 58
It recommended that the Governor have power to nominate an Indian
who possessed all the qualifications, except for the racial ones,
required by Articles 15 and 20 of the Fiji Letters Patent of
31 January 191lu At the same time it realised that this would make
Manilal, who was not a British subject, ineligible.
The Colonial Office informed the Governor that instead of eleven
officials he might appoint twelve, of whom eleven were to hold public
offices while the twelfth was to be an Indian British subject not in59public service. If such a person could not be found then the 
position was to be left vacant. Such a step raised the all-important 
question of precedence in the Legislative Council. As a sort of 
’official’, the nominated Indian would have priority over both the 
European elected members and the two Fijian members. Secondly if he 
voted with the non-officials it would reduce, though not destroy, the 
government majority. But the first problem had to be solved. Both 
Europeans and Fijians would resent any such precedence over them and 
it was resolved that the Indian nominated member should come after them.
YJith Manilal disqualified and not recommended by either of them, 
the Colonial Office did not expect the Governor to find a suitable 
person for some time.^0 Therefore it was with some surprise that the 
Governor’s despatch was received in January 1917 stating that he hoped
57 ibid.
58 ibid.
59 C.O. to Sweet-Escott Conf. 8 Aug.1916; C.0.83/13U.
60 C.O.Minutes Sweet-Escott to C.O.362, 1 Dec.1916; C.O.83/133.
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to report by next mail that he had appointed ’a native of India, of 
good position’ to the newly-created seat. The Colonial Office saw 
no need to convey this to the India Office until the Governor had made 
the selection. Moreover a fait accompli prevented India Office 
from making any recommendations of its own.
Governor Sweet-Escott selected Badri Mahraj for the honour, a
name that had been suggested to him no doubt by officials, and other
Europeans in social contact with them, during his last visit to the
61Lautoka and Ba districts. In this process of ’king-making’ the 
Agent-General of Immigration, R.M.Booth, played the role of furnishing 
the Governor with information for the purpose. But Booth had never 
met the candidate and all he knew was that Badri had two sons at 
Wanganui College in New Zealand; his solicitor Robert Crompton 
maintained that he had no difficulty in paying the school fees, 
estimated at about £350 p.a. When the Governor met Badri on 
27 November at Government House he was disappointed at his knowledge 
of English but was ’satisfied that he is as suitable a candidate for 
a seat in the Legislative Council as a representative of Indian 
interests as can be found at the present time'.^ The Governor had 
already made up his mind, and any shortcomings of his choice could 
be explained away.
Badri Dutt had been b o m  in the village of Bamanli in the district
65of Garhwal son of Pundit Rashi Rasu, an astrologer of repute. He
66was not a Brahmin but a Chattri. The suffix ’Mahraj' which was 
a title given to Brahmins was bestowed upon Badri in Fiji. He was 
a hard-working man who had arrived in Fiji in 1890 as an indentured 
labourer and begun work with the Melbourne Trust Ltd in Penang for 
5/6 a week. He commuted his indenture after three years but continued 
on the sugar estate there. Being literate he was transferred to the
61 Sweet-Escott to C.0.370, 20 Dec.1916; C.O.83/1335 C.S.0.9633/16
62 C.S.0.7310/16.
63 R.M.Booth to Col.Sec., 8 Nov.1916 Enel. 
20 Dec. 1916; C.0.83/133.
Sweet-Escott to C.O.370,
6U Sweet-Escott to C.0.370, 20 Dec. 1916; C.O.83/133.
65 Caiman 1952:95.
66 Sweet-Escott to C.0.370, 20 Dec. 1916; C.O.83/133.
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b la c k sm ith 's  shop to  keep reco rd s  o f equipm ent, and by h is  own i n t e r e s t  
and e f f o r t  le a r n t  th a t  tra d e  as w e ll .  E v en tu a lly  he became th e  
Company's b lack sm ith . From a European, F .B urness, he o b ta ined  lau d  
which he c u l t iv a te d  w hile s t i l l  working fo r  the  sugar company. In  
1900 he took  over U,000 a c res  fo r  1 0 /-  a t  an annual r e n ta l  of £i|0;
z 7
of th e se  500 a c res  were c u l t iv a b le  and th e  r e s t  was fo r  g raz in g .
By 191h he had 300 te n a n ts ,  who p a id  no re n t  fo r  a few y ears  u n t i l
68th e  lan d  had been broken. M oreover, in  I 89I1 he had s ta r te d  th e  
f i r s t  school f o r  In d ian s  in  a F i j i a n  bure  and a t  th e  tim e of h is  
nom ination he was s t i l l  invo lved  in  t h i s  ta s k .  Judging by h is  
a c tio n  in  sending h is  sons abroad f o r  ed u ca tio n  he was among th e  
f i r s t  o f h is  race  in  F i j i  to  accep t i t s  va lue  fo r  advancement. His 
involvem ent in  education  and h is  g e n e ro s ity  to  h is  te n a n ts  would have 
been s u f f ic ie n t  to  have won p ra is e  f o r  him from h is  community.
VJhen he ro se  to  th e  employer c la s s  he adopted i t s  argument th a t  th e  
in d en tu re  system was no t beyond reform . Yet he e a r ly  showed 
q u a l i t i e s  th a t  sep a ra ted  him from o th e r  men. In  t h i s  sense he was 
a lre ad y  an emerging le a d e r  i f  n o t an e s ta b lis h e d  one, be fo re  th e  
a r r i v a l  in  F i j i  o f M an ila l. He was c e r ta in ly  conversan t w ith  th e  
needs and g rievances of h is  ra c e . Perhaps because he had done w e ll 
he may n o t have been sym pathetic  to  a l l  t h e i r  com pla in ts. Like o th e r  
self-m ade men he may no t have been to le r a n t  o f th o se  who d is s ip a te d  
more energy in  s e l f - p i t y  th an  in  im proving t h e i r  s t a tu s .
In  th e  1916 h a rv e s tin g  season he expected  h is  land  to  y ie ld
692,000 to n s  o f sugar cane which would b r in g  him about £1,500.
No o th e r  c r i t e r io n  was n ecessa ry  to  measure h is  su ccess . The
o f f i c i a l  op in ion  in  th e  d i s t r i c t  was:
B adri i s  a man of good c h a ra c te r ;  w e ll spoken of by 
Europeans who have had b u s in ess  tr a n s a c t io n s  w ith  him 
and i s  h ig h ly  re sp ec ted  by h is  countrymen over whom 
he has co n sid erab le  in f lu e n c e .
I  b e lie v e  Badri i s  to ' a g re a t e x te n t a s e l f -  
ta u g h t man. He has very  f a i r  c o l lo q u ia l  knowledge of 
E n g lish , reads i t  a l i t t l e  b u t beyond sig n in g  h is  name 
I  cannot say he w rite s  i t .  He bo th  reads and w r ite s  
H indi and has some knowledge o f S a n sc rit*  He i s  a
6? Caiman 1952:95-96.
68 ib id .
69 H erbert Disbrovre to  Booth, 3 Nov. 1916 end«. Sw eet-E sco tt to  
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strong advocate in favour of education. He has been 
instrumental in opening up a school for Indian lads 
at Yatiritiri and it is mainly through his personal 
interest and financial support that it has been kept 
going. He has also subscribed £^0 towards the funds 
of the Indian School it is proposed to open at Lautoka.
Badri is without doubt the best fitted of any 
Indian I know for a seat in the Legislative Council, 
he is intelligent, and broad-minded and progressive 
in his views. He is highly respected by and has 
undoubted influence over his compatriots. 70
Better still he had been of assistance to the Government on more than
one occasion. At the outbreak of war in 191U his vigilance had been
useful in thwarting a European merchant, Ragg, from purchasing all
available stocks of rice in Ra, in order to have a monopoly and
71dictate prices when shortage occurred. Badri it was who alerted 
officials in his area to Ragg's design and the Government was thus 
able to take appropriate action in time, averting possible 
black-marketeering.
Opposition to Badri Mahraj emerged before his appointment and it
came from an unexpected quarter. The Fiji Times in an editorial
argued that the Government was proposing to nominate an Indian to
the Legislative Council so that it might ’with righteousness pride
itself of having accorded political representation to the large
72Indian population of Fiji’. It went on that it had oeen rumoured
that 'one Badri Mahraj, a wealthy but uneducated Indian of Penang’
was to be the choice and if this was true then:
the intelligent Indians in our midst have been cruelly 
insulted, and they should rise in a body and protest 
against such injustice. The whole thing is a hollow 
sham, and it would need but a child to see through the 
tissue-paper veil which the Government have weaved over 
this affair.
The Indian representative is to be permitted to 
freely voice the Indian grievances, but if an uneducated 
man is appointed, he will naturally take his cue from 
the Governor, and, in short, will sit on the Council as 
a Governmental marionette. The two native members are 
ridiculous dummies, but the appointment of a,n uneducated 
Indian member will be even more ridiculous.
70 ibid.
71 ibid.
72 F.T. 1 Dec.1916
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As there was no competent and educated person fit for that task in Fiji*
someone from India could be brought out and if he did not have to be
an Indian then perhaps C.F.Andrews might be considered. But if the
Governor had Badri in mind then it ought to be honest and eliminate
the proposal. Next a letter appeared in the same paper agreeing that
the selection of the uneducated Badri would be an insult to the
73Indian community and proposing Manilal as an alternative. ' Again
strangely the Fiji Times responded by saying that if the choice were
to be confined to Fiji then Manilal was the only suitable person.
Another correspondent thought that no one was less suitable than 
7)Manilal. This brought forth a letter in defence of Manilal and
the statement that he did not court such an appointment and actually
favoured Y.M.Pillay of Lautoka for the position. The same
correspondent thought some ex-interpreter would be better or even
Rev.Nunn, Rev.Steadman or Rev.Piper. Despite these comments there
was no major storm in the press on the issue. Generally the
Europeans appeared apathetic and most Indians were incapable of
writing letters in English. The Governor's choice was officially
gazetted on 22 December and this resulted in yet another
77)condemnatory editorial in the Fiji Times. From seventy-nine
Indians, mainly from Suva, a petition had been sent to the Governor
before he publicly announced his nominee stating that though the
right to nominate their representative rested with His Excellency
and they themselves were unfit for the task, they felt of the very
77few educated Indians among them, Manilal was the most suitable.
7 ftFrom Nadi came a similar request. The preference of Badri Mahraj 
over Manilal certainly did not stir a storm anything like the one 
that was to rage in 1920 when a restriction order forced the latter 
to quit Fiji. How the Indian community precisely felt is difficult 
to assess but the Indian Settler perhaps summed up the manner of
73 FjT.2 Dec. 1916.
7k fVT.6 Dec. 1916.
75 JYT.9 Dec. 1916.
76 F.T.23 Dec. 1916.
77 Enel. Sweet-Escott to C.0.370, 20 Dec. 1916; C.S.0. 9263/16.
78 C.S.0.99U6/16.
81
majority acceptancei
The choice of Mr Badri Mahraj, of Penang, Fiji to a seat 
in the Legislative Council, as a representative of the 
Indian peopulation of this Colony, appears to us a wise 
one. The hon. gentleman strikes us a keen business man, 
and one not likely to be led away by half-educated members 
of the community, who would very much like to make use of 
the honourable member in stirring up strife where a full 
enquiry will elucidate matters. We have had more than 
one interview with the Hon.Badri Mahraj, and we are more 
than pleased to note ohe quiet, unobtrusive manner in 
which he listens to his more noisy associate in a complaint, 
and finally suggests it would be better to form a 
judgement after a thorough inquiry than to complicate matters 
by a too hasty publicity. We feet sure that the honourable 
gentleman will be of great assistance to us, his countrymen, 
and the Colony in general. We are aware that it is not 
always the one who talks too much that gets listened to 
with feeling. 79
The question remains whether Badri Mahraj was fit to represent 
his people. In answer, it must first be considered whether there were 
alternatives. Manilal was the obvious alternative but he was 
unacceptable to the Government. Ih Council he would have too 
frequently stirred the hornets' nest and brought the swarm about the 
Government's ear. He had come to Fiji-to practise law and provide 
leadership and he had a reputation of being an agitator in Mauritius 
where he had spoken out boldly for Indians and come into conflict with 
the authorities. Had he been in the Legislative Council the pattern 
would have been repeated and the Government itself would have been 
responsible for providing him with a public platform to air his 
views. Government action would have elevated him officially as the 
Indian leader and once this was done it would have had to pay heed 
to his voice. Already his branding of indenture as slavery ran 
counter to official and European attitudes. Therefore to have 
expected the Governor to nominate Manilal was unrealistic. Moreover 
the official representative of Indian affairs was the Agent-General 
of Immigration and the Governor could not appoint anyone who might 
get the better of this man in debates on Indian issues and prove 
more knowledgeable. The Governor could only choose someone who would 
work under the aegis of this official protector, run to him fcr advice 
and occasionally make suggestions to him which, if ignored, would not 
lead to open confrontation. The nomination of an Indian member was
79 Indian Settler, Vol.I, No.2, February 1917
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not meant to usher in an era of drastic revision of the regime's 
Indian policy, in so far as one existed. The act was designated to 
grant the bare substance of the demand, not its soul. Hence the 
nominee had to be one from whom the Government could obtain cooperation, 
one who might easily accept official interpretation of events (as 
Badri did on the indenture system and industrial strife). He had to 
be one dependent on the Government rather than capable of independent 
assertion.
Of the others, there was V.M.Pillay, a Lautoka shopkeeper, who had 
arrived in the Colony with capital before 191U and was supposed to 
have been the recommendation of Manilal. In 1921 the Governor was to 
choose him for the abortive commission to enquire into the grievances 
of the strikers. But even then he was deemed unsuitable by his 
compatriots. His final end was bankruptcy through bad management 
of his business.^
Another aspirant was Peter Grant who spoke English well. But
he was a Christian, a minority group in the Indian community. Besides
he was not a popular man and suspected of partiality towards the
81regime by his compatriots. Equally unsatisfactory might have been
the choice of a European Christian missionary. These men frequently
had prejudices which would have prevented an adequate appreciation
82of the Indian point of view. Their first station in life was 
service to the Wesleyan Mission and the axiom that no man can serve 
two masters was as applicalbe to them as to anyone else. Their 
ultimate goal was Christianization, and they were bound to show 
favouritism, as they did, towards those who had washed in their 
baptismal waters. A population predominantly Hindu and Muslim, 
determined to remain so through fire and water, could not be 
represented in Council by men who had dedicated their life to 
subverting their religion and culture.
80 Gillion 1962:13U.
81 Oral Evidence.
82 Burton (1910) wrote in his Preface: 'Today there are over 1*0,000
Indians settled in these islands. Cargoes of the frankest 
'heathenism' come every year, and thus the numbers grow by leaps 
and bounds. What does this mean to the Christian Church here?
It means that unless tremendous and sustained effort is put forth, 
the sign of the Cross will be displaced by the Hindu trident and 
Muhammedan Crescent.'
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To have brought someone out from India would not have been 
practical. He would have taken time to become acquainted with 
local conditions. Even C.F.Andrews might not have been suitable.
His close association with Gandhi would have rendered him suspect in 
the eyes of the Government and the Europeans. Secondly, there would 
have been too much of a tendency to link events in Fiji with India and 
vice versa, to the disadvantage of Fiji Indians who needed to find a 
place for themselves in their new home instead of clinging to what they 
had chosen to leave. The Fiji Indians needed greater identification 
with Fiji and a nominee from India would have been an obstacle to this 
great prerequisite to their acceptance in the Colony. The Fiji 
Indians would have been seen as an inseparable part of India; this 
would have prolonged the habit of regarding him as an immigrant 
rather than a permanent settler in Fiji.
It was essential that the nominee be an Indian and be of Fiji, 
not a transient but a permanent dweller, one who had made his choice 
(unlike Manilal at this stage) and saw Fiji as his home. And it 
was preferable that he bear some connection, direct or by descent, 
with the indenture system as most Indians in Fiji did. Moreover as 
most Indians in Fiji at the time were rural dwellers involved in the 
cultivation of the land, it was also preferable that the privileged 
man be one who understood their ways and needs, instead of an urban 
professional who might assume their wants and whose way of thinking 
was foreign to them. He ought to be a man who might appreciate the 
vacillations of their fortunes and seek to remedy them for their 
own sake, not a person who might capitalize on their misery and 
exploit it for political goals which to the cultivator meant no 
alleviation of suffering. Under the circumstances then the choice of 
Badri Mahraj, ex-indentured labourer, farmer and landowner, was perhaps 
better than continued denial of. representation of Indians by an Indian. 
He may not have read law books or any books in English, but he was 
sufficiently coherent in that tongue to make himself understood. 
Besides, in the entrenched Crown Colony system where the will of the 
official majority always prevailed the loud pleas of an English- 
educated lawyer could be as easily overruled and ignored as the 
whispers of the rustic barely able to speak the English language.
The tumult of words could easily antagonize reluctant guardians while
8U
the quiet request might find sympathy. And the Indian plight at the 
time needed sympathy more than anything else.
When Badri Mahraj was nominated Indians were regarded essentially 
as labourers; the indenture system still prevailed. They were 
considered indispensable as labourers and both officialdom and settlers 
felt that this in fact ought to remain their function. Hence the 
franchise was not to be considered for them an absolute right. Under 
their existing status it could not be bestowed upon them when the 
Fijians, whose interests were deemed paramount, remained without it.
And the Indians were neither sufficiently literate nor organized with 
a unified voice to clamour for it.
THE INDIAN PROBLEM
THE first effective recommendation that Indians be granted the
franchise did not originate either at Government House, Suva or in
Whitehall. It was suggested by one, C.W.Doorly, who had been Fiji
Government Emigration Agent in India and was sensitive to the trend
of events there. He wrote to a Colonial Office official who had
sought his advice on the labour question:
My knowledge of the opinions held by leaders of native public 
opinion in India has forced me to the definite conclusion that 
no scheme for the future emigration of Indians to Fiji will 
be accepted unless it assures to all Indians in the Colony 
Pull political rights. 1
This was at a time when it was certain that indentured labourers would
no longer be available for Fiji (only the exact date of abolition
remained to be determined) and it was thought imperative for the
Colony's solvency to continue emigration from India in some form.
On the same day that Doorly's letter arrived at the Colonial Office,
Thomas Hughes, the C.S.R.Company's roving ambassador on the labour
issue, told an official in the Colonial Office that Indian politicians
had been favourably disposed towards British Guiana because of its
elective institutions and the presence cf Mr Luckoo, an Indian elected
member in that colony's delegation, had had an excellent influence.
If Fiji could have two elected Indians in its Council then the effect
2would be equally beneficial. But Green, a senior Whitehall official, 
minuted that in British Guiana there was a common electorate for 
whites, negroes and Indians whereas in Fiji the Europeans would never 
consent to an electorate with a coloured majority. Besides, two 
representatives for 60,000 Indians as opposed to six for 5,000 
Europeans would constitute 'an obvious disability for the former'.
He advised that they suggest to the Governor of Fiji that if he 
recommended it, the Secretary of State would authorize the amendment 
of that country's constitution to enable the election of two 
Indians to its Legislative Council.
1 Doorly to Green, Private, 11 Nov. 19195 C.0.83/1U9-
2 Minutes, ibid.
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Hughes had also spoken on the sane subject to Sir Henry Lambert,
permanent head of the Colonial Office. Lambert minuted:
Mr Hughes spoke to me about this and it certainly seems to me 
an effective piece of shop window dressing to offer say a 
couple of elected seats to Indians. I don’t want to be cynical, 
but I don't think it really matters what the franchise, since 
the Indians are quite incapable for the most part of exercising 
it properly. On this ground the broadest manhood suffrage would 
be best. But local conditions must largely determine this. 3
To this, the Under Secretary of State, Amery added:
I don't think we can have Indians on the same electorate and 
would suggest a separate electorate with a reasonably wide 
franchise as proposed and bring officials up to 12. 4
These views were embodied in a telegram sent on 21 November to the
5Governor of Fiji.
From the Colonial Office views mentioned above two points emerge. 
First, the elective principle was not accorded because the Indian 
deserved it or was entitled to it, nor was it io be a privilege 
extended to a subject race. Its design was to entice Indian 
politicians into agreeing to the emigration of their countrymen as 
labourers to Fiji. Secondly, the franchise was to be communal in 
recognition of likely European opposition to having Indian voters 
in their own electorate. These initial decisions, especially the 
second, became increasingly important as the negotiations between 
Fiji, India and London followed a long and tortuou<= ccurse full of 
argument and disagreement before the franchise became a reality for 
the Indian people in the Pacific colony.
The response of Governor Rodwell was favourable. He was 
certain that the European elected members would support political 
rights for Indians and there would be no difficulty in working out
3 ibid.
4 ibid. ?
5 The telegram read: 'Doorly holds opinion that unless Indians
have political rights, any scheme of Indian emigration will be 
unacceptable. He suggests that Indian community should elect two* 
or more representatives to Legislative Council. I am impressed by 
advice as to effect on Indian opinion of franchise in British 
Guiana. t would agree to two members being elected by Indians if 
you should so recommend. In order to safeguard official majority 
add another two representatives. Separate Indian electorate with 
fairly wide franchise would seem desirable. Please consider 
whether an offer of this kind could be made to Indian Government 
and report by telegram.’ C.O. to Rodwell, Tel. 21 Nov. 1919;
C.0.83/149.
6 Rodwell to C.O. Tel. 29 Nov. 1919; C.0.83/149.
the qualifications for electors and candidates even though these
needed serious consideration. In his mind too the question of a
guaranteed labour supply dominated. At that time he was hoping that
the indenture system would remain till the end of the following March
because the independent planters were still dismayed and anxious
about financial losses* though the C.S.R.Company with greater
resources was reconciled to abolition at the end of the year. But
the planters too were prepared to accept this date if it was the only7means of getting more Indian labourers. Because of the extreme 
importance of the labour question to Fiji* Rodwell wanted the 
Government of India to discuss the subject with the unofficial Fiji 
mission comprising the Colonial Treasurer* Rankine. and the Anglicang
Bishop in Polynesia.
The pressure of forces in India demanding immediate abolition
proved greater than the objections of planters in Fiji seeking time in
order to minimize financial losses. All indentures were cancelled
from the first day of 1920. To those* like Europeans in Fiji* who
maintained that advantages in the indenture system outweighed
disadvantages* its end meant a concession to Indian opinion which
henceforth was expected to show gratitude for such magnanimity. One
system had been decreed unfit for continuation, but another had to be
found to ensure that Indian labour flowed to Fiji's shores. India
held the key and there was no sense in offending it provided it did
not demand an unreasonable price. With this consideration before them
the members of the Fiji Executive Council approved that on
9 January 1920 the Governor should publicly announce the franchise for
Indians to come into effect at a later date on the basis of two
oIndian members to be elected by their own race.
But on 15 January 1920 Indian labourers employed by the Government 
and the Suva Municipal Council went on strike demanding higher wages. 
The strike spread to Nausori and Navua where it affected labourers in 
the sugar industry. It also extended to Levuka for a short duration.
7 ibid.
8 ibid.
9 Minutes Ex. Co. 6 Jan. 1920. C.A.b/9.
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Essentially it was inspired by economic conditions, wages had failed
to keep pace with rising prices. Bat as the strike continued (it
ended abruptly on 16 Februar;/) it acquired political and racial 
10overtones. On 11, 12 and 13 February in isolated incidents, law 
and order broke down though disorder did not prevail in the strike 
districts as a whole. In one case, in Samabuia, an Indian died when 
the police fired to disperse an angry crowd. The strike had a 
traumatic effect; Indians became more uncertain of their position 
while Europeans hitherto unanimous in their demands for mere Indian 
labourers felt a need for caution. The strike also divided the 
Indian community. Certain groups, especially some Indian Christians, 
stood apart from the rest of their compatriots and sided with the 
Government.'^ Also because of his role in encouraging Indians to
strike and in adopting an overall political stance, Manila! was
forced to leave Fiji. The Government was indignant; Rodwell
publicly stated; ’As to the strike and the encompanying disorders,
the former was unjustifiable and the latter were criminal and
12injurious to every interest.1 ' A Government Commission appointed
to inquire into the cost of living claimed that prices had risen by
100% when the town labourers’ wages had increased from 2/- in 1910 
13to 2/6 in 1919» Yet more important for our study, the Governor 
minuted that as a consequence of the dispute action on Indian 
political rights had been deliberately deferred because their 
behaviour in certain distr-5 cts indicaued that the time was not 
opportune.^ The whole subject was to be reviewed on the return 
of the unofficial Fiji delegation from India and if India raised 
queries about political rights it was to be informed that the 
dislocation caused by the strike had deprived the Government of an
13opportunity to consider it further.
10 Based on oral evidence.
11 Oral evidence.
12 L.C.Debates 1920:7.
13 Mayer 1963:37*
1li Minutes, Rodwell, 11 May 1920; C.A.I4/IU. 
1£ ibid. C.A.V15*
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In India itself, the unofficial deputation of the Bishop in
Polynesia and Mr Rankine met obstacles rather than success and
prospects for emigration to Fiji appeared dim,,'. Indian leaders were
not well-disposed to their compatriots' emigrating merely to become
servants of European masters opposed to their raising themselves to
16equal political status or to competition in commerce. Despite the
delegation’s objections and explanation, the guarantee of political
rights for Indians as offered by British Guiana was being sought from
Fiji as well. The Government of India wrote to the Fiji delegation
on 19 March 1920 and asked that Fiji guarantee for Indians by an
17ordinance, equal rights with other communities residing there.
Moreover, India was prepared to accept the franchise which allowed
the election of two Indians by members of their community. If Fiji
were prepared to give the guarantee, then India would send a
deputation to examine the possibility of emigration to Fiji as well
18as the adequacy of wages. The Government of Fiji was prepared to
oblige and the European elected members and the Council of Planters 
1 oconsented. ' Thus Fiji signified its willingness to carry out its
side of the bargain. And despite the events of 1920, the Governor,
though angry with the Indians for the nature of their retaliation,
was quick to admit that a gulf did exist between the rulers and the
ruled and that the former were out of touch with the latter. To
remedy this he asked the Secretary of State to sanction the
appointment of two advisers whose duties would be
to keep in touch with Indian and Fijian native feeling 
throughout the Colony, to advise Government on political 
questions and to visit districts with a view to securing 
uniformity in policy among district officers but without 
usurping /"the 7 executive function of the latter. 20
For the Fijian part an officer was available locally but for the
16 Rankine 2 and 9 Apr.1920. Enel. Rodwell to C.O.Conf. 30 June 
1920; C.0.83/191 and 1 July 1920; C.0.83/192.
17 C.S.O. 989/27; C.P.19/27» The full report without the 
deletions for its publication as C.P.19/27 can be found as an 
enclosure in C.O. to O.A.G.Conf. 30 March 1929»
18 Minutes, 1.0. to C.O. 11 Feb. 1921; C.O.83/199»
19 Raju Report:i.
Rodwell to C.O.Conf. Tel. 21 July 1920. As a result a Secretary 
for Indian Affairs was appointed in 1927»
20
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Indians one was sought from the Indian Civil Service on the
recommendation of the Indian Government. In the Colonial Office* the
request was viewed with sympathy and sanctioned, though there were
21doubts whether anyone could be obtained from India. What is 
noteworthy is that the Government in Fiji, even if its motives might 
have been to procure labour, as they definitely were on the franchise 
issue, was recognizing the need to understand the Indian by 
establishing a communication link with him. That a similar attitude 
was evident concerning the Fijians indicates that the intention was 
to prevent outbreaks like the January-February strike. The 
Governor's plan implied a change in the overall place of the Indian in 
Fiji, with the inference that he was no longer just an immigrant 
labourer but a permanent citizen whose grievances had to be 
investigated and where possible alleviated. The franchise itself 
implied citizenship, or did it? The answer might be found in a 
discussion of the Davson Report.
On 2$ August 1 920 the Governor appointed a Commission to make
22recommendations on Indian representation. It held three public 
meetings, two in Suva and one in Lautoka, but the response was meagre, 
despite wide publicity and an invitation to the public to give 
evidence. In addition to voluntary witnesses the Commission obtained 
information and suggestions from others it summoned. The poor 
response was due essentially to the lack of education and literacy 
within the community. The strike, the reaction of the other races 
to it, and the departure of the Manilals during the year, had all been 
too recent for the Indians; they were left dazed, unable to prepare 
for the Commission. The exit of D.M.Manilal left the community 
leaderless and seemingly apathetic, especially in Suva. But this 
did not mean that Indians were indifferent to political representation 
at this stage. It had already been decided that Indians ought to 
have members in the Legislative Council, all the Commission had to 
do was recommend who should choose and be chosen and how this might 
be done.
21 C.O. to Rodwell Tel. 30 July 1920. Lambert minuted the Governor's
telegram: 'Neither the Fijian mind, nor the Indian mind, is
intelligible to the ordinary white man and if the Governor feels 
in the dark (as he probably did when the riots broke out) he is 
entitled to expect assistance.'
22 C.P.1/21; C.S.O. 718/21. The Commissioners were C.S.Davson, 
Chief Justice of Fiji and Chairman, C.G.B.Francis, H.M.Scott,
P.R.Backhouse, P.G.Pilling, R.A.Harricks, Badri Mahraj.
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The Commission decided to accept a knowledge of English or any 
of five Indian dielects for eligibility to vote, though a candidate 
was required to have a sound knowledge of English because this was 
essential to the understanding of the proceedings of the Council. For 
voters the stipulated literacy qualification was thought essential 
because it enabled them to exercise their ballot secretly. Property 
qualifications were to be half those fixed for Europeans. The two 
Indians were to be chosen from a colony-wide constituency though 
the Commission advised that if at some later stage the number of 
Indian representatives was increased to three then the Colony would 
without difficulty be divided into three electorates.
Along with the report of the Commission the minutes of evidence
were also published. Since there is no other material available on
what the Indians thought on the issue, the minutes bear examination
in order to obtain some picture of their views or at least, a
23section of the community.
Where discussion occurs on the question of qualifications for 
the franchise, it becomes apparent that divisions, both class and 
communal, existed within the community. There was a consensus that 
property, income and literacy tests (although these were to be in 
one of the vernacular dialects) should be considered before granting 
the franchise to an individual. There was no universal call that all 
Indians above a certain age should be permitted to vote. There was 
awareness that the literacy tests would severely restrict the vote. 
Whereas the Commission as a whole was unprepared to state what 
percentage of the Indian population was literate, according to 
S.S.Chowla, a civil servant, and Swami Saraswati, a Hindu priest, it 
ranged from 10% to 1f>%. The South Indians sent in a letter of 
protest when they heard rumours that only those with property or 
leaseholds of at least 10 acres would be eligible to vote. They 
stated that most of the Indians in the Colony were poor and would thus 
remain disfranchised. But their letter also betrayed linguistic-
23 The discussion that follows, unless otherwise specified, is based 
on the minutes of evidence of the public hearings of the 
Commission and were published as C.P.1/21.
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communal feeling:
The Calcuttans who arrived in the Colony many years before the 
Madrasis, and also a number of Panjabis who came as passengers, 
possess property and wealth, while the poor Madrasis who came 
only a few years back possess neither wealth nor property.
There are many illiterate among the Calcuttans and Punjabis 
to whom a lecture is given who can neither understand nor 
grasp the purport of it, and if they are asked to vote for 
anything they will at once give their vote without knowing 
for whom they have voted.
Equally, the Agent-General of Immigration, Backhouse, one of the 
Commissioners, told a witness that where northern Indians dominated 
and the southerners were in a minority, the former would swamp the 
latter if the question arose of choosing representatives for a 
panchayat. The differences were not new, their origins were as old 
as India itself and were introduced into Fiji by the immigrants 
themselves. Their nature was such that they might remain submerged 
only till the time when a clash of interests arose; thenihey would 
surface. They needed to be recognized and emphasized not only 
because they affected local politics, but also because in analyses 
of colonial political situations there is a tendency to stress 
discrimination between black and white,, and to ignore or minimize 
racial and other differences between black and black and within each 
black society.
There were also strong class boundaries. A correspondent from 
Ba wrote that cane-growers hated labourers; if the former alone 
were permitted to vote then the latter would suffer. This was voiced 
before the cane strike of the following year when some Indian 
employers were adversely affected but apparently sided with their 
compatriots. This collaboration may have been necessitated by the 
fact that the Indian growers had no other alternative at a time when 
animosity towards the whole Indian community ran high. Between the 
propertied and the non-propertied Indians in Fiji the relationship 
has always been characterized by condescension and contempt on one 
side and distrust and envy on the other. The ’have-nots’ have 
never been particularly reluctant to air their knowledge of the 
methods whereby the ’haves' reached that status and the remark of 
District Officer Henry Pilling that ’it is rather a sign of a good 
Indian not to own a great deal of property’ is not totally without
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foundation.2 "^ One class of Indians regarding themselves better than 
another was not confined to Indians themselves; it was accepted by 
Europeans including the officials. And on the franchise issue that 
element which had to arrogate to itself the description of the better 
or elevated group thought it was deserving of some form of citizenship. 
An interpreter who advocated an income qualification of £120 p.a. 
recognized that this would exclude a very large number and added that 
he did not think that a locomotive driver or mill-worker was fit to 
vote. A race whose tradition sanctified caste remained always aware 
of distinctions between men and some always aspired to be elevated 
above others. Moreover, when governed by rulers who regarded class 
with no less sanctity, differences of education, property and 
income, received excessive attention and the barriers that resulted 
were often defended and perpetuated with vigour by the over-lord 
and vassal alike.
One disruptive factor which gathered force later was obviously 
of little consequence at this stage. There was no evidence of 
Hindu-Muslim conflict nor of the people of either faith demanding 
separate representation. The Muslim priest, calling himself 
President of the Anjuman-i-Hidayat-ul-Islam (Muslim Teaching Society), 
submitted a petition with four Hindus and sought the recognition of
26English, Urdu, Hindi, Gurmukhi and Madrasi for qualification to vote.
In fact; the priest favoured the adoption, with adaptation, of a very 
Hindu institution,the panchayat. And that Muslims be recognized as 
a voting entity in contradistinction to all others was suggested by a 
Hindu, S.S.Chowla, who based his submission on practices then 
prevalent in India. With only two members to be elected it would 
have been impracticable and grossly disproportionate to allocate one 
seat to the Muslims. But it seems that the Muslims did not' seek 
political separation from the rest of their race. Had political 
differences in Fiji been rife at this stage Muslims would have sought 
some guarantee of their position as they did later irrespective of
2h c .s .o .  718/21.
2^> ibid.
26 ibid.
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their numbers vis b. vis others in the community. This apparent 
harmony reflects the Hindu-Muslim rapprochement in India at the time. 
The Davson Commission' sat before the Khilafat honeymoon ended in 
divorce between the nationalists of the two religions in the 
sub-continent.
An issue on which some disagreement existed was whether government
officers should be permitted to vote and stand as candidates. The
Commission was emphatically against Indian civil servants receiving
this privilege which was denied their European counterparts, and
27the decision was reached before public witnesses were examined.
Many Indians who appeared before the Commission,including one of the 
leading civil servants, S.S.Chowla, argued that this class of Indians 
was certainly amongst the best educated in their community, which 
should not be deprived of their services in the political sphere. 
However, N.B.Mitter, from Nadi, President of the Indian Association 
and Headmaster of a government school, claimed that a large number of 
Indians was against government officials being enfranchised. A 
Fiji-born court interpreter also expressed to the Commissioners in 
Lautoka his opposition to Chowla and those of like opinion on this 
particular subject. The relationship between Indian officials and 
their community is a complex one; it varied with individuals and 
situations and any generalization about it would be an over­
simplification. But accepting this risk, one could say that the 
officials, especially court interpreters with their superficial 
but useful knowledge of the law and the processes of litigation, were 
conscious of their power. In a case where a defendant was illiterate 
and the magistrate and lawyers unable to speak or understand his 
vernacular tongue, an interpreter could sway the balance between 
acquittal and conviction. Unscrupulous interpreters were no less 
grasping than the ruthless sirdars of the indenture days. For their 
part, the uneducated Indians resented and feared Indian officials 
whose word could send them to prison or deprive them of a plot of 
land. Like all devotees, they resented gods that needed continual 
propitiation and whose hunger seemed insatiable. But as most of 
the people who came before the Commission were educated or in 
positions of influence they pressed for the franchise of civil
27 ibid.
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servants because they shared a similarity of interests with them.
There was consensus that the representatives to be chosen should 
be Indians. However, the Rev.W.R.Steadman of the Methodist Mission
suggested that j.± wished, they should elect a European.
His colleague, Richard Piper, went even further and wrote that Indians 
would be best served by ’one, or even two, Englishmen with a good 
knowledge of the Indian people and sympathetically interested in 
their legitimate aspirations’. He admitted, nonetheless, that any 
such person would have to present himself before an Indian electorate 
for selection. There was in reality no likelihood of Indians as 
a whole preferring a European to one of their own kind. What such 
a person might regard as ’legitimate aspirations’ of Indians would 
certainly be inadequate for the community he was representing.
Finally such a provision under the circumstances would threaten to 
breed ill-will. A European defeated in an election, in which the 
Indians might solidly prefer a man of their own race might find solace 
in blame and bitterness. Such a result might be interpreted as an 
exhibition of anti-European sentiments and Indian abhorrence of 
another race.
Most of the discussion centred around the method of choosing the
Indian members. Again before the public hearings began the
Commissioners had discussed the matter in camera and had come out
28strongly in favour of direct representation. There was strong 
support from Indians for the use of the panchayat or its adaptation; 
Chowla called it a 'village electoral board’. The Commissioners and 
witnesses and correspondents such as Steadman, Piper, A.A.Wright, 
N.B.Mitter and Here Singh all though the institution impracticable 
or unsuitable for the purpose. Piper characteristically, without 
fear of being left out on a limb, regarded a separate Indian 
electorate as a temporary expedient eventually to be replaced by a 
general roll of all electors as Indians qualified ’by good character, 
education and responsibility’. His was a lone voice and even if such 
a recommendation had been taken seriously it would have been certainly 
opposed by H.M.Scott. In the course of the first in camera meeting
he had expressed opposition to any possibility of an increase from
28 ibid.
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two to three representatives. As for the panchayat, the lack of
homogeneity of caste or religion in a particular settlement would lead
to dissatisfaction with the choice and would result in faction
fighting. But there were even graver reasons than these for its
unsuitability, as the District Commissioner of Labasa, A.A.Wright,
concluded after weighing its advantages and disadvantages:
The primary election or selection of voters would not be 
secret, and the local moneylender, shopkeeper, or landholder 
would have an unfair hold over his creditors or sub-tenants 
as the case might be. His interests would not be the same, 
nor would his views and aims be the same as those of the 
individuals who*were compelled to select him as a voter«
The Commissioners’ report was tabled in April 1921 and it
appeared that the Indians would have the vote if not citizenship by
the next election in 1923. There was some doubt about citizenship
because the Chairman told his colleagues at the outset that their
work was simply a question of who was to have a vote and the context
of his statement contained the clear inference that citizenship was
a separate issue, something with which they were not concerned at the 
29time. But before any action would be taken the Government of India, 
pressed by the Indians in the Viceroy’s Council intervened once more, 
and delay and prolonged wrangling was the consequence. Nothing 
concerning Indians in Fiji could be finalized without the imprimatur 
of India. And though this invigilation had its advantages, it stood 
in the way of quick settlements and desirable compromise.
The new attitude of the Government of India was partly a product 
of outside consideration. Since the public announcement in Fiji of 
the granting of electoral franchise to Indians, the Government of India 
had urged a common electoral roll, comprising Indians and Europeans, 
for Kenya. ^  This principle now dominated that Government's 
thinking. There was also an important delay; India was unable to 
make a definite pronouncement until the report of its deputation to 
Fiji was received. The Colonial Office, angered that the Government of 
India was now delaying the introduction of Indian representation in
29
30
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Fiji along lines which it had previously endorsed in a letter to the
Bishop in Polynesia, regarded that Government’s interference in the
31domestic affairs of Fiji as overweening and intolerable.
32In reply India preferred postponement and the common roll. The 
Colonial Office was Gismayed. Though it asserted that to admit
interference from an undecided Indian Government at this stage could
33mean uncertednty and indecision in the future, reality was also faced.
Fiji wanted Indian immigrants and if the price was mollification of
India this would have to be paid.
Two despatches were sent to Fiji on the subject, one numbered,
the other confidential. The first advised consent to the request
for deferment and conveyed India's preference for common franchise.
It also referred to the 1921 Imperial Conference which had felt
that in the interests of the solidarity of the British 
Commonwealth it is desirable that the rights of such 
Indians /“as those overseas 7 to citizenship should be 
recognized. 35
In confidence, the Officer Administering the Government in Fiji was 
informed that Indians would interpret the resolution of the Imperial 
Conference as entitling their race to uniform franchise with
-j/-
Europeans in Fiji. Hence:
You will, of course, realise that the Resolution, although it 
contemplates placing the Indians on a complete equality as 
regards the franchise, is not intended to make any substantial 
alteration in the distribution of political power, and does not 
entail swamping the electorate with Indian voters. It will, 
in fact, be necessary to draw any legislation which may have 
to be passed in such a manner (e.g. by the disqualification of 
all electors who are unable to write English or by other methods 
which can be applied to the whole of the electorate) as to ensure 
that the wholly unintended result shall not occur. 37
In Fiji, the Officer Administering the Government, T.E.Fell,
decided on the receipt of Churchill's above-mentioned despatches that
3T Minutes. ibid. C.O. to 1.0. draft, 18 July 1921: C.0.83/159.
32 1.0. to C.O. 26 July 1921; C.O.83/159.
33 Minutes, ibid.
3U C.O. to O.A.G. 221, 2? Aug. 1921; 0.0.83/159.
35 ibid.
36 C.O. to O.A.G. Conf. 27 Aug. 1921.
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t h i s  vas a m a tte r  l i k e ly  to  a f f e c t  th e  Colony f o r  a l l  tim e and he
o o
ought to  c o n su lt th o se  l i k e ly  to  be th e re  lo n g e r th an  h im se lf .
He w rote to  th e  A tto rn ey -G en era l, T.D .H .Bruce, and two Suva law y ers,
R obert Crompton and Henry S c o tt .  At th e  tim e F e l l  thought t h a t  i f
th e  im p r a c t ic a b i l i ty  o f ex tend ing  a common r o l l  f ra n c h is e  to  th e
F i j ia n s  were exp lained  to  th e  d e p u ta tio n  from In d ia  th ey  m ight agree
to  accep t th e  o r ig in a l  p ro p o s itio n  o f two s e a ts  on a communal b a s is .
For i t s  p a r t  th e  E xecu tive Council suggested  th e  appointm ent o f a
39c o n f id e n t ia l  committee as th e  p re lim in a ry  s te p .  Maynard Hedstrom, 
m erchant p r in c e ,  th e  e le c te d  member from Levuka, and Executive 
C o u n cillo r adv ised  th a t  i f  adequate safeg u ard s  could  n o t be e re c te d  
a g a in s t  In d ia n  p o l i t i c a l  ascendancy then  f u r th e r  m ig ra tio n  from In d ia  
should be h a l te d .  Thus th e  p o s s ib i l i t y  th a t  In d ia n  f ra n c h is e  meant 
In d ia n  ta k e -o v e r  gained  cu rrency  and became a te n e t  o f f a i t h  w ith  th e  
European community. Hedstrom a lso  added what was to  become a 
re c u rr in g  c o n ten tio n  in  th e  European case a g a in s t  concessions to  th e  
In d ia n s , t h a t  to  g ra n t In d ian s  p o l i t i c a l  p r iv i le g e s  beyond th o se  given 
to  th e  F i j i a n s  would be a b e tr a y a l  o f th e  Deed o f C ession .
Hedstrom*s f e a r s  were th e  r e s u l t  o f a dilemma th a t  had been 
p e rle x in g  European s e t t l e r  p o l i t i c i a n s  f o r  some tim e . They had from 
th e  e a r ly  tim es sought to  make F i j i  a colony w ith  re p re s e n ta t iv e  
i n s t i t u t i o n s  f o r  them selves as in  New Zealand and A u s tra l ia .  But a 
new r e a l i t y  had begun to  dawn upon them and i t  was f i r s t  p u b lic ly  
vo iced  by Henry S c o tt in  1917 du rin g  an e le c t io n  a d d re ss . He to ld  h is  
audience t h a t  re sp o n s ib le  government -was im p o ssib le  f o r  F i j i ,  a l l  t h a t  
could be hoped f o r  -was an improvement in  th e  e x is t in g  system th a t  
enabled  t h e i r  vo ice  to  be heard  on f in a n c ia l  and dom estic m a t t e r s . ^  
They were outnumbered 30:1 by th e  co loured  p o p u la tio n  and democracy, 
S c o tt warned, would mean th a t  w h ites  would be ru le d  by n o n -w h ites .
The s o lu tio n  was an i s l a n d s ’ c o n fe d e ra tio n , by augmenting t h e i r  numbers 
th ey  could th en  say to  London, *VJe ought to  have g re a te rj >j
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y .* This was a  re c o g n itio n  o f t h e i r  own p o s i t io n .
Hedstrom summed i t  up v ery  a c c u ra te ly  in  h is  comment th a t  B r i ta in
l i 2  'would no t p erm it F i j i  to  be governed by *a h an d fu l o f s e t t l e r s ' .
38 M inutes, F e l l ,  23 Nov. 1921. C.A.1i/3 8 .
39 M inutes Ex. Co. 2^ Nov. 1921. C .A .V 39.
1*0 W.P.H. 5 Ju ly  1917.
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There was no question of government by partnership with the 
coloured inhabitants; Hedstrom and his friends did not think them 
ready either for the franchise or to share equal status with the 
Europeans.^
Within the Colonial Office sympathy for European political
ambitions was on the decline as exemplified by the following minute
on receipt of Crompton’s motion of 1917:
The white population is about b,000, but the wealthy planters 
and merchanta monopolize the Legislative Council appointments. 
With a few exceptions among the merchants of whom Mr Hedstrom, 
a Fijian of third generation, is most notable, they are all 
birds of passage, only anxious to clear out as soon as their 
fortunes are made. They detest native control over land 
and are disturbed at the rapid progress of the Indians, who 
threaten to replace them.
It is this migratory character which distinguishes the 
white leaders from those of the West Indian communities which 
they quote as examples. If the planters, merchants and 
lawyers were really settlers and permanent residents, there 
would be something to be said for giving them preponderating 
power. As it is they cannot be expected to take any but 
short-sighted views and would involve us in constant trouble 
with the natives and with the Indian Government. You will 
notice that both the native representatives voted against 
the motion for an alteration of the L /"etters 7 P /“atent 7, 
while the Indian abstained (at least did not vote), hh
Even Sweet-Escott, who though in favour of more elected representation
for Europeans, warned them in 1917 that they could never hope for
itcomplete control of the finances and uhus the government of Fiji. 
Crompton obviously chose to ignore this, but Scott and Hedstrom did 
not and it was the latter attitude which was more significant.^
The granting of the franchise was thus a complex problem for 
the Fiji Government. It was constrained by its obligations under 
the Deed of Cession and encumbered by racist pressures from the 
European leaders. Each step it took had to be a slow and measured 
one, full of caution. Each move had to be approved by the Colonial 
Office which in turn had to explain its action to the Government of 
India, which was always pressing for the acceptance of its views.
These circumstances delayed the final decision and made all the more
h3> ibid.
hh Minutes, Sweet-Escott to C.0.353, 6 Nov. 1917; C.0.83/139.
U5 L.C.Debates 1917:90. When he enclosed this debate with his
despatch(No.353* 6 Nov. 1917) Sweet-Escott recommended an increase 
in European elected members, hence the Colonial Office minute 
quoted earlier.
1|6 Crompton (L.C.Debates 1971 :81-90 and 1919 £3-61*) moved two motions
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remote the day when the Indian Tnrst cast his secret ballot for his 
own representative.
Both Indians in Fiji and. India were also responsible for the delay. 
Firstly, in uanua^’y 1921 occurred another strike; on this occasion 
the sugar cane districts of Viti Levu stretching from Sigatoka to 
Rakiraki, and Labasa in Vanua Levu were involved. Besides the strike 
dragged on till August, though labourers began returning to work from
j n
July. Though no violence occurred in this dispute, feelings, which 
polarized along racial lines, ran high. The sugar industry was the 
lifeblood of the colony's economy and disruption therein posed serious 
problems for everyone. The Government in its correspondence blamed 
the C.S.R.Company1s uncomprising attitude as the cause. Though it 
sympathized with the labourers it was indignant with their 
stubbornness and demands for wages as high as 12/- a day. For its 
part, the Company refused to accept its culpability and claimed that 
competition from places such as Java and a precarious market with 
declining prices advised retrenchment not capitulation to Indian 
demands. Again Indians by their behaviour caused a strong reaction 
among the Europeans.
Secondly, the promised delegation from India was delayed. Despite
this, the Fiji Government continued to act promptly; it could not be
accused of dilly-dallying. In 1921 the Acting Governor asked his
Attorney-General to prepare a memorandum on the status of Indians in
Fiji because India along with the franchise had requested equal rights 
) ftfor the former. The Attorney-General stated that currently there 
was nothing to debar an Indian from appointment to the Executive 
Council, the usual practice was to select the unofficial representatives 
from the elected members of the Legislative Council under the terms of 
the Letters Patent then in operation. An Indian could, however, be
U6 cont'd: for a greater voice in the affairs of Fiji. In the
latter he advocated the franchise for Indians and Fijians. He 
added that if they misused it then it was their affair. Crompton 
by this stage had become a lone voice in auest of greater control. 
His European colleagues too wanted more say in the running of the 
government but they were more realistic in their assessments of 
the probDems involved; among them Britain's obligations to the 
Fijian people.
ii? C.S.0.165U/21, 1781/21, 1895/21, 2088/21, 2506/21, 2765/21.
F.T. 26 Feb., 29 Mar., i; Apr., 5 Apr., 22 Apr. 1921.
U8 The following paragraphs discuss the submission of the Attorney-
General. c.s.o. 6707/21.
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nominated to this Council and Badri Mahraj had filled this position 
since 19 December 1916. As regards municipal franchise the Indian 
had equal rights with any other person - so the official view held.
The Indians had the same trading rights as the Europeans and 
there were no legal obstacles to their advancement here. This* of 
course, affected a very percentage of the Indian population.
Most of them were cultivators and interested in land where 
discrimination existed as Indian leases were normally limited to
10 acres.
The memorandum mentioned that no liquor was permitted to the 
Indians except those exempted under the provisions of the Liquor 
Ordinance (1911). The aim was to safeguard Fijians, with whom the 
Indians were closely connected. One may question the total veracity 
of this claim of close association between Indians and Fijians 
especially as officials did their utmost to keep the two races apart. 
And there was minimal social contact between the two though Fijians 
had dealings with Indian traders. It was too readily assumed that 
Indians would provide the Fijians with alcohol whereas Europeans who 
had free access were unlikely to do so. Further, the restriction 
imposed on Indians was justified by the argument that Fijians and 
certain half-castes were equally affected. But as yet the Chinese 
were not discriminated against, despite the fact that traders of this 
group had greater contact with Fijians $ they often lived in their 
villages and took their women as wives.
Indians were not entitled to demand as a right trial by jury.
But the Chief Justice could grant them the privilege at his own 
discretion for special reasons. Again this did not apply to 
Indians alone as the Fijians, Chinese and all Pacific Islanders were 
in the same position.
Indians could not obtain gun licences or purchase arms or 
ammunition except on a permit from the Agent-General of Immigration 
and these perroits were subject to conditions laid down by the 
Governor. Indians found wandering or loitering in any town between
11 p.m. and 5> a.m. were liable to a fine and, in default of payment,
imprisonment under section 2l;(6) of Ordinance V of 1876. They could 
not beat drums or otherwise make music in any town between 6 p.m. 
and 6 a.m. Nor could they emigrate from Fiji as labourers« These
laws applied equally to the Fijians but this could not necessarily 
justify their existence. But they were the natural outcome of the
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policy which the British regime wove as a protective cocoon around 
the Fijian people to shelter them from allegedly disruptive forces 
likely to erode their social fabric officially regarded as essential 
for their survival.
An ordinance to give Indians in Fiji equal status was drafted 
in 1921 and submitted to tho Colonial Office for comment. From 
there it was referred to the India Office which in turn sought the 
advice of the Indian Government. The latter submitted its criticismsU9behove the departure of Raju and his colleagues for Fiji. It
raised q^oc*cions on the discrx-u-uiatory practices of the liquor and
municipal ordinances, as well as the disabilities in the existing
constitution and in the field of education. In the Colonial Office
dothis response encountered indignation rather than sympathy. In 
the process of prolonged consultation between the governments and the 
bureaucrats the urgency of the issue was lost and no action resulted. 
Fiji was thus able to escape the task of ensuring equal status for 
Indians by legislation.
Within Fiji itself the possibility of equal status for Indians 
with Europeans caused great concern among members of the 3.atter 
community. The Fiji Times, spokesman for the pro-vhite, anti- 
Indian element, denounced the concept and published letters from 
those who supported its stand. The Polynesian GazetteA published 
in the old capital of Fiji, Levuka, was not to be left behind: it
dpdecried equal status as abandoning Fiji to the mercy of the Indians.""'
European leaders were in accord with their community. Their
antagonism persisted even during the visit of the deputation led
<1by Raju; some letters were unabated in their prejudice. The
ddGovernment was told the ’coolie should be kept in his proper place’.
1*9 1.0c to C.O. 10 Dec. 1921; 0.0.83/159.
50 Minutes, ibid.
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52 Polynesian Gazette 29 Oct. 1921.
53 Pacific Age 22 Mar. 1922.
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The old arguments that had been voiced during the strikes of 1920 and 
1921 were once again unearthed* One of their severest critics in the 
press, a H.G.Paterson, stated that Indians had no grounds for 
complaint for they drove and hired motor cars and dressed more 
expensivcjL.y i-uau ■'ns basics having ’a monopoly
of the legal courts - and the asylums - which we /~i*e. Europeans 7 
have to pay for*. Another felt that most of the Indians were 
content ( a favourite European claim) to accept government by the 
superior white race. A third added that the majority of Indians 
could not be compared in intelligence and ethics to Europeans and 
until they attained European standards they could have no claim to 
an equal share in the management of Fiji or any other country.
Vocal Europeans in the years 1920 and immediately after gave the
impression that they were disturbed about their own future. The
Indian strikes as well as the worsening economic situation generally
were contributory factors. And in the case of the 1921 dispute
European planters with their not inexhaustible resources were
especially vulnerable« Articulate members of the European
community cast their minds yet once more for methods of consolidating
their interests. As early as 1918 a group of Suva Europeans
calling themselves the Fiji Annexation League had petitioned the
Colonial Office requesting annexation by either New Zealand or
99Australia. As before this was not a practical proposition. But 
there were some who thought in terms of a broader Pacific Federation 
without giving the concept detailed consideration.0^ Scott in 1919
96 £il- 7 Mar. 1922.
97 F.T. 8 Mar. 1922.
98 ibid.
99 W.H.Cuthbert for Fiji Annexation League to C.0.11; Nov.1918;
C*0*83/1UU* The leading men in the movement were those who in
1916 had formed the very short-lived (and abortive) Fiji Reform 
League which sought among other things: *A Constitution for Fiji
which will give the electors the right to control all domestic 
legislation through an elected Assembly; the rights of the natives 
being conserved by the conditions laid down by the Home 
Government.’ (Enel. Sweet-Escott to C.0,396, 1 Dec. 1916;
C.0.83/133. C.S.O. 8293/16, 8939/16, 8899/16.)
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had contended th a t  w ith  an i s l a n d s ’ c o n fe d e ra tio n  w ith  F i j i  as
c a p i t a l  would augment t h e i r  numbers and enab le  them to  say to
61London: ’Vie ought to  have g re a te r  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . '  Two y e a rs  l a t e r
in  A p ril 1921 he re s u rre c te d  th e  concept in  a m otion in  th e
L e g is la t iv e  C o u n c i l . I t  re ce iv ed  no p o s i t iv e  response  from e i th e r
th e  Governor o r th e  S e c re ta ry  of S ta te .  ** N e ith e r d id  th e
Government look w ith  favou r upon th e  scheme p u t forw ard in  1922 to
in tro d u ce  B r i t i s h  m igran ts in to  F i j i  d e sp ite  su pport from European
p u b lic  m eetings th roughout th e  colony and Ratu Pope S e n i l o l i 's  o f f e r
in  th e  L e g is la t iv e  Council to  make a v a ila b le  F i j i a n  lan d  fo r  th e
v e n t u r e .^  At th e  p u b lic  m eetings In d ian  demands fo r  equal s ta tu s
were denounced w hile  i t  was claim ed th a t  an in c re a s e  in  European
69p o p u la tio n  m ight e s ta b l is h  th e  prim acy o f th e  l a t t e r .
R eac tions o f F i j i  In d ian s  to  th e se  a t ta c k s  in  th e  1920-22 p e rio d
i s  d i f f i c u l t  to  gauge. A very  la rg e  p e rcen tag e  of In d ia n s  was
i l l i t e r a t e  and o f th e  l i t e r a t e  few could  w r ite  s u f f i c i e n t ly  w e ll to
re b u ff  European v iew s. However, a few l e t t e r s  d id  appear in  th e
P a c if ic  Age, which took th e  s tan d :
We have to  fa c e  th e  f a c t  th a t  we have here  a c e r ta in  number 
o f B r i t i s h e r s  who h a i l  from I n d ia ,“a re  w e ll educa ted , and 
have a s tak e  in  t h i s  Colony, and we cannot re fu se  them a l l  
r ig h t s  of p o l i t i c a l  ex p ress io n  j u s t  on account o f t h e i r  
c o lo u r . 66
I t  d ep reca ted  th e  remarks o f co rresponden ts  p u b lish ed  by i t s  r i v a l s  
as 'v u lg a r  jin g o ism , born . . .  o f narrow ignorance and d is to r te d
z  *7
v ie w p o in t '.  Some In d ian s  defended them selves th rough i t s  columns 
by r e i t e r a t i n g  t h e i r  g rievances and claim ing th a t  th e  re d re ss  th ey
61 L .C .D ebates 1919:60.
62 L.C .D ebates 1921:28-36.
63 F e l l  (O .A .G .) to  C.0 .1 8 6 , 1ii Ju ly  1921; 
O.A.G.228, 9 S e p t .1921; C.0 .83 /197 .
C;. 0 .8 3 /1 5 7 ; C.O. to
6U L.C .D ebates 1922:30—UO. Rodwell to  
P a c if ic  Age 21 M ar., 12, 13 A pr., 2, 
M inutes Ex. Co. 9 Jan . 1929.
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6,
.190, 22 June 1922. 
1h, 17, 21 June 1922.
69 P a c if ic  Age 22, 23, 2lq June 1922.
66 P a c if ic  Age 3 Apr. 1922.
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sought was theirs by right.
Into such an atmosphere of strained race relations the
Deputation from India finally arrived in January 1922 and remained in
Fiji till April. In its report it claimed that it had discussed
the frenchise with the leading Europeans as well as Indians and so
believed that the scheme proposed would satisfy and safeguard Indian
6'?interests without prejudice to those of the other communities.
Their recommendation which was given to the Governor beforehand was 
later summarised as:
. . .  we understand that no development towards responsible 
government is possible except with the consent of the Fijian 
Chiefs, who with the British Crown are the only parties to the 
Cession. We regard a common electoral roll as an essential 
condition of responsible Government, for the Government must 
then be responsible, through the elected members, to the 
electorate as a whole. But under Crown Colony Government 
the elected members are purely advisory; and for the purpose 
of advice it is possible that the views and interests of 
different communities may be better represented by communal 
election. This would probably be the opinion of the native 
Fijians, if it were expressed. It is certainly the view of 
the European community. And it is also the v*ew of leading 
Indians, who, from their experience in the Suva Municipality, 
where there are now only 12 Indian«voters, fear that with a 
common electoral roll they would neither be directly 
represented nor be able to influence the election of a 
European candidate. This disability would doubtless be remedied 
by time, with the spread of education and increased prosperity. 
But we are impressed with the necessity of immediate 
representation on an elective basis, in order that the Indian 
community may at once be brought into direct constitutional 
relations with the Government through its elected members. In 
existing conditions, therefore, we support the principle of 
communal representation. But if in the future there is any 
development towards responsible Government, we are of opinion, 
that the position should be reconsidered, and that the principle 
of a common electoral roll should be introduced. 70
The deputation continued that there were three overlapping interests
represented by the three major communities; the Fijian owned the
land, the European contributed capital and enterprise and the
71Indian his labour. Because each interest played an equal role
68 Pacific Age 21 Feb., 6 Mar., 7 Mar. 1922.
69 Raju Report:68.
70 ibid:68-69. In the 
generally acted upon 
nature.
end the Report was neither made public nor 
because of its forthright and controversial
71 ibid:69.
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each community ought to have in the Legislative Council an equal7?
number of seats. There should be three unofficials on the
73Executive Council, one Fijian, one Indian and one European. Here 
difficulties arose. The Acting Governor told the Secretary of State 
that the proposed distribution of seats could not be accepted without 
ascer^li.-uik the vi<=ws or all classes who, he knew, from events in
n I
the Colony at the time, would not all agree. For him the 
recommended abolition of education tests for the franchise was 
retrogressive and Indian membership of the Executive Council 
impracticable. Europeans and Fijians were opposed to any political 
concession to Indians. On his return from leave Governor Rodwell 
wrote that three Indians elected on a communal franchise would 
satisfy that community’s political aspirations. He wanted his 
Government consulted if and when a general policy was laid down by 
Westminster concerning Kenya and other colonies. He admitted that 
the existing European representation was indeed larger than essential 
and during his term ’there have never been more than four or five 
elected members at one time who have carried any weight in the 
Council’. Nonetheless, he was averse to a reduction of their 
numbers except with the concurrence of a majority of European 
elected members. An impasse again seemed the outcome. Amidst the 
obstinacy of all sides the proposals which provided a good starting 
point did not have a chance. Europeans were particularly adamant 
about any reduction in the number of their representatives. The 
Colonial Office did nothing; in fact it could do nothing until 
it had officially heard from its Indian counterpart. But there 
was delay and it was not until July 192h that Whitehall took up the 
subject with Fiji.
In the meantime the Acting Governor had received some indication 
of an aspect of European thinking which was to come to the fore 
later. His Attorney-General suggested that the on3.y way to prevent 
European voters being swamped in case of a common roll was to raise
72 ibid.
73 ibid:70.
7h O.A.G.Fell to C.O. Tel. 7 Mar. 1922: C.0.83/160.
7$ Rodwell to C.O.Conf. 18 Apr.1922.
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th e  requ irem en ts  f o r  both  v o te r  and can d id a te  to  ensure th a t  th o se
w ith o u t a s tak e  in  th e  co u n try , i r r e s p e c t iv e  o f ra c e , should no t
d o m in a te .^  The Council o f P la n te rs  thought th a t  even an
e d u c a tio n a l t e s t  in  th e  end would be i n s u f f i c i e n t $ and i f  th e  s in e
qua non o f o b ta in in g  In d ian  lab o u r was equal s ta tu s  th en  th ey  should
r-it • •• •• t  c i l a b o u r e r « ? ; ,  who sought no p o l i t i c a l  s ta tu s
77w hatsoever, o r r e v e r t  to  th e  nom ination system .
R obert Crompton argued th a t  as long as an In d ia n  demanded th e  
r e te n t io n  o f th e  r ig h t  o f r e p a t r ia t io n  a t  government expense he could 
n o t reg a rd  h im se lf as dom iciled  in  F i j i  and th u s  was no t e n t i t l e d  to
7  c>
th e  f r a n c h is e .  N ev erth e le ss  * he though t th e re  were th re e
a l t e r n a t iv e s :  In d ian s  should be co n ten t w ith  th e  r ig h t  to  e le c t  two
members, o r e q u a li ty  m ight be reached by su rre n d e rin g  th e  e le c t iv e
p r in c ip le  and re in tro d u c in g  nominated members, o r im m igration  from
In d ia  be abandoned and some o th e r  source con sid ered  as F i j i  had done
i t s  u tm ost to  p la c a te  In d ia  and could do no more. When F e l l
conveyed Crompton's th o u g h ts  to  London, i t  was m inuted th a t  i f
In d ian s  w ith  r e p a t r ia t io n  r ig h ts  were d eb arred  from th e  f ra n c h is e
then  Europeans w ith  c o n tra c ts  p ro v id in g  .re tu rn  passages would a lso
79have to  be excluded . Moreover th e  stoppage o f f u r th e r  im m igration
d id  n o t mean th a t  th e  r e s o lu t io n  of th e  Im p e ria l Conference on the
In d ian  p o s i t io n  could be ig n o red . In  an o th er m inu te , Green,
u s u a lly  sym pathetic  to  th e  European p o s i t io n  w ro te :
I  doubt i f  S ir  M.Hedstrom, Mr S c o tt and Mr Crompton r e a l ly  
re p re se n t th e  view o f th e  European community, most of whom 
a re  n o t w ealthy  and do n o t v i s i t  Government House. I  do 
n o t b e lie v e  th e  m a jo r ity  would acqu iesce  in  a r e s t r i c t i o n  
o r w ithdraw al of th e  f r a n c h is e . 80
The d ed uction  was f o r th r ig h t  b u t p robab ly  erroneous as i t  was
u n l ik e ly  th a t  th e  s tan d  o f t h i s  tr iu m v ira te  c o n f l ic te d  w ith  t h a t  of
o th e rs  in  t h e i r  community.
76 C.A. U/76.
77 C.A. U/77.
78 C.A. li/78.
79 M inutes F e l l  to  C .C .C onf.2 , 22 Feb. 1922; C .0 .83 /160 .
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In July 192[|. the Colonial Office once more set out to settle the 
thorny problem of the franchise. The Secretary of State told the 
Acting Governor of pressures upon him to concede either common roll
or equal representation and sought advice on likely reactions in the
81Colony."" If he were to reject common roll he had to be
accommodating^ and as two seats for Indians would not be a
sufficient concession Whitehall wished to Know whether there would be
any objection to three, on the basis of the Davson Report. Some
approximation of equality would undermine European influence, which
depended on quality not numbers, but it would arrest interference
from India. The Colonies Committee of the Government of India had
pressed for revision of the municipal ordinance and amelioration of
the Residential Tax legislation, as well as appointment of an agent of
the Government of India to oversee the conditions of Fiji Indians.
The Governor was asked to consult the elected members and the
Executive Council pins any other unofficial of standing} the
82Secretary of State would consult Kedstrom.
The Secretary of State’s telegram of 28 July received prompt 
attention from the Executive Council. Fortunately for the student
* ß o
of history these deliberations were noted in detail. ^ The 
Executive Council saw two alternatives: (a) a common electoral roll
and (b) equality in numbers between European and Indian elected 
members.
Henry Marks spoke at some length. He admitted the inevitability 
of governmental recognition of the political rights of Indians. While 
he did not like common roll he found alternative (b) impracticable 
so advised acceptance of (a). There would have to be strict 
supervision of enrolment and strict enforcement of requirements for 
qualifications to eliminate malpractices. In his opinion many 
half-castes already enfranchised were not as good as the rising 
generation of Indians, who possessed better standards than their 
forebears and so were entitled to vote. The better class of Indians 
had a stake in the country and must by right be recognized as 
citizens. A knowledge of English should not be imperative for 
enrolment, those who could read and write Hindustani should be
81 C.O. to O.A.G. Tel. 28 July 1921;. C.A.U/81.
82 ibid. C.A.U/82.
83 Undated Draft of the discussion in the Executive Council of the 
Secretary of State's telegram. C.A.U/83.
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accepted but there had to be at least this modicum of literacy- 
qualification. Income and property qualifications too should be 
necessary and the onus might be on the applicant to prove that he 
fulfilled the minimum stipulated by law.v Candidates for the 
Council must be able to read, write and speak English, have the 
existing property qualifications, and their income should be at 
least £^00 p.a. In an outburst rare for a European representative 
he called the Government to face up to the fact that in ten or fifteen 
years Indians would dominate the elected side because of their 
standing in the country. It would be suicidal for the Government 
not to accord them the political rights they sought and deserved in 
a country which must inevitably be 'a semi-Indian country1. Because 
of its permanent majority Government need have no fears. Marks also 
thought that Indians would not vote as a united body, and some would 
cast their ballots for European candidates.
The Colonial Treasurer, Harcourt, disagreed with Marks. Common
roll meant Indian domination and if equal rights were accorded then 
Fijians too should receive it. But this would involve the 
reconstruction of the entire fabric of Fijian life, which would also 
be subordinated to Indian interests. To prevent this he preferred 
alternative (b) which did not imply giving the elective principle 
to the Fijians.
The Chief Medical Officer, Dr. Montague preferred (a) if it 
could be made workable as it would enable members of the Legislative 
Council to represent a very considerable proportion of the 
population. Granting Indians the franchise did not automatically 
require the same for the Fijians whose interests were safeguarded by 
the Government majority. Alternative (b) meant seven Europeans 
and three Indians and would not placate the latter. On the other 
hand, common roll would produce ’an excellent effect on Imperial 
interests and assist the Anglo-Indian situation, especially if given 
of our free will1. Europeans should be induced to accept it and if 
this proved a failure then (b) should be adopted.
The Attorney-General, Muir Mackenzie agreed in principle with 
Marks and Montague and plumped for (a). He did not think it was 
essential to grant the franchise to Fijians but those of them who
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qualified could be given the vote.
The Acting Colonial Secretary,Steward contended that (a) would
lead to Indian control in ten years especially as there was a large
number of Indians earning £3 per week. .Mainly in view of what
Harcourt had outlined, common roll would prove a dangerous
experiment. Alternative (b) was better with a policy of gradual
approximation towards equality. Initially there should be five
elected European members, three Indians and three nominated Fijians.
He advised that Indian aspirations would be satisfied if Government
granted a system of Indian district and provincial councils with an
annual central council presided by the Governor.
Thus a majority by 3 to 2 favoured common rollj the absent
member was Maynard Hedstrom and he without doubt ’would have preferred
(b) though he was actually against both.
The Acting Governor remarked that in the case of (b) there should
be five Europeans and three Indian elected members. Marks countered
that Indians wTould object and demand five for themselves too.
Thus each race should have four. Continuing in his mood of
optimism he did not think they would vote en bloc against the
Government. Nor did he want the Colony to be divided into
electorates instead the Colony should constitute a single constituency
wherein each elector cast a required number of votes. The other
members, however, accepted the Governor’s proposal for (b).
Among the advisers of the Acting Governor opinion was evenly
divided. The surprising factor was the unexpected willingness to
give common roll a trial. But Fell himself was aware of the reactions
of the local European population who had been closely watching the
behaviour of their counterparts in Kenya for some time with the
possible threats of emulating it.^ His earlier expressions showed
that Fell did not lean towards common roll and even on equal status
he had doubts. He wrote privately to Green at the Colonial Office:
To admit too early a principle of equality may have awkward 
results, may upset the Indians themselves by turning their 
heads, and the balance of good Government which has continued 
for 50 years. 85
8h ibid. U/3U.
85 Fell to Green, Private, 3 Oct. 192l|. C«A.i;/85
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For him, and others too, the Indian was still an unknown quantity 
in many respects. And what was known was not very well liked; the 
memories of the two strikes of 1920 and 1921 appeared at the times 
when India;« political rights were being considered. Moreover, Fell 
was convinced that ’there exists in Fi.ii a section of Indians of the 
Babu class who are extreme in their views’. ^  They had been present 
for the last ten years and their activities required close scrutiny 
as they urged 'principles of equality, on unreasonable and impracticable 
terms’ and were linked with Kanilal’s Indian Association of Fiji 
which was 'undoubtedly the source of propaganda of a seditiousn7
character’. His contention was strengthened by Indian opposition
to the Residential Tax which began the previous year and gathered
force as it continued, having among its achievements the voluntary-
resignation of the generally placid Badri Mahraj as a sign of protest
88and support for his countrymen.
With a deadlock in his own Council Fell was deprived of unanimous 
backing either for his own stand or its total rejection. So he had 
to rely on outside comment to help him frame his recommendations to 
London. The fact that the Secretary of State encouraged outside 
consultation enabled Fell to modify attitudes expressed in the 
Executive Council and substitute in their place a scheme not likely 
to cause turmoil in the Colony. As Governor it was his task to 
maintain law and order. The checks and b;ilances which guaranteed 
peace required delicate handling; any alteration in the political 
base could very easily upset this and start in motion a set of 
events which might prove beyond control. The Fijians already^ had 
the Deed of Cession, and the European colonists capital and 
representation. Hitherto Indians without political status provided 
labour. It was more risky to undermine what the first two races 
already claimed as their holy sanctuary than to grant too little to 
the one that had nothing. It was more dangerous to go back
86 Fell to C.O.Conf.2, 1 Aug. 192li.
87 ibid.
88 Mayer 1963:U3.
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radically on the past than to be conservative with the future.
While he had to pacify the Indians for the future good he had to 
ascertain that, in achieving this goal, he did not offend others by 
depriving them of what was their own. The lengthy discussion in 
his Executive Council and the split of opinion in it did nothing to 
alleviate Fell’s task, in fact, it added to the complexity. He 
slimmed up his dilemma:
We cannot do without our Indians, and from the Colony’s point 
of view alone it is essential we should settle them as placidly 
and loyally as possible by giving them reasonable political 
status. The Imperial point of view is a far larger one. The
Government of India puts a ban upon us as an undesirable. We
are under no obligation to her. We might say, 'We will treat 
Indians fairly; but we will!do so according to our lights and 
we wish no further interference from you.' Such a policy would
be disastrous from the Imperial point of view. We are a pawn 
in a great game. The prize to be won is that of India, emerging 
from her present upheaval, as an integral portion of the Empire; 
on Dominion lines, to stick to us for all time. Fossibly I 
am not so optimistic about the ultimate result, but we can 
afford to play no false card to increase chances of losing it. 
Fortunately, the policy we will have to adopt for the Colony's 
future coincides very nearly with the policy which Imperial 
views require. Although within the past year the Indian 
atmosphere here is without doubt more placid, if we play the 
wrong game the Government of India.(or the Indian section of 
it) might certainly start a campaign here to unsettle Indians 
and to demand repatriation. If we can stave it off for a 
year or so, Indians will, with fair treatment, become so 
settled that no agitation from India will move them. Then we 
can a.ct accordingly. 89
Fell's predicament was not lightened by the prevailing attitudes 
of important elements in Fiji. The Attorney of the powerful C.S.R. 
Company, A.M.O.Farquhar expressed himself as opposed to common roll 
but not to 'fair political status'. Though he would not object to 
the numerical reduction of European seats as they were 'excessive
for the interests involved', to do so for the sake of equal status
90was a dangerous policy.'' The General Manager in Sydney, H.U.Dixon, 
held stronger views. For him it was of prime importance that the
colonial Government retain a substantial majority to ensure effective
91control of legislation. While he thought. Indians unfit to rule 
he was equally reluctant to chance the fate of his shareholders 
to a government controlled by Fiji Europeans who in the past had 
displayed a desire to restrain by taxation the outflow of his 
company's profits from Fiji. He was agreeable to three Indian
89 C.A.Ii/8 9.
90 C. A. li/90.
91 C.A.li/91 .
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representatives along the lines of the Davson Report but certainly
92not to equal status or common roll.
Ihe Mayor and the Deputy Mayor of Suva were agreeable to the
93election of three Indians on a communal roll. J The Deputy Mayor,
F.E.Riemenschneider, thought that common roll with an income 
qualification of £150 p.a. or £200 p.a. would enfranchise very few 
Indians and soon there would be a clamour for a lowering of the 
qualification or changing of the system of election. Fell disagreed, 
arguing that property qualifications would give a very large 
number of Indians the vote.
Early in August Fell also interviewed three elected members
Scott, Marks and Barker. Scott maintained tha.t the Secretary of
State would agree to the retention of the existing number of European
seats if three Indians and three Fijians were added to the Council.
He and Barker were unalterably against common roll which meant ultimate
Indian domination. Though all three contended that equal
representation would be bitterly opposed it was the lesser of two
evils and in any case Europeans must not have fewer than five elected
members. They found Indian franchise on a communal roll with three
seats adequate. Marks repeated his remarks to the Executive Council.
One of the country members, Clapcott wrote to the Acting Governor
that he would not have any objections to three Indian seats if the
Fijians had the s a m e . H e  added:
If there is only one electoral roll for all the Indians in 
the Colony, it would be quite possible to have three men 
elected with revolutionary ideas; this isn’t likely to 
happen if two members are elected by men mostly on the land.
Agitators & those of high opinion of their power of 
speech prefer living in the towns.
Common roll was a betrayal of the Fijians who would also consequently 
have to be given the franchise and because of their ownership of the 
land would all qualify as voters. It would be many years before 
they could be educated for the purpose and any such change could 
cause trouble and undo past work. Equal representation had to 
be fought tooth and nail but if the Colonial Office imposed it then 
three members for each race would have to do. But to have only three
92
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Europeans in the Legislative Council would leave agricultural 
interests unrepresented in a country which was wholly dependent on 
this sector of its economy for development. Clapcott did not third: 
that much notice should be taken of the Planters’ Association as most 
uf those who attended its meetings had little interest in or any 
knowledge of the requirements of farmers. He concluded with a guess 
that if all Indians were repatriated to India only about 2-^ of them 
would qualify for the vote there and such people could not expect 
equal representation in Fiji.
Instead of immediately conveying to London the wide spectrum of 
views expressed, Fell merely told the Secretary of State that there 
wTas no local objection to three seats for Indians and he himself 
thought that an adequate preliminary step necessary, politic and 
desirable for two or three years before finally embarking upon equal 
status either through common roll or the reduction of European seats.
So far Hedstrom’s contribution had not come. When it did, it 
proved a weighty one. It was given to the Secretary of State who 
sent it to the Governor:
I would be opposed to general electoral roll in Fiji because 
ultimate result would be detrimental to interests of Colony 
in general and Fijians in particular. I would advise offer 
Indians 3 seats in Legislative Council but do not think any 
greater measure of elective representation could be justified 
in present conditions.
Knowing Colonial policy must not conflict with Imperial 
Conference declaration of equality I realize this offer does 
not provide a permanent settlement but should satisfy 
aspirations of local Indians for many years. Meantime we 
should not concede more than is absolutely necessary. I 
do not think that question of reducing number of European 
Elected Members should be considered at present but an 
endeavour should be made to evolve some scheme whereby increase 
in numbers of official-members rna.y be avoided. 96
Hedstrom was a diehard fashioned in the Delamere mould. The previous
year he had wondered in the Governor's presence whether Whitehall was
resorting to delaying tactics in order to spring upon them common roll
and equal status; and he had been emphatic in his pronouncement that
95 Fell to C.O.Tel. 30 Aug. 192U-
96 C.O. to Gov. Tel. 1 Sept. 192U•
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he would rather go back to the nominated system than concede beyond
97the Davson recommendations.
Despite Hedstrom, the Secretary of State at that stage still had
98questions for which he sought answers in Fiji. ' He doubted the 
practicability of offering three seats with the postponement of equal 
status. There had to be a clear indication of the relationship 
between three seats and the demand for equal representation. What 
were the precise local views on the ’policy of adopting / the 7 
principle / o f  7 gradual approximation towards equal numbers'.
Not only had the present Indian demands to be satisfied but a 
long-term policy formulated to deal with the later advance in 
wrealth and education of the race. India would not have to be told 
of the exact time when equal status would be implemented but at the 
same time they themselves had to be ready for no one could speculate 
when that Government would press them again on the issue.
To provide answers to these a conference was held at Government 
House on 7 October 192li at which were present members of the Executive 
Council, the elected representatives in the Legislative Council, the 
Mayor of Suva and Robert Crompton. Significantly no Indians were 
invited, not even Badri Mahraj. There-was at this stage no official 
to oversee the affairs of this community. The fate of the Indians 
was to be decided without reference to them, though their noted 
antagonists, Hedstrom, Scott and Crompton were consulted. The 
Government could have found a wTay to consult the Indians but perhaps 
it was thought superfluous on the argument that they and their 
sympathizers had been provided with the opportunity during the public 
hearings of the Davson Commission.
The result of the Conference was as follows:
(1) Unanimous agreement to give Indians three seats in the 
Legislative Council, on a communal franchise. The number 
of Fijians, retaining the existing method of selection, 
was to be increased to the same number. This was 
deemed adequate for both races.
(2) The elected members were willing to reconsider the 
position when conditions changed and Indians advanced ’in 
capital interests, education, wealth and numbers and in
97 C.A.it/97.
98 C.O.to Gov. Tel. 23 Sept. 1?2lj.
r.6
the light of experience gained regarding the aptitude of 
Indian members of the Council and voters to exercise their 
political rights and to exhibit their sense of responsibility 
to the interests of the Colony as a whole1.
(3) With the exception of Henry Marks the elected members refused 
to go any further and declined to pledge themselves to a 
policy of future equality no matter how gradual.
(h ) The others at the conference, except the Mayor, were
prepared to reconsider the issue with the view of gradual 
approximation towards equality in the number of 
representatives on the principle of ’equal representation 
of equal interests’.
{$) The elected members would not support any reduction in their 
numbers and instead advocated an increase of one. The 
Mayor favoured only the first part. The others thought 
that apart from the question of equal representation a 
strong case could be made on the merits of the electorates 
alone for a reduction by two and this would not be 
detrimental to the interests of the Colony and ought to be 
considered before the next general election in 1926. Also 
if no reduction was made and with the absolutely essential 
retention of the official majority the Council would 
become cumbrous to a degree unwarranted by local 
circumstances and wTould involve the nomination of an 
excessive number of officials.
(6) If the Secretary of State accepted the latter suggestion 
the Acting Governor thought that the reasons for it ought 
to be given to the Government of India without the 
indication that it meant an immediate commencement of a 
'policy of approximation towards equality’.
(7) It was important that Fijians should not think that 
what Indians vjere receiving was being denied them.
Therefore the Council of Chiefs should be asked whether 
they wished to retain the present method of nominating 
Fijians to the Legislative Council. 99
After receipt of this evidence of the trend of thinking among the 
leading European officials and. non-officials in Fiji, the Secretary of 
State took a considerable time in reaching his conclusions. He 
would not grant common roll because of 'the circumstances of Fiji 
generally, and in particular the nature of organization of native 
inhabitants and / the_7 position, in which /"the 7 Crown /"stood 7 
in relation to them’. Communal franchise was the only solution.
Indians would be granted three seats and the Fijian number would, be 
increased to the same. The official majority would be retained 
not only in the interests of Fiji and the Fijians, but also because 
India would not accept the limited representation otherwise. He 
would be content with the reduction of European representation by one.
99 Suggested telegram to the Secretary of State, 9 Oct. 192ii. 
C.A.U/99.
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Because the remaining duration of the present Council was short it
might be worthwhile to nominate three Indians for this interim
period till the next elections.
The Secretary of State’s decisions were generally acceptable.
However, the suggestion that Europeans lose one seat was resented by
the majority of t h e m J ^  Henry Scott put forward a counter-proposal
with some support: that there be 7 Europeans, 3 Indians, and 3
Fijians and 12 official members with the Governor having an original
101as well as a casting vote. Hedstrom was more reasonable and
accepted that the reduction by one would give the Secretary of State
a chance to argue that the European representation was no more than
the combined Fijian-Indian one. The Acting Governor doubted the
practicability of a vote for himself. This would render the
Governor’s position more difficult; and it would not be in
accordance with his dignity to vote on minor matters while on some
102open issues he could find himself voting with the minority.
Fell also questioned the wisdom of the interim appointment of
103three nominated Indians. Such a selection might provoke discord
and it might even be refused if those approached thought nomination 
would diminish or nullify their chances at a subsequent election.
It would be unfortunate if nomination were to deprive the Council of 
the best men later. Negotiations with India would take some months 
and more than a year vrould be needed thereafter for a committee 
to frame electoral regulations and arrange theelection machinery.
VIhen these had been achieved the Council could be immediately 
dissolved and elections held on the basis of the new constitution. 
Local Indians would accept this alternative as reasonable.
Finally, the Fiji Government was of the opinion that the ’policy 
of gradual approximation towards equality' was unnecessary to satisfy 
local Indians and the European elected members were still adhering to 
the earlier stand on the issue. 4
100 C.O. to Gov. Tel. 7 Feb.1923, Fell to C.O.Tel. 23 Feb.1923.
101 Fell to C.O.Conf. 26 Feb.1923; Fell to C.O.Tel, 20 Mar.1923
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The problem of In d ian  f ra n c h is e  as f a r  as F i j i  was concerned was 
now s e t t l e d  and i t  was l e f t  to  V Jhitehall to  n e g o tia te  w ith  In d ia ,
The S e c re ta ry  o f S ta te  had made up h is  mind as to  how f a r  he would go. 
So f a r  th e  Europeans had trium phed. A dm ittedly th e y  would lo se  a 
s e a t ,  b u t th ey  had k i l l e d  common r o l l  and equal s ta tu s .  A ll was 
o s te n s ib ly  done in  th e  name of th e  Deed o f Cession and consequent 
B r i t i s h  o b lig a t io n s  to  th e  indigenous ra c e . Local Europeans whose 
fo re b e a rs  were th e  d i r e c t  cause of C ession could be more eq u a l than  
th e  F i j ia n s  bu t In d ian s  must n o t have e q u a li ty  w ith  th e  ru l in g  ra c e . 
Such was th e  f i a t  of European co lo n ia lism  and th e  su b je c ts  must e i th e r  
subm it o r re b e l  and s u f f e r  th e  consequence o f be ing  suppressed  by a 
more pow erful fo rc e .
The In d ia n  p o s i t io n  a t  t h i s  s tag e  stood as recommended by th e
C olonies Committee o f th e  Government of In d ia :
Communal f r a n c h is e  as  ap p lied  in  C olonies where In d ian s  do n o t 
form a m in o rity  community i s  regarded  in  In d ia  as a system  which 
i s  in ten d ed  to  a ss ig n  an in f e r io r  s ta tu s  to  In d ian s  as compared 
w ith  t h e i r  fe llo w  s u b je c ts ,  and to  l im i t  th e  growth o f t h e i r  
p o l i t i c a l  in f lu e n c e  in  th e  Colony. 105
I t  a lso  r e f e r r e d  to  th e  In d ian  re a c t io n  a g a in s t communal f r a n c h is e .
The Committee d id  no t seek any s p e c ia l  f ra n c h is e  f o r  In d ian s  and
was p rep a red  to  accep t th e  q u a l i f ic a t io n  f o r  e le c to r s  as p re sc r ib e d  by
th e  L e t te r s  P a ten t o f 191U su b je c t only  to  th e  r e v is io n  o f su b -c lau se  1
of S ec tio n  20 in  o rd e r  to  d e le te  r a c i a l  d is c r im in a tio n  a g a in s t
A s ia tic  B r i t i s h  su b je c ts  and to  in c lu d e  l i t e r a c y  q u a l i f ic a t io n s
107recommended by th e  Davson Commission. For can d id a te s  some
re d u c tio n  o f  th e  e x is t in g  q u a l i f ic a t io n s  was d e s ira b le  and th e  
q u a lify in g  t e s t  in  E ng lish  ought to  be th e  same f o r  F i j ia n s  and 
In d ian s  and to  be l e f t  to  th e  d is c r e t io n  o f th e  A gent-G eneral of 
Im m igration . The Committee recogn ized  th a t  th e  r e s u l t  o f t h i s  would 
be t h a t  th e  number of In d ian s  would be too  sm all f o r  them to  be ab le  
to  e le c t  one c a n d id a te . Hence th re e  s e a ts  ought to  be re se rv e d  fo r  
them u n t i l  th e  e f f e c t  o f in d en tu re  d isap p eared  and th e  p ro s p e r i ty  
o f th e  community p ro g ressed  s u f f i c i e n t ly  to  enable them to  re ce iv e  
re p re s e n ta t io n  w ith o u t s p e c ia l  p ro te c t io n .  The whole purpose was to  
have common r o l l ,  and In d ia  seemed p rep ared  to  go to  any le n g th  to
10^ C .P .15 /27 .
106 C .A .li/106.
107 C .P .1 5 /2 7 .
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o b ta in  i t .  For in s ta n c e , Kenyan In d ian s  were adv ised  n o t to
jeo p ard ize  th e  p ro sp ec t of i t  by c re a tin g  a la rg e  In d ian  e le c to r a te ,
108r e g is te r e d  on a d u lt f r a n c h is e . The q u estion  a r i s e s  why In d ia  was
prepared  to  go to  such le n g th s  e s p e c ia l ly  when communal e le c to r a te s  
were e s ta b lis h e d  th e re  in  1909? Perhaps th i s  was th e  very  reason  
f o r  t h e i r  o p p o s itio n . Acceptance o f communal f ra n c h is e  w ithou t 
b i t t e r  p ro te s t  could be in te rp re te d  as re c o g n itio n  by In d ian  
n a t io n a l i s t  p o l i t i c i a n s  of the claim s f o r  p e rp e tu a tio n  of se p a ra te  
re p re se n ta tio n  in  In d ia  i t s e l f .  I f  common r o l l  was unaccep tab le  
then  communal re p re se n ta tio n  would be to le r a b le  only  i f  In d ia n s  had 
th e  same number o f s e a ts  as Europeans in  accordance w ith  th e  p r in c ip le  
o f e q u a li ty  o f s ta tu s .
D esp ite  th e se  view s, th e  S ec re ta ry  of S ta te  subm itted  to  th e
109In d ia  O ffice  p ro p o sa ls  th a t  had been agreed  between F i j i  and h im se lf .
In d ia  d id  no t th in k  th re e  s e a ts  adequate and r e je c te d  o u tr ig h t  the
co n ten tio n  th a t  52,000 In d ian s  possessed  th e  r ig h t  of r e p a t r ia t io n  and
110could re tu rn  to  th e  m otherland . I t  re fu te d  th e  argument by say ing
th a t  from Ju ly  1922 to  January  1925 an average o f 1,100 had been 
r e p a tr ia te d  an n u ally  and th i s  was more th an  coun terbalanced  by th e  
average annual in c re a se  in  th e  In d ian  p o p u la tio n . Even in  th e  case of 
some unexpected fu tu re  exodus, th e  rem aining In d ian s  would s t i l l  
g re a t ly  outnumber th e  Europeans. A ccordingly i t  renewed i t s  re q u e s t 
f o r  equal r e p re s e n ta t io n .
The C o lon ia l O ffice  re fu sed  to  comply and th e  In d ian  Government
r e lu c ta n t ly  accep ted ; th ey  s t i l l  thought th re e  s e a ts  inadequate  bu t
would accep t s in ce  th e  C o lon ia l O ffice  was unable to  move beyond i t s
o r ig in a l  o f f e r .  They asked f o r  an amendment to  enable th e  In d ian s
111to  e le c t  t h e i r  r e p re s e n ta t iv e s  a t  th e  n ex t e le c t io n .  This l a s t
108 C.O. to  Hutson Conf. 6 J u ly  1926.
109 C.O. to  1 .0 .  20 M ar.1925 in  C .P .15 /27 .
110 T e l. from V iceroy, D ept, o f E ducation , H ealth  and Lands to  th e  
S ec re ta ry  o f S ta te  fo r  In d ia  11 Ju ly  1925.
111 Govt, o f In d ia ,  D ept, o f E ducation , H ealth  and Lands, to  1 .0 . 
27 May 1926.
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request was impossible to implement because the 1926 election in Fiji 
came too soon after the acquiescence of India and left no time for the 
preparations essential for the task.
Within Fiji the situation seemed calm; there was no agitation
and the Indians were prepared to wait knowing that the subject was
112being discussed with India. Governor Kutson waited for local
reactions. If the Indians wished for nominated representatives in
the intervening period then the recommendation for the measure ought
113to emanate from themselves rather than from Government House.
In fact, a request did come from the Indian Association of Fiji that
an Indian be appointed to the Legislative Council pending completion
of arrangements for the election of their representatives and Badri
Mahraj was once more (for the last time) installed in the seat he had
first occupied in 1916. But a group known as the Young Men’s
Indian Association writing from Lautoka in October 1926 asked one
Dr. A.Deva Sagayam, M.B. be appointed to the seat earlier vacated 
1 wby Badri Mahraj. p The reason for preferring Dr. Sagayam, a recent 
arrival from India, was that others including Badri Mahraj were 
not sufficiently conversant with the language in which the Council was 
conducted. The support for Sagayam, who was based in Nadi, was 
indicative of Indian recognition of the need for improvement in the 
quality of its leadership. Indians wanted someone who would be able 
to debate and match words with Europeans, someGne who would lead in 
appearance as well as in fact.
It is appropriate here to retrace our steps and evaluate briefly
Badri Mahraj’s contribution in the Legislative Council and as leader
of his community since his nomination in 1916. During his first year
in Council, on three major issues: constitutional reform, regulation
of the sugar industry, vernacular schools for Indians, he was
116conspicuous by his silence. ' The following year evidenced no 
noteworthy improvement.
112 Hutson to C.O.Conf. 18 June 1926.
113 ibid.
11ii C.O. to Hutson Conf. 3 Nov. 1926.
115 C.S.O. 1*022/26.
116 L.C.Debates 1917:160-168.
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When in  Ju ly  1919 Hedstrom moved f o r  th e  a b o l i t io n  o f th e
in d e n tu re s  to  tak e  e f f e c t  from 1 August 1920 Badri Mahraj again
117rem ained sp ee c h le ss . Here was a su b je c t o f which he knew more th an
a l l  o th e rs ;  he had been through th e  experience  and he was aware o f 
what h is  countrymen were demanding. Perhaps on t h i s  occasion  he was 
a la n d lo rd  and employer and stood to  s u f f e r  f in a n c ia l ly  from the  
immediate a b o l i t io n  o f th e  system which he thought needed reform  n o t 
d e s t r u c t io n .  On th e  same day and on th e  nex t m otion fo r  s e t t in g  up 
a committee to  improve th e  sex r a t io  o f th e  In d ian  p o p u la tio n , i t s  
housing  c o n d itio n s , m edical and n u rs in g  arrangem ents and e d u ca tio n a l 
and r e l ig io u s  f a c i l i t i e s ,  a l l  he could do was to  u t t e r  a s in g le
11Ösen tence  ’I  a g re e 1 to  an o rd in a ry  speech by a p la n te r ,  H a rric k s .
Not u n t i l  th e  debate  on th e  M arriage Ordinance 1918 Amendment B i l l
d id  he make a speech o f any su b stan ce , one la s t in g  no more than
th re e  o r fo u r  m inu tes. Yet he d id  make th e  a l l- im p o r ta n t  p o in t :
In  F i j i ,  much damage i s  done to  th e  cause of th e  
In d ia n s  by th e  Government no t reco g n iz in g  as v a l id  
and s t r i c t l y  b in d in g , th e  m arriages perform ed by a 
Mohammedan p r i e s t ,  o r In d ian  p u n d it. 119
For i t s  p a r t  th e  Government had a lre ad y  accep ted  t h i s  c o n ten tio n .
His n ex t s ig n i f ic a n t  c o n tr ib u tio n  was in  O ctober d u ring  th e  passage
of th e  C losing of Prem ises (w holesale  and r e t a i l )  B i l l  when he drew
a t te n t io n  su c c e s s fu lly  to  e f f e c t s  in  th e  r u r a l  a re a s  and e s p e c ia l ly
on th e  la b o u re r .
I f  t h i s  seemed to  foreshadow g re a te r  th in g s  th e y  d id  n o t
m a te r ia l iz e .  A ll he d id  was second w ith o u t comment H a rr ic k s ’ c a l l
1 21to  th e  Government f o r  a m onthly H indi newspaper. But in  November
he d id  em p h a tica lly  s ta t e  that- In d ian s  could n o t l i v e  on 1 /-  a day
and i f  p la n te r s  p a id  more th an  2 /-  o r 2 /6  a day th en  In d ian  lab o u r
122in  F i j i  would be a v a i la b le .  .D uring h is  speech he a lso  remarked 
th a t  C.F.Andrews’ re p o r t  con ta in ed  very  l i t t l e  t r u t h .  By t h i s  tim e 
he had a lre a d y  been nom inated f o r  a second term .
117 L .C .D ebates 1 9 1 9 .
118 i b i d :k$-h9.
119 i b i d : 159.
120 ib i d : 229-230.
121 L.C.Debates 1920:2h. 
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A lto g e th e r t h i s  was c e r ta in ly  n o t a very  im pressive  perform ance 
by th e  f i r s t  In d ia n  to  s i t  in  th e  L e g is la t iv e  C ouncil. He d id  no t 
i n i t i a t e  any m otion nor ask th e  many p e r t in e n t  q u estio n s  th a t  ran  
th rough  In d ia n  minds d u ring  th e se  y e a r s .  There was no d en u n c ia tio n  
of th e  Government n o r any p ra is e  of i t .  He a p p a re n tly  recogn ized  
h is  own inadequacy and spoke only  when i t  was unavoidab le  though he 
could  have been more v o ca l th an  he was. But he was no match f o r  
Crompton o r Hedstrom or S co tt and in s te a d  o f doing b a t t l e  w ith  them* 
which in  any case would have been f u t i l e  (as fu tu re  In d ian  members 
were to  d isco v e r)  he kep t th e  peace . I f  he d id  n o th in g  rem arkab le, 
he a lso  d id  n o th in g  f o o l i s h  t h a t  m ight c a s t  doubt on th e  value  o f th e  
need f o r  In d ia n  re p re s e n ta t io n  in  th e  C ouncil. Nothing on h is  p a r t  
gave anyone any reason  to  urge t h a t  In d ia n s  should  be dep rived  of 
th e  nom inated s e a t .  The p ro cess  had a lre ad y  been s e t  in  m otion 
to  give In d ia n s  e le c t iv e  r e p re s e n ta t io n  befo re  B adri M ahraj1s 
f i r s t  term  had e x p ire d .
Throughout b is  te n u re  in  th e  L e g is la t iv e  C ouncil (1916-23 and
1926-29) he behaved in  a low key except in  1923 on th e  is su e  of th e
R e s id e n tia l  Tax. This he opposed s tro n g ly  and in  f u l l  agreement w ith
123h is  fe llo w  In d ian s  who a g i ta te d  a g a in s t i t .  When he f a i l e d  to
move th e  Government he re s ig n ed  h is  s e a t .  This was an im portan t 
change from h is  behav iour in  1920 and 1921 when he had re fu sed  to  
support th e  m i l i t a n t  elem ents who had gone on s t r i k e .  In  f a i rn e s s  
to  B adri Mahraj one m ight say th a t  he adhered to  h is  p r in c ip le s .
On th e se  o ccasions he appeared a c o n se rv a tiv e . But he was a lso  an 
a c tiv e  Arya Sam aji, though no t n e c e s s a r i ly  a r e l ig io u s  b ig o t .  And in  
1923 he re fu sed  as a nominated member to  be j u s t  a c ip h e r c f  th e  
Government.
N onetheless he lacked  th e  dynamism th a t  appealed to  a community th a t  
was in  a h a s te  to  demand a l le v ia t io n  of i t s  g rie v a n ce s , r e a l  and 
a l le g e d . He was a self-m ade man who had achieved much through hard  
work and co -o p e ra tio n  w ith  o th e rs .  His community sought someone more 
a r t i c u l a t e ,  more v e r s a t i l e ,  someone who could be f re q u e n tly  d e f ia n t  
and v o c a l, someone p rep ared  to  engage in  th e  b a t t l e  of words in  th e  
L e g is la t iv e  Council w ith  confidence and a b i l i t y  to  score  p o in ts  o f f  h is  
opponents. I t  was t h i s  th a t  perhaps encouraged a group o f young men
123 Mayer 1963:U3.
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to propose the name of Dr.Sagayam. The Government chose to ignore 
the call. Perhapa it felt that Sagay&m as a newcomer had not yet 
proved himself while Badri Mahraj had by 1926 won some respect and 
acceptability among his own people. Besides, the franchise for 
Indians was near and there was no point in terminating the innings 
ofj the tried leader for an unknown quantity.
SOMETIME before the public announcement of Indian representation 
on communal franchise Governor Hutson decided to appoint yet another
1 2hcommittee to advise on the qualification of electors and candidates.
In his memo Hutson recommended three electorates with indirect voting
123along the lines suggested by Chowla to the Davson Commission.
The second part of the recommendation was quite superfluous as the
Davson Commission had fully dealt with the unsuitability of using the
1'panchayat' form. Fortunately the Committee would not hear of it.
In its report of September 1926 it favoured direct voting with secret 
127ballot. Moreover, it agreed that the vote should be given to
British subjects of Indian birth but British protected persons should 
also be given the privilege as in Kenya and Ceylon. There should be 
no insistence on educational and property qualifications for electors 
rather there should be universal adult franchise for which precedent 
existed in Kenya. For candidates, property qualifications were 
deemed necessary though Pilling dissented from this recommendation. 
Again the Governor’s memorandum and the Committee report with their
12l| Those appointed were the Attorney-General as Chairman, the 
Acting Agent-General of Immigration (J.S.Neill), the Chief 
Police Magistrate (R.C.G.D.Higginson) and the Secretary of 
the VJestern Pacific High Commission (H.G.Pilling).
123 C.S.O. C26/26.
126 Hutson advised the Committee not to use the expression 'panchayat' 
in referring to the District Electoral Board.
127 C.S.O. C26/26.
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d e ta i l s  about e l e c to r s ' and c a n d id a te s ' q u a l i f ic a t io n s  should have 
p rovided  th e  b a s is  f o r  a quick amendment of th e  L e t te r s  P a te n t and the  
e le c t io n  o f In d ia n s  b u t no d e c is io n  could be f in a l iz e d  w ith o u t th e  
concurrence o f W h ite h a ll,
The S e c re ta ry  o f S ta te  w rote th a t  in  th e  i n i t i a l  s tag e  some
p ro p e rty  and e d u ca tio n a l q u a l i f ic a t io n s  were e s s e n t ia l  f o r  th e  e le c to r s
f o r  i f  th ey  were o m itted  a t  th e  beginn ing  i t  would be d i f f i c u l t  to
128impose them l a t e r .  In d ian  f ra n c h is e  in  F i j i  was an experim ent and
i t s  consequences were u n fo reseen  hence safeguards as in  o th e r 
co lo n ie s  ought to  be adopted . For in s ta n c e , in  Ceylon, an e le c to r  
had to  be ab le  to  read  and w rite  E ng lish  o r a s p e c if ie d  lo c a l  language 
and in  F i j i  th e re  should be a  s im ila r  requ irem ent o f E n g lish  and 
a s ta te d  In d ian  language. P ro p erty  q u a l i f ic a t io n s  were to  be 
s t ip u la te d  in  accordance w ith  lo c a l  c o n d itio n s . In  F i j i  th e  
Executive C ouncil decided  to  d e fe r  d e c is io n  on i t  t i l l  th e  a r r i v a l  
o f th e  S e c re ta ry  o f In d ian  A f fa ir s .
Yet an o th er committee was s e t  up f o r  th e  ta sk  com prising th e  
C o lon ia l S e c re ta ry , th e  A cting A tto rney-G eneral (H .M .Scott, th e  
e le c te d  European member) and th e  S e c re ta ry  of In d ian  A f fa ir s .
130F i r s t ,  th e  l a s t  named subm itted  a len g th y  memorandum on th e  is s u e .
He thought th a t  th e re  was a danger in  th e  r e g i s t r a t io n  of In d ia n s  
because only a sm all number was l i k e ly  to  ge t on th e  r o l l  and th e se  
would be f r ie n d s  of th e  p o li t ic a l ly -m in d e d . Thus th e se  
q u a l i f ic a t io n s  could  become p u re ly  f i c t i t i o u s .  To so lve  th e  problem  
ru le s  should be fram ed to  give v o te s  a u to m a tic a lly  to  a c o n sid e rab le  
number of d i f f e r e n t  c la s s e s .  Many In d ian s  on a d a i ly  wage were 
e n t i t l e d  to  r e p a t r i a t io n  and t h i s  group, a tem porary e lem ent, and 
w ith  no th ing  to  lo se  would be open to  subversion  by p ro fe s s io n a l  
p o l i t i c i a n s .  Consequently th e  f ra n c h is e  must be l im ite d  to  th e  
permanent r e s id e n ts  and in s is te n c e  on p ro p e rty  q u a l i f ic a t io n  was 
im p e ra tiv e . As many o f th e  s e t t l e d  c u l t iv a to r s  as p o s s ib le  should  
be inc luded  on th e  r o l l  because th e se  were th e  r e a l  p roducers  in  
th e  In d ian  community and adequate re p re s e n ta t io n  f o r  them would r e s u l t  
in  s t a b i l i t y .  Payers o f l ic e n c e  ta x es  such as keepers  o f r e t a i l
128 C.O. to  Gov. Conf. 8 M ar.1927.
129 M inutes Ex.Co. 6 May 1927.
130 C .A .a/130.
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stores, tailors, hawkers should be franchised automatically but not 
those with licence for hawking pigeons or other wild birds. Income, 
and educational qualifications too were suggested. The Committee
submitted its report late in October and in November the Executive
1 31Council accepted the recommendations with some modifications.
It. was 1928 by the time these were approved by Whitehall and
incorporated into the new Letters Patent published in February 1929«
But all was not settled yet. When the Letters Patent were
published those who were subjects of native states such as Kathiawar,
Baroda or Hyderabad and classified as protected persons found
themselves excluded. Nor was Gujerati listed as one of the dialects
among those accepted for qualification. Deputation and protest
1 32from those excluded followed. The Acting Governor, Seymour,
stated that Gujeratis had on the average higher educational
qualifications than other Indian groups and their disqualification
was to be regretted. But as the Letters Patent required that
the general election take place within six months of their
proclamation time precluded the Gujeratis from being enfranchised.
The disability was later removed but one wonders whether the lack
of rapid official effort to provide redress was a consequence of the
Gujeratis being known to be supporters of the Arya Samaj faction
which was locally regarded as extremist.
Tins after much debate, discussion, pressure and obstruction
Indian franchise became a reality in the year of the fiftieth
anniversary of Indian arrival in Fiji. Yet it brought only partial.
joy to Indian political activists. Though they were now enfranchised
for participation in tho central legistive body they still harboured
bitterness about their virtual exclusion by stringent restriction since
1915 from municipal politics. Just as India had involved itself
in the issue of the franchise for the Legislative Council so it pressed
for the re-examination of the municipal question.
The Raju Committee in 1922 commented that the education test
1 33deprived Indians of participation in municipal affairs. Among
131 Minutes Ex.Co. 2 Nov.1927.
132 C.S.O. CU7/29.
133 Raju Report:72.
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their recommendations was a call for the repeal of the education test
and the use of ballet papers printed in the vernacular, introduction
of the ward system to ensure minority representation or the sanction
1 "hof ’plumping’ for a single candidate. v The Government of India’s
paper on the position of Indians in Fiji, published in 1927, also
referred to the subject and advised the use of Indian vernaculars
in a simple educational test and ’the ward system under the powers
already vested in the Governor under section 3(3) of the Ordinance of 1331909* And a commission was set up as a consequence of this paper.
After three meetings a majority of the Commission, i.e. Scott, 
Marks, Millett, Hedstrom and Sukuna, decided that no amendment to the 
law was necessary and 'under present circumstances’ the 1909 
Ordinance operated 'equitably towards all classes of the ratepayers'. 
Governor Hutson refused to recommend this view to the Secretary of 
State. Since the majority report was short and presented without 
reasons for arriving at its conclusions, it would be fruitless to try 
to speculate in detail on what influenced it. But it is noteworthy 
that Scott and Hedstrom were in the forefront of the battle to impose 
the education test. Marks, with them, constituted the ’big three’ of 
Fiji European society and its politics. They shared identical 
convictions. With his knowledge of local politics Hutson perhaps 
erred in judgement by appointing Scott as Chairman. A perusal of
13U ibid:72-73.
133 C.P. 13/27. Section 3(3) of XXV of 1909 read: 'The Governor
may by proclamation divide a town into wards and define and 
alter the boundaries of such wards.’
136 The terms of reference of the Committee were to consider:
'(a) the question referred to on page 2, Council Paper No.13 of 
1927, under the heading 'Municipal Franchise';
(b) whether the Municipal Institutions Ordinance 1909 operates 
equitably towards all classes of ratepayers; and
(c) to submit recommendations as to the desirability or 
otherwise of amending the Municipal Institutions Ordinance 1909 
with particular reference to Part II relating to members and 
officers, and to Part III thereof relating to the elections of 
members of the Councils and by-laws made thereunder.’
C.P. 38/29.
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correspondence of the previous two years relating to Indian franchise
generally would have sufficiently revealed to Hutson the standpoint
137of Scott and his supporters. The Chief Justice or even the
Colonial Secretary, or perhaps Pearson as Secretary of Indian Affairs 
(though the latter not without local protest), might have proved 
a better chairman. Ratu Sukuna's behaviour was quite logical as he
1 38intended to side with the conservative stalwarts of European opinion.
139The minority presented two separate reports. One came from
the Secretary of Indian Affairs and the other from the three Indians 
jointly. Both were agreed on the crucial issue that the 1909 
Ordinance did not operate equitably towards all. Pearson, however, 
disagreed with the Indians’ practice of providing reasons for their 
conclusions and with certain passages in their report which offended 
against what he considered to be ordinary rules of procedure. There 
had been a discussion on the question of not divulging reasons for 
any conclusions reached, but no vote was taken nor had the Indians 
given any undertaking on it.
From the Indian members came a detailed report containing a 
reiteration of the discontent of their community and the reforms 
desired. They condemned the 1915 amendment as depriving them of 
municipal representation and accused the Council of neglecting Indian
137 C.A.U/137.
138 Sukuna was absent from the first two meetings and before the third 
he had a long conference with Scott. Sukuna’s vote proved 
crucial at the third meeting as hitherto there had been a It - I4. 
split. (C.S.O. 3603/27.)
139 Indian Minority Report. C.P.38/29.
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r e s i d e n t i a l  a r e a s .  They gave the r a te p a y e r s  and e l e c t o r s  as f o l l o w s :
N a t i o n a l i t y R a t e p a y e r s E l e c t o r s Remarks
Europeans 206 355 149 e v i d e n t l y  
b e i n g  o c c u p i e r s .
I n d i a n s 143 22 121 e v i d e n t l y  
b e in g  u n a b l e  t o  
r e a d ,  w r i t e  and 
speak  E n g l i s h .
F i j i a n s 1 -
H a l f - c a s t e s 9 13 4 e v i d e n t l y  
b e in g  o c c u p i e r s .
O t h e r s 28 14 14 e v i d e n t l y
b e in g  u n a b l e  to  
r e a d ,  w r i t e  and 
speak  E n g l i s h .
The s t a t i s t i c s  were to  i l l u s t r a t e  the i n j u s t i c e  which made i t  
' d i f f i c u l t  to  secu re  a t t e n t i o n  to  the needs o f  the Ind ian  community'. 
Hence they sought the r e c o g n i t io n  o f  H in d u sta n i ,  Tamil and F i j i a n  along
1U1
w ith  E n g l ish  f o r  the e d u c a t io n  t e s t .  Moreover, they  wanted the
r e s i d e n t i a l  q u a l i f i c a t i o n  to  be s i x  months r a th e r  than th ree  months.
An amendment here would have a f f e c t e d  Europeans r a th e r  than In d ia n s .  
There was a l s o  a w ish  to  make compulsory the a b i l i t y  to  read , w r i te  
and speak E n g l is h  f o r  C o u n c i l lo r s .  They d isc o u n te d  the c la im  th a t
lil.O ( 1 ) l n d i a n s  have been  d e p r i v e d  o f  r e p r e s e n t a t i o n  on th e  M u n ic i p a l  
C o u n c i l s  s i n c e  1915 and have no f a c i l i t y  f o r  p a r t i c i p a t i n g  i n  
M u n i c i p a l  a f f a i r s  t o  lo o k  a f t e r  t h e i r  r e q u i r e m e n t s  and i n t e r e s t s ;
( 2 )  t h e  M u n i c i p a l  C o u n c i l  o f  Suva i s  n o t  c a r r y i n g  o u t  i t s  
o b l i g a t i o n s  t o  I n d i a n  r a t e p a y e r s .  Most o f  t h e  r o a d s  i n  I n d i a n  
a r e a s  a r e  i n  a d i s g r a c e f u l  c o n d i t i o n ,  l i g h t i n g  a r r a n g e m e n t s  i n  
such  a r e a s  a r e  b a d ,  and m ea s u res  o f  d i s c r i m i n a t i o n  have been  
a d o p te d  on r a c i a l  g r o u n d s ,  i n  t h e  m a t t e r s  o f  p u b l i c  b a t h s  and 
l i b r a r y ;
( 3 )  t h e  Levuka M u n ic i p a l  C o u n c i l  c o l l e c t s  E d u c a t i o n  r a t e s  f rom I n d i a n  
r a t e p a y e r s  a l t h o u g h  I n d i a n  c h i l d r e n  a r e  n o t  a d m i t t e d  i n t o  the  
P u b l i c  S c hoo l  a t  Levuka.
(The c o l l e c t i o n  o f  E d u c a t i o n  r a t e  was d i s c o n t i n u e d  by th e  Suva 
M u n i c i p a l i t y  a b o u t  t h e  y e a r  1916 by r e a s o n  o f  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  I n d i a n  
c h i l d r e n  a r e  n o t  a d m i t t e d  i n t o  t h e  P u b l i c  S c h o o l s  a t  S u v a . )
( I n d i a n  M i n o r i t y  R e p o r t .  C . P . 3 8 / 2 9 . )
Illl They added: 'The o th e r  Indian lan gu ages  such as T e legu , Malayalam,
G u je r a t i ,  Punjabee &c. ,  and f o r e ig n  la n g u a g es ,  such as Chinese
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11.2t h a t  t h e i r  p r o p o s a l s  would l e a d  t o  d o m in a t i o n  by I n d i a n s 4 F u r t h e r ,
t h e y  s o u g h t  e l e c t i o n s  on a  common f r a n c h i s e  and e x p r e s s e d  o p p o s i t i o n  
t o  one on a communal b a s i s  b e c au s e  i t  would a s s i g n  t o  them an i n f e r i o r  
s t a t u s .  I f  t h i s  were u n a c c e p t a b l e  t h e n  t h e y  s o u g h t  a s  an a l t e r n a t i v e  
the  r e s e r v a t i o n  o f  two s e a t s  f o r  I n d i a n s ,  who, t h e y  a r g u e d ,  were 
p l a y i n g  an e s s e n t i a l  r o l e  i n  t h e  p r o s p e r i t y  o f  Suva and d e s e r v e d  an 
o p p o r t u n i t y  to  v o i c e  t h e i r  own w an t s  t h e m s e lv e s  i n  t h e i r  pe rm anen t
, '  1U3home as  no o t h e r  community c o u i d  a d e q u a t e l y  speak  f o r  them. The
S e c r e t a r y  o f  I n d i a n  A f f a i r s  would n o t  a g re e  w i t h  them on a l l  t h e s e  
c o u n t s .  A l l  he was p r e p a r e d  t o  do was recommend f u r t h e r  
i n v e s t i g a t i o n  o f  t h e  p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  i n t r o d u c i n g  H i n d u s t a n i  a l o n g s i d e  
E n g l i s h ,  an i n c r e a s e  o f  r e s i d e n t i a l  q u a l i f i c a t i o n  t o  s i x  months ,  
r a t e a b l e  p r o p e r t y  f o r  o c c u p i e r  t o  be £20 p . a .  and t h e  d i v i s i o n  o f  
Suva i n t o  w a r d s .  P e a r s o n  l a t e r  c l a i m e d  t h a t  he was u n a b l e  t o
p e r s u a d e  th e  I n d i a n  members t o  h i s  way o f  t h i n k i n g  as  t h e y  s u b m i t t e d
1 lill
t h e i r  r e p o r t  w i t h o u t  i n f o r m i n g  him.  Given th e  keen  s e n s e  o f  h u r t
1itl
1U2
1U3
c o n t ' d .  do n o t  come u n d e r  t h e  same c a t e g o r y ,  and i t  would seem 
r e a s o n a b l e  t o  draw a d i s t i n c t i o n . * ( C . P . 3 8 / 2 9 * )
They s t a t e d :  ( l )  A l though  th e  I n d i a n  p o p u l a t i o n  i n  Suva M u n ic ip a l  
a r e a  i s  more t h a n  tw i c e  t h e  number o f  E u r o p e a n s ,  y e t  a c c o r d i n g  t o  
t h e  l a s t  c e n s u s  r e p o r t  o n l y  16 p e r  c e n t  o f  t h e  I n d i a n  p o p u l a t i o n  
a r e  l i t e r a t e ;
(2 )  on ly  o c c u p i e r s  who a r e  d i r e c t  t e n a n t s  o f  
owners  o r  r e g i s t e r e d  l e s s e e s  can  become e l e c t o r s ;
(3 )  ou r  r ecom menda t ion  i s  n o t  t o  e x t e n d  the  
f r a n c h i s e  to  t h o s e  who a r e  l i t e r a t e  i n  a l a n g u a g e  o t h e r  t h a n  
E n g l i s h ,  H i n d u s t a n i ,  Tamil  o r  F i j i a n  which would  b r i n g  the  
p e r c e n t a g e  o f  e l e c t o r s  much lower  t h a n  16 p e r  c e n t  o f  r a t e p a y e r s  
and o c c u p i e r s ;
(4 )  t h e  l a b o u r e r s  who c a n n o t  pay as  much as  £10 
p e r  annum as  r e n t  o u t  o f  t h e i r  a n n u a l  income o f  a b o u t  £36,  
c a l c u l a t e d  a t  the  maximum r a t e  o f  two s h i l l i n g s  and s i x p e n c e  pe r  
work ing  day,  w i l l  a l s o  be e x c l u d e d  from th e  e l e c t o r a l  r o l l s ;
( 5 ) the  number o f  I n d i a n  r a t e p a y e r s  and o c c u p i e r s  
i n  Levuka M u n i c i p a l i t y  i s  s m a l l .  ( C . P . 3 8 / 2 9 . )
They q u o t e d c o n t r i b u t i g n t o  r a t e s on v a l u e  o f  p r o p e r t y
E uropeans £ 1 2 ,8 8 5 . 15. 4
F i j i a n s 9. 4. 2
I n d i a n s 1 ,619 . 17- 6
O t h e r s 1 ,137 . 3. 8
Government 1 ,4 5 6 . 5. 6
£1 7 ,1 0 8 . 6. 2
Wheel Tax B u s i n e s s  L ic e n c e
E uropeans £846.  0 . 0 £1 ,823 .1 7 . 0
I n d i a n s 7 7 6 . 1 0 . 0 1 ,171 . 2.C
O t h e r s 63.1C.O 565 . 8 .6
£1 ,686 .  0 . 0 £3 ,560 . 7 .6
a s :
T o t a l
£2 ,269*17*0 
1 ,9 4 7 * 1 2 .0  
6 2 8 . 1 8 . 6
11dU C.S .O.  7 4 8 /2 8 .
£ 5 ,2 4 6 .  7 .6
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among the  I n d i a n s  i t  i s  u n l i k e l y  t h a t  t h e y  would have w a t e r e d  down
t h e i r  s t r i c t u r e s  t o  s a t i s f y  P e a r s o n .  The A c t in g  C o l o n i a l  S e c r e t a r y ,
I s l a y  MacOwan, t h o u g h t  t h e  n a t u r e  o f  t h e  I n d i a n  m i n o r i t y  r e p o r t  had
1[l5>p u t  the  S e c r e t a r y  o f  I n d i a n  A f f a i r s  i n  a f a l s e  p o s i t i o n .  P e a r s o n
blamed i t  on t h e  z e a l  o f  t h e  I n d i a n s  t o  e x p l o i t  t h e  o p p o r t u n i t y  f o r  
p u t t i n g  t h e i r  c a s e  as  f o r c e f u l l y  as  p o s s i b l e  t o  a c h i e v e  c h a n g e ,  t h u s
1U6
t h e y  o v e r - s t e p p e d  t h e  bounds o f  d i s c r e t i o n .
There  were many d i f f i c u l t i e s  and no s im p le  s o l u t i o n  was 
p o s s i b l e .  For  i n s t a n c e ,  a c c o r d i n g  t o  t h e  1921 C ensus ,  t h e  p o p u l a t i o n  
o f  Suva c o m p r i se d  22% Europeans  and 47% I n d i a n s .  I n  d i r e c t  r a t e s  
the  Europeans  p a i d  a round  70% to  75% as  a g a i n s t  l e s s  t h a n  10% by
J rp
I n d i a n s .  When i n d i r e c t  r a t e s  were t a k e n  i n t o  a c c o u n t  c o n s i d e r a b l e
a d j u s t m e n t  was n e c e s s a r y ,  a s  t h e  I n d i a n  members t h e m s e l v e s  s u g g e s t e d .
I f  wheel  t a x  and b u s i n e s s  l i c e n c e s  were t a k e n  w i t h o u t  a d j u s t m e n t  the
European  c o n t r i b u t i o n  was 50%, the  I n d i a n  37%. Under the  e x i s t i n g
sys tem  I n d i a n s  were by no means p o s s e s s e d  o f  p o l i t i c a l  r i g h t s  i n  any
a p p ro x im a te  p r o p o r t i o n ,  to  t h e i r  c o n t r i b u t i o n .  I t  was e s t i m a t e d  by
P e a r s o n  t h a t  w i t h o u t  t h e  e d u c a t i o n  t e s t  t h e r e  would be 156 I n d i a n
1 ) R
e l e c t o r s  t o  206 E u r o p e a n s /  But  t h e s e  f i g u r e s  were u n a c c e p t a b l e
t o  t h e  Europeans  who a rg u e d  t h a t  w i t h  a growing p o p u l a t i o n  I n d i a n s
would swamp them. The I n d i a n s  d e n i e d  t h i s  d a n g e r .  And n e i t h e r  s i d e
c o u l d  s u b s t a n t i a t e  t h e i r  c a s e  w i t h  s t a t i s t i c s .  S c o t t  a rg u e d  t h a t
Europeans  p a i d  75% o f  t h e  r a t e s  and i t  was i n e q u i t a b l e  t h a t  t h e y  r i s k
a m u n i c i p a l  c o u n c i l  d om ina ted  by I n d i a n s  f o r  which  no European  would
1 1*9se ek  e l e c t i o n .  Marks was e x p l i c i t  t h a t  i f  an I n d i a n  were e l e c t e d
t o  t h e  Suva M u n ic i p a l  C o u n c i l  a l l  t h e  European  members v/ould r e s i g n
130t h e r e b y  f o r c i n g  t h e  Government  to  assume c o n t r o l .  T h i s
r e p r e s e n t e d  l o c a l  European  o p i n i o n  and t h e  Governor  c o u l d  n o t  
i g n o r e  t h i s  t h r e a t .
M inu te ,  9 Feb .  1928,  C . S . 0 .  3 603 /27 .  
1J|6 C . S . 0 .  360 3 /2 7 .
1li7 c . s . o .  1798/ 2 9 .
1U8 i b i d .
C .S .O.  36 0 3 /2 7 .
15>0 Hutson t o  C .O .C onf .  25 May 1 928.
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The intricacy of the problem became apparent when reports carae 
up for decision before the Executive Council. Governor Hutson felt
131that the reports had been disappointing if not ’distinctly abortive’.
He found the Majority Report 'a. move to shelve the question 
indefinitely'.^^ The officials in the Executive Council generally 
favoured the adoption of the Minority Report submitted by the 
Secretary of Indian Affairs although the Attorney-General was 
opposed to the introduction of a dual language qualification and 
preferred the nomination of an Indian member or election by a 
communal franchise. He described the proposed ward system as 
inconsistent with the communal franchise to be granted to Indians 
for representation in the Legislative Council. The Secretary for 
Native Affairs, however, advised the acceptance of the Majority 
Report; if the language qualification was essential he was 
prepared to agree to Hindustani and Fijian being put alongside 
English. The two unofficial members, Marks and Hedstrom, preferred 
the Majority Report. As a compromise, Marks advocated that the 
Secretary of Indian Affairs could sit as the Indian representative 
in the Municipal Council. Hedstrom adhered to his original 
proposition stating that 'on the ground of public policy' he was 
strongly opposed to the introduction of a dual language 
qualification.
Governor Hutson stated that he would despatch aid three reports 
to the Colonial Office and reserved his decision till the next 
meeting of the Executive Council. Subsequently he decided there 
were three alternatives:
(1) adopt Pearson's report, modify the language qualification, 
and recognize both Fijian and Hindustani;
(2) amend the 1909 Ordinance, specify the number of elected 
members and raise property and residential qualifications 
along with recognition of Fijian and Hindi while providing 
for the nomination of no more than two members by the 
Governor; and
(3) before reaching any decision investigate the allegations 
of the three Indians on the Commission.
1^ 1 Hutson to C.O.Conf. 23 May 1928. 
132 ibid.
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A Commission under the Chief Justice was instituted to hear
evidence in public and pronounce on the allegations of the three
Indian members. The Chief Justice kept strictly to the terms of his
1 53reference and adopted a very legalistic approach. Perhaps there
was no choice as both sides were represented by counsel who adopted
court procedure and Chief Justice Young had no wish to add to the 1 bhcontroversy. The judgement of the Chief Justice was by no means
definite:
(1) prejudice did exist in the language test but not 
to the extent suggested;
(2) allegation concerning the rating and the education rate 
of the Levuka Municipal Council were sustained while 
that regarding the reading room of the library were
•apt to mislead and afford^”ed 7 no substantial grievance’.
For the Governor's purpose these were no help. At first he
advised the Secretary of State that he could recommend neither the
Majority Report nor that of the Secretary of Indian Affairs though
1 ^5he generally agreed with it. Of the Indians b o m  in Fiji who had
grown up in the last 50 years there was not an adequate number
educated to a sufficient standard to warrant a change in the
prevailing education test and he thought it expedient to defer that
change. Nonetheless the law ought to be amended to give Indian
ratepayers direct representation in the Municipal Council. To
achieve this he would nominate two (one of them the Secretary of
Indian Affairs) for Suva and one, an Indian, for Levuka. Later
he advised that the election of Indians on a communal basis to the
municipal bodies as intended for the Legislative Council might be
1 56deferred for some years.
153 The findings and minutes of evidence were published as C.P,39/29. 
The Commission held its first sitting on 16 October 192Ö and the 
last on 7 January 1929.
15h He stated for instance: ’It trill be observed that in the
addresses Counsel on one side characterized the Minority Report 
as not being a bona, fide report made on behalf of the Indian 
community; whilst Counsel on behalf of the Indian ratepayers 
referred to the ’spirit’ and 'attitude' of the Municipal Council 
of Suva in the way in which it had come before the Commission.
On these recriminations I offer no comment. My sole duty as 
Commissioner is to find whether or not certain allegations and 
statements contained in the Minority Report are justified, and, 
if so, to what extent.' C.P.39/29.
155 Hutson to C.O.96, 2 Apr.1929»
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In 1929 then Indians set out for the first time to vote by
secret ballot in a Legislative Council election. This was some
achievement but it was marred by their sense of deprivation in
municipal matters. Their behaviour in the new era -would be
scrutinized. Their quest for the franchise and the steps towards its
1 £7bestowal had aroused responses and reactions in other communities.
Each had evaluated the progress towards the constitutional landmark
of the franchise for Indians in terms of its own security in Fiji.
Therefore how the Indians utilized the franchise was to be crucial
for the political future of the Colony.
The European politicians made their position extremely clear
from the outset$ in their remarks in the European election campaign
of 1929 Scott and Marks, both seeking election in the two-member
Southern Division seat, -were particularly critical. Scott accepted
that Indians should be enfranchised but expressed total opposition
1S8 *1^ 9to social equality for them. Marks went even further. He
deprecated the granting of the franchise to the Indians because by 
accepting this Europeans had manufactured 'a whip to flog themselves 
with1 and added: ’We have the Indians here and we must make the best
of it and teach them ’we’ are the Colony and not the Indians.' He 
accused the Government of neglecting the Fijians because of its 
obsession to placate Indians. Though he was not against educating 
Indians he thought that they should be taught to read and write and 
then sent back to the land because Fiji wanted them as 
agriculturalists not as lawyers or solicitors, nor did it want to 
have its gaols 'filled with educated criminals'. Here indeed was 
a challenge to Indian politicians.
' Hutson to C.O.Conf. 9 Apr. 1929.
157 For the attitudes of the Fijians see Chapter VI. 
1^8 h i -  k Sept. 1929.
159 FYT. 6 Sept.1929.
13U
THE POLITICS OF ASSERTION
THE enfranchisement of Indians was a landmark for the community.
It had come almost a decade after the abolition of the indenture
system which in itself had been a milestone. The intervening years
between the end of the indenture system and the arrival of the
franchise had witnessed significant changes in the community.
The Indian population was increasing rapidly.1 23 Largely it was the
consequence of natural means as Appendix II indicates. But in the
nineteen twenties the arrival of passage-paying immigrants from India
received a new impetus which was curtailed only by the restrictions
2of the Fiji Government in 1930. These were imposed in the interests
of the Fiji people and though Fiji-Indian opinion was divided on the
subject* it was significant that the Fiji-born generally agreed with
3the Government measures. Unlike the indentured labourers the new 
migrants were mainly Punjabis and Gujeratis, more of the latter 
than the former. Though the Punjabis became labourers and to a 
lesser extent cultivators, the Gujeratis entered commerce as small 
shopkeepers.^ And with the flow of free migrants came some men 
whose names appear in the following pages - among them were the two 
Gujerati lawyers S.B.Patel and A.D.Patol as well as the Punjabi 
school teacher K.B.Singh who arrived in Fiji via Singapore. Though 
these men were to make Fiji their home eventually* in the early days 
their loyalty appeared to be divided between Fiji and India - they were 
as much interested in the success of the nationalist struggle in 
their motherland as they were in the causes of the local Indians.
But their influence and role must not be overstated because the 
Fiji-born produced their own leaders which in itself was an important
V
1 See Appendix II.
2 For a discussion of such immigrants in the pre-1920 period see 
Gillion 1962:130-135. C.P.20/02, 21/08, hb/11.
3 C.P.2li/35, 2U/38; Luke to C.0.52, 13 Mar. 1939.
k With the passage of time Gujeratis came to dominate commerce, along
with European business-houses. Some of the small family businesses
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development.
These were the signs of a community on the march towards conditions
which were an improvement on the indenture days. In fac t, from the
onset, once the Indians had served th e ir girmit they strove to
become participants in  the cash economy of the Colony.^ Though a
majority remained in agriculture, they sought to obtain land and
cultivate i t  oh th e ir  own behalf instead of continuing solely as
labourers. Thus the emergence of a class of peasant cultivators
was contemporaneous with the indenture system, and at the turn of
the century a few Indians even became th e :employers of the ir
indentured countrymen.  ^ And early they became competitors with
7European cane growers u n til they ultimately ousted them. In th is 
they were helped and encouraged by the C.S.R.Company particularly  
afte r 1920 when they increasingly became tenants of and contractors
o
to the Company. While irr 1925 they cultivated less than 50% 
of the acreage devoted to sugar cane, by 1937 th e ir  contribution 
approximated 90%. Sugar cane production became the economic l i f e ­
blood of the Colony and the Indians controlled and contributed to i t  
as much by th e ir  labour as the C.S.R.Company did by i t s  capital and 
milling and marketing expertise. Sugar cane was the most lucrative 
agricultural crop and Indians on the land concentrated on i t  though 
they also grew rice and vegetables which they consumed themselves or 
sold. Along with the Chinese they became the market-gardeners of 
the Colony.
O fficial accounts, especially the reports of the Secretary of 
Indian Affairs, make frequent references to the prosperity of the
J4 cont’di of the early days were to develop into very large concerns
involved both in re ta il  and wholesale trade. Narseys Ltd. and
G.B.Hari and Co. of Suva are two of the many examples of Guje ra ti
prosperity.
5 Immigration Report l58i;(F.R.G. 1886). C.P.22/97. C.S.O.11456/ 81;*
1731/37, 1730/99, 5293/08. Derrick 1957:133.
6 C.P.21/05. F.R.G.:617~652.
7 C.S.O. 333/97. Shephard 191*5*38.
8 Lowndes 1 *5678956:67-90. Shephard 19U5:8-10.
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In d ian s  in  F i j i  du ring  th e  n in e te en  tw e n tie s  and t h i r t i e s .  This
glowing p ic tu re  m ight n o t have been t o t a l l y  a c c u ra te . I t  i s  c e r ta in
th a t  a sm all p ro p o r tio n  of th e  In d ian s  were becoming w ealthy  in
F i j i ,  B adri Mahraj was an obvious example. But th e re  was a
s u b s ta n t ia l  number who b a re ly  eked ou t an e x is ten c e  plagued by
ind eb ted n ess  and u n c e r ta in ty  o f lan d  te n u re . There were some in
th e  community who were la n d lo rd s  and m oney-lenders b u t th e re  were
10many more o th e rs  who were in  th e  g rip  of th e  fo rm er. The s t r ik e s  
o f 1920 and 1921 e s s e n t i a l ly  economic in  c h a ra c te r ,  though no t 
w ith o u t s l i g h t  p o l i t i c a l  and r a c i a l  o v e rto n es , in d ic a te d  th a t  wages 
had f a i l e d  to  keep pace w ith  p r ic e  r i s e s  o f commodities b a s ic  to  
e x i s t e n c e .^
In  t h e i r  e f f o r t s  to  become independent c u l t iv a to r s  In d ian s
sought to  acq u ire  land  on a more secure  b a s i s ; t h e i r  demands
in c re a se d  and gained ra p id  momentum a f t e r  1920. Here th ey
encountered  se v e ra l d i f f i c u l t i e s .  F i r s t ,  l e g i s l a t i o n  fo rbade the
a l ie n a t io n  o f n a tiv e  lan d  and s t r i c t l y  c o n tro l le d  i t s  le a s in g .
Leases to  In d ian s  were u s u a lly  f o r  21 y e a rs  w ith  p ro v is io n  f o r  a
f u r th e r  ex ten s io n  o f 10 y e a r s ;  th e  s iz e  of th e  b lock  o f lan d  was
norm ally  l im ite d  to  10 a c re s . A fte r  1922 th e  in te n d in g  buyers had
to  pay survey fe e s  as w e ll; in  a d d itio n  inducem ents had to  be
given to  th e  owners to  e n tic e  them to  re le a s e  t h e i r  la n d , and in  th e
12p re v a il in g  co n d itio n s  th e  owners could  la y  down t h e i r  own te rm s.
9 The R eport o f th e  S e c re ta ry  o f In d ia n  A ffa irs  f o r  1929 p ro v id es  an
e x c e lle n t  example: ’In  rev iew ing th e  economic s i tu a t io n  o f th e
In d ian s  in  F i j i  one i s  le d  to  th e  con clu sio n  th a t  t h e i r  p u rchasing  
power has r is e n  much more ra p id ly  th an  t h e i r  s tan d a rd  o f  l iv in g .  
W ith th e  n e c e s s i t i e s  o f l i f e  so e a s i ly  p ro c u ra b le , th e re  a re  
p r a c t i c a l ly  no p au p ers , bu t in  th e  absence o f com petition  and 
economic p re ssu re  th e re  i s  a ’d e f in i te  tendency , p r in c ip a l ly  
among th e  younger g e n e ra tio n , to  seek employment along easy  l i n e s ,  
and to  become c le rk s  and ta x i - d r iv e r s ,  in s te a d  o f fa rm ers ; and 
la n d lo rd s  and m oney-lenders, in s te a d  o f p ro d u c e rs . ' C .P .33 /30 .
10 C .S .0 .1162/23, 1098/26, U 80l4/29,Fl8/2Pt2. C .P .39/38.
Shephard 191*5: 18-19.
11 Mayer 1963:36. C .S .0 . 7610/19, 765/20, 967/20, 1009/20, 11*50/20,
1651|/21, 1781/21, 1895/21, 2088/21, 2506/21, 2765/21 . C .P .1*6/20, 
67 /20 . F .T . 15 J a n . ,  20 J a n . ,  21 J a n . ,  31 J a n . ,  1* F e b ., 9 F e b .,
12 F eb .,~T £ F e b .1920; 26 F e b ., 29 M ar., 1* A p r., 5 A p r.,
22 Apr. 1921. (Only a sample of th e  evidence examined on th e  
1920 and 1921 s t r i k e s  i s  c i te d  h e re .)
12 C .S .0 .5098/15, 5300/29. P a c if ic  Age h  Jan . 1923. F le tc h e r  to  
C.O.Conf. 30 Dec. 1937.
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D esp ite  th e  d i f f i c u l t i e s  in  o b ta in in g  la n d , t r a n s f e r s  o f le a s e s  were
13f re q u e n t. That th e  le a s e s  were n o t abandoned b u t easily- 
t r a n s fe r r e d  to  some o th e r  r e a d i ly -a v a i la b le  le s s e e ,  in d ic a te s  th a t  
a g re a t demand e x is te d  f o r  c u lt iv a b le  la n d .
Not a l l  In d ia n s  s tayed  on th e  la n d . Some though rem aining 
la b o u re rs  took  employment w ith  th e  Government o r th e  m u n ic ip a li t ie s  
o r  o th e rs  needing  t h e i r  s e rv ic e s . Some became ta x i  oim ers o r 
d r iv e r s ;  o th e rs  acq u ired  l ic e n c e s  to  be hawkers o r shopkeepers. But 
commerce g ra d u a lly  became th e  monopoly of th e  G u je ra t i3 . The 
census s t a t i s t i c s  on In d ian  occupations show a c o n sid e ra b le  
d iv e r s i ty ,  in d ic a t in g  th e  p e n e tra t io n  o f In d ian s  in to  n e a r ly  
every  s e c to r  o f th e  econom y.^  By t h i s  p ro cess  th ey  became 
t o t a l l y  invo lved  in  th e  Colony’ s economic l i f e  w hile  a t  th e  same 
tim e rem aining a se p a ra te  s o c ia l ,  r e l ig io u s  and r a c i a l  e n t i ty .  
S im ultaneously  th e  In d ia n  community was in c re a s in g  in  numbers where 
th e  F i j i - b o r n  were becoming th e  dominant p ro p o r tio n . These knew 
o f no o th e r coun try  b u t F i j i ;  th ey  were quick to  recogn ize  th a t  
th ey  must f in d  a  p em an en t p lace  f o r  them selves in  th e  coun try  of 
t h e i r  b i r t h .
A new aw areness was emerging in  th e  F i j i - I n d ia n  s o c ie ty  d u ring  
th e  tw e n tie s  and was to  con tinue  th e r e a f t e r .  A re c o g n itio n  of th e  
n e c e s s i ty  to  h e lp  them selves was becoming e v id e n t. P a r t ly  t h i s  
found ex p ress io n  in  a p le th o ra  o f v o lu n ta ry  se rv ic e  o rg a n iz a tio n s  
such as th e  In d ian  Reform League, th e  In d ia n  Young Men’s A sso c ia tio n , 
th e  F i j i  In d ian  N a tio n a l C ongress, th e  In d ian  A sso c ia tio n  o f F i j i ,  th e  
F i j i  Muslim League, th e  Arya Samaj Sangathans and th e  Then I lk y a  
Sanmarka Sangam, a l l  designed  to  u p l i f t  th e  In d ia n  community e i th e r  
in  th e  s o c ia l ,  economic o r p o l i t i c a l  f i e l d .  P a r t ly  i t  was rea lized , 
th rough th e  new a s s e r t iv e n e s s  o f th e  In d ia n s . The s t r ik e  in  Suva 
in  1920 and th e  accompanying d is tu rb a n c e s , th e  p ro longed in d u s t r i a l  
d isp u te  in  1921 w ith  the:CiS*R,Company*- a l l  ex em p lified  ra c ia l.
13 C .P .26/17, 29 /19 , 59/22 , 51*/27, 36/30 , 37/35 , 10/39, 35/1*0. 
C.S.O. 1*191/22, 1155/30. F62/ I44, F37/ 182.
11* See Appendix. V.
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unity in quest of redress. The abolition of the indenture system 
changed social reality in Fiji and made necessary a revision of 
attitudes towards Indians by others. When it was not forthcoming 
the Indians were prepared to act in a concerted manner in an attempt 
to enforce change. The two strikes and the clamour for equality 
and enfranchisement were manifestations of the new spirit. The
assertiveness was again evident in the protest meetings and petitions
15organized against the Residential Tax Ordinance in 1923.
Throughout this period Indians seemed to suffer from a 
persecution complex. Whether it was education, land, or political 
rights they felt they were not obtaining a fair share. Having 
decided to make Fiji their home they sought to redress the balance 
in their own favour. Indian politics and politicians were 
orientated towards this end. In the pursuit of this goal racial 
solidarity was not always possible and Indian society frequently 
divided on linguistic and religious lines. But this did not 
diminish the determination of the vocal elements which championed 
Indian rights in Fiji.
THE grant of the franchise to the Indians opened up a new era in 
the politics of Fiji. The Indians were extended the right or 
privilege (depending on one’s interpretation) before it had been 
bestowed upon the indigenous people. Political development among 
Indians would thus be more rapid than among the Fijians. This was a 
certain means of creating a political gap between the two 
communities, and the gulf vrould widen with the years unless immediate
15 C.S.O.U*2/23, 1217/23, 1269/23, 21*53/23, 2609/23, 3558/23, 3880/23,
3936/23, 14-037/23, 1*193/23, 14370/23, 1*706/23. Rodwell to C.0.102, 
21 Apr. 1923. Rodwell to 0.0.262, 11 Oct. 1923. Rodwell to 
C.0.279, 11* Nov. 1923. Rodwell to C.0.37, 19 Jan. I92I4.
Pacific Age 2 Oct. 1922, 11* Dec. 1922, II4 Nov. 1923.
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c o n s t i tu t io n a l  reform  eq u a lised  th e  r ig h ts  o r p r iv i le g e s  o f bo th  
ra c e s . As one community grew more s o p h is t ic a te d  by th e  use o f th e  
b a l lo t  box and a d ju s te d  to  th e  s tro n g  words and abuses o f e le c t io n  
campaigns i t s  a p p e ti te  f o r  continued  p ro g re ss io n  o f th e  p o l i t i c a l  
p ro cess  would in c re a s e . I t  was bound to  demand re p e a te d  changes 
w ith  an in c re a s in g  share  o f th e  l e g i s l a t i v e  power. Conversely w hile  
th e  o th e r  community remained p ro te c te d  and s h e lte re d  from the  
h u r ly -b u r ly  o f dem ocratic  p o l i t i c s  w hile  i t  was re p e a te d ly  warned 
o f th e  dangers of p o l i t i c s  as a th r e a t  to  th e  s o c ia l  mechanisms th a t  
a l le g e d ly  su s ta in e d  i t ,  i t s  conservatism  s tren g th en ed  i t s  f a i t h  in  
th e  a b so lu te  need to  p re se rv e  th e  s ta tu s  quo. A ll changes were 
viewed w ith  d i s t r u s t  and even th e  s l i g h t e s t  amendment conceded w ith  
th e  maximum o f re lu c ta n c e . By g ra n tin g  e le c t iv e  f r a n c h is e  to  th e  
In d ia n s  and s im u ltan eo u sly  denying i t  to  th e  F i j i a n s ,  th e  B r i t i s h  
ensu red , a l b e i t  u n w ittin g ly  and t o t a l l y  w ith o u t m a lic e , a 
d ivergence  o f th e  p o l i t i c a l  tempo o f th e  two communities d e s tin e d  to  
dw ell in  th e  same p o l i t i c a l  e n t i t y .  T h e ir d i f f e r e n t  re sp o n ses , 
c u l tu r a l ly  co n d itio n ed  as w e ll, o f te n  made f o r  a n ta g o n is t ic  
a t t i tu d e s  on im p o rtan t i s s u e s .  VJhere fo r  th e  fu tu re  th e  two ra c e s  
m ight have been brought c lo s e r ,  th ey  tended  to  move a p a r t ,  
accompanied by n e ed le ss  m isunderstand ing  and in to le r a n c e .
Because th e  a c t i v i t i e s  o f th e  n a t io n a l i s t s  in  In d ia  th re a te n e d  
to  dismember th e  B r i t i s h  Empire, a l l  In d ia n  p o l i t i c s ,  w hether in  th e  
m otherland i t s e l f  o r among h e r progeny abroad , tended  to  be viewed 
w ith  su sp ic io n . The European s e t t l e r s  in  th e  c o lo n ie s  were more 
co n se rv a tiv e  th an  t h e i r  b re th re n  a t  ’home’ and t h e i r  n o s ta l  g ia  f o r  
th in g s  B r i t i s h  made them re a c t  w ith  venom and in d ig n a tio n  to  a l l  th a t  
seemed to  th re a te n  th e  ru le  o f th e  Anglo-Saxon over l e s s e r  men.
They were c e r ta in  in  t h e i r  f a i t h  in  t h e i r  own s u p e r io r i ty  as a race  
arid.had*no sympathy f o r  th o se  who challenged  t h i s  assum ption and 
d e s ire d  to  ru le  them selv es , e s p e c ia l ly  i f  th ey  had dark  s k in s .
The o f f i c i a l s  m ight neb countenance s e t t l e r  desig n s  to  a s s e r t  r a c i a l  
supremacy b u t th ey  b e lie v e d  no l e s s  in  th e  d iv in e  p o s i t io n  o f t h e i r  
race  in  th e  Colony. Moreover any th r e a t  to  th e  Empire menaced t h e i r  
o rn  p o s i t io n  no l e s s .  O ften th e y  were men who in  th e  co lo n ie s  had 
power and s ta tu s  t h a t  th e y  would never have ta s t e d  in  th e  lan d  of 
t h e i r  b i r t h ,  and th e y  were no l e s s  w il l in g  to  sa feg u a rd  t h e i r
lUo
citadel of privilege. The settlers with their public and frequent 
demands for more land end native labour, with their assumption that 
the native race and primitivism must ultimately perish before the 
onslaught of progressive -white civilization, left themselves open to 
charges of racism and the condemnation of philanthropists, 
humanitarians and missionaries, no less rigid in their vision of the 
black man’s role in the realm of God. On the other hand the 
officials could always conceal their self-interested intentions 
in the feigned charity of paternalism. Their motives were no less 
base than those of the settlers, but by the execution of an 
•enlightened' native policy formulated by a benevolent government 
of which they were a part provided them with a useful camouflage.
And once Indians had become enfranchised there were doubts and 
fears as to how the Indians might use their latest gain. Even 
the first step of registration posed problems in the official mind.
The need for practical, workable electoral regulations had been 
recognized very early in the first few years when the franchise was 
being discussed. But the difficulty lay in the method of 
preparing lists of voters. The Secretary of Indian Affairs suggested
the use of registers of persons holding land leases and paying
17taxes. He wanted the list prepared well in advance, as in India
and Ceylon, and then scrutinized to remove those whose qualifications
were inadequate. He feared that otherwise there was risk of :'the
lists being largely composed of the personal friends and adherents
18of political schemers'. This distrust, from the man who was the 
Governor's adviser on Indian Affairs did not augur well for the 
future. James Pearson, the Secretary of Indian Affairs, was a 
retired Indian Civil Service man, an unrepentant believer in British 
rule for the Indians with a dislike for those who appeared to 
question its validity. The Governor, Eyre Hutson, a man with 
considerable knowledge of Fiji, having served as Colonial Secretary 
in the Colony before returning as Governor, disagreed. He discounted
16 C.S.0.2385/23.
17 C.S.0.7W29.
18 ibid.
th e  l ik e l ih o o d  o f dom ination by ’p o l i t i c a l  schem ers’ and favoured
v o lu n ta ry  r e g i s t r a t io n  to  p ro te c t  th e  Government from c r i t ic i s m  i f
19numbers on th e  r o l l  were sm all. There was no a ttem p t to  pu t any
o b s ta c le s  in  th e  way o f those  seeking  r e g i s t r a t io n  and some
20f l e x i b i l i t y  was p e rm itte d . D esp ite  such le n ie n cy  and th e  f a c t
th a t  q u a l i f ic a t io n s  f o r  In d ian  v o te rs  were low er th an  th o se  fo r
t h e i r  European c o u n te rp a r ts  only  1,i*0lj. persons r e g is te r e d  in  th e
21th re e  c o n s ti tu e n c ie s  ou t o f a p o p u la tio n  o f n e a r ly  75,000. Since
p ro p e rty  and income were re q u ired  f o r  q u a l i f ic a t io n  i t  i s  d i f f i c u l t ,
in  th e  absence of s t a t i s t i c s  on th e s e , to  s ta t e  how many were
e l ig ib le  and f a i le d  to  r e g i s t e r .
The y ea r of th e  f i r s t  e le c t io n  co incided  w ith  th e  f i f t i e t h
an n iv e rsa ry  o f th e  advent o f In d ian  in d en tu red  la b o u re rs  in to  F i j i .
The occasion  c a lle d  f o r  c e le b ra tio n  and d e sp ite  th e  demur o f Henry
S c o tt and th e  F i j i  Times th e  Governor d ec la red  th e  day a p u b lic  
22h o lid a y . The In d ia n , though c o n g ra tu la te d , was reminded th a t
i t  was a ’day fo r  th e  s in c e re s t  th an k sg iv in g  f o r  th e  f a c t  th a t  h is
fo rb e a rs ,  he h im se lf , and h is  f r ie n d s ,  were p r iv i le g e d  to  come to
t h i s  land  flo w in g , as i t  w ere, w ith  m ilk and honey and sp rin k le d
so p ro fu se ly  w ith  su g ar, to  work here  and to  l iv e  here  under such
c o n d itio n s  as a re  undreamed of in  Mother In d ia  fo r  people of th e  
23same c l a s s ' .  The e d i to r i a l  concluded th a t  i t  was th e  du ty  of th e
Government to  remember and pursue w ithou t any d e v ia t io n  ' t h a t  F i j i
i s  th e  h e r i ta g e  o f th e  F i j ia n  and th a t  we B r i t i s h e r s  have been given
th e  sacred charge of ad m in is te r in g  th a t  h e r i t a g e ' . ^  The P a c if ic
P ress  and th e  V riddhi Vani eschewed h o m ilies  o f t h i s  kind in  favour
of t a c t  and p r o b a b i l i ty .  From them came th e  su g g es tio n  of an In d ian
N a tio n a l Congress to  in c lu d e  o th e r  ra c es  e s p e c ia l ly  th e  F i j i a n  and
25th e  C hinese. The Government doubted w hether such an
19 ib id .
20 C.S.O. C10/29.
21 C .P .33 /30 . C .S .O .717/30.
22 F .T .13  May 1929.
23 i b i d .
2k ib id .
25 P a c if ic  P ress  2 Mar. 1929? V riddhi Vani March 1929.
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O rgan ization  would work and recognized  th a t  th e  N ative Department
would o b je c t to  F i j ia n  p a r t i c ip a t io n ;  th e re  was, b e s id e s , th e  r i s k
26th a t  th e  Arya Samaj would cap tu re  i t .
J u s t  as th e  Congress in  In d ia  had i n i t i a l l y  been encouraged by
a European so was th e  case in  F i j i .  In  May, i t  was rumoured th a t
a S c o ttis h  d o c to r , I .H .B e a t t ie ,  who had been in  F i j i  fo r  some tim e
and d isp lay ed  a hum anitarian  ben t tow ards h is  co loured  b re th re n , was
27about to  c a l l  a  m eeting in  Suva fo r  t h i s  pu rpose . But s h o r t ly  
b e fo re  t h i s  even tuated  Vishnu Deo, a young Arya Samaji who had 
begun to  emerge as a le a d e r  in  h is  community, v i s i t e d  th e  n o rth ­
w estern  sugar-grow ing reg io n  and on 12 May 1929 founded a F i j i  
In d ian  N a tio n a l Congress in  Lautoka. Dr. B e a t t ie ,  who was 
desc rib ed  by th e  S e c re ta ry  of In d ian  A ffa irs  as ’n o to r io u s ly
sym pathetic  tow ards th e  achievem ent o f In d ia n  p o l i t i c a l  aims by
28moderate means’ , s e t  up h is  o rg a n iz a tio n  two days l a t e r .  Where
Vishnu Deo’s group was h e av ily  w eighted w ith  Arya Samaj e lem en ts ,
th e  o f f ic e -h o ld e rs  of B e a t t i e ’s Congress were p redom inantly  
29C h r is t ia n s . The episode i l l u s t r a t e s  th e  d iv is io n  th a t  was 
a lre ad y  ev id en t v rith in  th e  In d ian  community. Both groups je a lo u s ly  
m ain tained  t h e i r  sep a ra tism  which reached i t s  climax- in  th e  
e le c t io n  in  September.
When nom inations c losed  th e re  was to  be a two-way c o n te s t in
every  c o n s titu e n c y . The e le c t io n  e l i c i t e d  no g re a t  excitem ent and
avoided is s u e s  th a t  m ight have been c o n ten tio u s  w ith in  tn e  In d ian
community. The o f f i c i a l  conclusion  was th a t  lo c a l  is su e s  alone
were ra is e d  and th e  c o n tro v e rs ia l  ones circum vented in  a d e l ib e ra te
a ttem p t to  ensure  th e  re tu rn  o f can d id a te s  sym pathetic  to  th e  cause
31of In d ian  n a tio n a lism . When th e  d if fe re n c e  between th e  can d id a te s  
and th e  d e s ire  o f each to  o b ta in  th e  honour o f being  th e  f i r s t  In d ian  
e le c te d  to  th e  L e g is la t iv e  Council a re  considered  i t  i s  d i f f i c u l t  to  
accep t th a t  th e re  was c o llu s io n  among th e  s ix  men who fough t th e
26 C .S .O .1182/29.
2? C .S .O .289/ 30.
28 ib id .
29 F .T .16 May 1929 gave th e  fo llo w in g : P re s id e n t J .F .G ra n t,
S e c re ta ry  H .S .S ingh, V ice -P re s id en ts  I l a h i  Ram an, Ratu Ramsarrrujh, 
A sst. S e c re ta ry  Gaya P rasad , T rea su re r Deoki.
30 C .S .O .289/ 30.
31 ib id .
e le c t io n . The o f f i c i a l s  had them selves accep ted  th a t  in  th e  
Northern and Southern c o n s ti tu e n c ie s  r e l ig io n  was ’th e  unspoken 
l in e  o f c lea v a g e ’ between th e  can d id a te s ; th ey  must have been 
deluding them selves when in  th e  n ex t b re a th  th ey  argued th a t  th e se  
same men were u n ite d  in  a co n sp iracy .
In  th e  E aste rn  d iv is io n  th e  c o n te s t was between a young Muslim
in  h i s  tw e n tie s , K h a lil Sahim and an Arya Saraaj tu rn e d  C h r is t ia n ,
James Rao Ranch and a r  M ahraj, a th e a t r e  owner from Levuka m arried  to
32a d au gh ter o f P e te r  G rant. In  th e  N orthern and W estern
c o n s ti tu e n c ie s  both  can d id a tes  were Arya Samaji H indus. Champadan
Kanakadan Gopalan was an In d ia -b o rn  d o c to r w ith  a p ra c t ic e  in
Lautoka and a member o f a lo c a l  s o c ia l  o rg a n is a tio n  known as th e
E h a rtiy a -H itra -M an d a li. His r i v a l ,  Parmanand S ingh, was a F i j i - b o m
" 33
New Zealand-educated p la n te r  from Namosau. S ince th e  G u je ra ti  
law yer, S< B .P atel, had signed h is  nom ination form , Gopalan, a lso  a 
v ic e -p re s id e n t of Vishnu Deo’ s Congress, might be regarded  as th e  
o f f i c i a l  can d id a te  of what Government would have termed th e  
n a t io n a l i s t  sym path izers. But Parmanand Singh, to o , hud h is  
connections; he was b ro th e r  to  a fu tu re  member o f th e  L e g is la t iv e  
Council, C hattu r Singh, who a t  th e  tim e was regarded  by th e  
Government as th e  ’most a c tiv e  and th e  most ab le  o f th e  lo c a l  
ex trem is t p o l i t i c i a n s ’ .
The v o tin g  in  th e  E aste rn  c o n s titu en c y  seems to  have been on 
re l ig io u s  l i n e s .  There x^ere 101 r e g is te r e d  v o te rs  o f whom 88 
e x erc ised  t h e i r  r ig h t  though 5 d id  so in c o r r e c t ly .  Of th e  
re g is te re d  v o te rs  th e re  were on ly  17 w ith  d i s t i n c t l y  Muslim names 
on th e  r o l l .  K h a lil Sahim, th e  Muslim c a n d id a te , rece iv ed  on ly  
20 v o te s  to  J .R .R .M ahraj’ s 63.
In  th e  N orthern  and W estern c o n s ti tu e n c ie s  no such d iv is io n  
occurred  as both  can d id a te s  were of th e  same Hindu s e c t .  Out o f
32 C .S .0 .1977/29 <> K h a lil Sahim bom  a t  Toorak, Suva was about
25 y e a rs  o ld  and had been educated a t  th e  M ethodist M ission 
School. He was m arried  w ithou t c h ild re n  and had a p la n ta t io n  
in  Bua. J.R .R .M ahraj was In d ia -b o rn , a p p a ren tly  a Hindu who 
had embraced C h r is t ia n i ty  f o r  th e  purpose o f m arriag e .
33 ib id .
3b C .S .O .289/30.
35 •F vR«G. 1929:357~358,b 88.
61|0 voters, 588 exercised their right but 57 of these wasted their 
votes. This is explained by the low level of education and 
unfamiliarity with the system; it does not necessarily imply a 
widespread inability to read the names of the candidates 
accurately. In such a case the tendency would be to tick a name
with the hope of having selected one’s intended choice though some
of the shrewder ones in this category may have made a mark on the 
ballot paper expecting that those doing the counting would decide 
favourably for the man they had in mind. The majority (309 to 222) 
chose Parmanand Singh, probably, because he was a local and could 
identify himself with them. Because he was a cultivator as was his 
father, here was also a similarity of class and occupation. This
was particularly important because this was the sugar-cane
electorate and the farmers with their own problems and grievances 
preferred a man whose interests were the same as theirs rather 
than a professional man, a newcomer in their midst, a man with whom 
they were likely to have little or no social contact. Singh came 
from Ba which had the heaviest concentration of Indian population 
among the districts involved; in a small electorate such 
solidarity counted.
Much of the interest in the first Indian election was
concentrated in the Southern division. Not only did it contain
Suva, the town of the working man as opposed to the self-employed
farmers, but it was also in this electorate that Vishnu Deo
conducted his fight for a seat. Vishnu Deo was born on 17 July 1900
in Navua, the son of Hargovind Dubay and Emily Balgovind of that 
37district. He was educated at the Methodist Mission School in 
Navua and the Marist Brothers' School in Suva. Despite his 
wholly Christian education he remained a devout Arya Samaj. His 
career was varied; he had been a book-keeper, school teacher, 
clerk and interpreter. As a result of some financial irregularity 
he had been dismissed from government service. Henceforth he had 
a grievance against the Government. Fortunately for him there had 
been no prosecution, simply because during the previous year a 
Fijian chief of high rank had been involved in a similar misdemeanour
36 ibid:337-3i|6, U87.
37 C.S.O. 1977/29.
and the Government, sensitive to the man's position and possible 
repercussions, had decided not to chastise him publicly. It v;as 
therefore deemed that there should be no discrimination in the 
treatment of an erring Indian and an erring chief. His fortune or 
the official sense of justice Vishnu Deo chose to ignore.
The other contender was John Francis Grant, also Fiji-born and 
the son of Peter Grant, mentioned earlier. He, too, had been 
educated at the Marist Brothers' School in Suva but he was a member 
of the Roman Catholic Church. Grant, a cinema proprietor, also 
owned a house and land in Suva. His only son was being educated in 
Sydney. He was also president of the rival Congress and a vice- 
president of the Indian Reform League, a social (also claimed to be 
social welfare) body comprised predominantly of Indian Christians 
and those Indians who aspired to European ways. Finally, John Grant 
was a member of the Board of Visitors at the Suva War Memorial 
Hospital; this post he owed to the generosity of the Government 
which was just beginning to appoint 'suitable' Indians to such 
'advisory' bodies.
From the outset the two men were poles apart. One did not
even possess an Indian name, an immense handicap in an Indian
communal electorate; especially as he was also a member of a
family distrusted by the Indians, for they had co-operated with
the Government during the 1920 strike. As a Christian, John Grant's
mode of living and values were different from the majority of his
community. In most Indian minds he was associated with Europeans
and what they stood for, especially on those aspects where the
39Indians felt themselves subjected to discrimination. The other 
man was a pundit, a Hindu and an Indian to the marrow of his bones; 
someone with a clean slate: someone who could claim, with whatever
validity, to have been ill-treated by the Government. Where his 
rival was tarnished by association with Europeans and as a receiver 
of official favour, Vishnu Deo appeared as a man ill-used by the same 
group. In a small electorate where no man's past was a secret, 
where gossip-mongers thrived and at will could, pull out of their 
immense repertoire some tale which incriminated a man or his family,
38 Hutson to C.O.Conf. 29 June 1926.
39 This assessment of Indian attitudes towards John Grant and
Vishnu Deo is based on discussions and interviews with those who
knew them or about them.
p e rso n a l f a c to r s  counted a g re a t d e a l, in  f a c t ,  th ey  determ ined th e  
In d ia n  v o t e r ’s id e n t i f i c a t io n  o f h im se lf w ith , o r re v u ls io n  from, 
an in d iv id u a l .
Of h i s  d isad v an tag es  Grant h im se lf was f u l l y  aware and in  h is  
ad d ress a t  N ausori he beseeched h is  audience to  fo rg e t  th e  p a s t  and 
f o r g i v e . ^  In  h is  add ress Grant prom ised many th in g s :  he would
have th e  p o l l  ta x  ab o lish ed , du ty  on l iq u o r  reduced , p rov ide  
e d u c a tio n a l f a c i l i t i e s ,  have th e  N ausori b rid g e  c o n s tru c te d , make 
arrangem ents f o r  d i r e c t  passenger s e rv ic e  w ith  I n d ia .4 He 
expressed  h im se lf a g a in s t a l l  ta x a t io n  and th e  ed u ca tio n  r a te  because 
a revenue su rp lu s  made th e se  demands un n ecessa ry . By c o -o p e ra tio n  
w ith  o th e rs  he hoped to  a t t a in  th e se  and a g en e ra l improvement o f th e  
In d ia n s ’ p o s i t io n .
Vishnu Deo follow ed a d i f f e r e n t  b u t more r e a l i s t i c  approach.
He em phasized th e  is su e  th a t  m atte red  most a t  th e  tim e , equal s ta tu s  
and th e  f r a n c h is e . His audience was reminded th a t  w ith  th re e  
members th e  In d ian s  were in  a ho p e less  m in o rity  p o s i t io n .  I t  was 
n o t p o s s ib le  fo r  a cand ida te  to  pu t forward a programme w ith  th e  
hope of im plem enting i t .  One could m erely do one’ s b e s t  and s t r iv e  
w ith  th e  hope th a t  th e  Government would be convinced by one’s 
argum ents. VJhat th e  In d ian s  wanted was equal r e p re s e n ta t io n  on a 
common f r a n c h is e ,  n o t on a communal b a s is .  They d id  no t seek 
u n iv e r s a l  su ffra g e  as th e  European c u r re n tly  enjoyed o r even 
p ro p e rty  r e p re s e n ta t io n .  They sought e q u a li ty  w ith o u t any d e s ire  
o f dom ination . Nor had th ey  any wish to  dep rive  th e  F i j ia n s  of 
t h e i r  p o s i t io n .  There was th e  in e v i ta b le  re fe re n c e  to  S a l is b u ry 's  
despa tch  and i t s  g u a ran tee , and a com plaint about th e  d i s p a r i ty  of 
r e p re s e n ta t io n .  Perhaps most in te r e s t in g  were h is  f i n a l  comments 
th a t  th e  accep tance o f communal f ra n c h is e  in  F i j i  would, be d e tr im e n ta l 
to  In d ia n s  in  Kenya. This gave an in tim a tio n  th a t  Vishnu Deo 
and h is  group were view ing t h e i r  c o n s t i tu t io n a l  c laim s in  a much 
w ider c o n te x t . And t h i s  was brought home by h is  f i n a l  'E qual
ii2c i t iz e n s h ip  th roughou t th e  B r i t i s h  Empire and Freedom in  I n d i a ' .
hO F i j i  Samachar S ep t. 1929. 
hi ib id .  
h2 C .S .0 .6 l!i1 /29c
T h e ;:f irs t p a r t  was und ers tan d ab le  because of th e  p re v a il in g  
d i s a b i l i t i e s  of In d ia n s  in  th e  v a rio u s  co lo n ie s  and dom inions. The
second was s tran g e  because i t  meant th a t  Vishnu Deo was ta k in g  up in  
F i j i  th e  burden o f th e  n a t io n a l i s t s  in  In d ia . Such a s te p  was 
und ip lom atic  and t a c t l e s s ;  i t  could do n o th in g  b u t harm to  th e  
cause o f th e  In d ian s  in  F i j i .  I f  any th ing  gave th e  semblance of 
In d ian  a s p ir a t io n s  in  F i j i  being  d ire c te d  from abroad* t h i s  d id .
Vishnu Deo was e le c te d  w ith  an overwhelming m a jo r ity . Out o f 
6ii3 e le c to r s  59U vo ted  and I4.19 of th e se  favoured  Vishnu Deo and only
) *5
162 were f o r  G ran t. Most o f G ra n t 's  support must have come from 
a sm all p e rso n a l fo llo w in g  and an an ti-A ry a  Samaj elem ent. Some 
539 b a l lo t  papers were issu ed  a t  S u v a .^4 Many who d id  n o t l iv e  
in  th a t  town and i t s  suburbs must have come from th e  immediate 
env irons such as Nasinu to  vo te  in  Suva. The com position o f th e  
Southern e le c to ra te  was d i f f e r e n t  from th e  o th e r  two in  t h a t  most 
o f th o se  who q u a l i f ie d  here  were income e a rn e rs .
Q u a lif ic a t io n Southern N orthern
&
W estern
E as te rn
Income only 508 320 60
P ro p erty  only 37 206 29
P ro p erty  Sc Income only 118 11U 12
T o ta l on th e  E le c to ra l  
R o ll 663 6i|0 101
Those p o sse ss in g  income q u a l i f ic a t io n s  only  com prised about 76% 
o f th e  e le c to ra te  in  th e  South, b u t 50% in  th e  North and W est, and
53 F.R .G . 1929:3147-356, U87.
h h  F .R .G .1929:587.
1|5 A count o f v o te rs  from th e  r o l l  in  Suva and i t s  suburbs g ives 
332, p r a c t i c a l ly  50% of th e  t o t a l  r e g i s t r a t i o n .
11*8
60/o in the Eastern region.^ This helped Yislinu Deo rather than 
John Grant.
Of the three members elected Vishnu Deo was unquestionably the 
most able; he never left any doubt that he was to be the leader and 
spokesman. But even he was not wholly a free agent. Behind him 
stood two Gujerati lawyers S.B.Patel and A.D.Patel, who had arrived 
in Fiji in 1927 and 1928 respectively. According to McGusty, 
shortly to be made Secretary of Indian Affairs, these two had been 
'delegated to guide local politicians into conformity of action with
) 7the advanced party /"nationalists 7 in India'. A.D.Patel was 
'an adherent of Gandhi, and reported an extremist', while his
) Rcompatriot S.B.Patel was 'by repute a moderate and reasonable man*.
Of the attachment to Gandhian philosophy there can be no doubt.
Every Gujerati shared a kinship with the greatest Gujerati of them 
all. Gandhi has always been granted a god-like adulation by the 
Gujeratis of Fiji, in his lifetime and subsequently. This loyalty 
has appeared to transcend all other attachments of the Gujeratis, 
except perhaps to their money. But it seems that S.B.Patel, at least, 
initially, was justifiably labelled a moderate. At a meeting 
in Lautoka on 13 October before the Legislative Council was convened 
and -where both Vishnu Deo and Parmanand Singh were present, 
resolutions were passed on common roll, education and land. One 
G.R.Sahu Khan, a clerk of S.B.Patel, suggested that the Indian members 
should walk out of the Council if their motion was rejected in
]iQsimilar fashion to their counterparts in Kenya. This was
deprecated by S.B.Patel and others present.
An initial step in the direction of unity had been the merging
of the two Congress groups into one at a meeting in Lautoka on
3011 October well before the Council met. Certainly Dr. Beattie 
would not have relished the action; he disapproved of the Patels
1*6 Figures deduced from the 1929 Indian Electoral Rolls. 
1*7 Minute, 29 Nov. 1929; C.S.0.1*91*2/29.
1*8 ibid.
1*9 ibid.
90 C.S.0.289/30.
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for they signified the end of his influence. Even among the
Indian Christians, who tended to remain aloof from their heathen
brethren and leaned towards things and views European, disillusionment
was apparent. The defeat of John Grant must have awakened them
sharply to their isolation from their own kind. Never fully
accepted by Europeans, who kept social contact with them to a
minimum, they found themselves in a situation akin to the laundryman's
donkey in the Indian proverb. At a meeting in Suva on 27 October
they founded their own Christian Society, reasoning that they could
advance no further under missionary tutelage as their patrons wished
$1to ’keep them under'.
There was then a tendency among certain elements in the Indian 
community to close ranks and put forward a united front. But there 
was one communal and religious group, already apprehensive of its 
position, whose leaders were convinced by the outcome of the 
election that as a minority they were in danger. This was the 
Muslim community; and henceforth their movement was in a 
separatist direction away from the attempts of their bete noire, the 
Arya Samaj, to unify the Indian population. The nature of Muslim 
politics will be the subject of another chapter, but here it ought 
to be noted that despite the efforts of the Patels and Vishnu Deo 
the Indian community was far from being a monolith. But in the 
remaining months of 1929 the Arya Samajis were not fully aware of 
the depth of Muslim anxiety and the plans to alleviate it; the 
Muslims were being cautious and discreet; not till the beginning 
of the following year did they divulge their strategy.
When the two country members, Parmanand Singh and J.R.R.Mahraj
arrived in Suva to take their seats they were accompanied by
S.B.Patel who acted as adviser to all three Indian members. Some
indication of Indian tactics was evident from the presence of
Patel. The Secretary of Indian Affairs interpreted it as a
determination 'to make their attack on the franchise their
<2immediate and practically their sole aim'. Whether by their free 
choice or by the fiat of their Arya Samaj leaders, the three Indian
C.S.0.1i9li2/29. 
52 C.P.33/30.
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members were to act in constant consultation with Patel. To a 
certain extent this was understandable. Patel was an educated 
lawyer who had travelled extensively in Europe-.and had been a close53associate of Gujerati politicians, Gandhi and Desai. He possessed
knowledge of the Parliamentary system, its workings and procedures;
and his education had given him breadth of mind and experience
which the three members lacked. Since they were to confront in the
Council others who were their superiors in education and the
language of the debates, they needed assistance. Political advice
can never be devoid of the bias of the giver, and it was inevitable
that Patel would influence the Indian members.
Guessing the likely trend of events, the Secretary of Indian
Affairs chose to intervene. For several days he conducted a daily
discussion with Vishnu Deo and his colleagues, endeavouring to5ixdissuade them from their avowed goal. His requests that they 
take the chance to show their ability in the Council and that they 
defer discussion on the franchise were rejected. Their response 
was always the same; that communal franchise implied inferiority 
and they must remove this anomaly. They adopted the same posture 
in an informal meeting with the European elected members, accept 
common roll first and then they would be willing to discuss other 
things.^
In the intial stage the action proposed was that the members
would move a motion calling for the adoption of common roll and if
it were defeated they would resign. But as yet there was no plan
for an indefinite boycott of the Legislative Council. From the
candidates who had opposed them at the election they had obtained
the guarantee that they would not stand against than in any second
election caused by their resignation. They would return unopposed
and co-operate and after a lapse of some time they would re-introduce56their franchise motion.
The new Council convened on 25 October but it was not till 
5 November that the Indian members introduced their motion. The
53 C.S.0.289/30. Nation-Tovata Second August Issue 1969«
51; C.S.0.1;9^2/29, 289/30.
55 L.C.Debates 1929:182.
56 C.S.0.289/30.
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f i r s t  sh o ts  in  th e  ep isode were f i r e d  by S ir  Maynard Hedstrom.
In  h is  add ress of welcome to  th e  In d ian s  on the  f i r s t  day, he sounded 
a warning on th e  c o n s t i tu t io n  and in  h is  speech he la id  down th e  
co n d itio n s  fo r  European co -o p e ra tio n  w ith  th e  In d ia n s . Repeated 
u t te ra n c e s  by th e  European c o u n c il lo rs  and the  p re s s  l e f t  no room 
fo r  doubt in  any mind, l e a s t  o f a l l  in  th a t  of th e  In d ia n . He 
preached how th e  In d ian s  ought to  conduct them selves, o therw ise  th ey  
would be working a g a in s t th e  i n t e r e s t s  of th e  Colony. He to ld  th e  
In d ian s  t h a t  one b a s ic  p r in c ip le  rem ained unchanged and th a t  had been 
r e s ta te d  by th e  White Paper, In d ian s  in  Kenya. I t  concerned th e  
paramountcy o f n a tiv e  i n t e r e s t s .  Secondly, c o n tro l o f p o lic y  and 
le g i s l a t i o n  u l t im a te ly  re s te d  w ith  the  S e c re ta ry  o f S ta te .  As a 
consequence o f th e se  r e s t r i c t i o n s  ’dem ocratic id e a ls  can have b u t 
l i t t l e  p lace  in  t h i s  C ouncil’ . At no s tag e  had In d ian  p o l i t i c i a n s  
s ta te d  o th e rw ise . Even b e fo re  th ey  had spoken th e  In d ian s  were 
suspected  of demagoguery and re v o lu tio n a ry  id e a l s ,  accord ing  to  th e  
d e f in i t io n  and s tan d a rd s  o f Hedstrom and h is  c o lle a g u e s . Had th e  
Governor o r an o f f i c i a l  spoken s im ila r  words in  l ik e  tone in  
welcoming th e  f i r s t  European e le c te d  members to  th e  same Council 
in  1905 th ey  would c e r ta in ly  have expressed  in d ig n a tio n . A fte r  th e  
European clamour o f th e  n in e te e n th  cen tu ry , th e  p ro fu se  v i tu p e ra t io n  
showered on Gordon and h is  su c c e sso rs , th e  d en u n cia tio n  o f t h e i r  
n a tiv e  and land p o l ic ie s ,  th e  a g i ta t io n  f o r  fe d e ra t io n  in  c o llu s io n  
w ith  Seddon, a G overnor, w ith  some ju s t i f i c a t i o n  m ight have l a id  down 
th e  g u id e lin e s  as to  what was in  th e  i n t e r e s t s  o f th e  Colony and how 
th e  new ly -e lec ted  members m ight work tow ards achievem ent o f th e se  
g o a ls . To do so would have been c o n tra ry  to  th e  dem ocratic 
p ra c t ic e  which Hedstrom h im se lf in  h is  e a r ly  y ears  had championed.
But Hedstrom, S co tt and t h e i r  co lle ag u es  were a f f l i c t e d  w ith  both  
myopia and c o lo u r-b lin d n e s s . They could n o t see beyond what th ey  
regarded  as t h e i r  sac red  r ig h t  and p r iv i le g e  and th e  need to  
p e rp e tu a te  th e se ; r e a c t io n a r ie s  a re  r a r e ly  men o f v is io n . T h e ir own 
in t e r e s t s  were always equated  w ith  th o se  o f the  Colony, even 
when th ey  demanded th e  u n r e s t r ic te d  sa le  o f n a tiv e  la n d . Anything
57
57 L .C .D ebates 1929:101^105
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e ls e  was denounced as d is a s t ro u s .  They, as e le c te d  re p re s e n ta t iv e s  
o f th e  Europeans, claim ed a r ig h t  to  vo ice  th e  a s p ir a t io n s  o f those  
who had chosen them, t h i s  r ig h t  th ey  je a lo u s ly  guarded« But the  
In d ian  must n o t serve  one s e c tio n  of th e  community, he must always 
be s e n s i t iv e  to  th e  in t e r e s t s  o f th e  Colony. Yet th e  In d ian s  
made no immediate a ttem p t to  r e t a l i a t e ,  choosing to  ig no re  Hedstrom 
a t  th i s  s ta g e .
The f i r s t  tw elve days of In d ian  re p re s e n ta t io n  in  th e  Council 
were d is tin g u is h e d  by th e  number o f q u e s tio n s , each w ith  s e v e ra l 
s u b -d iv is io n s . Of th e se  th e  th re e  In d ian  members ta b le d  108 and 
t h e i r  s ix  European c o u n te rp a r ts  57« The In d ian  q u e rie s  t ra v e rs e d  
a wide range and sometimes sought minute d e t a i l .  Every m a tte r  
a f f e c t in g  th e  community where a sense of g rievance  o r in ju s t i c e  was 
though t to  e x i s t ,  where f a c i l i t i e s  were thought inadequate  o r 
d is c r im in a to ry , was r a is e d .  E ducation , la n d , th e  f r a n c h is e ,  
m unicipal a f f a i r s ,  r e s id e n t i a l  ta x ,  on a l l  th e se  th e  Government 
was re q u ire d  to  fu rn ish  in fo rm a tio n . O rd in a rily  th e  Government 
would have o b jec ted  to  th e  d e t a i l  re q u ire d  and th e  tone  o f some of 
th e  q u e s tio n s . But th e re  was a  w illin g n e s s  to  o b lig e  and no wish 
to  o ffen d . The Government wanted to  a l la y  th e  In d ia n s ’ su sp ic io n s  
and keep them in  a mood to  c o -o p e ra te . The In d ian  members could 
have taken  advantage o f t h i s  f l e x i b i l i t y  and used th e  in fo rm atio n  
from th e  o f f i c i a l  answers to  move m otions concern ing  th e  so c io ­
economic d i f f i c u l t i e s  th a t  t h e i r  people were fa c in g . No a ttem p t 
was made e i th e r  to  tak e  such an i n i t i a t i v e  them selves o r to  
c o n tr ib u te  t h e i r  share  to  o th e r  is s u e s  deb ated . They had ample 
o p p o rtu n ity , f o r  dudng t h e i r  sh o rt so jou rn  th e  Council d iscu ssed  
among o th e r  th in g s  th e  edu ca tio n  r a t in g  b i l l ,  m aintenance o f 
c e r ta in  roads and b r id g e s  and a loan  p o lic y  f o r  th e s e ,  p r iso n  
re g u la t io n s ,  refund  on sugar d u t ie s ,  p ro v in c ia l  schoo ls and th e  
T ailevu  D airy  Scheme. A ll were is s u e s  where th e  In d ian s  could 
have p a r t ic ip a te d  i f  f o r  no o th e r  reason  than  to  in tro d u ce  id e a s  
on how t h e i r  own community m ight b e n e f i t .  S ilen ce  on th e se  
occasions wras a g ross n e g le c t o f duty  and s h o r t- s ig h te d n e s s . 
T a c t ic a l ly  i t  was a c o lo s s a l  b lu n d e r. I f  i t  was done a t  th e
behest of outside advice, whether from within or without the Colony, 
then such advice was ill-conceived. It displayed a lack of reality 
and appreciation of the situation. Had the Indian members made some 
contribution other than merely asking numerous questions, they might 
have encountered less hostility later towards themselves and their 
supporters. If Hedstrom by his strong words appeared to be 
spoiling for a fight, the Indians by their obstinacy and 
inflexibility were making certain that a collision occurred.
On 5 November Vishnu Deo moved his famous motion:
(a) that political rights and status granted to Indian 
settlers in this Colony on racial lines are not acceptable 
to them, and
(b) that Indians in Fiji should be granted Common Franchise 
along with other British subjects resident in the Colony. 5859His arguments in support were simple. Communal franchise 
segregated Indians from Europeans and conflicted with the pledge 
given by the Fiji Government that Indians would be treated on a 
basis of equality with other races. There was the inevitable 
reference to Lord Salisbury1s despatch and a quotation from the 
Hilton Young Commission that ’the ideal to be aimed at is a common 
electoral roll on equal franchise with no discrimination between 
the races’. Vishnu Deo was of the opinion that communal franchise 
led to racial friction. He discounted Hedstrom’s fears about the 
dangers to the primacy of native interests. Common roll would not 
undermine this policy nor would it conflict with the Deed of Cession, 
which was in no way abrogated by the existing elective principle.
In fact, Fijians would benefit from a common franchise. Indians 
had no desire to dominate or impose their civilization on anyone.
In British Guiana common roll was functioning satisfactorily; there 
was no reason why it should not do so in Fiji. He denied that they 
were demagogues or obstructionists or men of immoderate and 
revolutionary ideas. All he sought was that they ’pull together 
for the benefit of the Empire’.
In support Farmanand Singh referred to the fact that Indians 
along with Europeans had helped develop Fiji. ^ He pointed out that
58 ibid:176.
59 ibid:179-180.
60 ibid:180-181.
Fiji was not a self-governing Dominion ’and the political equality 
in the Crown Colonies is not based on the principle of equity’.
And it was not possible to maintain the Empire while denying 
equality to Indians.
The Acting Colonial Secretary for the Government, and Ratu Pope 
Seniloli for the Fijians, expressed satisfaction with the 
Constitution and against the motion without stating their reasons.
The supporters of the motion put forward no new arguments but
61these, nonetheless, drew lengthy rebuttals from Hedstrom and Scott.
Hedstrom contended that the European members could not be expected 
to support a system that would in the future bring about the loss 
of their political rights; they would be swamped by the Indians.
Nor would Fijians want a change of masters. The British race had 
shown itself capable of ruling other peoples where the Indians had 
not in the past shown themselves capable of governing even 
themselves. Indians had ’a good deal to learn politically and in 
other ways, and you cannot hurry evolution’. Most of the Indians 
who came to Fiji were ’from Calcutta streets', and came 'because of 
their own utter poverty’; they had done well in the Colony and wTere 
better off here than they could have been at home, and he thought 
they had ’every right and every privilege that British subjects 
/”had 7 . . . which can be granted to them without harm or danger 
to the Fijian race'.
Henry Scott took the stand that if Indians were granted common 
roll then so would the Fijians, but they were not ready for it. He 
reiterated the fear of Indian domination and warned that there could 
be only one alteration from the present franchise and that would be 
a reversion to the nominated system, for which he received the 
applause of the Council. The common roll movement had not originated 
in Fiji but had been deliberately brought from India by certain 
emissaries living in Fiji 'not for the betterment of the Indian 
community, but their own aggrandisement, political and otherwise'.
The other four European elected members merely rose to support their 
two senior colleagues. In his reply Vishnu Deo said nothing of
61 ibid:181-186.
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no te  b e sid e s  p o in tin g  ou t th a t  though In d ian  q u a l i f ic a t io n s  to  vo te  
were lower than  those  fo r  Europeans th e re  were only  1f bOk In d ian  
e le c to r s  to  1,356 Europeans. I f ,  as th ey  sought, th e  
q u a l i f ic a t io n s  were made id e n t ic a l  i t  was u n lik e ly  th a t  200 In d ian s  
would be e l i g i b l e .  He d isag reed  w ith  S c o tt about th e  re a d in ess  o f 
F i j ia n s ;  he thought th a t  th ey  could cope w ith  common r o l l .
The r e s u l t  o f th e  debate was expected . Only th e  th re e  In d ian  
members favoured i t ,  th e  o th e r tw enty-tw o opposed i t .  Vishnu Deo 
responded th a t  s in ce  th e  common cause of th e  Empire had rece iv ed  such 
a cold re c e p tio n  fu tu re  co -o p e ra tio n  was f u t i l e .  Accompanied by 
h is  two co lleag u es  he walked ou t o f th e  C ouncil chamber. The 
melodrama had ended.
Once th ey  had taken  th e  u lt im a te  plunge th e  onus was on th e
In d ian  members them selves to  make th e  nex t move. F i r s t ,  th e re
were p u b lic  m eetings. On 6 November in  th e  Town H all b e fo re  a
predom inantly  G u je ra ti  audience S .B .P a te l approved o f a b o y co tt of
th e  C o u n c i l .^  Next th e  N a tional Congress of F i j i  was formed w ith
h ead q u a rte rs  a t  Lautoka and a committee chosen by S .B .P a te l and
Vishnu Deo; t h i s  a lso  saw th e  demise of th e  B e a ttie  o rg a n is a tio n .^ *
A fte r th e  w alk-ou t th e  le a d e rs  had prom ptly despatched  a
te leg ram  to  Gandhi inform ing  him of th e  f a i lu r e  o f th e  common r o l l
m otion. In  re p ly  he co n g ra tu la ted  th e  th re e  members fo r  re s ig n in g
in  p ro te s t  and hoped th a t  th ey  would ab ide by t h e i r  d e c is io n  and no t
6$seek r e - e le c t io n  u n t i l  t h e i r  demand had been m et. He ad v ised :
U nited e f f o r t  and a g i ta t io n  w i l l  su re ly  b r in g  about r e l i e f  
a t  an e a r ly  p e rio d  bu t w hether i t  comes e a r ly  o r l a t e  i t  i s  
p e r f e c t ly  u s e le s s  to  go to  th e  Council u n le ss  t h i s  elem entary  
th in g  i s  done. P lease  keep me inform ed o f f u r th e r  
developm ents. 66
L a te r Gqndhi m ain tained  th a t  th e  In d ia n s  could n o t g e t what th ey
62 i b i d : 186-187.
63 C.S.O.U9li2/29.
6Ü ib id .  C .S .0 .2 8 9 /3 0 .
65 Gandhi 1929-30:166.
66 ib id .
156
sought because 'that would be too much for the white exploiters of
Indian labour'. He did not think that Indian members elected by
Indians only could have any influence in the Council. Hence those
who hadwiresigned deserved commendation for 'their patriotic spirit'.
Having quit the Council, they ought not to sit idle but continue
their agitation for simple justice, for 'if the Indian community in
Fiji is well organised the citadel of anti-Indian prejudice is bound
68to break down through united effort'. The advice was acceptable, 
and no nominations were forthcoming from the Indian community when 
writs were issued on 25 November for a fresh election to fill the 
vacancy. Consequently there were no Indians in the Council till 
the election of 1932.
The Acting Secretary of Indian Affairs believed that Pollack
69of the Servants of India Society in London had advised the boycott. 
This is not unlikely because by 6 November S.B.Patel was thinking in 
these terms. But the Mahatma's instructions were the crucial ones.
He was the Pope of the non-cooperationists and every word he spoke 
or wrote was accepted without demur as an ex-cathedra pronouncement 
by his disciples. The two Patels were to admit to the Secretary of 
Indian Affairs, according to the latter, that 'the present political 
situation is controlled more or less from India, and that it is 
dependent on the political situations in India and in Kenya'.
Both in his election address and in the Legislative Council Vishnu Deo 
gave the indication that wnat the Indians sought would have 
repercussions beyond Fiji. This broad perspective as well as aid 
from India were essential, though there were risks involved. Among 
these the most pernicious was to ignore the set of circumstances 
peculiar to Fiji and to interpret events and demands within a very 
general spectrum with the result that the details of the particular 
tended to be blurred or lost. Indeed this was the Gandhian fallacy. 
His philosophy was pertinent to the needs of the nationalists in 
India but was not of universal relevance. Even in India when 
Muslim-Hindu communal strife began to surface with regular 
frequency it was found wanting, not in terms of its values but 
its realism. On the Fijian scene it was no less unrealistic.
6? ibid:191.
68 ibid.
69 C.S.0.289/30.
157
Gandhis falure to appreciate this sprang partly from his own belief 
in the innate goodness of human beings and his championing of the 
cause of overseas Indians. But given the successes of Gandhi in 
India and the very limited quality of Indian leadership in Fiji, 
the worship of Gandhian practices is understandable. Isolated in 
a Pacific archipelago, impoverished, and with limited opportunities 
for education, the Fiji-born Indians were unlikely at this stage of 
their history, especially in view of the rigours of their past, to 
produce leaders possessing originality of vision. Even if one had 
suddenly emerged he probably would have been stifled and muzzled by 
the hostile environment of the colonial situation, where the Scotts 
and Hedstroms would never have paid heed to him. Too much 
criticism cannot, therefore, be levelled at Vishnu Beo and his 
colleagues. The Patels too were the products of their 
environment; Gujeratis born in India and barely two years in Fiji, 
they too believed in the efficacy of their great countryman. As 
much dedicated to victory in India as in Fiji, their loyalty was 
divided. Hitherto, all the gains of the Fiji-Indians: the
abolition of indenture, the bestowal of the franchise, had been 
achieved more by the efforts of India than their own; therefore, 
they were susceptible to outside pressures. On occasions Fiji- 
Indians were thoroughgoing in displaying oneness \rith their 
compatriots in India, as exemplified by the closing of shops and
stopping the taxi service in Lautoka in condolence for Gandhi's
70arrest in India in 1922. Another instance was the holding of
meetings in the same year as protest on the imprisonment of
71Nehru and V.Patel. The meetings were organized by A.D.Patel
who was supposed to have told his audience that only the Hindus
were suffering in India for the Muslims were siding with the 
72Government. Such actions were liable to misinterpretation by 
members of the other communities, who as a result were liable to 
shout sedition at every Indian .'political activity or demand. The 
Indian community ran this risk by placing excessive confidence in 
India-born, India-orientated leaders whose attachment to Fiji was 
secondary. There was a failure both on the part of the Indians
70 C.S.O. CF51/9.
71 ibid.
72 ibid.
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themselves and the other races to recognize that political goals in
India and Fiji were totally different. Indian nationalists were
seeking self-government or independence from colonial rule. Indians
in Fiji desired equality of status within the colonial framework
or within a constitution with a permanent official majority in the
Legislative Council. By associating with India, and obtaining the
aid of nationalist leaders there, Fiji-Indians weakened their own
demands. It is doubtful whether they could have done otherwise
amidst the seeming collusion of Government reluctance and European
intransigence, with its failure to accept Indians as permanent
residents whose aspirations needed reasonable fulfilment.
The apparent unity of the Indian voters, evidenced by the
absence of even a single nomination left the Government^raore than
disappointed. The Governor informed the Secretary of State that the
Indians were contenting themselves with platitudes of brotherhood
and equality and the claim that 'a common roll was the birthright
73of all Indians, and there was nothing more to be said*. They
were acting on instructions from abroad, in his opinion, and he had
7)it on good authority that Pollack was the man responsible.
Despite this the Governor called a conference on 27 December at 
Government House to resolve the impasse.
Apart from the Governor, the Colonial Secretary, and the 
Secretary of Indian Affairs there were seven Indians present, an 
eighth though invited was allegedly too ill to attend and was 
granted an interview the following day. Those present were?
S.B.Patel, A.D.Patel, Vishnu Deo, Parmanand Singh, John Grant,
Sahodar Singh of the Pacific Press and Abdul Karim, a Muslim school 
teacher from Suva. Both sides reiterated their now familiar 
arguments. The Governor claimed that communal franchise was 
advantageous in a heterogeneous'society while the Indians repeated 
that it implied racial inferiority and was productive of racial 
friction. Even the Muslim member of the delegation took this 
view but he later refused to sign a joint letter from his colleagues
73 Fletcher to C.O.Conf. 2 Jan.1930. 
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giving the Governor a formal answer in which they resolved in 
favour of common roll.
The refusal of the majority of the politically articulate 
Indians to co-operate on any terms other than common roll increased 
the hostility of others towards them. In the following months 
disunity appeared, the Muslims by the beginning of 1930 were 
openly against co-operation with Vishnu Deo and his Arya Samajis.
The followers of John Grant, mainly Christians, and a few of the 
wealthier Hindu Indians were speaking of their dissatisfaction with 
Vishnu Deo and the Patels. Dr. Sagayam, who had absented himself 
from the conference on 2? December on account of illness, informed 
the Government that 98% of the Indians were totally ignorant of the7 2
motives of the few politically minded among them. How closely 
such a percentage approximated to the truth was difficult to deduce 
but it was accepted because it gave substance to the Government's 
own beliefs.
Part of the problem lay in the fact that the Government lived in 
a world completely cut off from the reality of Indian feeling. It 
was also too ready to encourage divisive groups, especially those 
against the Arya Samajis. And most remarkable were the beliefs of 
the two men who held consecutively the position of Secretary of 
Indian Affairs, Pearson and McGusty. The latter had long been in 
Fiji and exhibited greater prejudice, while the former, with 
experience in India, occasionally showed glimpses of true 
understanding. Pearson was the more realistic, his basic premise 
was:
The Indians are here. They cannot be ejected or forced 
to leave without a disastrous economic upheaval. . . . and 
the prosperity of the Colony largely depends on them. 77
Fiji had to adapt itself to the Indian presence. He was aware
of the extreme view that the Indian had come to be a labourer and
76 ibid. Sagayam had arrived in Fiji in 1925 from India where, 
according to the Government, he had been an extremist. His 
wife was described as a Russian Bolshevist determined to 
rectify the Indian position in Fiji. But on arrival in Fiji 
they found the conditions so favourable (according to the 
Secretary of Indian Affairs) that they chose to co-operate with 
the officials.
77 C.S.0.5286/29.
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must not arrogate to himself anything more or, at the most, be a
78small farmer growing crops for others. He must be kept in his
place and if he did not like it despite his alleged advantages he 
79could leave. Vftiile he had no sympathy for this attitude Pearson 
reflected his Indian Civil Service belief that India could not 
survive without Europeans and so would remain permanently in the 
Empire, hence Indians in Fiji could not be treated as aliens.
Though he found no widespread desire among local Indians for 
clerical and sedentary jobs (most preferred mechanical or 
agricultural employment), he, nonetheless, desired that education for 
them ought to be provided locally especially in view of the 
Indian determination to obtain education to the extent of sending 
their children abroad. There was a danger that these would 
return ’disciples of advanced and impractical idealists to their 
own country'. Instead they should be taught what would make them 
useful citizens of Fiji. His memorandum ended advising tolerance 
towards Indian aspirations for policies which would ensure that 
they made Fiji their home. But he exhibited no willingness to 
accept Indians on equal terms with Europeans; they were distinctgoraces with differing needs.
McGusty, who later succeeded Pearson, was less perceptive and 
more influenced by Fiji's colonial environment. His thinking
81on the issue resembled closely that of the European residents.
Given such attitudes dissatisfaction was inevitable. Race
and status as causes of conflict were to become increasingly
prominent with the growing dissemination of western education among
the Indians. The stigma of inferiority was repugnant to the Indian.
He chafed under it and grew bitter when, in his view, the
administration failed to provide appropriate redress. According to
the Colonial Secretary local opinion was unsympathetic to Indian
aspirations in education and the franchise, and officials were
placed at a disadvantage because Indians were suspicious of their
82efforts. But this was only half the problem. Indians distrusted 
European officials and considered them sympathetic to the attitudes 
of local Europeans. European civil servants and European residents
78 ibid.
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80 Enel. Fletcher to C.O.Conf. 29 Oct. 1931; C.S.0.CF$l/7.
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met on s o c ia l  term s and each had th e  o p p o r tu n i ty ,- a t  l e a s t ,  o f 
l i s t e n in g  to  th e  v iew poin t of the  o th e r  away from th e  form al 
r i g i d i t y  o f o f f i c i a l  m eetings and d is c u s s io n s . From such s o c ia l  
co n tac ts  w ith  Europeans th e  In d ian s  were cu t o f f .  They were th u s  
unable to  i n i t i a t e  any change tow ards t h e i r  community v ia  th i s  
medium. Those few In d ian s  who deemed them selves educated a sp ired  
to  s o c ia l  in te rc o u rs e  w ith  Europeans. The l a t t e r  g e n e ra lly  re fu sed  
to  countenance t h i s  on grounds th a t  i t  was beneath  t h e i r  d ig n i ty  to  
allow  In d ian s  to  mix w ith  them as s o c ia l  eq u a ls . The In d ian s  
considered  t h e i r  ex c lu s io n  to  be based on race and th u s  u n p a la ta b le . 
The S e c re ta ry  o f In d ian  A f fa ir s ,  Pearson , who though opposed to  
'in t im a te  s o c ia l  r e l a t i o n s '  between ra c e s  adm itted  'w hat i s  
wanted i s  s o c ia l  c o n ta c t in  some form and re c o g n itio n  th a t  th e re  i s
O n
a c la s s  o f In d ian  s o c ie ty  w ith  which t h i s  i s  p o s s ib l e ' .  In  
p ra c t ic e  t h i s  d id  n o t ev en tua te  to  any s ig n i f ic a n t  d eg ree . For the  
Europeans, e s p e c ia l ly  lo c a l  r e s id e n ts ,  In d ian s  were In d ian s  be they  
educated o r i l l i t e r a t e .  And in  any case i f  an In d ian  were 
educated th en  th e re  was a l l  th e  more reason  to  ensure  he re a l iz e d  
always in  h is  d e a lin g s  w ith  Europeans th a t  he was an In d ian  and 
ought to  remain in  th e  s ta t io n  appo in ted  f o r  him.
The a g i ta t io n  f o r  common r o l l  and equal s t a tu s ,  th e  b o y co tt 
of th e  C ouncil, a s s o c ia t io n  w ith  In d ian  n a t io n a l i s t s ,  a l l  th e se  
re in fo rc e d  e x is t in g  p re ju d ic e s  a g a in s t th e  In d ian  community in  
g en era l and th e  le a d e rs  in  p a r t i c u la r .  Concessions f o r  th e  
b e tte rm en t of th e  In d ia n s  had always been very  g rudg ing ly  made by 
th e  European le a d e r s .  A fte r th e  ev en ts  o f l a t e  1929, t h e i r  
n ig g a rd lin e s s  in te n s i f i e d  as shown by t h e i r  u n ite d  clamour when
82,
Government proposed to  spend £10,000 on th e  ed u ca tio n  o f In d ia n s .
D esp ite  th e  doubts th a t  th e  is su e  o f In d ian  f ra n c h is e  had 
involved  tn e  B r i t i s h  had made t h i s  momentous g ra n t .  But th e  
behav iour o f th e  f i r s t  e le c te d  In d ian s  in  th e  L e g is la t iv e  Council 
l e f t  behind d i s t a s t e  and in d ig n a tio n  in  o th e rs .  Men such as 
Murchison F le tc h e r  and McGusty who had regarded  th e  In d ian s  as a 
co n ten ted , p rosperous and su c c e ss fu l community were dismayed and
83 C.S.O. CF$1/13Pt1.
81* F i j i  Samach a r Dec. 1929. See f o r  in s ta n c e , Telegram of
European E lec ted  Members to  S e c re ta ry  o f S ta te ,  Lord P a s s f ie ld  
in  L .C .D ebates 1929, 2l;0-l*1.
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disappointed. The response of the Indian politicians they found 
less than generous and futile. They hoped that the franchise, 
which was a political concession, would be utilized sensibly for 
the socio-economic advancement of both the Indians and the colony. 
The demand for majority rule which common roll implied was for them 
unrealistic as it foreshadowed the paramountcy of the Indian with 
the concomitant subordination of the interests of others to the 
detriment of the welfare of Fiji. And it displayed a disregard 
of British obligations to the Fijian people.
Given the Indians’ persecution complex and their acute feeling 
of injustice, whether rightly or wrongly, they tended to see 
constitutional problems from a very narrow perspective. They were 
inclined to see it merely from their own vantage point, to the 
exclusion of others' views. Their myopia deprived them of the 
realization that they were only one component in the colony's 
plural society. Particularly, it deprived them of a full 
appreciation of the Fijian position repeatedly stated by the 
leaders of that oomimmity. The Indians insistent in their demands 
upon official time and resources either ignored or failed to grasp 
that the British had firm obligations to the Fijian people.
Colonial Governors and officials had frequently professed the 
paramountcy of Fijian interests in the colony and this doctrine had 
been proclaimed specifically for East Africa and the Empire 
generally in 1923. And in this narrative in order to put the 
picture in its correct focus it is imperative to examine Fijian 
aspirations.
85
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THE INDIGENOUS RESPONSE
VI
AFTER earlier reluctance Britain accepted the offer of Cession from 
the Tui Viti and other chiefs in 1874 because she could find no other 
effective way of exercising her authority over the activities of 
European settlers, largely British, whose numbers in the archipelago
1had rapidly increased in the late eighteen sixties and early seventies.
Though Cession had been an unconditional surrender of their property
and rights and those of their people by the signatory chiefs to the
British Crown and its heirs, the Deed of Cession came to be regarded
as a covenant between the British Crown and the Fijian people. The
first substantive Governor of the Colony, Sir Arthur Gordon (1875-1880)
institutionalized for native administration the system adopted by
Sir Hercules Robinson and laid down the guidelines for a native
2policy which was never radically altered. Sir Everard im Thurn
was the only one of Gordon’s successors to attempt to change a
major aspect of his policy regarding land but the measure proved
3temporary and abortive. Though im Thurn expressed doubts about
the Fijian communal system and native taxation scheme, he did
nothing to alter these beyond calling on chiefs for a greater effort
4towards individualism. Im Thurn showed no wish either to destroy 
the separate native administration or to subjugate Fijian interests 
to those of other communities.
The basic structure of native administration remained the same 
throughout British rule. The Colony was divided into provinces, 
districts and villages, varying in number at different times, and
1 For a discussion of events leading to Cession see Derrick 1946: 
195-250; Legge 1958:1-150; MacIntyre 1967:317-336; Scarr 1964: 
361-382.
2 Gordon's policy is adequately examined in Legge 1958:151-283, and 
Chapman 1964. The various views on the origins of the native 
administration in Fiji and its workings are discussed in the above 
and also in Roth 1953:134-163; France 1969; C.P.13/59.
3 France 1969:149-164.
4 Everard im Thurn, Diary entries 16 and 21 Nov. 1904 in im Thurn 
Papers housed in the Royal Anthropological Institute of Great 
Britain and Ireland, London. (Microfilm copy in the Dept, of 
Pacific History, A.N.U.)
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each with its own council and indigenous official. None of these 
councils had legislative powers but it was their function to enforce 
laws and regulations made by superior authorities. The Provincial 
Council, however, was responsible for the budget of its province, 
largely derived from the annual levy paid by its people. One could 
say that the Fijian people, through their various taxes, paid for 
their own administration. At the apex stood the Council of Chiefs; 
it too was advisory but its recommendations carried great weight both 
with the Fijian people and with the Governor and his bureaucracy.
On occasions its advice was not accepted by the colonial regime but 
the rejection always carried an explanation. Though generally known 
as the Council of Chiefs, membership of this august body was not 
confined to this group. Because the colonial administration 
employed commoners as bulis, provincial scribes or native 
stipendiary magistrates and later those trained as native medical 
practitioners, this class found its way into the Council of Chiefs. 
And it always included nominated representatives from the provinces. 
Nevertheless, the traditional rulers were always in a majority in 
the Council which became the mouthpiece of the Fijian people.
The officials of the Fijian administration were salaried servants
of the Crown. Though in the upper echelons chiefs predominated,
these were not always assigned to areas over which they had customary
5overlordship. Making chiefs salaried officials meant they were no
5 Sometimes there was conflict when an outsider was appointed as 
shown in Scarr 1970:3-31. In 1913 Ratu Kadavu Levu, a grandson 
of Cakobau, misappropriated funds and was relieved of the Rokoship 
of Tailevu and replaced by Joni Madraiwiwi; an action which caused 
some resentment in that province. (May to C.0.71, 12 March 1912. 
F.T. 9 Oct. 1913.) Governor Sir Henry May told the Colonial Office 
(Conf. 30 June 1911; C.0.83/101) that Rokos appointed to various 
provinces were as a rule high chiefs and selected because of their 
personal influence over the people, an attribute necessary for 
the execution of such tasks as housebuilding and village sanitation. 
And such an official was useful to the Government only while his 
influence lasted. Sometimes by his actions a Roko lost this 
influence and therefore his usefulness and had to be removed. But 
as these men were 'subsidized native chiefs' it was essential that 
once 'removed from office f~they / shall not be entirely alienated 
from the Government'. Otherwise they might coerce levies from 
those below. Hence their past service ought not to be ignored 
and despite dismissal from office they ought to be given allowances 
to retain their loyalty. C.O. to May, Conf. 16 Sept. 1911,
accepted this principle. In 1904 im Thurn had warned Kadavu Levu
against selfishness noting in his diary that dismissal would mean 
'not only disgrace but loss of pay and advantages equivalent to 
something like £1,500 p.a.'. Diary entry, 26 Oct. 1904.
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l o n g e r  w h o l l y  d e p e n d e n t  on t r a d i t i o n a l  r e s t r a i n t s .  But  i n  t h e
absenc e  o f  d e t a i l e d  c o lo n y - w i d e  r e s e a r c h  on c h i e f l y  r u l e  u n d e r  t h e
B r i t i s h  a s s e s s m e n t  o f  i t  must  be c a u t i o u s .  C e r t a i n  f a c t o r s  ne e d
e m p h a s i s .  Be ing a c h i e f  i m p l i e d  b e i n g  a b l e  to  l i v e  l i k e  one;  b e i n g
a b le  to  d i s p l a y  g e n e r o s i t y  e s p e c i a l l y  i n  o n e ' s  s u b j e c t s '  t im e s  o f  n e e d .
And a c h i e f  r e s t r i c t e d  by a m on th ly  s a l a r y  and f i x e d  e x t r a s ,  such  as
from l a n d  r e n t s ,  o f t e n  found  h i m s e l f  i n  f i n a n c i a l  e m b a r r a s s m e n t s ,
7
sometim es  h a v in g  to  u t i l i z e  p u b l i c  fu n d s  i n  h i s  t r u s t .  The c h i e f l y  
sy s te m  was b a s e d  on t r i b u t e  and u n d e r  B r i t i s h  r u l e  c h i e f s  were 
p e r m i t t e d  to  r e t a i n  some p r i v i l e g e s  o f  s e r v i c e  from t h o s e  be low them; 
somet im es  t h e s e  were abused ;  sometim es  l o o p h o l e s  i n  t h e  r e g u l a t i o n s
g
p e r m i t t e d  a b u s e s .  The Government  when aware o f  t h e s e  took  a c t i o n
and e x p r e s s l y  f o r b a d e  and p u n i s h e d  o v e r - e x p l o i t a t i o n .  I t  would  be
u n f a i r  to  b r a n d  c h i e f l y  r u l e  u n d e r  B r i t a i n  as  w i d e s p r e a d  s l a v e r y  o r
9
t o t a l  t y r a n n y  as  some c r i t i c s  c l a i m e d .  There  was no w i d e s p r e a d  
r e b e l l i o n  a g a i n s t  i t ,  though  d i s c o n t e n t  was p e r i o d i c a l l y  e v i d e n t  as  
w i l l  be m en t io n e d  l a t e r ;  i t  c a n n o t  be d e n i e d  t h a t  t h e  sy s te m  gave 
g r e a t e r  p r o t e c t i o n  t o  the  c h i e f s  who manned t h e  b u r e a u c r a c y  t h a n  
t o  t h e  commoners who were gove rned  by i t .
The n a t i v e  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  q u i c k l y  became an Imperium i n  i m p e r i o  
and t h e  F i j i a n s  once i t  became so e s t a b l i s h e d  w i s h e d  t o  r e t a i n  i t .
When i n  1916 the  N a t i v e  Depa r tm en t  was a b o l i s h e d  and i t s  work i n  t h e  
p r o v i n c e s  handed  o v e r  t o  Eu ropean  c o m m is s io n e r s  and s t i p e n d i a r y  
m a g i s t r a t e s ,  and v/hen f o r  a s h o r t  t erm (1 921-1923)  t h e r e  was no 
S e c r e t a r y  o f  N a t i v e  A f f a i r s ,  F i j i a n s  o b j e c t e d .  The C o u n c i l  o f  C h i e f s  
made c l e a r  a t  i t s  1923 m e e t in g  i t s  c o n c e r n  t h a t  t h e  a c t i o n  had  been  
t a k e n  w i t h o u t  p r i o r  c o n s u l t a t i o n  w i t h  i t  and t h a t  i t  was d i s t i n c t l y
6 W i l l i a m s  1 858 :42 ,  w r o t e :  ' C h i e f s  o f  power e x a c t  l a r g e l y  and g iv e
l i b e r a l l y ,  o n l y  a s m a l l  p o r t i o n  o f  what  t h e y  r e c e i v e  r e m a i n i n g
i n  t h e i r  own hands.®
7 F e l l  to  C .O .Conf .  15 Feb.  1924,  s p e a k s  o f  t h e  r em ova l  f rom o f f i c e
o f  a c h i e f  f o r  d e f a l c a t i o n  a f t e r  he had g i v e n  t h e  Government  26 y e a r s  
o f  l o y a l  s e r v i c e .  L a t e r  t h i s  c h i e f  made v e r y  e f f o r t  t o  r e p a y  
a l l  t h a t  had been  l o s t  t h r o u g h  h i s  n e g l i g e n c e .  Seymour t o  C.O.
Conf .  26 June  1931.
8 H e l l i e t ,  N a t o v i ,  25 O c t .  1928.  P.M.B.457* Some c h i e f s  r e g a r d e d
t h e s e  s e r v i c e s  as  p a r t  o f  t h e i r  r e m u n e r a t i o n  and were p r e p a r e d  to  
s u r r e n d e r  them p r o v i d e d  t h e y  r e c e i v e d  an e q u i v a l e n t  i n c r e a s e  i n  
t h e i r  s a l a r y .  ( im Thurn D i a r y ,  11 A p r i l  1905«)
9 Barrow 1921,  and 1922.
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unhappy with the new arrangement. Indeed rokos, bulls and the
various councils were not affected by the change, but the Fijian leaders 
sought the reservation of a separate department concentrating solely 
on their affairs. v
In these matters the Council of Chiefs took the dominant role.
It both formulated and voiced the opinion of the Fijian people in all 
matters, political, economic, and social. Therefore it was natural 
that it should be the first to consider the question of Fijian 
representation in the Legislative Council making a pronouncement as 
early as 1880.
The Roko Tui Ba at that Council of Chiefs meeting, in his complaint 
that there were Europeans in Fiji who took little or no interest in 
the work of the chiefs and frequently misconstrued matters to deceive 
the Fijian people, added:
Now my question is whether one of us would be allowed to enter the 
Bose vaka Matanitu (Legislative Council). At present it would 
appear that we are kept at a distance. There are matters that 
have been discussed there, the importance of which is only known 
to ourselves; for instance our rights to and ownership of the 
various reefs which have belonged to us from all past times down 
to the present. Strangers are not aware of this fact and they 
dispute our rights to them.
According to the report of the proceedings of this Council a lengthy
discussion took place on the subject but unfortunately there is no
record of what was said and by whom. But apparently there was some
consensus of opinion because the chiefs submitted a resolution to
the Governor that one of their number be permitted to attend the
sittings of the Legislative Council. The resolution,though lengthy,
does deserve quoting in full as it is the first public expression of
the Fijian leaders on the issue and displays an acute appreciation
of the political process which controlled their destiny:
There is one thing we wish to ’represent to your Excellency 
respecting our discussions. What we discuss, we see and 
understand ourselves, as well as its usefulness to ourselves.
We also know and understand your Excellency's true mindedness 
to us in our work but there are some things that are not so clear, 
some that are spoken of as English law which seem to be 
different or against us, and create in our minds a feeling that 
there is a hindrance which renders or may render our discussion 
and condition of our affairs of little use. One thing is that 
it may be neither we nor the manners and customs of our land are 
understood. There is one thing we wish to represent to your
10 Reply of the Council of Chiefs to the Governor's Address, 
Proceedings. C.P.52/23.
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Excellency. You will then see whether it be good or not. Our 
request is that if it be admissible that one of us taukei should 
enter the Legislative Council. Some of our thoughts on the 
matter are that such a person would be able to explain and make 
clear many things that are not clear when laws are being discussed, 
that have some application to us or to some of our affairs. He 
would be able to explain what would be useful to us and what 
should be understood by us. As our Bose is drawing to a close, 
we shall soon return to our homes. We know and feel the importance 
of many things that we wish to represent to your Excellency. It
is a weighty matter to us, as to whether what we have discussed
will be carried out, knowing as v/e do its suitability to us. It 
is said abroad, 'What is the object of your Bose? Others govern 
you. What you discuss and decide upon does not become law: 
there is another Bose that alone makes laws, not you.' There are 
many amongst us who remain quiet and indifferent as to how matters 
affecting the land or the people go. The effect of this also 
we fear, as it lessens the importance of our Bose. For this
and many other reasons we think it would be usdful if one of us
were in the Legislative Council. 11
The Governor's, reply was tepid: 'This is well. I had already
thought of this matter and will arrange that the taukei interest
shall be represented in the Bose, in accordance with your request.'
Although the request was for a Fijian to be their spokesman, the
Governor's reply indicates that his nominee would be an official,
and therefore a European. In fact it was to be the Native
Commissioner.
There the matter rested until Governor Jackson recommended 
constitutional change. He favoured, and the Colonial Ofidee accepted, 
the selection of two representatives by the Governor from a list of 
names recommended by the Council of Chiefs. The method was not only 
indirect representation for the Fijian people but also the Governor 
made the final choice. Even the most popular candidates nominated by 
the chiefs were not automatically granted seats in the Legislative 
Council. Since records of voting on this matter in the Council of 
Chiefs are virtually non-existent * it is difficult to assess how often 
this occurred, but there were instances. Both in 1926 and 1928 the
11 Proceedings of the Council of Chiefs. 1880. Hereafter all 
references to the Council of Chiefs meetings are drawn from 
these proceedings of the relevant years unless otherwise stated. 
These proceedings of the Council of Chiefs were not published 
separately until 1923; thereafter they appeared as Legislative 
Council Papers. The National Archives of Fiji, however, has two 
collated volumes of the Minutes of the Council of Chiefs from 
its first meeting.
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1 2t h i r d  most  p o p u l a r  c a n d id a te '  was p r e f e r r e d  o v e r  t h e  s e co n d .
The a p p o in tm e n t  o f  c h i e f s  to  t h e  L e g i s l a t i v e  C o u n c i l  i n  1905 and 
t h e r e a f t e r  d i d  n o t  l e a d  t o  a g e n e r a l  p o l i t i c a l  awakening o f  the  F i j i a n s ,  
though  as  b e f o r e  t h e y  r em a in e d  c o n s c i o u s  o f  what  a f f e c t e d  t h e i r  own 
community.  Even i n  t h e  C o u n c i l  o f  C h i e f s  i t  c a u s e d  no g r e a t  
j u b i l a t i o n ,  r a t h e r  a f o rm a l  e x p r e s s i o n  o f  t h a n k s  to  t h e  Governor  f o r  
h i s  a c t i o n .  E a r l y  i t  became a c c e p t e d  as  a f u n c t i o n  t h a t  t h a t  C ou n c i l  
had t o  p e r f o r m .  I t  c a n n o t  be r e g a r d e d  as  h a v in g  c o n t r i b u t e d  i n  any 
way to  F i j i a n  p o l i t i c a l  deve lopm en t  f o r  i t  r e g i s t e r e d  no im pa c t  on 
the  mass o f  t h e  p o p u l a t i o n .  Nor d i d  t h o s e  n om ina ted  c o n t r i b u t e  
a n y t h i n g  s u b s t a n t i a l ;  t h e y  c a s t  t h e i r  v o t e s ,  u s u a l l y  w i t h  the  
o f f i c i a l s .  I n  f a c t ,  t h e y  were t h e m s e l v e s  o f f i c i a l s ,  p a i d  s e r v a n t s  
o f  t h e  Government i n  t h e  F i j i a n  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n .  T h e i r  i n a c t i o n  d i d  
n o t  p a s s  u n n o t i c e d  f o r  i n  t h e  C o u n c i l  o f  C h i e f s  on 25 May 1914 the  
f o l l o w i n g  d i s c u s s i o n  took  p l a c e :
Ratu Joni M a ta i t in i :
Ratu Jon i  Madraiwiwi
I w ish  to  ask what good our 
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  Ratu Jon i M adraiwiwi, 
Ratu R ab ic i  and Ratu Kadavulevu have 
done u s .  They never speak and we do 
n ot  se e  th a t  they  do anyth ing  to  
sa feg u a rd  our i n t e r e s t s .
What can we do? We are o n ly  two, 
but we g iv e  our v o t e s .
12 On b o t h  o c c a s i o n s  J o n i  M a t a i t i n i  r e c e i v e d  th e  h i g h e s t  number o f  
v o t e s  and E p e l i  G a n i l a u  was n e x t  b u t  t h e  l a t t e r  was b y p a s s e d  f o r  
Deve T o g a n i v a l u .  The v o t i n g  i n  1928 was as  f o l l o w s :
J o n i  M a t a i t i n i  37,  E p e l i  G a n i l a u  35, Deve T o g a n i v a l u  32,
Pope S e n i l o l i  31,  J . L . V . S u k u n a  22,  P.  V e l i  20.  The Governor ,  
S i r  Eyre H u t son ,  w ished  t o  a p p o i n t  Sukuna b e c a u s e  o f  h i s  e d u c a t i o n  
and q u a l i f i c a t i o n s  which  would e n a b l e  him to  s e r v e  h i s  p e o p l e .
But  Sukuna p o i n t e d  o u t  t h a t  t h e  F i j i a n  people, would n o t  u n d e r s t a n d  
h i s  b e in g  c h o s e n  o v e r  Pope S e n i l o l i ,  g r a n d - s o n  o f  Cakobau, and i f  
he a c c e p t e d  i t  would a d v e r s e l y  a f f e c t  h i s  s t a n d i n g  i n  F i j i a n  
s o c i e t y .  (C .S .O .  5 5 5 3 / 2 8 ) .  L a t e r  i n  1929 when F i j i a n  
membership was i n c r e a s e d  t o  t h r e e ,  i t  was Pope S e n i l o l i  who was 
c h o s e n .  Sukuna ,  d e s p i t e  h i s  c r e d e n t i a l s ,  d i d  n o t  o b t a i n  a  s e a t  
i n  t h e  L e g i s l a t i v e  C ou n c i l  u n t i l  November 1932. Though h i s  name 
was among th e  group  recommended by t h e  C o u n c i l  o f  C h i e f s  f o r  some 
t i m e ,  t h e  Governor  i n  view o f  F i j i a n  t r a d i t i o n  and S u k u n a ' s  
p o s i t i o n  i n  t h e  F i j i a n  h i e r a r c h y  c o u l d  n o t  s e l e c t  him t i l l  t h a t  
d a t e .  Sukuna was the  g r a n d s o n  o f  R a tu  Mara,  t h e  C h i e f  d e f e a t e d  
a t  Kaba and s u b s e q u e n t l y  hanged  as  a r e b e l .  However , S u k u n a ' s  
f a t h e r ,  Ra tu  J o n i  Madra iwiwi must r a n k  as  one o f  t h e  a b l e s t  c h i e f s  
and r o k o s ; he was Roko Tui  Ra, Bua and T a i l e v u  and s e r v e d  i n  the  
L e g i s l a t i v e  C o u n c i l  f rom 1905 t i l l  h i s  d e a t h  i n  December 1920.
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Ratu Kadavuievu: They are of no use to us. We should 
have one who can really speak,read and 
write English. We should have one 
European and one native representative. 
Let us petition the King to alter the 
Letters Patent. We will pay our 
representative.
Ratu Joni Madraiwiwi: I am not in favour of that. We have 
the Native Commissioner to safeguard our 
interests, and he can speak for us.
Ratu Sevanaca Seniloli: If we had a European it would seem as if 
we wished to ignore the Native Department
Ratu Joni Mataitini: I did not mean to suggest that we should 
do without the Native Office.
The Native Commissioner explained that this was a matter for 
discussion later on. In the meantime the Letters Patent provided 
for the appointment of two members in a certain manner and the 
Council must follow the course laid down.
The subject was not dropped for two days later, on 27 May Ratu-
Kadavuievu, seconded by Ratu Joni Mataitini, tabled the following
That it is the desire of this Council to petition His Majesty 
King George V to amend the Letters Patent in so far as they affect 
the appointment of the Legislative Council and that provision may 
be made for the appointment of one European representative and one 
native able to speak, read and understand English. The natives 
will be responsible for the salary of the European.
Speaking in support the mover stated:
The Native Members are unable to speak in the Legislative Council 
or to represent native feeling. No Fijian has sufficient 
education at present. We would get more satisfaction and support 
from a paid European representative, and if after the end of three 
years the experiment did not prove a success we could then return 
to the present system. By that time we might have one of 
ourselves able to take up the duty.
But he encountered formidable opposition, led by Ratu Joni Madraiwiwi, 
who advised:
It would not make us more independent but rather the reverse.
What we should aim at was not to spend £450 a year (the amount 
of salary suggested by the mover) in paying a European 
representative but to educate our own people up. Better spend 
the £450 a year in sending one or two of our own young men abroad 
for further education.
Apart from saying that Ratu Sevanaca Seniloli and others spoke in 
opposition, the proceedings of the Council report no further on the 
debate. When the vote was taken only 14 supported the motion and over
motion:
50 opposed it.
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During the next few years the performance of the Fijian members
did not undergo any radical transformation. And at the Council of
Chiefs in 1920 there was again reference made to political
representation, first of all by the Governor in his opening address:
The office of membership of the Legislative Council is a 
responsible one and in the selection of your nominees you 
will be best guided by bearing in mind the names of those 
of you who have in the past shown themselves capable and keen 
in promoting and leading native opinion in all matters 
appertaining to the general welfare and the good name of 
the native inhabitants of these islands.
Governor Rodwell took the opportunity of praising the advice and
assistance given to him on Fijian affairs by Ratu Joni Madraiwiwi and
Ratu Rabici who had been in the Legislative Council for 15 and 7 years
respectively. The Chiefs replied that they regarded their task of
selection as 'an important and difficult thing because there are but
few of us who know and speak and read English as is required by the
law'. That there was disquiet was evident from the Governor's own
reply in the end to the Chiefs:
I am not altogether satisfied that the object of native 
representation in the Council, which is to afford an opportunity 
for the open expression of native views on matters affecting the 
native welfare is adequately secured by the existing provisions 
of the Constitution. The matter is receiving my consideration. 
Whatever may be decided as to the future, I should be reluctant 
now to make a change which would involve the displacement of 
either of the two chiefs above mentioned /"Madraiwiwi and 
Rabici /, who have served your interests so long and so 
faithfully and have once more been nominated. 13
The Governor's statement indicates caution and an unwillingness to
experiment, plus a preference for tried and experienced men.
That Chiefs at their 1920 Council were anxious about the franchise
is evident from a despatch written by the Officer Administering the
14Government, T.E.Fell, in the following year. Essentially the
13 The names submitted by the Council were: P.E.Seniloli,
Joni C.Mataitini, Deve Toganivalu, Ilisoni Waqanivavalagi,
J.A.Rabici, J.Madraiwiwi. Among 14 others who received votes 
as well were, J.L.V.Sukuna, Savanaca Seniloli, Epeli Ganilau. 
That Sukuna did not get into the first six might indicate that 
western education was not regarded by the chiefly elite as the 
all-important qualification to represent the Fijian people. 
Besides, in Sukuna's case, the difficulty might also have been 
compounded by the fact that his father (joni Madraiwiwi) was 
still available and the Governor had already expressed a 
preference for him; the chiefs could not be expected to trust 
all interests to the safe keeping of the one family, who in any 
case, was not preeminent in the traditional hierarchy.
14 Fell to C.O.Conf. 23 Dec. 1921.
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c o n c e r n  was a con s eq u e n c e  o f  d i s c u s s i o n s  to  g r a n t  t h e  r i g h t  to  v o t e  to
1 s
t h e  I n d i a n  community.  A lthough  th e  F i j i a n  was n o t  a p o l i t i c i a n  by
n a t u r e ,  a rg u e d  F e l l ,  and d i d  n o t  want  the  f r a n c h i s e ,  a t  t h e  C ou n c i l
o f  C h i e f s  ( l 9 2 0 )  some were o f  t h e  o p i n i o n  t h a t  F i j i a n s  s h o u l d  be
p e r m i t t e d  to  v o t e .  F e l l  d i d  n o t  t h i n k  th e  F i j i a n  commoner would
a p p r e c i a t e  t h i s  r i g h t ,  as  i t  was f o r e i g n  to  h i s  n a t u r e ,  and he m igh t
become t h e  t o o l  o f  p o l i t i c a l  a g i t a t o r s ,  r e s u l t i n g  i n  c o m p l e t e
change  i n  h i s  ' s o c i a l  c o m i t y ' .  He f e a r e d  th e  r em ote  d a n g e r  o f  an
a l l i a n c e  be tw een  c e r t a i n  e l e m e n t s  i n  t h e  I n d i a n  and F i j i a n  p o p u l a t i o n
which  would u l t i m a t e l y  p u t  p o l i t i c a l  power i n  the  hands  o f  t h e  f o r m e r .
T h i s  t h e  F i j i a n  c h i e f s  would see  as  b e t r a y a l  and a r i s k  to  t h e i r
b i r t h r i g h t .  Tha t  t h e r e  was some v a l i d i t y  i n  F e l l ' s  a s s e s s m e n t  o f
p o s s i b l e  F i j i a n  r e a c t i o n  becomes e v i d e n t  f rom l a t e r  e v e n t s .
F e l l  a l s o  i n fo rm e d  th e  C o l o n i a l  O f f i c e  t h a t  c e r t a i n  Europeans
were i n s t i l l i n g  i n  F i j i a n  minds the  f e a r  t h a t  t h e i r  r a c e  would be
i n  d a n g e r  i f  p o l i t i c a l  c o n c e s s i o n s  were made to  I n d i a n s  as  would be
demanded by t h e  p r o p o s e d  commiss ion  from I n d i a .  He s u b m i t t e d  a
l e t t e r  f rom an o l d  s e t t l e r ,  J . J . R a g g  from L a u toka  to  Pope S e n i l o l i ,
1 6who had  t r a n s m i t t e d  i t  t o  h i s  s u p e r i o r s .  Ragg t o l d  t h e  F i j i a n s
t h a t  I n d i a n s  i n t e n d e d  to  u s u r p  t h e i r  l a n d  and r e p l a c e  B r i t i s h  r u l e .
L e t t e r s ,  l i k e  R a g g ' s ,  were aimed a t  p r e v e n t i n g  F i j i a n - I n d i a n  am i ty
1 7a s  t h i s  m igh t  o p e r a t e  a g a i n s t  European  i n t e r e s t s .  But  R a g g ' s
a c t i o n  was n o t  an i s o l a t e d  one ;  a C a t h o l i c  p r i e s t  i n  Ba,
Rev.  Yves H e l l i e t ,  was a c c u s e d  o f  i n c i t i n g  F i j i a n s  i n  h i s  d i s t r i c t
t o  c a l l  a m e e t in g  t o  oppose I n d i a n  f r a n c h i s e ;  o f f i c i a l  i n t e r v e n t i o n
1 8t h w a r t e d  h i s  a d v i c e .  I n  Ba F i j i a n s  had been  d i s t u r b e d  f o r  some
15 T h re e  c h i e f s ,  J . A . R a b i c i  (Roko Tui  C a k a u d r o v e ) ,  P . E . S e n i l o l i  
(Roko Tui  T a i l e v u ) ,  A .S ava na c a  S e n i l o l i  ( A s s i s t a n t  N a t i v e  Lands 
C o m m is s io n e r ) ,  a sked  i n  a l e . t t e r  o f  16 Nov. 1921 t o  t h e  C o l o n i a l  
S e c r e t a r y  t h a t  a  m e e t in g  o f  t h e  C o u n c i l  o f  C h i e f s  be c a l l e d  e a r l y  
i n  1922 to  d i s c u s s  t h i s  q u e s t i o n .  T h e i r  r e q u e s t  was n o t  g r a n t e d .
16 Ragg t o  S e n i l o l i ,  23 Nov. 1921, e n d .  F e l l  t o  C .O .Conf .  23 D e c . 1921.
17 T h e re  i s  e v i d e n c e  to  show t h a t  t h e r e  was some F i j i a n  sympathy
f o r  t h e  I n d i a n  s t r i k e  o f  1921 u n t i l  o f f i c i a l  and European  
m i s s i o n a r y  e f f o r t s  p e r s u a d e d  F i j i a n s  t o  a i d  European  e m p l o y e r s .  
H e l l i e t  t o  N i c o l a s ,  23 A p r i l  1923.  P.M.B.466 .  P r o v i n c i a l
Com m iss ione r ,  L a u to k a  and N a d i ,  24 March 1921;  C .S .O .  2 6 79 /21 .
18 C .S .O .  C33 /22 .  H e l l i e t  t o  N i c o l a s ,  23 A p r i l  1922.  P.M.B. 466 ,
a d m i t s  d i s s u a d i n g  F i j i a n s  f rom s i d i n g  w i t h  I n d i a n s  a g a i n s t  
E u r o p e a n s .  But  as  a p r i e s t  he was w i l l i n g  t o  a d v i s e  anyone ,  
i n c l u d i n g  I n d i a n s ,  who s o u g h t  h i s  h e l p .  From h i s  l e t t e r s  a l r e a d y  
c i t e d ,  and o f  21 A p r i l  and 18 August  1922. P .M .B .466 ,  he was
c r i t i c a l  o f  t h e  G ov e rn m e n t ' s  n a t i v e  p o l i c y  and a c c u s e d  F i j i a n  
o f f i c i a l s  o f  a p r o - M e t h o d i s t  and a n t i - C a t h o l i c  b i a s .  H e l l i e t ,  
N a t o v i ,  25 Feb.  1929- P .M .B .457.
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t ime  by rumours  o f  t h e  l i k e l i h o o d  o f  60 ,0 0 0  I n d i a n s  m i g r a t i n g  t o  F i j i
1 9and a b o u t  e q u a l  s t a t u s  f o r  I n d i a n s  v/ i th  E u r o p e a n s .  The A c t in g
P r o v i n c i a l  Com miss ioner  t h e r e ,  d e c i d i n g  t o  c a l l  a P r o v i n c i a l  C ou n c i l
m e e t in g  t o  d i s c u s s  t h e  I n d i a n  q u e s t i o n , ,  had h i s  a c t i o n  d e p r e c a t e d  by
20h i s  s u p e r i o r s  i n  Suva .  The F i j i a n s  p r e s e n t  seemed r e s e n t f u l  a bou t
t h e  g r a n t  o f  t h e  f r a n c h i s e  t o  I n d i a n s  b u t  t h e y  were a s s u r e d  t h a t  t h e i r
21
i n t e r e s t s  u n d e r  t h e  Deed o f  C e s s i o n  would be f u l l y  p r o t e c t e d .
Though E u rope ans  a t t e m p t e d  t o  a r o u s e  F i j i a n s  p o l i t i c a l l y ,  t o o  much
must  n o t  be made o f  i t .  The F i j i a n s  d i d  n o t  need  European  p ro m p t in g ;
t h e y  were q u i t e  a l i v e  t o  e v e n t s  i n  t h e i r  own c o u n t r y  and t h e i r
l e a d e r s  were n o t  h e s i t a n t  i n  d raw ing  t h e  Governmen t ’ s a t t e n t i o n  t o
22t h e i r  p o s i t i o n ,  Ratu  E p e l i  G a n i l a u ,  Roko Tui  Ra, was an example .
H is  c o n t e n t i o n s  can  be summarized :  ( l )  Most F i j i a n s  were opposed
t o  e q u a l  s t a t u s  f o r  I n d i a n s .  (2 )  F i j i  became a B r i t i s h  p o s s e s s i o n  
'b y  p e a c e f u l  and v o l u n t a r y  c o n s e n t '  n o t  by c o n q u e s t .  (3 )  I f  any 
move tow ard  e q u a l i t y  was c o n t e m p l a t e d  t h e n  t h e  r o k o s  and c h i e f s  
must  be c o n s u l t e d .  (4 )  I f  I n d i a n s  were to  be g i v e n  e q u a l i t y  w i t h  
E u ropeans  t h e n  F i j i a n s  were e n t i t l e d  to  a f i r s t  c l a i m .  (5 )  B r i t i s h  
r u l e  had been  u n d i s r u p t e d  b e c a u s e  o f  F i j i a n  r e l i a n c e  on B r i t i s h  
j u s t i c e  and f a i r n e s s .  (6 )  Government  was aware o f  F i j i a n  l o y a l t y  
as  d i s p l a y e d  d u r i n g  t h e  r e c e n t  war .  ( 7 )  R ecen t  I n d i a n  s t r i k e s  had 
shown t h e  ' d i s l o y a l  and m u t in o u s  s p i r i t s  / " s i c  /  o f  t h e  I n d i a n s ' .
( 8 )  F i j i a n s  would t h u s  r e s e n t  e q u a l  s t a t u s  f o r  I n d i a n s .  ( 9 ) ' I t  i s  
q u i t e  f a m i l i a r  to  u s  t h a t  t h e  m a j o r i t y  o f  I n d i a n s  i n  F i j i  a r e  f rom th e  
l o w e s t  c l a s s  o r  c a s t e  i n  I n d i a  and we, a s  n a t i v e s  o f  t h i s  c o u n t r y ,
19 C .S .O.  128 2 /2 2 .  H e l l i e t  t o  N i c o l a s ,  23 A p r i l  1922.  P .M .B .4 66 .
These rumours  be g a n  b e f o r e  t h e  a r r i v a l  o f  Ra ju  and h i s  c o l l e a g u e s  
e a r l y  i n  1922 and c o n t i n u e d  d u r i n g  t h e i r  v i s i t  which was w i d e ly  
r e p o r t e d  i n  t h e  p r e s s  and r e g a r d e d  w i th  a n x i e t y  and r e s e n t m e n t  
b o th  by E u rope ans  and F i j i ’a n s .  The F i j i  T i m e s , 6 and 8 March 
1922 c a r r i e d  a r t i c l e s  on ' F i j i a n  P r o t e s t ’ , d e s c r i b e d  as  
e x a g g e r a t e d  by t h e  A c t in g  D i s t r i c t  Commiss ioner  o f  Ba (C .S .O .  
1 2 7 4 / 2 2 ) .  The Ra ju  D e p u t a t i o n  was sup p o s ed  to  have been  t o l d  by 
some b u l i s  a t  Nadi  t h a t  F i j i a n s  were n o t  h o s t i l e  t o  I n d i a n s  and 
t h e  Ba a f f a i r  was i n s t i g a t e d  by E u r o p e a n s .  M inu te ,  F e l l ,
6 A p r i l  1922;  C .S .O .  1 282 /22 .
20 C .S .O.  1 2 8 2 /2 2 .
21 i b i d .  At t h i s  s t a g e  t h e r e  was a movement among E u ropeans  i n  
N o r t h - W e s te r n  V i t i  Levu t o  e n c o u ra g e  the  m i g r a t i o n  o f  Europeans  
t o  F i j i .
E p e l i  G a n i l a u  t o  C o l . S e c .  23 Feb .  1922;  C .S .O.  C13/22 .22
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would not like to see them on a higher social and political level than
we are in our native country.' (10) Fijians deprecated political
rights for Indians as they had no wish to be ruled by them. The
enfranchisement of Indians and equal status were thus interpreted as
political domination by them of the other races. V/hile this
conclusion was not wholly correct it was perhaps a justifiable
deduction from several factors. First was the anti-Indian campaign
of the European press, frequently cited in this study. Second was the
inability of the Government to enunciate clearly the nature of
political rights and equal status to be bestowed upon Indians. This
was partly a consequence of having to wait for instructions from the
Colonial Office which in turn was delayed by its consultation with
the Indian Government and the India Office. Third, the strikes of
1920 and 1921, the new Indian assertion in Fiji, reportage in Fiji of
nationalistic (and anti-British) fervour in India, all made Fijians
suspicious of Indian aspirations.
Anxiety on the franchise issue was not confined to chiefs alone.
At this stage there seemed some unrest and dissatisfaction among
Fijians; the Government blamed this on the recent Indian strikes and
political agitators sowing distrust of the colonial regime's Indian 
23policy. A commoner and former member of the Fiji Transport Corps,
and currently teacher at the Methodist Mission training school at
Davuilevu, wrote to the Government stressing the following:
(1) Fijians were upset on learning that Indians would be permitted
to elect their own representatives to the Legislative Council
but not the Fijians. He asked why this privilege could not also
be accorded the Fijians. (2) If Indians were granted the
franchise they would forge ahead politically while Fijians would appear
24humiliated in the eyes of all in their own country. The official
23 Rodwell to C.O.Conf. 25 May 1922. The despatch was the result 
of a communication from Rev.A.Small, Chairman of the Methodist 
Mission in Fiji to the Acting Governor (Fell), 14 March 1922.
With its network of native ministers and catechists the Methodist 
Church had a very good intelligence system on Fijian affairs.
Small blamed the unrest not merely on the Indian trouble but also 
on the existing system of Fijian administration; he concluded, 
'unrest and dissatisfaction widely prevail and the idle are more 
easily tempted to indulge in such vices as drinking and gambling.'
24 Mosese Buadromo to Col.Sec. 12 July 1923; C.S.O. 2765/23.
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25reply attempted to rationalize away the anomaly. Fijians lived on
a communal basis, it was argued, and circumstances affecting them were 
local rather than general. Moreover, Fijians were governed along 
their own traditional lines and under the prevailing system enjoyed 
'a very large measure of self-government'. For instance, in their 
district (tikina) councils every man had a voice; they were fully 
represented in their Provincial Councils; and in the Council of 
Chiefs all matters of general importance were considered first-hand 
by the Governor himself. Other communities did not possess these 
privileges. Fijians chose Legislative Councillors, through the 
Council of Chiefs, who aided Government in the affairs of the Colony. 
The voting system was 'strange to native ideal' and based on 
qualifications which could not be made to apply 'to native Fijians 
in the present state of development'. Not all Indians would be 
granted the franchise, only those who possessed certain educational, 
property and income qualifications. By contrast every Fijian had 
the right to exercise his voice through the various councils already 
mentioned. Thus enfranchising Indians only was not denigrating 
Fijians. Through the existing system the Fijian people, their chiefs 
and the Government were all linked; without it the interests of 
each would suffer. Hence it was 'better that Fijians should 
preserve what /~was / best in their traditions, and that they should 
not too hurriedly aspire to a different plane, which, although 
unsuitable to themselves, might yet be suitable to the people of 
other races'. The commentary continued that the Fiji Government's 
first responsibility was to look after the Fijians while the first 
duty of the elected members was the care of their constituents.
It was doubtful, the argument ran, whether Fijians could elect 
better representatives by direct voting than they obtained through the 
present system. Fijians should wait until electoral arrangements 
were completed for the Indians, then they might discover that what 
they presently sought was less advantageous than what they already 
enjoyed.
In the same file there are two other relevant minutes, one by 
D.R.Stewart, the Principal Assistant Colonial Secretary who had wide 
experience in Fijian matters, and the other by the Governor. Stewart
25 ibid.
referred to the discussion of the franchise at the 1920 Council of
Chiefs when his explanation had been accepted as satisfactory by the
Chiefs who 'did not, however, at the time realize that the grant of a
general franchise to Fijians might have a serious effect upon their
own positions'. Rodwell minuted:
The time is approaching when we might give the Fijians a wider 
say in the elections of representatives in the Council. The 
voting unit might be the district council. I have no doubt 
that oui"1 experience in inaugurating the new electoral system 
for the Indians will be a useful guide in considering later on 
the question of advanced electoral institutions for the Fijians.
If the Governor wished to go by the experience of the Indians,
then had he remained in Fiji after 1929 (he left by 1926) he would
have been as disappointed as his successors. The franchise brought
dissension within the Indian community and conflict with other groups.
But his intention of introducing the secret ballot in the district
councils came to nought. At the time these councils met monthly
and were presided over by the buli; their other members were,
turaga ni koros(official village headmen) of the districts, chiefs
of tribes and anyone summoned by the buli, whether officials below
him in the local native administration or ordinary village folk.
The Provincial Councils held annually (though they could be called
on special occasions) were presided over by the Secretary for Native
Affairs; other members were the Roko, Bulis of each district,
native magistrates, and medical practitioners, provincial scribe,
a representative from each district selected by the district council,
and no more than five chiefs nominated by the Provincial Commissioner
or the Roko of the province. And representatives from these,
chosen by officials, went with their Rokos and other government-
chosen chiefs and officials to form the Council of Chiefs. None of
these was chosen by direct election.
In fact the chiefs seemed themselves to show some democratic
tendency as far as their own Council was concerned. In 1926 they
resolved to reduce the size of the Council, as well as suggested that
26each provincial council itself select one of its representatives.
26 Proceedings, 1926. C.P.50/26. Resolution (relevant part) XXI.
'That the Council be composed of the Secretary for Native Affairs, 
the Rokos, Assistant Commissioners, and one representative from 
each Province selected by the Provincial Council (if the 
resolution regarding the re-constit.ution of Provincial Councils 
be approved) and such other persons as may be nominated by the 
Governor.'
+ Resolution XVIII of the 1926 Council requested that all
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The Council that met in 1928 had 44 members instead of the 75 of
previous years; it was more manageable and more representative without
a wholly official composition: 13 official members, 12 nominated by
27the Governor and 19 selected by Provincial Councils. There was no
wish to stop there for in 1933 the Chiefs resolved for future
Councils:
(a) that two representatives from each province should be 
selected by the Provincial Council;
(b) that one Native Magistrate only and one Native Medical 
Practitioner only should be nominated by the Secretary for 
Native Affairs;
(c) that the maximum number of Chiefs to be appointed by the 
Governor should be reduced from 12 to 6;
(d) that selected and nominated members should hold office for 
four years. 28
As the Secretary for Native Affairs stated in his Report for 1933,
29part (a) of the resolution was particularly significant. Yet despite
the willingness of the chiefs to be democratic, section (a) of their
30resolution was the only part that the Governor refused to sanction.
26 cont'd. persons entitled to attend the Provincial Councils 
should be permitted to vote, not merely those permitted by 
Native Regulation No.Ill of 1912, Section 7(l). The Governor 
agreed.
27 Hutson to C.0.369, 20 Dec. 1928; C.S.O. 3359/28. The Governor 
also claimed that the chiefs were quite satisfied with the new 
Council as it preserved its influence and status while at the 
same time giving it breadth of outlook and a voice to native 
opinion in the provinces.
28 Proceedings, 1933. Resolution 1. C.P.8/34.
29 C.P.17/34. The Provincial Council was perhaps the lynch-pin 
in the native administration. Besides those mentioned in the 
text above its annual meetings were attended by the Rokos and 
the Secretary for Native Affairs who presided. Again in the 
words of the Report (1937)- of the Secretary for Native Affairs:
’ /~it / dealt with ... finances, taxation, rates, annual 
estimates of revenue, and expenditure, the programme of 
work for the following year, education, health and lands. 
Resolutions passed by these councils are approved, or 
disallowed, by the Governor. These councils are a most 
important factor in the administration of native affairs 
and give a close contact between the natives and Government. 
Each Province is a separate unit, each with its own 
financial problems.'
30 Proceedings, 1936. Contains Action taken on the Resolutions 
of 1933. C.P.36/36.
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No explanation was provided. Nor were the hopes of Rodwell to
introduce direct voting at district council level realized; neither
he nor any of his successors took steps to experiment. Some thirty-
three years after Rodwell's minute, when 11 out of 14 Provinces had'
sanctioned the secret ballot in their tikina councils, the Acting
Secretary of Fijian Affairs claimed the procedure was not generally
understood and expressed indignation with the Secretary of State in
London for imposing it, accusing him of 'dictating a western political
system to groups of people of whom few are yet ready to assimilate
and I wish he would leave experienced administrators to conduct
administrative affairs without extruding his undesirable influence 
31over them'. Such arrogance and paternalism in officials created
a great hindrance to Fijian political development. The question 
that the British failed to answer was at what stage in his history 
was the Fijian going to be ready for democratic institutions - the 
professed ultimate goal of colonial rule. Of course, officials in 
Fiji in 1920 (and in 1953 no less), laboured under the delusion that 
time was at their disposal, and that training in democracy could be 
at leisure.
The Governor had already crushed any Fijian expectations for the
franchise at the Council of Chiefs meeting of 1923:
The prospect of elective representation for the Indian 
community has given rise to various inquiries as to the 
prospect of a similar privilege being granted to the Fijians.
The mere fact of the Indians receiving a communal franchise 
is not sufficient argument for according it to the Fijians, 
whose social system is entirely different, whose interests 
are protected by an administrative machinery more elaborate 
than any yet applied to the Indians, and to whom, through 
their Rokos, Chiefs and Councils, the Government is readier 
of access. When the time is ripe, and when it has been 
possible to judge -by experience the success of the Indian 
franchise, I have no doubt that the Legislative Council 
and the Secretary of State will be prepared to consider 
the case of the Fijians, but in my opinion the moment has 
not yet arrived. 32
On his audience these words had a strange effect. While
selecting the six from whom the Governor would choose two as their
representatives the Chiefs stated:
This Council desires, however, to represent in a humble and 
loyal spirit that it considers that such membership is of
31 Minute, Acting Secretary for Fijian Affairs, G.K.Roth, 30 July 
1953; C.S.O. F9/69.
32 Proceedings, 1923. C.P.52/23.
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little use to the Fijians, and that this Council considers that 
there are other ways more conducive to the prosperity of us native 
Fijians. 33
Both the Governor's remarks and the Fijian response were unfortunate.
Neither was conducive to a healthy political advancement of the Colony.
Government attitude appears particularly short-sighted when an
examination of the Legislative Council debates reveals the birth of
serious and increased Fijian participation there. And the new
involvement accelerated with the years, obtaining greater force,
direction, and positiveness following the appointment in November 1932
of Ratu J.L.V.Sukuna who quickly emerged there as the leading light
both in the formulation and the expression of Fijian views. But in
the twenties it was Pope Seniloli who was the first to decide that
greater Fijian contribution was essential. His speeches were
certainly not lengthy; they were extremely short by comparison with
the others, but his brevity contained relevance and precision; the
34conciseness totally conveyed the Fijian viewpoint. Nor was the
Governor oblivious of this new vitality: 'I may say that the
greater the part taken in debate by native members the better I am 
pleased, and I have noted with gratification an increasing readiness
35on the part of the native members to take part in discussions.'
After the Council of Chiefs' discussion had revealed the
dissatisfaction there with the existing arrangements for native
administration, Pope Seniloli and Jor.i Rabici brought their case to
the Legislative Council in a motion which called for the appointment
of a specially qualified officer at the headquarters to give his
36undivided attention to Fijian affairs. Seniloli's motion was
accepted and the Secretary for Native Affairs was re-appointed to 
concentrate fully on Fijian matters.
33 ibid.
34 For example, L.C.Debates 1921:183 (on Distribution of Native 
Rents Bill); L.C.Debates 1922:37 (British Peasant Settlement 
Scheme) and p.67 (Tailevu Dairy Scheme); L.C.Debates 1923:90 
(Residential Tax Bill) , this also displayed considerable 
firmness; on the same subject he stated 'the lav/ provides for 
the Fijian boy to pay the tax from sixteen, and I think it should 
apply to every race.' (p.93.)
35 Proceedings, 1923. C.P.50/23.
36 L.C.Debates 1923:156-157 for speeches of Seniloli and Rabici; 
156-162 for the whole debate. Rabici spoke through an 
interpreter.
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INITIATIVE in political matters appeared to be the prerogative of the 
chiefs. They were the voice of their people in all communication 
between the colonial regime and the Fijians. What needs 
explanation is the ready acceptance by the indigenous people of this 
system.
The presence of other races deterred disunity among Fijians.
They had had experience of European settlers disrupting their way of 
life and seeking their land, their most valued possession until 
British rule had intervened. After Cession they had witnessed 
European clamour for land and labour, without consideration of 
Fijian sentiment. Again the presence of British rule had saved them. 
Recently Indians had twice gone on strike, while now they sought 
equality and political rights, all which seemed to portray a desire 
for control of Fiji. British rule and the chiefs were an effective 
barrier to Fijian subjugation by Indians. Hence the Fijian people 
found no incentive to join others. Besides they were themselves 
linked in various kinship ties, through marriage, through religion, 
through vasu (nephew uncle relationship), through their tribe or 
yavusa (descent from a common ancestor) and the mataqali (land­
owning unit). Their chiefs wrere similarly related. And. this 
solidarity was not to be breached for the sake of a widespread
alliance with non-Fijians whose ways would destroy the fabric of 
37their own society.
Secondly Fijian political development was arrested after the
O
extension of British hegemony. L Hence to understand Fijian
political behaviour, one needs to examine traditional Fijian
39political attitudes ad relationships.
37 Geddes 19148:103-117, discusses how various ties reinforced each 
other to create group solidarity. It is not intended to imply 
that Fijian society was a monolith. Indigenous Fijian life was 
characterized by cultural diversity, social and political 
conflicts between tribes, clans and kinsmen, but pax britannica 
made these futile and instead imposed conformity to the Bauan 
model.
38 Sukuna as Secretary for Fijian Affairs wrote in his Report of
1 9U8 (C.P.27/I49): 'With Cession native political development
ceased. Fijians did not again come into active politics until 
the Constitution was revised, in 1905; but it was politics of 
a very different kind.'
39 What follows is based on a memorandum on Native Politics by J.L. 
V.Sukuna in 1922 (C.S.O.221/22). Quotations and references are 
from this work unless otherwise stated. After Sukuna became 
Secretary for Fijian Affairs in 19ll5 some of his annual reports 
carried lively historical comments on Fijian society (e.g.C.P.27/ 
k9, C.P.5/52)* Fijian political organization is also discussed 
in Roth 1937; Geddes I9I48.
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I t  i s  e s s e n t i a l  t o  r e c o g n i z e  w i t h  Sukuna t h a t  ' F i j i a n  s o c i e t y  
i s  p a t r i a r c h a l  i n  type  and i s  b a s e d  n o t  on c o n t r a c t  and f reedom  b u t  
on c o n s a n g u i n j t y  and s t a t u s ' . ^  The power o f  t h e  f a m i l y  head ' e v e r  
h i s  d e p e n d e n t s  and o v e r  t h e  c h a t t e l s  o f  t h e  f a m i l y  was p r a c t i c a l l y  
u n l i m i t e d  f~and /  p o l i t i c a l l y  he m ig h t  be r e g a r d e d  as  t h e  u n i t  o f  
government  and l e g a l l y  as  t h e  p r o p r i e t a r y  u n i t ' .  I n  p r a c t i c e  he was
t h e  t r u s t e e  o f  t h e  f a m i l y .  The he a ds  o f  v a r i o u s  f a m i l i e s  c o n s t i t u t e d  
a  c o u n c i l  whose command was law.  T o g e t h e r  t h e y  c o n t r o l l e d  e v e r y  f a c e t  
o f  l i f e ,  p l a n t i n g ,  f i s h i n g ,  r o u t i n e  o c c u p a t i o n s ,  r e c r e a t i o n ,  
h o u s e b u i l d i n g ,  r a i d s  on o t h e r  t r i b e s ,  m a r r i a g e  and b u r i a l .  A l l  
a c i t i v i t y ,  s o c i a l ,  economic and p o l i t i c a l  was d i r e c t e d  by th e  c l a n ,  
and o r d e r s  were i s s u e d  th ro u g h  e l d e r s  n o t  to  i n d i v i d u a l s  b u t  to  
f a m i l y  u n i t s .  The head  o f  t h e  l e a d i n g  f a m i l y  was t h e  c h i e f  o f  the  
c l a n  and when c l a n s  formed t r i b e s  t h e  p a t r i a r c h  o f  t h e  f i r s t  f a m i l y  
i n  t h e  most  s e n i o r  c l a n  became th e  c h i e f t a i n .  Remembering t h e r e
were v a r i a t i o n s ,  i t  m igh t  be s t a t e d  g e n e r a l l y  t h a t  power was c e n t r e d  
i n  t h e  p e r s o n  o f  t h e  c h i e f ,  whose c l a i m s  to  t h e  p o s i t i o n  were 
h e r e d i t a r y  and by c e r e m o n i a l  r e c o g n i t i o n  such  as  i n s t a l l a t i o n .  The
h2
p e r s o n  o f  t h e  c h i e f  was s u r r o u n d e d  by t a b o o s  and r e s p e c t  f rom o t h e r s .
I n  t h e s e  c i r c u m s t a n c e s  t h e  i n d i v i d u a l  b e l i e v e d  t h a t  ' n o t  o n l y  h i s  
s e r v i c e s  b u t  h i s  l i f e  b e l o n g e d  t o  t h e  f a m i l y  and u l t i m a t e l y  t o  t h e  
t r i b e  o f  which  he was a p a r t ;  and so he d e v o te d  h i m s e l f  t o  t h e  w i l l  
and to  t h e  commands o f  t h e  e l d e r s  w i t h o u t  so much as  a t h o u g h t  f o r  
a b s t r a c t  r i g h t s ' .  U n q u e s t i o n i n g  s u b m i s s i o n  r e s u l t e d  b e c a u s e  ' e a c h  
member o f  t h e  s o c i a l  g roup  had s e c u r e d  t o  him by th e  s o c i a l  s t r u c t u r e  
t h e  b a s i s  o f  h i s  l i f e - e c o n o m y ' .  S in c e  t h e  ' l a w  o f  t h e  p r e s e r v a t i o n  
o f  t h e  t r i b e  a s s u r e d  him a l s o  a  d e f i n i t e  s h a r e  i n  t h e  l i f e  and 
w e l l - b e i n g  o f  t h e  g r o u p '  t h e  i n d i v i d u a l  i n  h i s  s e c u r i t y  was n o t  
i n c l i n e d  tow ards  a  l i f e  t e n d i n g  to  ' s e l f - r e g a r d i n g  q u a l i t i e s  i n  the  
com m u n i ty ' .  Such,  a c c o r d i n g  to  Sukuna ,was  t h e  s i t u a t i o n  b e f o r e  
C e s s i o n ,  and t h i s  t h e  B r i t i s h  d i d  n o t  a l t e r .
Sukuna 1950 i n  C . P . 5 / 5 2 .
1|1 Geddes 1948 :121 .  Rank i n  F i j i  was a lways h e r e d i t a r y  and bes tow ed  
a c c o r d i n g  to  t h r e e  p r i n c i p l e s :  c o n s a n g u i n i t y ,  o r d e r  o f  b i r t h ,
male  s e x .  Roth 193 7 :1 3 2 .  In  t r a n s m i s s i o n  o f  o f f i c e  s u c c e s s i o n  
was d e t e r m i n e d  by s e n i o r i t y  and e l e c t i o n .
U2 Roth 193 7 :1 6 3 -1 6 4 .
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In the states that emerged, he continued, the good Fijian was the 
one ’who served his tribe without question, who gave obedience to 
authority, and who submitted to the will of his chief as the 
personification of the ’state'.' This concept was adapted and 
adopted by the colonial rulers in the native regulations where 
certain communal obligations to chiefs were recognized. Thus ’all 
power, control and initiative’ were vested in the chiefs particularly 
in those states like Rewa, Cakaudrove and Bau which had extended their 
might by conquest. The chief was the earthly embodiment of the 
state which in turn was an absolute power, in terms of its 
relationship with its subjects. Within this environment ’loyalty 
and respect for authority constituted the living forces in the 
organism of the ’state’ in its more developed form, as the ties of 
blood had been in the early stages'. Further the individual was 
not a unit of society. From his own discourse, Sukuna concluded 
on the issue of equality:
All are agreed that this step, with certain restrictions 
against the excessive individualism of today and all that 
it implies, is the ultimate goal. But we cannot agree that 
that time has yet arrived ... the native mind is still as 
dependent, still as undeveloped, as his form of society 
indicates. Indeed a change so fundamental as the change 
of values and the substitution of a teleological end for 
one of blind service to the ’State’ can only be achieved 
gradually through education and this step will be really 
only begun when the new teaching has first permeated the 
whole people. For these reasons it is to be regretted 
that an education system was not sooner started by the 
Government amongst the natives.
Not only did the colonial Government fail to educate Fijians 
politically, it terminated political growth. Politics was one 
aspect of life that the colonial regime wished to keep out of reach 
of its subjects, acute addiction to paternalism permitting it the 
rationalization chat the subject race was not ready to tackle it. 
Indeed in the Fijian political system the Fijian people were 
subservient to the chiefs but the chiefs owed reciprocal obligations: 
protection and assistance in times of need. British rule made chiefs 
paid servants of the Crown and largely dependent upon it, and it 
buttressed their position. Colonialism superimposed its own 
autocracy (personified by the Governor) and authoritarianism 
(symbolized by the fiat of a hierarchy of alien officials) upon the 
traditional ones that it encountered. Fijians were henceforth to
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obey two laws, their own enshrined in the native regulations and the 
general one, encompassing the whole Colony. Actually their position 
was worse, they were expected to adhere to certain rules from v/hich 
the rest of the community was exempt. Stagnation, not development, 
resulted. Where they attempted to break out of their shackles the 
fetters gripped even more tenaciously; they were forbidden to discuss 
politics in their own councils; when for instance in Ba, they sought 
to discuss the current topic of Indian franchise at the behest of a 
European official, the Government in Suva retorted with condemnation. 
Initiative was stifled unless it emanated from the rulers and its 
favourites - the case of Apolosi Nawai, in the next section, will 
illustrate this type of action. Under these circumstances the 
Fijians generally possessed no other alternative but to accept 
chiefly rule and its dicta; and it was averse to their enfranchisement 
after 1923. To such a degree did the old order prevail that in 1939 
Sir Harry Luke could still write that 'their f  Fijians' ~J outlook^ 
in matters of government is essentially monarchical and feudal'.
The Methodist arid Catholic Missions reinforced the intentions of 
the colonial regime. While both had their differences periodically 
with the Government, these were not insurmountable, and British 
colonialism found Christianity an invaluable ally in its major aims. 
Both worked through the chiefs, both professed a desire to transform 
Fijian communalism to individualism. Neither had a definite plan 
as to how this would be achieved. Both favoured gradual change 
permitting time to take its course.- The religious institutions which 
monopolized education had control over the development of the Fijian 
mind, and they too preached unswerving obedience and unquestioning
1*3 Luke to C.O.Conf. 30 Oct. 1939.
ijli France 1 969:31 . 'The methods adopted by missionaries called 
to the task of converting Fijians involved supporting the 
stratified system of privilege and authority and securing a 
a position for the church in the highest stratum.'
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loyalty to British rule and the Kingdom of God in Fiji. Both
Catholicism and Methodism in their evangelizing crusade adopted the 
strategy of attempting to convert the chief initially, on the assumption 
that his retinue would follow. Despite their criticism of native 
administration and native regulations, and of individual chiefs, they 
had no intention of undermining the hierarchical structure of Fijian 
society or seeking the destruction of the traditional aristocracy, 
except where it suited their own ends.
That Fijians made no concerted attempt to reject these 
constraints owed a great deal to their economic condition. The 
debate on Fijian economic development centred around communalism 
versus individualism. At the various stages of British rule the 
policy makers stated that Fijians move away from their old ways 
towards individualism.^ Their real difficulty lay in being 
unable to deduce at what stage communalism should be phased out and 
how slowly individualism should be introduced. The dilemma may 
be best summed in the words of Governor Rodwell who had to solve 
this gargantuan problem.
Until the Fijian conceives an ambition to improve his status 
and environment, and to accumulate wealth for this purpose 
by means of agricultural and other industries, the development 
of individualistic tendencies is bound to be slow. It would 
be dangerous, even if it were practicable, to force such 
tendencies, by artificial means, although it may be possible 
to eliminate obstacles to the development of them. JLj.7
In the process of instilling individualism, chiefly power, village
structure, land tenure, would all have been affected. Radical
change would have resulted and the most revolutionary of these
would have been required in the thinking process and the value
system of the Fijian people. The colonial regime appeared reluctant
to resort to such drastic transformation. This is not to imply
I|-5 Amos to Small, 24 July 1915* M.M.P. Though the Queen Victoria 
School begun in 1907, was run not by any of the Churches the 
Government, in its selection of teachers ensured these would not 
undermine Christianity. In Fiji, as in other colonies, 
Christianity was accepted as an essential weapon in its 
'civilising mission' by the European colonial power.
U6 C.S.O. 4625/11, 221/22, F9/6, F23/7Pt3, F2/148, F22/3, F50/32.
U7 Rodwell to C.O.Conf. 27 June 1922.
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that there was no change. In fact, the Fijian people themselves 
were willing to see modification as evidenced by the resolutions of 
their provincial councils, reports of officials in the districts, and 
the emergence of individual (galala) Fijian farmers operating 
independently (so far as possible) of the Fijian social structure, 
migration of labourers away from v i l l a g e s . L i k e  their rulers the 
Fijians too were confronted with an extremely perplexing choice: how
much of their culture must they sacrifice in order to come to terms 
with a western economic system; in order to obtain material 
prosperity what aspects of their ancestral ways must they abandon.
No clear solution was available. They too were prepared to let time 
take its slow toll and adapt themselves to each situation, 
relinquishing custom where inevitable and imperative, or wedding 
tradition to economic exigencies when possible.^
What is important is that even by the end of our period of study 
ninety per cent of the Fijians still lived in villages observing
Sotheir tribal customs and pursuing subsistence agriculture. Thus
they remained outside the cash economy of their country while the 
Indians were rapidly moving into it. Their education remained 
very rudimentary, those who obtained it were absorbed into the 
administration or into ecclesiastical duties as catechists or 
teachers and preachers; essentially they became men dedicated to 
the perpetuation of the status quo or to gradual modification. No 
entrepreneurs appeared, no dynamic middle class was in the making.
The old order still held sway. And it was not conducive at this 
stage to political development towards democracy. Therefore there 
was no widespread clamour for reform, when clamour came it was
1|8 Provincial Council Books (with Resolutions) Ba-Yasawa 1892-1902: 
Nadroga 1892-1911. Provincial Council Resolutions: Ra 1933,
1935, 1937 (C.S.O. F9/2Pt1); Nadi 1932 and 1935 (C.S.O. F9/5Pt1); 
Namosi 1 936 and 1 937 (C.S.O. F9/3). Reports in C.S.O. F1l/l , 
9/17, 9/l Pt1, F9/6. Stockdale 1938:12-14.
Il9 Once Ratu Sukuna assumed the role of prophet and saviour he 
prescribed the preservation of Eijian culture and planned 
economic development within the context of the existing social 
structure. But it must also be noted that until 1919 the 
Fijian population was on the decline and some even forecast the 
extinction of the race. Thus for almost two decades of this 
century the Fijian had to concern himself first and foremost 
with sheer survival.
SO Stockdale 1938:12.
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rare and isolated. The examples, Apolosi Nawai and the Viti Cauravou 
deserve some examination.
APOLOSI NAWAI, a carpenter by trade, appeared suddenly upon the Fijian 
political stage late in 1913 when officials began reporting on 
activity to form a Fijian commercial company along co-operative lines. 
Early in 1914 the Viti Company, with five Europeans as directors was52formed, but Apolosi's connection with it was short-lived. By
February 1915 he had dissociated himself from the Viti Company 
although he continued to collect money with the intention of 
establishing a fully Fijian company, the Fiji Produce Agency as it 
came to be called. But that year he was sentenced to eighteen
months' imprisonment for resisting the police. After being 
discharged in 1916 he set about attempting to fulfil his ambition 
until he was deported in November 1917 to Rotuma for seven years for 
sedition. He was freed in 1924 until 1930 when he was once more 
sent to Rotuma, for similar reasons; this time for ten years. In 
1940 he was temporarily released but subsequently exiled to 
New Zealand as a precautionary measure during the War at the end of 
which he returned to Fiji and further imprisonment until his death in531946 at the age of about 67 years.'
Basically Apolosi's aim was to enable Fijians to enter commerce 
from which they were conspicuously absent and thus cut off from the 
profits that v/ere available. His company intended to buy all Fijian 
produce (particularly bananas) for export, and import goods from 
abroad via a wholesale monopoly which would distribute its5Umerchandise to Fijian retail shops. The whole effort was to be
on a co-operative basis among Fijians with the design to eliminate 
Indian and European entrepreneurs who controlled all commerce and55at whose mercy the Fijians found themselves. European banana
51
51 Enel. Hutson to C.O.Conf. 30 Dec. 1915; C.0.83/128.
52 Hutson to C.0.365, 7 Sept. 1915* Small to Burton, 17 Mar.
1915. M.M.P. C.S.O. 9137/14, 3357/15.
53 Secretariat of Fijian Affairs Papers. (Unnumbered in the National 
Archives of Fiji.)
5k C.S.O. 86/15. FVT. 30 March 1915. C.S.O. 2340/l9- 
55 C.S.O. 382/14, 3571/14, 9384/14, 3760/14. FVT. 5 Feb. 1914.
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and copra purchasers, and Indian and Chinese small shopkeepers, would 
have been severely affected. In outlook Apolosi's plans displayed 
intense economic nationalism inspired by the total Fijian absence from 
the cash economy.
To achieve his goals Apolosi and his agents set about collecting
funds from their countrymen. Judging from official and press reports
dkand missionary accounts, the attempts proved an immediate success.''
But inadequate knowledge of financial practices and business 
organization, a lack of co-ordination without strict control from a 
central authority, quickly ushered in mismanagement, thence 
embezzlement, and finally the whole venture was discredited. A 
noble plan soon became a gigantic fraud. Initially there was 
widespread support for the scheme from Fijians generally as well as 
from some of the lesser officials such as bulis and scribes and from 
some Fijian missionary teachers, who, despite risks and threats of 
loss of office, contributed to Apolosi's coffers and attended his57meetings. The patronage of these groups was useful numerically,
but no more; they did not possess the business acumen sorely 
needed to establish the company on a durable foundation and set it 
on the path of profit. Further, mass support for Apolosi 
frightened the establishment. The Fijian chiefs, the Christian 
missions, the European merchants and planters, all of whom found in 
Apolosi a menace to their social, economic or political standing,58pressured the Government to stem the movement.
Apolosi's extension of his propaganda into extra-commercial 
affairs worked to his disadvantage and contravened the laws of the 
colonial regime. In his attempts to arouse the Fijian people he 
prophesied the end of native taxes and chiefly rule, the expulsion of 
Europeans and Indians from Fiji and the overthrow of British rule.^
He advocated the control of chiefs by village councils and unity of 
Fijians in a single church. He forbade the payment of contributions
56 C.S.O. 9/l4, 6755/14, 10287/14, 1031 3/14, 1858/1 5- Small to 
Amos, 18 Jan. 1915* M.M.P.; Amos to Small, 16 Feb. 1915* M.M.P. 
F.T. 17 March 1914.
57 C.S.O. 1975/14, 9/14, 285/15.
58 Hutson to C.O.Conf. 22 Mar. 1916 and Enclosures; C.0.83/130. 
E n d . Sweet-Escott to C.0.110, 19 April 1917; C.0.83/136. 
Council of Chiefs Proceedings, 1917. Sweet-Escott to C.0.210, 
11 July 1917; C.0.83/139.
59 C.S.O. 3571/14, 3370/14.
60 Helliet, Delailagi, 21 Mar. 1925. P.M.B.457.
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to the church, and in some cases he even confiscated these for his own
61scheme. As a commoner he needed to justify his own claims and
demonstrate their legitimacy beyond doubt and against challenge. 
Therefore he drew upon Fijian mythology and proclaimed his descent 
as being from the gods who had invested him with power to alleviate 
the lowly position of his compatriots. Political overtones 
coupled with financial corruption in his scheme, plus his denunciation
iby the Council of Chiefs in 1917, necessitated government intervention. 
Thus in 1917 the first phase of Apolosi Nawai's career ended with 
deportation to Rotuma,
During Apolosi’s incarceration in Rotuma his disciples 
continued to maintain support for his ideas, especially the socio-
63religious aspects of them. But his influence declined quickly.
On his return to Fiji, Apolosi, though he had not relinquished his 
economic ambitions, found that his former appeal had shrunk to a 
coterie that followed him on his travels and he was no longer 
welcome in every village.^ He concentrated more on his
religious and political motives which with frequent sexual 
indiscretions, led to disruption and conflict with the authorities 
till his second deportation to Rotuma in 1930.
That Apolosi (in the 1913-1917 period especially) had 
considerable appeal was indicative of Fijian dissatisfaction with the 
status quo and a desire for improvement such as promised by him.
Some of his most ardent followers had been former officials 
dismissed from the service and others who found the prevailing 
system stultifying. The establishment of British rule and the 
demands it generated, above all, the need to come to terms with a 
world wherein western economic values alone spelled material gain, 
spawned new needs within Fijian society. These remained largely 
unsatisfied because of the policy -of preserving the traditional 
social structure without a definite programme to create and
C.S.O. 9/24. Small to Amos, 1 March 1915* M.M.P.; Amos to 
Small, 26 March 1915- M.M.P.
62 Proceedings, 1917. C.S.O. 3304/17, Sweet-Escott to C.O. Conf.
7 Dec. 1917 and 24 April 1918.
63 Enel. Rodwell to C.O.Conf. 1 April 1923.
6)4 Report of Acting Secretary for Native Affairs on the Activities of 
Apolosi Nawai; C.S.O. C2/30.
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accommodate changes essential for adjustment and development. With
gradualism and stagnation as the chief characteristics of the British
administration, an appeal for the utopia promised by Apolosi still
existed as it had earlier for the Tuka and Luveniwai, although the
Adappeal of these had not been as universal.  ^ Despite this
attraction Apolosi failed, for two reasons. The forces ranged
against him were too powerful for him. Second, he was unable to
create a mass movement willing to follow him to the end against his
enemies: the officials, missionaries and chiefs. The grip of
communalism and the traditional hierarchy was too firm to be
sufficiently loosened by a sudden onslaught.
Politically Apolosi's movement was purely disruptive. Beyond
advocating the removal of the chiefs, he had offered no alternatives.
He made no call for Fijian political representation either in the
Municipal Council or Legislative Council or in the Council of Chiefs.
Later, he sought to be made Tui Nadi after the death of the
incumbent, as much for his own personal aggrandisement as perhaps for
the political advancement of his people through his position.
Because of the scandals, sexual and financial, surrounding Apolosi,
his emergence as a leader had a detrimental rather than a
beneficial effect for the Fijians. His .misdemeanour enhanced the
official and conservative view, that the Fijian was not yet ready to66be freed from ihe political tutelage of his chiefs.
THE Viti Cauravou (Young Fijian Society) was in its objects 
considerably different from the movement unleashed by Apolosi Nawai. 
Yet both were motivated by the desire to improve the circumstances 
of the Fijians in their own land. In their origins there v/as one 
similarity. Viti Cauravou had originated in Davuilevu where Apolosi 
had been educated and there is no 'doubt that had he fulfilled certain 
requirements he could very well have become a member of this society.
6^ Worsley 1970:29-38.
66 Memorandum, J.L.V.Sukuna; C.S.O. 2286/17; Fell to C.O.Conf. 
23 Dec. 1921.
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The Viti Cauravou grew out of a society founded in 1922 by
R.A.Derrick, Headmaster of the Methodist Mission Technical School at
67Davuilevu. His purpose was twofold: to enable old boys of his
school to keep in touch with each other in adult life, and to extend 
membership to old boys and assistant teachers of the Queen Victoria 68
School, thereby forming 'a mutual improvement and debating society'.
As these former students returned home they formed branches in their 
various districts. Some of the better-educated and more perceptive 
Fijian commoners such as Mosese Buadromo (mentioned earlier) and 
Joeli Ravai (who had spent three years at Wanganui College, New Zealand, 
and some years later became the first commoner to be appointed a 
Fijian member in the Legislatiye Council) quickly seized on this 
initiative to implement their own ideals.
By 1923 the organization was open to all Fijian young men who 
possessed the necessary educational qualifications; produced evidence 
of good character; were members of some church, irrespective of 
sect; were engaged in useful work or occupation and operated a
69savings bank account. Obviously it was an attempt to teach by
example and its President, Mosese Buadromo, stated:
It is not the intention of the Young Fijian Society to' 
be enemies of the Government or Church, or any other body, 
or to deceive our countrymen and reap benefit for ourselves 
only. We wish to co-operate with both Government and the 
Church so as to enable every man and this country to be 
improved which is also the esteemed desire of the Government. 70
The objects of the society were defined as: (l) to provide good
fellowship among young Fijians; (2) to provide means of studying
and discussing problems affecting Fijians and their development;
(3) to provide facilities for improving the minds of members by
discussions, lectures, etc.; (4) to provide occasions for members
and their families to meet socially; (5) to engage in loyal
exercises on such occasions as Empire and Cession Days; (6) to
stimulate in an organized way efforts of members to undertake
productive work, especially agriculture and to encourage the Fijian
67 Seymour to C.0.216, 2 Aug.1933.
68 ibid.
69 Statement on Viti Cauravou supplied by its Council 1926 in 
C.S.O. C19/26. The following information on the aims of the 
Society are from the same source.
70 Buadromo to Col.Sec. 12 July 1926. ibid.
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people to utilize their land and (?) to provide means whereby Fijians
enaged in various branches of useful work may meet and talk together,
and compare notes to discuss difficulties. It gave the undertaking:
It is expressly agreed that the society will not engage, as 
an organizer, in commercial enterprises; but on the other hand, 
it is expected that all members will engage in some useful work 
as Government servants, mission teachers or workers, or in some 
commercial or agricultural undertaking of their own.
No doubt such abnegation was a precautionary device after the
commercial mismanagement of Apolosi Nawai.
Though after 1926 the annual conference of the society was
addressed by the Secretary for Native Affairs, it did not meet with
unanimous approval and encouragement. The Government made it clear
that it ought not to become a political organization; politics was
71equated with sedition by the colonial regime in Fiji. Politics in
the colonial situation implied a change of the status quo in its 
various aspects and hence was anathema to the conservatism that 
guided the ruling caste in Fiji. Both European officials and chiefs
were wary of the organization, particularly when it began to voice
72criticisms of the traditional social order. A more liberal
attitude was adopted by the Secretary for Native Affairs, Islay McOwan, 
who argued that while potentialities for both good and evil existed 
in the Viti Cauravou, opposition might antagonize the better elements 
who could guide it along proper channels.'^  Contrary to 
expectations the society did not wane and disappear, rather it 
engaged in some positive work such as employing Fijians as
71*carpenters in the Nadi district to erect homes for its members.
Through its efforts the society was able to persuade the Government 
to employ Fijians in the Agriculture Department in order to instruct 
them in preparing bananas for package for export. And the
Governor gave a piece of Crown land as a site for a proposed 
boarding house in Suva; where possible,candidates recommended by it
71 For instance, the Government granted recognition to the Indian 
Reform League on condition that its aims and objects remain 
social and phiianthropical and not political. (Minute, Acting 
Colonial Secretary, 20 May 1926; C.S.O. C19/26.)
72 ibid.
73 Minute, 16 July 1926; ibid.
7l* C.S.O. 900/28, 869/29.
75 C.S.O. C27/27.
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were accepted into the Queen Victoria School. All, however, was
not plain sailing as the following report from the District 
Commissioner, Savusavu indicates:
This society is active, and may or may not have high ideals. 
However, like many such schemes amongst a native people the 
'tag-end* - of the population get the wrong ideas - or are 
allowed to. I understand that one of the principles of 
the society is that men with land and nuts, should cultivate 
and cut copra themselves instead of leaving their land and 
units to Chinamen or Indians whilst they go out to work. 
Planters assure me that many landless men whom they have 
tried to indenture refuse and say that the Viti Cauravou 
forbids it and in consequence labour already scarce, is 
becoming everyday more impossible to secure.
I am informed by some of the more educated members of 
the society that this is not the intention and there is no 
such prohibition on men.indenturing who have no land. 77
Despite the misunderstanding between the ideals of leaders and the
practices of their disciples the Society, undeterred, pressed for a
better deal for the Fijians.
While its members collectively eschewed political involvement 
they did not refrain from comment, on political issues of the day 
through resolutions passed at their annual conference and submitted 
for Government perusal and action. And its resolutions indicate 
incipient Fijian nationalism, though confined to an elite, 
numerically a minority, in the society. They were not chiefs, nor 
did they constitute the masses, but they were educated men and can 
correctly be described as able men possessing rational judgement; 
their opinion was educated opinion. It was an expression of those 
who understood their society, v/ere in touch with it, and could be
regarded as representative of their class. Though they commented 
on land and other matters such as the purity of the Fijian race,
76 ibid.
77 Report of Quarter ending 31 March 1927; C.S.O. 1983/27.
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what is most relevant here is their stand on political representation. 
The society was dissatisfied with the system of Fijian
79administration and sought to obtain some voice, in its conduct. It
was requested in 1931 that the Government Vgive the Fijian the right to
elect directly their three representatives to the Legislative 
80Council. In reply the Government said that the nomination system
was the one 'most in accord with the native social system and most
likely to secure experienced and well-tried representation of the
81natives in the Legislative Council*. Moreover, the Council of
Chiefs was the most competent body to participate in this responsible 
task. Rebuffed here, the Viti Cauravou the following year requested 
that two members of their society should be regularly appointed 
to the Council of Chiefs. Again they received a negative answer; 
the Governor contended that the method of representation through the 
Provincial Council ensured that all sections of the Fijian community 
were granted adequate representation on that body.
78
78 In 1931 they resolved: 'Our hearts cry out at the great injustice
that v/as done by the sale of our lands by our ancestors, for guns. 
Since the guns have been returned why do not the lands revert to 
us?' If it was no longer possible to return the lands to the 
rightful owners, then rents ought to be paid for them. C.S.O.
CF 62/3. In 1930 they had been even stronger: 'that before Fiji 
is allowed to manage its own Church affairs all churches and the 
sites on which they stand, together with all mission lands be 
controlled by us Fijians and that the Mission have nothing 
whatever to do with it.' Further the society was against 
payment of compensation for improvements to land on the expiry 
of leases because it was exhausted and unfertile when it was 
returned The society was especially concerned about the purity 
of the Fijian race asking for legislation because 'there is no 
law to protect from non-natives the mothers of our race'.
Therefore it sought the restriction of Chinese and Indian 
migration into Fiji lest their influx led to the extinction of 
the Fijian race. (ibid). It stated that it had made a request 
in 1930 for legislation to forbid marriages between Fijian 
women and non-Fijians; it was undesirable to have a mixed race 
and to ensure this it would encourage Fijian women to join the 
society in order to educate them on the subject. 1932 Resolution, 
C.S.O. CF50/6; C.S.O. 771/29.
79 In 1931 it informed the Government that certain persons because 
of their past conduct ought not to be given official positions.
In reply the Government said this referred to bulis, who were 
very carefully chosen and 'the present system has been 
productive of excellent results'. C.S.O. CF62/3.
80 C.S.O. CF62/3.
81 ibid.
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Beyond n o tin g  re q u e s ts  o f th e  Government th e re  was n o t much
th a t  t h i s  s o c ie ty  o f educated  F i j ia n s  could ach iev e . I t s  b ranches
continued  and i t  met an n u ally  in  conference bu t was unable  to  o b ta in
w idespread su p p o rt. A dm ittedly i t  was e l i t i s t  and th e re fo re
r e s t r i c t i v e  in  membership, b u t th e re  i s  no in d ic a t io n  th a t  d u rin g  th e
t h i r t i e s  i t  re ce iv ed  overwhelming support from even th e  educated
elem en ts . One reason  i s  th a t  th e  le a d e rs  of t h i s  o rg a n iz a tio n ,
which was ’th e  a r t i c u l a t e  ex p ress io n  o f / " a  7 vague groping of th e
/  F i j ia n  7 younger g e n e ra tio n  tow ards a new s o c ia l  system ’ , f a i l e d
to  comprehend th a t  n o t a l l  in  t h e i r  s o c ie ty  shared  t h e i r  nob le  id e a l s
and some m erely jo in e d  fo r  nebulous id e a s  o f b e t t e r  tim es ahead
82which were n o t v i s ib le  on th e  immediate h o riz o n . Another 
reason  was t h a t  th e  s o c ie ty  could n o t c o n te s t  th e  in f lu e n c e  o f th e  
c h ie fs  and th e  n a tiv e  a d m in is tra tio n  which w ith  government sup p o rt 
had a lread y  a h o ld  over th e  p eo p le . Since th e  V it i  Cauravou 
appeared as a r i v a l  and was c r i t i c a l  o f th e  s ta tu s  quo in  F i j i a n  
s o c ie ty  i t  could n o t expect th e  b le s s in g  o f th e  t r a d i t i o n a l  e l i t e  
which fe a red  th a t  i t  m ight su p p lan t i t  and u surp  i t s  p o s i t io n .  But 
most im portan t was th e  i n e r t i a  o f mind th a t  engu lfed  F i j i a n  s o c ie ty .  
Sukuna, w r it in g  in  1917, had spoken o f t h i s  c h a r a c te r i s t i c ,  and 
a sc rib e d  i t  to  a le n g th y  p e rio d  of s e r v i l i t y  to  a u to c r a t ic  r u le  of 
th e  c h ie f s .  ** By th e  end of th e  n in e te e n  t h i r t i e s  t h i s  m ala ise  s t i l l  
p e r s is te d  excep t in  th e  t in y  m in o rity  who p a r t ic ip a te d  in  th e  
V it i  Cauravou.
Since th e  V it i  Cauravou d isag ree d  w ith  th e  c h ie fs  and th e  
c o lo n ia l regime on th e  pace o f change w ith in  F i j i a n  s o c ie ty  i t  m ight 
have been expected th a t  i t  would seek an e n ten te  w ith  o th e r s ,  such as 
s e c tio n s  of th e  In d ia n  community which were a lso  d i s s a t i s f i e d  w ith  
th e  Government. This was n o t to  be . The s o c ie ty , l ik e  th e  c h ie f s  
and th e  Government com pletely  upheld  th e  p r in c ip le  o f th e  
paramountcy o f F i j i a n  i n t e r e s t s  and would seek an a l l ia n c e  w ith  th o se
82 Seymour to  C.0 .2 1 6 , 2 Aug. 1933.
83 C .S .O .2286/17.
Thus like the traditional leaderswho appeared a threat to it. 
this organization of the emerging Fijian educated elite stood aloof 
from a community which by 1929 had been fifty years in Fiji and was 
rapidly transforming itself from being migrants into permanent 
citizens of the colony. Again this requires explanation.
When the two races met at the outset as labourers on the same
plantations there was some conflict and the situation threatened to
89become worse. Early after the influx of Indians, Fijians began
expressing the fear that the newcomers might deprive them of their
86land. And in 1888 at the Council of Chiefs the Government was
asked to explain the implications of the Indians5 presence in Fiji
87for the future of the indigenous people. Though there was no
rejoinder to Governor Thurston’s reply the Fijian leaders could
hardly have been fully satisfied by it«. He at the time was
uncertain whether any Indians would settle in Fiji and warned them
not to shelter deserters or thieves end ’not to copy their
88distasteful customs’. It is important to note that there was no
integration between the two communities; inter-marriages for
89instance were extremely rare and have remained so always.
The twro races were distinct in very many vzays and the factors 
that divided them became more marked and manifest with the passage 
of time and increased contact. The Indian was an individualist with 
his greatest loyalty to self in pursuit of material gain; he showed 
scant respect for anyone who put obstacles in his path. He wras not 
reluctant to denounce authority when he found it irksome. For the
O)
8U The attitude of the Vlti Cauravou to constitutional change in the 
thirties is discussed in Chapter VIII pp.229-226 • this has
been done to preserve the chronological framework of the 
narrative as far as possible.
89 C.S.O. 2829/82, 21^1/83, 1U09M, 1701/89, 236/87.
86 C.S.O. 21UO/8U, 2977/87.
87 Proceedings, 1888.
88 ibid.
89 C.S.O. 9079/98.
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European he cared l i t t l e  and showed him s u lle n  deference  when fo rced  
by circum stances to  do so . On th e  o th e r  hand, th e  F i j i a n  was 
devoted to  h is  communal s o c ia l  s t ru c tu re  w ith  obedience to  h is  
c h ie f s ;  h is  lo y a l ty  to  a u th o r i ty  was g e n e ra lly  u n q u estio n in g . The 
c h ie fs  and th e  Government o f th e  Europeans were f o r  h is  p ro te c t io n .
Of th e  two, he p re fe r re d  Europeans to  In d ia n s .
90Mutual contempt c h a ra c te r iz e d  F ij ia n - In d ia n  a t t i t u d e s .  The 
In d ia n , th e  F i j ia n  knew, c a lle d  him a ju n g a l i , l i t e r a l l y  a bushman,
w ith  th e  conno ta tion  of la ck in g  c iv i l i z a t io n  o r b reed in g . For h is
91p a r t  th e  F i j ia n  found n o th ing  adm irable in  th e  k a i I n d ia .
P h y s ic a lly  he tended to  be sm all and th in  where th e  F i j ia n  boasted  
a physique among th e  b e s t  in  th e  w orld . VJhere th e  F i j i e n  enjoyed
l i f e ,  was th e  owner o f h is  land  and m aster of h is  tim e , th e  In d ian  
was a c o o lie  s lav in g  f o r  someone e ls e  and s u b je c t to  th e  whims o f 
h is  em ployer, and engaged in  a  ro u tin e  of d rudgery . The la ck  of 
co n tac t between th e  two races  meant th a t  p re ju d ic e s  hardened w ith  
tim e and th e re  was no o p p o rtu n ity  f o r  th e  u n d ers tan d in g  o f each 
o th e r ’s a s p i r a t io n s .
Sometimes when c o n tac t occurred  i t  in c reased  d i s t r u s t .  For 
in s ta n c e , du ring  th e  1920 s t r ik e  F i j i a n  co n sta b le s  were used to  
m ain ta in  peace . But in  th e  1921 cane s t r ik e  some F i j ia n s  
i n i t i a l l y  showed sympathy and in  Nadroga, tem p o ra rily  provided 
succour r o r In d ian  la b o u re rs  u n t i l  a com bination o f o f f i c i a l  p re s su re , 
m issionary  p e rsu as io n  and s e l f - i n t e r e s t  made t h i s  new-found union  
s h o r t - l iv e d .  When in  th e  n in e te e n  tw e n tie s  and t h i r t i e s  In d ian s  
a g ita te d  f o r  p o l i t i c a l  r ig h t s  and a g a in s t th e  R e s id e n tia l  Tax. and 
made demands fo r  more land and b e t t e r  ed u ca tio n a l f a c i l i t i e s ,
F i j ia n s  found them selves unable  to  jo in  them. The re la t io n s h ip  of 
F i j ia n  lan d lo rd  and In d ia n  te n a n t th a t  emerged e a r ly  and endured 
th e r e a f te r  a lso  kep t th e  two ra c e s  a p a r t .  F req u en tly  th e  F i j i a n  
was r e lu c ta n t  to  p a r t  w ith  h is  lan d  and f re q u e n tly  he had to  be 
e n tic ed  by g i f t s ,  and always over th e  head o f th e  In d ian  hung th e
90 C.S.O. 1 5 0 M .
91 The phrase means ’In d ia  p e rso n ’ , a d e ro g a to ry  term  depending 
on th e  tone o f v o ic e .
196
u n c e r ta in ty  o f ten u re  and th e re fo re  l iv e l ih o o d . To have c o n tin u a lly  
to  humour th e  la n d lo rd  did no t in c re a se  th e  te n a n ts ' love f o r  him, 
he had to  be to le r a te d  and p la ca te d  and t h i s  r e la t io n s h ip  d id  no t 
make fo r  t o t a l  f r ie n d s h ip .
For i t s  p a r t  th e  Government pursued no p o lic y  to  achieve 
in te g ra t io n  o r even to  b rin g  th e  two n u m erica lly  m ajor components 
of th e  p o p u la tio n  in to  a c lo se  working r e la t io n s h ip .  In  th e  
com parm entalized world of c o lo n ia lism  s o c ia l  in te rc o u rs e  between 
e th n ic  groups was d isco u rag ed . The se p a ra te  a d m in is tra tio n  fo r  
governing th e  F i j ia n s  ensured d iv e rg e n t p a th s  f o r  th e  two 
com m unities. F i j ia n s  took t h e i r  problem s and g riev an ces  to  a 
sep a ra te  i n s t i t u t i o n  f o r  re d re s s .  And th ey  w ished t h i s  
arrangem ent to  con tinue unhampered. B esid es, i t  was th e  European 
whom th e  F i j ia n s  were ta u g h t to  look up to ,  no t th e  In d ia n s .
T heir r u le r s  were Europeans, t h e i r  m issionary  b e n e fac to rs  arid 
ed u ca to rs  were Europeans. European s k i l l ,  e x p e r tis e  and commerce 
(whether th e  C.S.R.Company o r M orris Hedstrom o r Bums P h ilp ) 
su sta in ed  t h e i r  co u n try . They rece iv ed  no ta n g ib le  nourishm ent, 
s p i r i t u a l  o r m a te r ia l  from th e  In d ia n s .
Thus th ey  e x is te d  s id e  by s id e  in  th e  same co u n try , aware of 
each o th e r ’ s e x is te n c e , r e a c t in g  to  each o th e r 's  am b itions, 
g e n e ra lly  a t  peace and w ith o u t open d is c o rd , f r e q u e n tly  a p a th e tic  
and u su a lly  to le r a n t .  These do no t c h a ra c te r iz e  good r e la t io n s  
though th ey  o s te n s ib ly  i l l u s t r a t e  harmony. They do n o t make fo r  
a p o l i t i c a l  a l l i a n c e ,  r a th e r  f o r  s e p a ra te , w ith o u t eq u a l, p o l i t i c a l  
developm ent. So i t  was between In d ian s  and F i j i a n s .  While th e  
form er was im p a tien t f o r  more p o l i t i c a l  power th e  l a t t e r  remained 
s a t i s f i e d  w ith  th e  s ta tu s  quo and government c o n tro l .
What th e  F i j ia n s  wanted was p ro te c t io n  from th r e a t s  to  t h e i r  way 
o f l i f e .  In  f a c t ,  t h i s  was th e  reason  th a t  had induced them to  
cede t h e i r  autonomy to  th e  B r i t i s h  Crown in  1Ö7U. To i t  th ey  had 
remained lo y a l  and i t  had n o t b e tray ed  them. They saw no reason  
f o r  w ishing th e  ab ro g a tio n  of an agreement which worked to  t h e i r  
p o l i t i c a l  advantage. T ried  f r ie n d s  had proved good guard ians and 
th ey  ought no t to  be offended o r d e se r te d  f o r  th o se  l i k e ly  to  
menace F i j i a n  p o l i t i c a l  prim acy in  F i j i .  F i j ia n s  f e l t  e n t i t l e d  to  
F i j ia n  paramountcy as t h e i r  b i r t h r ig h t  and B r i t i s h  ru le  was
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providing this guarantee.
And in their stand the Fijians were united in opposition to 
Indian demands. Thus Fijian and Indian political paths diverged. 
But with the arrival of the franchise the Indians lost the unity 
that the Fijians continued to display.
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MUSLIM SEPARATISM
DURING th e  n in e te e n th  cen tu ry  Hindus and Muslims liv e d  a lo n g sid e  one 
an o th er in  th e  v a rio u s  p la n ta t io n s  to  which th ey  were assigned  as 
in d en tu red  la b o u re rs  o r in  th e  v a rio u s  d i s t r i c t s  where th ey  s e t t l e d  
a f t e r  th e  ex p iry  of t h e i r  c o n tra c t .  Most of them observed t h e i r  
r i t u a l s  and taboos w ith o u t one a ttem p tin g  to  offend  th e  o th e r .  
P la n ta t io n  communities were sm alle r th an  in  th e  average v i l la g e  in  
In d ia  and people l iv in g  under uniform  co n d itio n s  were in  freq u e n t 
c o n ta c t;  t h i s  made fo r  m utual to le ra n c e . B esides, th e  common 
enemies were th e  in d en tu re  system , th e  em ployers, and th e  s i r d a r s ,  
and th e  sense o f s o l id a r i ty  so embodied, d iscouraged  unnecessary  
i n te r n a l  squabb les, th e  b ro therhood fo s te re d  by th e  r ig o u rs  of 
p la n ta t io n  l i f e  d e te r re d  f u t i l e  r e l ig io u s  b ic k e r in g . When 
in to le ra n c e  and s t r i f e  appeared th ey  d id  n o t o r ig in a te  in  th e  
p la n ta t io n s  of in d en tu red  la b o u re rs  r a th e r  among those  who had 
served t h e i r  c o n tra c t .  They were th e  lu xu ry  of th e  f r e e .
The f i r s t  s ig n s  of Hindu-Muslim b i t t e r n e s s  in  F i j i  su rfaced  a t  
th e  tu rn  o f th e  cen tu ry  and invo lved  Hindu in d ig n a tio n  a t  cow 
s la u g h te r .  The Hindu held  th e  cow sac red ; she was th e  m other 
whose m ilk provided  nourishm ent and su sten an ce , to  k i l l  th e  anim al 
was no le s s  than  m a tr ic id e . By k i l l i n g  i t  and p a rta k in g  o f i t s  
f le s h  one became a namak haram, an in g ra te  who having ea ten  a t  a 
m an's ta b le  then  tu rn e d  and tre a c h e ro u s ly  murdered th e  h o s t .  To the  
Hindu c o w -k illin g  was heinous a t  any tim e , b u t to  have to  see i t  
o r know of i t s  occurrence in  c lo se  p rox im ity  o f h is  own dw elling  
was u n b ea rab le . He vias always aware o f th e  Muslim as a b e e f - e a te r ,  
bu t p re fe r re d  no t to  see s ig n s  -of i t ,  no r to  be to ld  of i t .  In  th e  
days o f am ity , Hindus and Muslims o f te n  sang hymns to g e th e r ,  and
Hindus even helped Muslims to  b u ild  mosques. Those k i l l i n g  a cow
1
o r a p ig  when caught were o s tra c iz e d  and punished .
VII
1 Sharma 1937:35-36, says such a person  was b eaten  up and boyco tted  
s o c ia l ly .  Through th e  C.S.R.Company's and i t s  s i r d a r s '  
co -o p e ra tio n  th e  in d iv id u a l  was given e x tra  work. Before he 
was r e - in s ta te d  by s o c ie ty  th e  panchayat re q u ire d  him to  give a 
f e a s t  in  which both  Hindus and Muslims p a r t i c ip a te d .
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U n til  th e  end o f th e  second decade of th e  tw e n tie th  cen tu ry  
Hindus and Muslims, d e sp ite  th e  d iv e rg e n t and o f te n  opposed t r a i t s  
of t h e i r  c u l tu re s ,  e x is te d  w ith o u t c o l l i s io n  o r p u b lic  re c r im in a tio n  
a t  each o th e r 's  b e l i e f s .  In  th e  n in e te en  tw e n tie s  and t h i r t i e s  th e  
t r a n q u i l l i t y  was s h a t te re d .  Yet th e  d if f e r e n c e s  d id  n o t end in  
v io len ce  o r c i v i l  s t r i f e  as in  In d ia . In  F i j i  th e  weapons were 
s o c ia l  bo y co tt and newspaper w ars; th e  b a t t l e s  were fough t w ith  
words, em otional and ab u siv e , in s te a d  of blow s, in ju r io u s  and 
f a t a l .  N onetheless, Hindu-Muslim d if fe re n c e s  in  F i j i  were 
in flu en ced  and in te n s i f i e d  by th e  tre n d s  in  s im ila r  communal 
r e la t io n s  in  In d ia  a t  th e  tim e .
In  essence th e se  o u tb u rs ts  of communal f e e l in g  in  F i j i  were
p a r t  of th e  new confidence of th e  new In d ian  s o c ie ty  th a t  was
growing th e r e .  The im petus f o r  th e  r e l ig io u s  re v iv a l  came w ith
m il i t a n t  le a d e rs  from In d ia ,  e s p e c ia l ly  th o se  espousing  Arya Saraaj
p r in c ip le s .  The Arya Samaj movement had e x is te d  in  F i j i  as e a r ly
as 190ii b u t i t  had rem ained dormant u n t i l  th e  a r r i v a l  from In d ia ,
in  th e  n in e te en  tw e n tie s  o f an Arya Samaji m iss io n ary , S r i K rishna,
who brought w ith  him communal a n t ip a th ie s  c u r re n tly  a f f l i c t i n g  
2
In d ia . His p r o le t iz in g  z ea l made c o n f l ic t  in e v i ta b le .  B esides, 
th e  Arya Samaj movement by i t s  n a tu re  was d ed ica ted  to  reform ing 
and purg ing  Hinduism of a l ie n  in flu en c e  and re c o n v e rtin g  those  
In d ian s  who had l e f t  i t s  f o ld .
S r i K rishna preached th a t  a l l  Muslims and C h r is tia n s  were
a g a in s t p ro g re s s , hence Hindus ought to  have no co n tac t w ith  them
w hatsoever. He advocated suddhi o r cerem onial reco n v ers io n  -  th e
cause of much Hindu-Muslim tro u b le  in  In d ia .  He urged  th e  b o yco tt
3
of European goods and m ission  sch o o ls . G ir ls  ought n o t to  be 
ta u g h t E ng lish  as t h i s  le d  to  th e  a c q u is i t io n  o f E ng lish  ways 
which were contr?j*y to  Hindu custom; he even condemned th e  use o f 
knives and fo rk s  f o r  e a t in g .  Hindus were adv ised  a g a in s t 
in d u lg in g  in  tobacco and a lc o h o l. Under h is  a eg is  th e  Hindu Maha 
Sabha was se t-u p  in  F i j i  f o r  th e  purpose o f u n i t in g  a l l  H indus.
An immediate rep e rcu ss io n  o f S r i K rish n a 's  p reach in g  was Hindu anger 
w ith  Muslims in  F i j i  when th e  Arya Samaj le a d e r  Swami Shradanand was 
murdered in  D elh i in  1926 by a Muslim. L a te r  a r r i v a l s  l ik e
2
3
C.S.O. C6/27.
C.S.O. C6/27, C15/27»
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Kundan S ingh  Kush and K .B .S in g h  c o n t i n u e d  the  work o f  S r i  K r i s h n a .
But  i t  i s  too  s i m p l i s t i c  t o  blame Hindu-Musl im c o n f l i c t  i n  F i j i  s o l e l y  
on men from a b r o a d .  Had t h o s e  emerg ing  as  l o c a l  l e a d e r s  r e p u d i a t e d  
them peace  m igh t  have p r e v a i l e d .  I n s t e a d  t h e y  s u p p o r t e d  t h e  new­
comers .  Men such as  B a d r i  Mahra j , h i s  son  Raghvanand,  o t h e r s  l i k e  
J . P . M a h r a j ,  Pa rmeshwar,  a l l  j o i n e d  f o r c e s  i n  s e a r c h  o f  eminence  i n  
t h e i r  community.  They c a p i t a l i z e d  on o p p o r t u n i t i e s  f o r  a g i t a t i o n  
such  as  t h o s e  p r o v i d e d  by t h e  r e q u e s t  o f  a Muslim,  I n a y a t ,  t o  open 
a b u t c h e r y  i n  1926. Hindu-Musl im d i f f e r e n c e s  were a l s o  e x p l o i t e d  
by members o f  t h e  em erg ing  e d u c a t e d  c l a s s ,  such  as  V ishnu  Deo, 
Raghvanand,  Parmeshwar and C h a t t u r  S in g h ,  t o  o b t a i n  p o s i t i o n s  o f  
l e a d e r s h i p  i n  t h e  I n d i a n  community.  Such s t a t u s  c o u l d  b r i n g  
m a t e r i a l  g a i n  and l a t e r ,  w i t h  t h e  ad v e n t  o f  p o l i t i c a l  f r a n c h i s e ,  
e l e c t i o n  t o  t h e  L e g i s l a t i v e  C o u n c i l .
Of t h e  i n d e n t u r e d  l a b o u r e r s  e m i g r a t i n g  to  F i j i  f rom C a l c u t t a
4
d u r i n g  1879 t o  1916 Musl ims had formed 14.6% and t h e i r  p r o p o r t i o n
i n  the  I n d i a n  p o p u l a t i o n  d i d  n o t  v a r y  g r e a t l y  t h e r e a f t e r .  I n
1908 i t  was e s t i m a t e d  t h a t  t h e r e  were a b o u t  4 , 0 0 0  Musl ims ,  m a in ly
from t h e  U n i t e d  P r o v i n c e s ,  Benga l  and P u n j a b ,  o f  whom a b o u t  a t h i r d
5
were u n d e r  i n d e n t u r e  on p l a n t a t i o n s .  On c o m p l e t i o n  o f  t h e i r  
c o n t r a c t  t h e y  u s u a l l y  l e a s e d  l a n d  m a i n ly  f o r  c u l t i v a t i n g  s u g a r  cane  
and b a n a n a s .  A number had  t r a d i n g  l i c e n c e s  o r  s t o r e s ,  w h i l e  a  few 
were employed as  d o m e s t i c  s e r v a n t s  o r  i n  some minor  c a p a c i t y  i n  t h e  
Government .  At t h i s  s t a g e  t h e y  had  o n l y  one m u l l a h  ( p r i e s t ) ,  
N a s r u l l a h  Shah,  who r e s i d e d  a t  Ba and o c c a s i o n a l l y  v i s i t e d  Suva and 
o t h e r  d i s t r i c t s .  I n  1908 t h e y  had t h r e e  o r  f o u r  s c h o o l s ,  and t h r e e  
b u i l d i n g s  i n  c o u n t r y  d i s t r i c t s  f o r  w o r s h i p ;  i n  Suva where t h e r e  were 
o n l y  70 Musl ims t h e r e  was n e i t h e r  mosque n o r  s c h o o l .  A c c o rd ing  to  
an o f f i c i a l  a s s e s s m e n t  t h e  p o s i t i o n  o f  Musl ims was f a i r l y  p r o s p e r o u s  
and t h e r e  was no l a c k  o f  employment .  They were no l e s s  l a w - a b i d i n g  
t h a n  o t h e r s ,  and t h e  y o u n g e r  ones  were e a g e r  t o  a v a i l  t h e m s e l v e s  o f  
o p p o r t u n i t i e s  f o r  s e l f - a d v a n c e m e n t . Thus t h e y  were no d i f f e r e n t  
i n  t h e i r  g o a l s  and a s p i r a t i o n s  from t h e  r e s t  o f  t h e  I n d i a n  s o c i e t y  
a l r e a d y  d e s c r i b e d .
4 G i l l i o n  1962 :209 .
5 C .S .O.  3471 /08 .
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RELIGIONS OF INDIANS
1 911 1921 1936
Hindus 86.0% 87.27% 83.51%
Muslims 13.2 10.62 1 3.28
Sikhs Not given + 1 .26
Christians Not given 1.17 1 .95
Others 0.8 .94 .
(+ Not known in which category Sikhs were put.)
Source: Census Reports 1911, 1921, 1936.
Nonetheless from the outset the Muslims had preserved their owng
rituals and feasts and retained their separate religious identity.
With the annual increase in the number of ex-indentured Muslims
there grew among them the need to establish their religion on a
firmer foundation in Fiji. They were a minority and their sense
of solidarity amidst a Hindu majority advised such action,
especially when the latter began showing signs of a new religious 
7consciousness. Muslims began collecting funds.searching for landg
to build mosques, and forming associations to achieve their goals.
6 Thomas Orr McMillan, My Story. McMillan was born in Scotland 
in 1867 and arrived in Fiji in 1893 as a chemist at the C.S.R. 
Company's Rarawai mill, Ba. A photocopy of his manuscript 
exists in the Alport Barker Library in Suva. It contains no 
dates, no page numbers. A report in the Fiji Times, 1 Oct.1887, 
says that Indians in Rewa were enjoying a three-day holiday
to celebrate Mohurram, the occasion when the Tazia procession 
took place. The same report states that Indians around Suva 
mistook the date of these celebrations, having anticipated them 
through want of information and the observance was being held, 
apparently again, on the orthodox days. The inference is that 
a specifically Muslim feast was being celebrated by Hindus as well.
7 See Gillion 1962:146ff. for religious affairs in Fiji in the 
indenture period.
8 In 1915 Anjuman Hidayat-ul-Islam or the Association for teaching 
Islam was founded. Other organizations in existence were:
Anjuman Ishait El Islam of Lautoka (1915), Anjuman Ishar Ithul 
Islam (1916), Anjuman-e-Islam (1919). C.S.0.10364/1 5, 8942/16, 
994/18, CF5l/874i F.T. 7 May 1919. Gillion 1962:150.
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The birth and continuance of these organizations polarized groups,
9both within Muslim society and among Indians as a whole. With the
appearance of these blocs Muslims began to establish direct contact
1 0with the Government for recognition of their religious practices.
And officials, though generally neutral in religious matters were 
not unwilling to help, as an inspector of immigrants wrote from 
Navua:
I have personally taken some interest in the Mohammedans 
here, as they endeavour to do something for the religious 
instruction o±' their people, and this is much needed. 11
As a distinct Muslim identity began to appear differences occurred
between Hindus and Muslims when the less tolerant and sensitive
elements on both sides insisted on practices repugnant to adherents
1 2of the other creed. But these occurrences were rare and not
9 In 1915 according to what C.F.Andrews told Booth, the Agent- 
General of Immigration,there were three factions among Muslims 
in the Suva-Rewa area. One was led by Mirza Mulla Khan (who 
according to Gillion 1962:149, had arrived in Fiji in 1898), 
with their headquarters at Nausori; these were strictly 
orthodox and educated and a minority. The second faction was 
led by Nasrullah Shah of Suva; these were wealthy and liberal.
The second group was known as the ’Indian Reconciliation Society’ 
and was willing to unite with Mirza Khan's supporters who called 
themselves 'Separatists' and did not desire unity. The third 
comprised those who refused to identify themselves with either of 
the other two. C.S.O. 10364/15-
10 The Anjuman Hidayat-ul-Islam informed the Government that their
marriage ceremonies had to be performed by a kazi or a Muslim 
priest. And only those who had been recommended by the Anjuman 
and registered with government should be permitted to solemnize 
Muslim marriages. The kazi should be entitled to some fixed fee
as w'as customary in India. (C.S.O. 10364/1 5)- The Soceity of
Ishar Ithul Islam wrote to the C.S.R.Company for land in order to 
build a mosque which would be used as a school. (C.S.0.8942/1 6.) 
The Company obliged by granting a site plus £50. (C.S.0.1063/1 7)- 
The Anjuman Ishait El Islam sought land from.the Government for 
Qurbani (i.e.slaughtering animals according to Muslim rites.) 
C.S.O. 994/18.
11 C.S.O. 9323/11.
12 Labasa in 1908 was an example. Certain Muslims insisted that 
the Koran required that they sacrifice cattle for their Bakr-Id 
festival. Some Hindu Brahmins during the Ram Lila refused to 
permit Muslim participation as in the previous year. In 1903 
at Bulileka, near Labasa, a Muslim had his hands and feet 
mutilated because of insult to some Hindu ceremonies.
C.S.O. 5544/08, 5579/08, 6139/08.
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widespread.
In 1926 a group of Suva Muslims founded the Fiji Muslim League
influenced in this direction by a reaction to the resurgence of
Hinduism in Fiji under Sri Krishna and his Arya Samaj supporters.
Previous to 1926 there had been Muslim organizations in the various
districts and the Fiji Muslim League was to be a central body
designed to represent the views of these smaller and less effective 
14associations. The objects of the Fiji Muslim League were given as:
(a) To disseminate the morals, ideals and teaching of Islam.
(b) To unite the Muslims, and promote social intercourse between 
them.
(c) To render religious and secular service to the Muslims.
(d) To promote and arrange for the learning of Islamic 
literature by Muslim children.
(e) To endeavour to eradicate the use of intoxicants and 
narcotics such as alcohol, opium, charas and other 
obnoxious drugs by the Muslims.
(f) To bring about a close tie and better understanding 
between the Government and its subjects.
Among the rules it was emphasized that 'discussions in rebuke to other
religions or of a political nature will not be allowed at any
meeting of the League'. Initially the League was not political.
Also it appeared willing to co-operate with the Government; it
made requests for help rather than condemn the latter for Muslim
grievances. This strategy paid dividends when it became embroiled
1 5with the Arya Samajis. Among its major objectives was the
provision of religious education for Muslim youth; there was a call 
for instruction in Urdu and teachers were supplied, for instance,
13 Brewster 1922:299-300, states that no friction existed between 
Hindus and Muslims and when the latter celebrated the Mohurram, 
'Hindu sword-players and jugglers used to dance and take a place 
in the procession of the rival persuasion.'
14 C.S.O. 4791/26.
15 Under its aegis a Moslem V/omen's League was formed and it 
requested that Government provide a woman doctor in Toorak (Suva) 
qualified to treat maternity cases as Indian women abhorred 
treatment by males. The Executive Council advised the Governor 
to inform the League that an annual subsidy for such a doctor 
would be given if a motion were introduced in the Legislative 
Council and provided the appointee attended paupers 
gratuitously. C.S.O. 5190/28.
20h
1 6to the Methodist School in Toorak and the Sangam School in Nadi.
Until the Indian communal election of 1929 Hindu-Muslim relations
continued in a low key without major outbursts. With the defeat of
the Muslim, Khalil Sahim, in the Eastern constituency, the situation
deteriorated. Muslims had been under the impression that they might
be permitted through Hindu magnanimityto win one of the three Indian
seats. In the prevailing atmosphere of strained relations their
disappointment was galling. They thought their position precarious.
In the 1930's Hindu-Muslim antagonism reached a new peak and
subsided only towards the end of the decade. Both sides circulated
1 7scurrilous literature about their opponents' faith and founders.
Muslims complained of a pamphlet called Rangeela Rasul which dwelt
on the alleged iniquities of their prophet. The Arya Samaj
distributed material highlighting the less pleasant features of
Muslim rule in India, and there was another called Shuddhi Samachar
which had pictures of maulvis having their beards and hair shaved
and performing the hauan or ceremony for their conversion to 
1 8Hinduism. Muslim propaganda literature emphasized the
miseries of the Hindu caste system, alleged instances of beef
eating among ancient Hindus, and criticised Swami Dayanand Saraswati's
1 9personal life and teachings. Abuse and counterabuse followed in
the press, initially in the Fiji Samachar and then in Dr.Beattie's
20Vriddhi-Vani and from 1935 the Message of Islam.
In the Hindu community there was also division between
Sanatanis (orthodox) and the Arya Samajis. Its only political
implication was the conviction of Vishnu Deo and his disqualification
21from being a candidate in the Legislative Council election of 1932.
16 C.S.O. 167/29. FVT. 4 Jan.. 1929-
17 To avert trouble the Post Office confiscated most of this 
material before it could reach its destination.
18 C.S.O. 167/29.
19 C.S.O. 2226/20.
20 Vriddhi-Vani was particularly critical of the Arya Samajis.
(c.S.o'. 1837/30); but it also incurred the wrath of the Message 
of Islam.
21 Vishnu Deo circulated extracts from the Hindu Purana aimed at 
embarrassing the Sanatanis, but the Supreme Court judged the 
excerpts pornographic.
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It was not as significant as the conflict with the Muslims. The
Muslims found themselves harassed and outmanoeuvred by the better
organized Arya Samajis who were led by V.Deo, K.B.Singh, Kundan Singh
Kush in the Suva-Rewa area and Chattur Singh and Sahodar Singh in the
western district. Hindus were organized at village levels into
Sangathans (religious unions) with the Hindu Maha Sabha as the
co-ordinating body, The Sangathans aimed at converting Muslims by
economic pressure and boycott. Hindu midwives either refused or
22demanded exorbitant fees before attending Muslim women. Muslims
in Viria had a torrid time as they were forced to conform to Hindu
rites and ceremonies. A Hindu woman was fined £1 for having
received water from a Muslim; social contact with Muslims meant
ostracism for Hindus from their co-religionists. Some Hindu youths
in cars and motor lorries when passing Muslim homes slowed down and
sang insulting songs, citing instances of Muslim conversion to
Hinduism. The Sangathan in Rewa resolved to assault a Muslim whose
father-in-law had sold cattle to a European butcher. A prominent
Hindu offered £200 to those willing to participate. But the
Muslim v/as saved by other Hindus. There were Hindus, largely
23Sanatanis, who deprecated Arya Samaji behaviour. Some Hindus in
the Rewa district refused to work under Muslim sirdars during cane- 
24cutting. Muslims, at first helpless, retaliated by keeping
contact with Hindus to the unavoidable minimum and refrained from
attending Hindu ceremonies and feasts.
The arrival in 1933 of a Muslim missionary, Mirza Muzzaffar Beg, 
25aggravated the strife. Unlike his Muslim counterparts in Fiji, he
was well-educated and fully conversant with Hindu and Christian 
scriptures besides his own. He was prepared to engage in public
22 C.S.O. 531/30.
23 In Rakiraki, for instance in 1935, members of the South India 
Sanmarka Ikia Sabha sent a memorial to the Government in which 
they accused Arya Samaj Sangathans in their area of stirring 
trouble. The South Indians dissociated themselves from these 
Hindus saying they regarded all Indians as one and had no wish 
to cause mischief. C.S.O. F51/5/23.
24 C.S.O. 1774/30.
25 Muzzaffar Beg's entry into Fiji also split the Muslim community 
into Sunnis (orthodox) and Ahmadiyyas (the followers of one 
Mirza Gulab Ahmed, and regarded by Sunnis as heretics). Strife 
between the two sects thereafter became an enduring feature. 
Because of space, and its irrelevance to this study, it is not 
intended to discuss this aspect of Muslim history in this thesis.
I
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debate with members of the opposing religions but the Government,
fully aware of the dangerous repercussion of this practice, discouraged
it. Besides, the Arya Samajis, appreciating Beg's powers, found it
best to avoid hirn. Much of the battle was confined to the press.
Beg was a relentless agitator, bent as much on displaying his own
knowledge as on propagating Islam, and in 1937 the Government refused
his request to remain in Fiji. Beg certainly stirred the Ahmadiyyas,
but the Sunnis at the beginning of the thirties found their champions
in the Hasan brothers, two English-educated Punjabi barristers.
Like Beg they were fanatics and desired Muslim separatism. If the
Arya Samajis were the instigators of a rift in the Indian community,
these Muslims did nothing to mend the breach, they sought its
2 6perpetuation and entrenchment.
The rancorous climate in which the Muslims found themselves
led them to demand separate political representation. The
immediate cause for Muslim action was the failure of Muslims to obtain
27a seat in the Legislative Council in 1929« In pursuit of
Muslim political rights the Fiji Muslim League emerged as the 
leader and spokesman.
Muslims from Suva, Rewa and Navua gathered at the Jame Mosque
28in Toorak on 29 September 1929 to discuss the question. It was
alleged that Hindus had voted en bloc by 'herd instinct', having
become tools of the Arya Samaj, therefore:
This mass meeting of the Muslims deeply regrets the attitude of 
certain sections of the Indian community who made a religious 
issue of the recent Indian Elections, thereby succeeding on the 
strength of their numerical preponderance in returning their 
candidates to Indian seats in the Legislative Council; and 
further this mass meeting expresses its deep sense of loyalty
26 C.S.O. F51/9.
27 Even before the franchise was granted to Indians Muslims were 
apprehensive of what might become of their political position.
The following resolution passed at the meeting of the Muslim 
League on 23 Dec.1928 underlines their anxiety:
'That this annual general meeting feels alarmed at the anti- 
Islamic propaganda which is being assiduously fostered up all 
over the Colony by a certain section of the Indian community 
and respectfully appeals to the Government to take every 
precaution in safeguarding the Muslim minority community when 
political privileges are extended to Indians.' Fiji Samachar 
17 May 1930.
28 Fiji Muslim League to the Col.Sec. 18 Oct. 1929; C.S.O. CF5/2.
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to the British Government and dissociates itself from any 
extreme unconstitutional measures which may be pursued 
for the attainment of Indian aspirations. 29
Communal strife and the boycott of the Legislative Council after
the defeat of a common roll resolution in October 1929 left the
Government distressed and angered by the behaviour of the Indian
community, especially the small but dynamic Arya Samaj element which
was in the vanguard of all political initiative and agitation. On
27 December, after a conference between the Governor and seven Indian
leaders who pressed for common roll, the Muslim delegate Abdul Karim
refused to sign a letter from these leaders reiterating their demands.
From a Muslim official who was clerk to the Chief Police Magistrate,
30Government received a minute on the Muslim viewpoint. He stated
that Hindu-Muslim hatred was strong in Fiji, especially in the Rewa
where the Hindu majority was boycotting Muslims socially and
commercially, resulting in the near ruin of Muslim barbers and
petty traders. Under common roll Hindu domination would result.
Hindus wished to use others to destroy Europeans first, then Indian
Christians and finally Muslims. If the Government wished to grant
common roll, it must reserve seats for Europeans, Muslims and
Christians. Or else, three Indian seats ought to be allocated one
31each to Hindus, Muslims and Christians. Unless the Government
chose one of the above alternatives, he concluded, it would be unwise 
for Muslims to oppose Hindus for in the end the latter would take 
revenge. Having had enough harassment from the Indian community, 
and the Government of India too at times, and being aware of 
communal electorates in India, the Fiji Government seemed willing to 
capitalize on the divisions in the Indian community in order to 
silence and outwit the Arya Samajis in their campaign for non­
cooperation and common franchise. Arya Samaji tactics and Muslim 
fears provided it with assistance and justification for its policy.
On 11,12 and 13 December, 1929, storms and floods struck Labasa, 
Sigatoka, Navua and Rewa and brought havoc. Leaders of the Fiji
29 Resolution, 29 Sept. 1929, to Col.Sec. 18 Oct. 1929; C.S.O. CF5/2. 
Muslims thereafter desisted from participation in the meetings
of the Arya Samaj dominated Indian National Congress.
30 Minute, Gafoor Sahu, 28 Dec. 1929; C.S.O. CF5/2.
31 Sahu stated that in an Indian population of 65,000, there were 
9,000 Muslims and 2,000 Christians.
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Indian National Congress used the disaster to condemn the Government 
for neglect and themselves collected and distributed provisions.
But charges that help was provided only to political friends and 
religious followers led Muslims and Christians to demand a meeting; 
the President refused and these two sections resigned, leaving the 
Congress in Hindu hands under the control of the Gujerati lawyer,
S.B.Patel.
A mass meeting of Muslims, called at Nausori on 5 Jan. 1930,
unanimously elected a Provisional Committee for the Attainment of
Muslim Political Rights which was authorized to assert by all
constitutional means the Muslim claim to direct representation in the
32Legislative Council. A petition was prepared and sent to the
Governor on 8 January 1930 drawing his attention to the situation of 
the Muslims and requesting the creation of a constituency for all 
Muslims in Fiji so that they might have one representative in the 
Legislative Council until the number of seats were increased when they 
too would receive a proportionate increase; in case of common roll 
the Governor should guarantee that seats would be reserved for 
them and other minorities; they wished their memorial to be sent 
to the Secretary of State. They gave the several reasons why 
they sought this remedy. First, they were a numerically small 
community which had shown its great importance in the Colony by 
devotion to British rule and continuous co-operation with the C.S.R. 
Company. Second, Hindus greatly outnumbered them and they could not 
hope to elect a Muslim. Third, Hindus, being anti-Muslim and inspired 
by events in India, had organized commercial, industrial, and social 
boycott of Muslims hoping to convert them to Hinduism by economic 
pressures. Fourth, Muslims were sparsely scattered in districts 
with a concentration of Hindu population and sought to educate their 
children in the Urdu script which was opposed by the majority.
Fifth, the common roll agitation conducted by Arya Samajis and other 
Hindus was.not supported by Muslims except a few who could not do
32 The meeting resolved: ’This mass meeting of Muslims unanimously
declares that the anti-Islamic attitude of the Hindoos has made 
it impossible for the Muslims to any longer co-operate with 
the Hindoos in their demand for ’Common Electoral Roll' unless 
special provisions are made for the safeguarding of the interests 
of the Muslims and other minority communities.'
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otherwise and showed ostensible solidarity with Hindus; even some of 
these had now parted company. Sixth, Muslims repudiated 
obstructionist attitudes and favoured co-operation with the Government 
for the welfare of Fiji. And, common roll meant Hindu domination 
of others including Fijians; Muslims and other minorities could 
expect no justice from it. In March 1930, M.T.Khan of Lautoka, 
who had favoured common roll and was the Secretary of the Anjuman 
Ishait El Islam, wrote to the Muslim League that he and his 
organization no longer sided with Arya Samaji elements like Parmanand 
and Chattur Singh who were advocating that they send both a 
deputation to India to press for common franchise and volunteers to 
fight for sv/araj there. Instead M.T.Khan now favoured separate 
representation.
From other Indians Muslims received no aid for their scheme.
The Hindu Maha Sabha repeated its demand for a common franchise for
all British subjects and protested against, communal or separate 
33representation. At a meeting in Lautoka Indian leaders like
S.B.Patel and A.D.Patel regretted that Muslims had fallen prey to
34divide and rule tactics. The Fiji Samachar, the Arya Samaj
mouthpiece, deprecated the Muslim demand and countered by repeated
35requests for common franchise.
The Governor did nothing to discourage the Muslims, his response 
to the Fiji Muslim League on receiving its resolution of 29 September 
1929 was:
His Excellency the Governor is confident that he will find 
in the Muslims of Fiji the same measure of loyal support 
as is accorded to the Government by Muslims in other parts 
of the Empire, and he will be glad of the assistance and 
advice of the League in all matters affecting the welfare 
of their community. 36
33 C.S.O. 1837/30.
34 FVT. 22 Aug. 1930. C.S.O. 289/30.
35 In this period practically every issue of this bilingual paper 
deals with Indian politics and in 1930 several issues discuss. 
Hindu-Muslim relations, see for instance copies of 22 Mar.,
17 May, 24 May, 31 May, 6 July 1930.
36 Col. Sec. to Fiji Muslim League, 18 Jan. 1930; C.S.O. 289/30.
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His a d v i s e r  on I n d i a n  a f f a i r s  was e q u a l l y  s y m p a t h e t i c  to  t h e  Muslims
37and f a v o u r e d  a s e p a r a t e  s e a t  f o r  them.
S i r  M urch ison  F l e t c h e r ,  i n  h i s  d e s p a t c h  to  t h e  S e c r e t a r y  o f  S t a t e ,
Lord P a s s f i e l d ,  e n c l o s e d  th e  Muslim p e t i t i o n  o f  8 J a n .  1930 and s t a t e d
t h a t  much c o u l d  be s a i d  i n  f a v o u r  o f  the  Muslim demand. In  a
Crown Colony where t h e  Government  a lways had an o f f i c i a l  m a j o r i t y
i t  was u s e f u l  t o  have t h e  a d v ic e  o f  each  i m p o r t a n t  segment  o f  the  
38community.  B e s i d e s ,  Muslims who were . 'more l o y a l  and more law-
a b i d i n g ’ had good g ro u n d s  to  f e a r  t h a t  t h e i r  n e e d s  would r e c e i v e
39s c a n t  c o n s i d e r a t i o n  a t  t h e  hands  o f  Hindu members . T h e r e f o r e ,
a t  t h e  n e x t  d i s s o l u t i o n  o f  t h e  L e g i s l a t i v e  C o u n c i l  t h e  Muslim
r e q u e s t  s h o u ld  r e c e i v e  f a v o u r a b l e  c o n s i d e r a t i o n .  The S e c r e t a r y  o f
S t a t e  e n q u i r e d  w h e t h e r  F l e t c h e r  had i n  mind an e x t r a  s e a t  f o r  t h e
40I n d i a n  community -  he had n o t .  Lord  P a s s f i e l d  was t o l d  by
I s l a y  McOwan, d e p u t i s i n g  f o r  F l e t c h e r ,  t h a t  two d i s t i n c t _ e l e c t c r a t e s
were e n v i s a g e d ,  one f o r  a  Muslim r e p r e s e n t a t i v e  and a n o t h e r  f o r  two 
41H indus .  As i n s t r u c t e d  by F l e t c h e r ,  McOwan s t r e s s e d  t h a t  t h e r e  was
42r e a l  a n i m o s i t y  be tw een  th e  two c o m m u n i t i e s .  I n  h i s  r e p l y  P a s s f i e l d
was a g a i n s t  im m edia te  a c t i o n  though  he gave the  Governor  l i b e r t y  t o  
s u g g e s t  t h a t  f a v o u r a b l e  c o n s i d e r a t i o n  c o u l d  be g i v e n  a t  t h e  n e x t
37 The S e c r e t a r y  o f  I n d i a n  A f f a i r s  t o l d  t h e  C o l . S e c .  21 J a n ,  1930:
' S o c i a l l y  and e c o n o m i c a l l y  p r o g r e s s i v e  b u t  n u m e r i c a l l y  
s m a l l  and h a r d l y  more t h a n  12% o f  t h e  t o t a l  I n d i a n  
p o p u l a t i o n ,  t h e  s c a t t e r e d  Muslim community c a n n o t  hope to  
r e t u r n  a r e p r e s e n t a t i v e  u n d e r  a common I n d i a n  f r a n c h i s e .
High q u e s t i o n s  o f  p o l i t i c a l  e q u a l i t y  t e n d  t o  f a d e  i n t o  
o b s c u r i t y  i n  t h e  l i g h t  o f  a r e q u e s t  t h a t  t h e  d e s p i s e d  
communal f r a n c h i s e  s h o u l d  be made y e t  more communal . '
C .S .O.  289 /3 0 .  E n e l .  F l e t c h e r  t o  C .O .Conf .  3 Feb.  1930.
38 A y e a r  l a t e r ,  F l e t c h e r  minu. ted:  'As long  as  t h e  Government
r e t a i n s  i t s  m a j o r i t y ,  t h e  C o u n c i l  i s  i n  e f f e c t  an a d v i s o r y  body,  
and I would p r e f e r  t o  have t h e  a d v i c e  o f  b o t h  Hindus and Musl ims,  
w he re as  u n d e r  t h e  p r e s e n t  c o n d i t i o n s  i t  i s  p r o b a b l e  t h a t  o n l y  
Hindus  would be r e t u r n e d . '  M inu te ,  18 Mar. 1931;  C .S .O.  289 /3 0 .
39 F l e t c h e r  to  C .O .Conf .  3 Feb .  1930.
40 C.O. t o  F l e t c h e r  Conf .  2 May 1930.
41 O.A.G. t o  C .O .Conf .  3 J u l y  1930.
42 In  June  a Muslim d e p u t a t i o n  to  t h e  Governor  had  c o m p la in e d  o f  
Hindu i n t e r f e r e n c e  w i t h  c e r t a i n  Muslim f e s t i v a l s  and F l e t c h e r  
w an ted  the  p r e v a l e n c e  o f  t h i s  a n ta g o n i s m  conveyed  t o  London. 
M inu te ,  F l e t c h e r ,  12 June  1930;  C .S .O.  2 8 9 /3 0 .
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d i s s o l u t i o n .  F l e t c h e r ,  however ,  gave no such  i n t i m a t i o n  to  t h e
Musl ims i m m e d i a t e l y .  B e f o re  he c o u l d ,  t h e  Government  o f  I n d i a
i n t e r v e n e d  r e q u e s t i n g  pos tponem en t  o f  any d e c i s i o n  u n t i l  t h e y  had made
43t h e i r  s u b m i s s io n  on th e  s u b j e c t .
Meanwhile ,  i n  F i j i ,  o f f i c i a l  o p i n i o n  c o n t e n d e d  t h a t  Hindu-Musl im
r e l a t i o n s  were d e t e r i o r a t i n g  and s t e p s  tow'ards a s o l u t i o n  were
n e c e s s a r y .  F l e t c h e r  r e g r e t t e d  t h a t  t h e  poor  i n t e l l i g e n c e  s y s te m  o f
th e  Government  meant t h a t  t h e y  were u n a b l e  t o  fa thom  o c c u r r e n c e s
a t  v i l l a g e  l e v e l .  The s e t t i n g  up o f  a p a n c h a y a t  was c o n s i d e r e d  and
d r opped ,  and e a r l y  i n  1932 the  Governor  in fo r m e d  t h e  L e g i s l a t i v e
C o u n c i l  o f  t h e  a p p o in t m e n t  o f  t h e  f i r s t  I n d i a n  A d v i s o ry  Commit tee ,
44i n  Rewa, t h e  h o t b e d  o f  communal s t r i f e .  The E x e c u t i v e  C o u n c i l  i n
1931 made t h r e e  recom m enda t ions  on s e p a r a t e  o c c a s i o n s  on th e  communal
s i t u a t i o n .  I n  May i t  app roved  a p r o p o s a l  t o  g r a n t  Muslims
s e p a r a t e  r e p r e s e n t a t i o n  and c a l l e d  f o r  t h e  p r e p a r a t i o n  o f  a  d e f i n i t e
45scheme f o r  s e p a r a t e  c o n s t i t u e n c i e s . Next  i t  a d v i s e d  t h a t  t h e
46Government  t a k e  no a c t i o n  i n  t h e  Hindu-Musl im f r i c t i o n .  T h i r d l y ,
i t  d e c i d e d  t h a t  t h e  S e c r e t a r y  o f  S t a t e  s h o u ld  c o n s e n t  t o  the
c r e a t i o n  o f  two e l e c t o r a t e s ,  one f o r  Musl ims w i t h  one s e a t ,  a n o t h e r
47w i t h  two s e a t s  f o r  non-M us l im s .  For  t h e  s e c o n d ,  a sy s te m  o f  v o t i n g
i n c o r p o r a t i n g  some form o f  plumping  s h o u ld  be i n t r o d u c e d  so as  t o  improve
th e  p r o s p e c t s  o f  m i n o r i t i e s  o f  r e t u r n i n g  a c a n d i d a t e  a t  the  p o l l s .  The
48a d v ic e  was d e s p a t c h e d  t o  W h i t e h a l l .  N o th ing  was done as  a  r e p l y  from 
I n d i a  was s t i l l  a w a i t e d .  B e f o re  t h i s  came t h e  I n d i a n  e l e c t i o n  was h e l d ,
43 C.O. t o  F l e t c h e r  Conf .  30 J a n .  1931.
44 F l e t c h e r  to  C .O .Conf .  23 S e p t .  1930;  C .S .O.  5 53 /30 .
L .C .D e b a te s  1932:7*
45 M inu te s  Ex.Co.  6 May 1931.
46 M inu te s  Ex.Co. 19 Aug. 1931;  C .S .O.  260 0 /3 0 .
47 M in u te s  Ex.Co.  2 S e p t .  1931.
48 F l e t c h e r  t o  C.O. Conf .  24 S e p t .  1931.  The Governor  a l s o  s e n t  
s t a t i s t i c s  o f  I n d i a n  v o t e r s  and p o p u l a t i o n  (1921 Census)  a c c o r d i n g  
t o  r e l i g i o n .  The re  were 52 ,906  Hindus  and 1 ,1 6 5  o f  t h e s e  were 
r e g i s t e r e d  as  e l e c t o r s ;  f rom 6 ,435  Muslims t h e r e  were 708 ,  and 
o n l y  57 from 708 C h r i s t i a n s .
212
and members were r e t u r n e d  f o r  two c o n s t i t u e n c i e s  -  no c a n d i d a t e  c o u l d  
be found  f o r  t h e  t h i r d .  The Muslim League in fo r m e d  th e  Governor  t h a t  
t h e y  had  t a k e n  no p a r t  i n  t h e  e l e c t i o n  and a s  t h e  new members d i d  n o t
49r e p r e s e n t  them they  would a c c e p t  no r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  f o r  t h e i r  a c t i o n s .
I n  c a s e  o f  f u r t h e r  d e l a y  i n  g r a n t i n g  Musl ims a s e p a r a t e  f r a n c h i s e  
t h e y  w an ted  t h e  Governor  t o  no m in a te  a Muslim i n  t h e  meant im e.
Once aga in -  t h e  Governor  was u n a b l e  t o  make t h e  f i n a l  d e c i s i o n  
f o r  on 2 September  1932 he r e c e i v e d  t h e  r e p l y  o f  t h e  I n d i a n
50Government  w i t h  which t h e  S e c r e t a r y  o f  S t a t e  was i n  a g re e m e n t .  As
long  as  I n d i a n s  had o n l y  t h r e e  s e a t s ,  a r g u e d  I n d i a ,  one o f  t h e s e  
c o u l d  n o t  be a l l o c a t e d  t o  Musl ims e i t h e r  on t h e  b a s i s  o f  t h e i r  
p o p u l a t i o n  o r  t h e i r  v o t i n g  s t r e n g t h .  S e c o n d ly ,  t h e  r e s e r v a t i o n  o f  
a s e a t  f o r  Musl ims on t h e  b a s i s  o f  a s e p a r a t e  communal f r a n c h i s e  would 
p e r p e t u a t e  c o n f l i c t  b e tw een  t h e  two c om m un i t i e s  and be d e t r i m e n t a l  
t o  t h e  i n t e r e s t s  o f  b o t h  I n d i a n s  and F i j i .  T h i r d l y ,  t h e  Government  
o f  I n d i a  s t i l l  a d h e re d  t o  i t s  p r i n c i p l e  o f  common r o l l .  Even i f  
t h e  C o l o n i a l  O f f i c e  d i s a g r e e d  w i t h  t h e  t h i r d  p r o p o s i t i o n ,  i t  c o u l d  
n o t  deny th e  v a l i d i t y  o f  t h e  two p r e c e d i n g  o n e s .
I n  I n d i a ,  I n d i a n  p o l i t i c i a n s  were a g a i n s t  r e c o g n i t i o n  o f  communal 
s e p a r a t i s m ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  t h e y  c o u l d  n o t  o b l i g e  Musl ims i n  F i j i .  Again 
t h e  i n t e r v e n t i o n  o f  I n d i a  had  p ro v ed  c r u c i a l  on a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  
i s s u e  a f f e c t i n g  F i j i .  I t  was I n d i a  a l s o  which  by i t s  a d v i c e  was to  
dampen Muslim hopes  o f  s e e i n g  t h e  a p p l i c a t i o n  o f  Muslim law i n  F i j i  
f o r  t h a t  r e l i g i o u s  group  i n  such  m a t t e r s  a s  i n h e r i t a n c e ,  m a r r i a g e  
and d i v o r c e . ^
The Muslim League t r e a t e d  t h e  r e f u s a l  o f  s e p a r a t e  r e p r e s e n t a t i o n
as  t e m p o r a r y .  Dur ing  t h e  d i s c u s s i o n  i n  t h e  t h i r t i e s  on
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  change  i t  made new s u b m i s s i o n s .  I t  a l t o g e t h e r
r e p u d i a t e d  th e  e l e c t i v e  s y s t e m .  Common r o l l  was d i s m i s s e d  as
i d e a l i s m  w i t h  no r e a l  a d v a n ta g e  t.o any community and i t s  c o n t i n u e d
p u r s u i t  was ' a  v i n d i c t i v e  demand'  which  had b r o u g h t  ' i m m e a s u r a b l e
harm'  and c r e a t e d  r a c i a l  a n i m o s i t i e s  u n l i k e l y  t o  be a s s u a g e d  f o r  
52some t im e .  As t h e  G ove rnm e n t -c hose n  r o a d  b o a r d s  and a d v i s o r y
49 F i j i  Muslim League t o  C o l . S e c .  31 Aug. 1932;  C .S .O .  CF5/2 .
50 C.O. t o  F l e t c h e r  Conf .  5 Aug. 1932.
51 C.,0. t o  Gov. Conf .  13 Feb .  1937-
52 C .S .O.  CF38/3 .
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committees had been functioning well, Muslims thought the nomination 
system would be the best method for the protection of minority rights. 
The Government ought to resort to nomination immediately and bear 
in mind separate Muslim representation. One group of Muslims went 
further and suggested that the Government nominate those born and 
bred in Fiji, with its interests at heart, not birds of passage 
who had merely come to reap a fortune, for these could not be trusted
33as their tactics were aimed at personal gain. When the Letters 
Patent of 1937 were published the Muslims were disappointed and asked 
the Governor, unsuccessfully, for an amendment. But when the 
Governor came to select the two Indian nominated members, one was a c'r'
Muslim, S.Hasan. Thereafter this became an established convention.^ 
Muslims have continued to press for separate representation; the 
desire still persists and finds frequent expression but remains 
unsatisfied, and it seems unlikely that it will ever be granted now 
that Fiji is independent and the urgency for nation-building 
militates against separatist tendencies.
This is getting ahead of the story and anticipating events yet to 
be analysed. What ought to be established is that Indians no longer 
spoke -with a single voice on constitutional .change. Muslim
33 Those who stipulated this proviso were: A.R.Sahu, M„T.Khan,
A.Kalam, Sahu Khan (Snr.), M.Esahaq Khan, Ramzan Khan, Ilaiii 
Khan, Gulam Nabi, Haider Buksh, Mohammed Nazeer Khan. These 
men were not in the Muslim League which by this stage had become 
a Sunni organization. These belonged to the Ahmadiyya sect 
which at the time comprised the better educated and more 
progressive element, and their newspaper was the Message of 
Islam. Their request for a Fiji-born was very likely directed 
against the Hasans, who at this stage were playing a prominent 
role in guiding the League and Sunni interests. Though the 
Sunni-Ahmadiyya controversy was raging vehemently at the time, 
the two groups were united in the call for separate Muslim 
representation.
5U President, Fiji Muslim League to Gov. 19 Aug. 1937, asked that 
separate Muslim representation be entrenched in the new Letters 
Patent. Col.Sec. to Fiji Muslim League, 6 Oct. 1937, replied 
that the Governor was not prepared to comply. C.S.O. F38/27.
33 No Muslim won election to the Fiji Legislative Council until 
1963.
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separatism illustrated that it was not just Fijians and Europeans 
who were afraid of the consequences of a political system where 
the voice of an ethnic majority might hold sway. Within the Indian 
community itself, a significant minority, the Muslims, who based 
their uniqueness on religion, found it equally imperative that 
Government control should persist. For its part, the Government 
found itself unable to ignore either the Fijian and European 
consternation or Muslim uncertainty. It determined, its action on 
an interpretation of Indian politics that took cognizance of the 
fears of others.
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TOWARDS RETROGRESSION
INDIAN advocates of common roll were bound to be isolated* The 
previous three chapters have amply indicated this: the defeat of
the common roll motion in the Legislative Council, its repudiation 
by Fijian political opinion and the Muslims* counter-demand for 
separate representation. The error of Indian strategy should 
have been obvious to the politicians of the community but in their 
determination to obtain redress for what they considered their 
grievances and a stigma of inferiority upon themselves they tended 
to be excessively single-minded. They saw common roll as the 
panacea, hence they wanted nought else as the initial step in the 
recognition of their equal status in their new land. But their 
tactics had the opposite of the desired effectj they proved 
counter-productive. The Government felt let down, the Europeans 
were angered, the Fijians appeared threatened and the Indian 
community became permanently divided. This near unanimous 
alienation from others proved disastrous not merely for the Indians 
themselves but for political development through the elective 
principle in the colony as a whole. Moreover, Indian politial 
assertion coincided with the return of a Labour Government in 
Britain, a government considered by European settlers in Fiji and 
Kenya likely to be sympathetic to the Indian cause. The efforts 
of the Labour Secretary of State for the Colonies, Lord Passfield 
to resolve the Kenyan problem gave substance to this belief. And 
in Fiji events in Kenya were followed closely by both Europeans and 
Indians.
But it was not just occurrences in Kenya that caused a 
reaction in Fiji; Passfield*s attempt to settle the issue of the 
municipal franchise aroused an immediately defensive reaction. The 
Government in Fiji had not been able to accommodate Indian objections 
to the strict literacy test imposed in 1915* At the beginning of
VIII
1 See Gregory 1971 Chapter X, 331-37k for a discussion of Passfield 
and Kenya.
2 See Chapter II pp.60-61; Chapter IV pp.123-132.
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1931 P a s s f ie ld  communicated to  th e  Governor, S ir  Murchison F le tc h e r ,
th e  sug g estio n  of th e  Government of In d ia  th a t  th e  l i t e r a c y
q u a l i f ic a t io n  fo r  th e  m unic ipal f ra n c h is e  be made th e  same as th a t
3
re q u ire d  to  q u a lify  as an e le c to r  f o r  th e  L e g is la tiv e  C ouncil« '
T his meant th e  in c lu s io n  o f c e r ta in  In d ian  languages: H ind i, Urdu,
Tam il, Telegu and G u je ra t i .  P a s s f ie ld  p o in te d  ou t th a t  th e  
Government had done com paratively  l i t t l e  to  a s s i s t  In d ia n s  to  
o b ta in  educa tion  in  E ng lish  in  lo c a l  schoo ls hence i t  was f a i r  th a t  
t h e i r  a b i l i t y  to  read  o r w rite  one o f t h e i r  own s t ip u la te d  
languages should enab le  them to  vo te  f o r  m unic ipal r e p re s e n ta t iv e s .  
P a s s f ie ld ,  however, made c le a r  th a t  he was n o t advocating  complete 
d em o cra tiza tio n  o f th e  m unic ipal c o n s t i tu t io n  which he adm itted  
would le ad  to  In d ian  dom ination . He recognized  th a t  n a tiv e  
i n t e r e s t s  came f i r s t  and u lt im a te  c o n tro l must l i e  w ith  the  
Government to  ensure th a t  t h i s  was n o t d is re g a rd ed  by an 
a d m in is tra tio n  dom inated by In d ia n s . But, he added, th a t  th a t  was 
much more im portan t as reg a rd s  th e  c o n s t i tu t io n  o f th e  whole 
colony r a th e r  th an  in  connection  w ith  m unic ipal a f f a i r s .  B esides, 
P a s s f ie ld  argued, F i j i a n  s o c ie ty  was founded on lan d  w hile  th e  
towns were th e  c re a t io n  of th e  im m igrants. He went on to  make 
se v e ra l o th e r  p o in ts  which a re  summarized in  th e  r e s t  o f the  
pa rag rap h . F i j i a n  elem ents in  th e  m u n ic ip a lity  were u n lik e ly  to  
be as s tro n g  as in  th e  country  w hile  urban F i j ia n s  were cu t o f f  
from communal l i f e  which th e  B r i t i s h  were in  fav o u r o f p ro te c t in g .
No s u b s ta n t ia l  in ju ry  to  F i j i a n  i n t e r e s t s  would r e s u l t  from In d ian  
c o n tro l o f th e  m u n ic ip a li t ie s  excep t th a t  i t  m ight s tre n g th en  In d ian  
demands to  c o n tro l th e  L e g is la t iv e  C ouncil. IG iether In d ian s  in  
F i j i  were s u i ta b le  to  c o n tro l dem ocratic  i n s t i t u t i o n s  and work them 
e f f i c i e n t ly  experience  alone could d e c id e . And th e  Government must 
face  th e  f a c t  th a t  In d ia n  demands f o r  e le c t iv e  i n s t i t u t i o n s  e x is te d  
no m a tte r f o r  wTh a t reason  and. must remember th a t  i t  was e a s ie r  to  
a d m in is te r a system of government accep tab le  to  th e  governed than  
one th ey  d is l ik e d .  B esides th e  In d ian s  had been brought to  F i j i  by 
th e  Government and th e re  could be no q u es tio n  th a t  w ith  due regard  to
3 C .A .8/3.
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F i j i a n  i n t e r e s t s ,  th e y  should  be t r e a te d  f a i r l y  and w ithou t 
d is c r im in a t io n . A voiding In d ia n  c o n tro l of th e  m u n ic ip a lity  
would be suspec ted  and In d ia n s  would see i t  as a d e l ib e ra te  evasion  
of reform s demanded and t h i s  cou ld  n o t be done i f  an e le c te d  co u n cil 
was m a in ta in ed » The e f f e c t  would be an ex ac e rb a tio n  of r a c i a l  
f e e l in g .  Hence th e  S e c re ta ry  o f S ta te  w ished to  avoid  a d r a s t ic  
measure by th e  s u b s t i tu t io n  o f w holly  o r la rg e ly  nominated co u n c ils  
in  p lace  o f th e  p re s e n t e le c te d  M unicipal C ouncil. As th e  main 
p o in t was to  ensure  e f f i c i e n t  con tinuance  o f s e rv ic e s  such as p u b lic  
h e a l th ,  i t  was e s s e n t i a l  t h a t  th e se  remained in  th e  c o n tro l o f the  
c e n tr a l  Government. The problem  was to  re c o n c ile  p o pu lar 
management of m unic ipal a f f a i r s  w ith  Government c o n tro l fo r  
e f f ic ie n c y . There were v a rio u s  methods to  ach ieve  t h i s .  The 
despatch  suggested  an e le c te d  c o u n c il w ith  a mayor p o sse ss in g  wide 
powers and appoin ted  by th e  c e n t r a l  Government. Suva and Levuka 
should ex p lo re  th e  p o s s i b i l i t y  o f r e ta in in g  e le c te d  m unicipal 
c o u n c il lo rs  w ith  an o f f i c i a l  chairm an who m ight have s p e c ia l  powers 
in  connection  w ith  f in a n c e , appo in tm en ts, e t c . ,  e i th e r  independen tly  
of th e  Council o r by way o f v e to  o r o th e rw ise . Another check on 
th e  e le c te d  Council could, in c lu d e  th e  m aintenance o f an e f f i c i e n t  
a u d i t ,  of s to re s  as w e ll as cash and in c lu d in g  com parative co s tin g  
where p ra c t ic a b le  by a Government o f f i c i a l .  The Governor could have 
th e  power to  ve to  ex p en a itu re  i f  th e  Council f a i l e d  to  m ain ta in  o r 
r a is e  th e  s tan d a rd  of e f f ic ie n c y  in  p u b lic  s e rv ic e s . In sp e c tio n s  
could be i n s t i t u t e d  -  annual o r fre q u e n t checks on p a r t i c u la r  
s e rv ic e s , ju d ic io u s  use of g r a n t- in - a id ,  r e te n t io n  by c e n tr a l  
Government of s p e c ia l power in  r e la t io n  to  c e r ta in  s e rv ic e s  which 
in  more developed communities a re  norm ally  th e  sphere o f m unicipal 
c o n tro l. Lord P a s s f ie ld  recommended a m unic ipal co u n c il e lected , on 
a common fra n c h ise  w ith  th e  Government r e ta in in g  wide powers of 
s u rv e il la n c e . lh i s  would n e i th e r  an tagon ize  In d ia n s  nor je o p a rd ize  
e f f ic ie n c y .
F le tc h e r  d iscussed  the  su b jec t w ith  th e  Executive Council and 
then  sen t a len g th y  re p ly .^  As he to ld  th e  L e g is la t iv e  Council
h L.C.Debates 1935:257.
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four years later, he opposed the widening of the franchise as 
advocated by Passfield because it would lead to Indian domination.''
In his despatch to Passfield he elaborated and his arguments are 
paraphrased here. The Indian population in Fiji did not have a 
genuine desire for democratic institutions. The educated element 
in it were alert and argumentative and would exploit any grievance 
to the full with the oriental flair for bargaining. These nursed a 
real grievance against whites who insisted on ignoring them socially. 
The whites for their part were arrogant because of their skin and 
regarded coloured persons as inferior. let despite admitting this, 
Fletcher confided in Hedstrom and Scott. He continued that the 
large majority of the Indians worked on the land and were originally 
recruited from the lower classes, including untouchables.
Fiji-Indians debated the question of representative institutions 
only now and then; the real stimulus came from India and the 
nationalists there. Common roll was demanded in Kenya and Fiji 
because it would lead to Indian domination over the Europeans but 
there was silence on it in India where various minorities and 
special interests v;ere catered for by communal franchise. Most of 
the Fiji-Indians were permanently occupied with domestic matters 
such as disputes between Arya Samajis and Sanatanis and Hindus 
versus Muslims, and the sporadic interest of the 1929 election 
had now faded and the leaders had lost their following. Fletcher 
ignored the strength of Vishnu Deo, chief advocate of common roll.
He concluded that the situation in Fiji was similar to that in 
Hong Kong after the war where the Chinese preferred Government 
control to an elected European majority.
Fletcher repeated at length the attitudes of the other 
communities. The Europeans in Fiji were imbued with Australian 
ideas on the colour question. The Fijians tolerated but despised 
and. distrusted Indians. Fijian communalism was gradually giving way 
to individualism which was essential for their survival in 
competition with Indians and others. At that stage it was unwise to 
move in the direction of self-government with the more important 
institutions until the Fijian could hold his own. Fletcher here
$ ibid
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ignored Passfield’s valid separation of Fijian interests and 
municipal control. In his view the interests of the races were 
divergent. He suggested that the growth of the Colony required 
Fijian and Indian interests to be separately represented - a 
specious argument for development necessitated a national not racial 
approach. Though he conceded that the Indians objected to the 
present Council because their interests were insufficiently 
represented he warned against common roll which would put power 
into the hands of one community. Therefore the Municipal Council 
ought to be controlled by the Government and sectional interests 
represented by communally elected candidates. Fletcher quoted 
the Secretary of Indian Affairs as saying that Indians sought some 
representation to voice their grievances and that it ought to be 
borne in mind that though the Fijian population of Suva was a 
fluctuating one, both the Government and the Fijians had 
considerable interests in the port there.
In support of his arguments Fletcher had enclosed a memorandum 
prepared for him by Scott and Hedstrom and submitted on 12 May 1931. 
The background to this document is noteworthy. On receipt of 
Passfield’s despatch, Fletcher had sent for Hedstrom and Scott.^ 
Fletcher already knew that Scott and Hedstrom were against any 
change in the municipal constitution and were even more opposed to
7common franchise. Thus it is not unfair to conclude that what 
Fletcher was in fact seeking was support. This he obtained for 
the Scott-Hedstrom memorandum emphasized that:
(1) common roll in the municipality would lead to an Indian 
domination and resentment by Fijians and Europeans;
(2) it was largely Europeans who had brought the municipality 
to the present high level of efficiency and they would not 
happily view sanitation and health, for instance, under 
Indian control, especially as the most unsanitary and 
unhealthy areas like Toorak and Rewa Street were those 
occupied by that community;
6 Scott divulged this in a public address in Suva on 10 Nov. 1933ji 
F.T. 11 Nov. 1933.
7 Both Scott (Chairman) and Hedstrom had served on the commission 
to consider the Municipal Franchise. The majority report to 
which they were signatories had advised against any amendment 
to the existing ordinance (C.P.390/29). See pp.123-132.
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(3) able men would refuse to participate in municipal affairs 
if Indians took over.
There was no immediate action taken by the Colonial Office to 
Fletcher’s reply to Passfield. The delay aided Fletcher for in 
August 1931 a new Secretary of State for the Colonies took office, 
a conservative, Sir Philip Cunliffe-Lister. Fletcher was also
assisted by the Indian boycott of the Fiji Legislative Council.
During the Governor’s consideration of the Passfield proposals the 
Indians by their own action had no representatives of their own.
No onus was therefore placed on the Governor to seek representative 
Indian opinion and convey it to London. There is little doubt that 
Indians would have supported the suggestion of incD.uding Indian 
languages as a qualification for the municipal franchise which was 
already on a common roll basis. But the possibility of making 
the qualifications for the municipal franchise similar to those in 
the Legislative Council raised other spectres. If it could be 
argued in the first instance that literacy qualifications for the 
municipal vote should be the same as those for the Legislative 
Council and if this were conceded, then the next step could be to 
press for a similarity of franchise. It might then be contended 
that if common franchise were permissible for the municipal elections 
then it ought to be so for the Legislative Council. The 
prevalence of the common franchise in the municipality could be us°d 
to argue that the principle of common roll as such was not invalid. 
But for Fletcher, the Europeans, the Fijians and the Muslims, the 
very principle of common roll was abhorrent because it implied 
Hindu-Indian domination.
Mien the new Indian representatives entered the Legislative 
Council in 1932 they again pressed for common franchise. Apart 
from the Muslims, the Indians in 1932 were still solidly in favour 
of common roll. Miere there was disagreement was in the tactics to 
be used for the achievement of their goal. The Arya Samaji faction 
led by Vishnu Deo and responsible for the election of K.B.Singh 
still favoured boycott. They had been forced to slightly mend their 
position when Narbahadur Singh had decided to contest the seat for 
the Southern Indian constituency. The strength of Vishnu Deo and 
his Arya Samaji supporters was amply illustrated twice. First in 
the 1932 election when K.B.Singh defeated Narbahadur Singh by
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3U1 v o te s  to  92 and again  a t  th e  b y -e le c tio n  in  1933 n e c e s s i ta te d  
by K .B .S ingh 's  re s ig n a tio n  when th e  Council and then  th e  S e c re ta ry  
o f S ta te  rep u d ia ted  h is  motion f o r  th e  in tro d u c tio n  o f common r o l l .
To v in d ic a te  h is  support among th e  In d ian s  K.B.Singh re c o n te s te d  th e  
s e a t ,  again  h is  opponent was Narbahadur S ingh. This tim e only  
i|3/b o f th e  e le c to r s  voted  and Narbahadur Singh l o s t  h is  d e p o s it  o f
£25* '
The low p o l l  in  th e  b y -e le c t io n  m ight be in te r p r e te d  as a
d e c lin e  o f i n t e r e s t  among th e  In d ia n s . Even more im portan t was th e
d iv is io n  th a t  was becoming a p p a ren t. For in s ta n c e , Munsami M udaliar
who had been e le c te d  unopposed to  th e  N orthern  and W estern In d ian
se a t did no t re s ig n  and seek r e e le c t io n  as K.B.Singh d id  in  1933.
9
A pparently  h is  mandate was to  co -o p e ra te  w ith  th e  Government.
This was an in d ic a t io n  th a t  th e  r u r a l  In d ian s  were s h i f t in g  from 
t h e i r  e a r l i e r  p o lic y  of b o y c o tt. But t h i s  d id  n o t seem to  be th e  
case in  th e  u rb a n /ru ra l  Southern c o n s titu en c y  which in c lu d ed  Suva,
i f  one accep ts  th e  a n a ly s is  p u b lish ed  by a non-Arya Samaji newspaper.
10I t  ta b u la te d  th e  d iv is io n  among th e  In d ia n s  as fo llo w s :
1929 1932
Non-c o o p e ra t io n is ts 68 30h
P ro g re ss iv e s 163 92
O b s tru c tio n is ts U19 3U1
Inform al 13 39
TOTAL 663 776
8 See Appendix IX f o r  th e  r e s u l t s .
9 C.S.O. CF5/2. A re p o r t  speaks o f a m eeting arranged  by two cane 
growers from Ba, Randhir Singh and Ramkewal S ingh, and p re s id ed  by 
Munsami M udaliar, on 11 Ju ly  1932. Between 300 and U00 a tten d ed  
and i t  vjas reso lved  th a t  th e  In d ian  r e p re s e n ta t iv e  from th a t  
co n stitu en cy  should, co -o p e ra te  w ith  th e  Government in  every  
p o ss ib le  way. When in  Suva and in  th e  p resence of Vishnu Deo 
and S .B .P a te l ,  M udaliar, be ing  a l e s s  f o r c e fu l  man in  such 
company, tended to  abide by t h e i r  in s t r u c t io n s .  But when w ith o u t 
t h e i r  p re sen ce , he p re fe r re d  h i s  own judgem ent.
10 V rid d h i, 12 S ep t. 1932.
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In the absence of contrary evidence if the table is accepted as at 
least approximating the truth then the conclusion is that Indian 
attitudes in the Southern constituency had moved strongly towards 
non-cooperation with the Government in the quest for common roll.
When the number in this category is added to the obstructionists 
then it becomes evident that Indian opinion in the area was 
overwhelmingly negative.
Yet its opponents were not so, particularly Murchison Fletcher.
While on leave in England during late 1932 and early 1933 he had
visited the Colonial Office and. put forward his case against common
roll.^ In May 1933 he had told the Colonial Office that his arguments
were based on advice he received from his Executive Council (this
included Scott and Marks) and he admitted that he had not hitherto
consulted local opinion though he promised that on his return to Fiji he
would put to eacn community the idea of having nominated members for
12the municipal councils. Fletcher had also consulted the incumbent 
mayor of Suva, G.F.Grahame as early as 2U September 1932. Grahame 
argued, that the number of Indian electors was cn the rise and with 
improvements in education there would be a rapid growth until 
sufficient young Indians would qualify to elect their own 
councillors who would ultimately become a majority. Not even the 
ward system would be a counter, for only one or two wards would be 
European and others predominantly Indian because this implied one 
councillor to so many ratepayers. With the increase in the number 
of Indians the present difficulty of obtaining suitable candidates 
for the Council -would be aggravated. At all points town affairs 
touched the interests of large property owners and big businesses 
and five or six of these corporations expressly or tacitly debarred 
their employees from participation in municipal politics. For his 
part the small business man having to tend his affairs himself could 
not afford the time for any active involvements in municipal affairs. 
The Council and. municipality depended for administration on the 
Maypr who received no remuneration, having to spend from his own
11 His presence in England coincided with that of Hedstrom and 
together they had. several discussions with officials at 
Whitehall, including the Secretary of State. Among the topics 
discussed wras the constitution.
12 C.A.8/12.
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private accounts and to do a lot more to ascertain efficiency as the
13t o m ’s affairs grew beyond cleaning footpaths and drains.
Fletcher returned to Fiji on 3 August 1933 when the Legislative 
Council was in recess. It was to reassemble on 13 October for the 
Budget Session and the Governor was to put forward his proposals for 
the municipal franchise on this occasion, his earliest opportunity 
to do so. Meanwhile he sought to sound out opinion. He was already 
aware that the Indian Government which was bound to comment on such an 
important issue preferred the elective system with the division of 
the municipality of Suva into wards. [ Provided the Indian 
community acquiesced it would accept Government control with Indian 
and European members elected on a widened franchise that put Indian 
languages on par with English. It recommended the consultation 
with and support from Indian opinion. Some time before his budget
speech Fletcher spoke to Vishnu Deo who agreed to the Governor’s
13proposals to reconstruct the municipal council. Admittedly this
is based purely on Fletcher’s account but there is no reason to
doubt his word. Vishnu Deo was frequently neither constant nor
consistent.^ Also on 9 October, the Inspecting Medical Officer
had told the Governor that he had discussed the subject with
Indians (unspecified) in North-West Viti Levu and to his surprise
17had found them favourable to Government control.
Fletcher could also count on the support of the two Indian 
elected members. Mudaliar as has been mentioned earlier favoured 
co-operation. On 23 August 1933 he had been appointed the first
13 C.A.3/13. Minute, Fletcher, 9 Sept.1933
1l4 Enel. C.O. to O.A.G.Conf. 27 June 1933.
13 C.A.8/l3. Minutes, Fletcher, 3 Sept.1933
16 Early in 1932 Vishnu Deo was convicted and fined in a case 
involving the dissemination of pornographic literature. Thus
he was disqualified from contesting the elections. He petitioned 
the Governor to remove his political disability to enable him to 
be a contestant. When his petition failed he changed his 
strategy and called for a boycott of the elections. This too 
failed when Narbahadur Singh decided to enter the race; 
then Vishnu Deo successfully put up K.B.Singh as a 
candidate. C.P.11/33.
17 C.A.8/17.
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In d ian  J u s t ic e  o f th e  Peace. The Governor f e l t  h is  a c tio n  
j u s t i f i e d  because M udaliar had ’a s o lid  b lock  of Ind ian  
a g r i c u l tu r a l i s t s  behind him* though th e  Arya-Sam aji F i j i  Sarnachar
a sc rib ed  i t  to  continued  p a r t ic ip a t io n  in  th e  L e g is la tiv e  Council
18and the  b e tra y a l  o f th e  In d ian  cause . The A cting C o lon ia l 
S e c re ta ry , A .A .F rig h t, a lso  f e l t  th a t  M udaliar was being  rewarded
19fo r  no t re s ig n in g  and r e s i s t i n g  p re s su re s  from Vishnu Deo to  do so .
F r ig h t f e l t  M udaliar remained in  co u n c il f o r  p e rso n a l m otives
which 'may p a r t ly  have been th a t  he enjoyed th e  g lo ry  and s o c ia l
p re s t ig e  a tta ch ed  to  th e  p o s i t io n  and was n o t u n a p p re c ia tiv e
20of i t s  f in a n c ia l  a d v a n ta g e s '. W right concluded:
I f  in  th e  In d ia n  community he i s  more o r l e s s  a cypher, 
and i f  i t  i s  adm itted  t h a t  he i s  a 'dummy' member, I  do 
n o t fav o u r th e  p ro p o sa l to  make him a J .P .
The In d ian  member from th e  Southern c o n s titu e n c y , K .B .Singh,
was a lso  r e t r e a t in g  from h is  p rev io u s  uncompromising p o s i t io n .
By ta k in g  h is  s e a t  in  Council in  Ju ly  1933 a f t e r  h is  b y -e le c tio n
v ic to ry  Singh had d e f ie d  h is  su p p o rte rs  who in  accordance w ith
t h e i r  p ro fesse d  p o lic y  o f no n -co o p era tio n  expected  h is  re s ig n a tio n .
Next Singh had sen t th rough th e  S e c re ta ry  o f In d ian  A ffa irs  a
l e t t e r  dated  1U Ju ly  1933 to  th e  C lerk o f Council w ith  h is  common
r o l l  m otion. But he had req u ested  th a t  th e  l e t t e r  be d e l ib e r a te ly
delayed so th a t  by th e  tim e th e  C lerk of Council rece iv ed  i t  i t
would be too  l a t e  w ith in  th e  term s of th e  S tanding  O rders f o r  him
21to  in tro d u ce  h is  m otion in  th e  Ju ly  C ession . By O ctober he was
inform ing th e  Governor th a t  he d id  n o t regard  common r o l l  as
im portan t to  F i j i - I n d ia n s  a t  th e  tim e and he would n o t r a is e  the
22is su e  again  in  th e  L e g is la t iv e  C ouncil. In s te a d  he would
co n cen tra te  on 'm a t te r s  a f f e c t in g  t h e i r  / ~ i . e .  In d ia n s ' 7 s o c ia l ,
23economic, and g en e ra l w e l f a r e '.  And a t  an in te rv ie w  w ith  the  
Governor on 7 O ctober 1933 bo th  Singh and M udaliar had expressed  
a hope of rem aining in  th e  C ouncil. F le tc h e r ,  however, knew
18 C.S.O. CF51/12. F i j i  Sarnachar, 26 Aug. 1933. The d e c is io n  to  
make In d ian s  J .P . s  was made in  th e  Executive Council in  Sept. 
1932. I t  was opposed by S c o tt and Hedstrom who argued th a t  
In d ian s  would abuse t h e i r  p o s i t io n .
19 C.S.O.CF51/12.
20 ib id .
21 C.S.O. CF5A.
22 C.S.O. CF5/3.
23 i b i d .
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before the announcement of his municipal scheme that the two
Indian members had been denounced at public meetings for remaining 
9)in Council/' He could at this early stage ignore this,
provided the elected members were with him.
More important Fletcher could expect Fijian opinion not to
defy him. The Council of Chiefs in the past had aligned itself
with the Government and. there was no reason to believe that they
would do otherwise on this crucial issue. He could also rely on
another quarter. At its 11th Annual Conference (29 September to
10 October 1933) the Viti Cauravou had resolved that Indians should
not be chosen as municipal councillors. Since Fiji had been
ceded to Britain and not India, Europeans should be appointed
instead of Indians. The resolution continued%
India is under Britain -r Britain is not under India, 
therefore it is not right that one belonging to India 
should rule over Europeans but that the Indian in 
Fiji should be subject to the Europeans.
The Indians in times past have been the cause of some big 
happenings in this Colony, and we believe that if their 
aspirations are realized, there may be similar happenings in 
the days to come. This is a matter of some concern to the 
Fijian.
We Fijians do not approve of some of the actions and 
character of the Indians as we see them. It is therefore 
not possible for us to support the Indian in this their 
intention and we strongly urge that at no time in the future 
will it be made possible for them to be appointed to positions 
of leadership in this Colony. 25
With equal emphasis the Viti Cauravou disapproved of common roll
’at the present time' for the following reasons:
We are bound by the laws of our land and our customs at the 
present time.
Only a small percentage is as yet sufficiently educated to 
undertake these responsibilities
Very few of us have yet been able to establish ourselves in 
bus5.ness undertakings.
It is true that there are more Fijians than any other race 
in the Colony and the Indians come next in number. Should 
there be an election on the Common Roll it is clear that a 
large majority of Indians would be returned.. It is our 
desire to remain united with the Europeans but not with the 
Indians. 26
2h L.C.Debates 1933,162.
25 C.S.O. CF62/3.
26 ibid. The Government informed the Society that it had not 
accepted common roll and it would fully safeguard. Fijian 
interests in any change to the constitution of the Legislative 
and Municipal Councils.
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The significance of the Viti Cs.uravou comments lay in that
the society was completely aligned with its chiefs in rejecting
Indian political claims and any likelihood of participation with
that community and reaffirming an alliance with the Europeans, As
the Fijians and Indians were numerically the largest components in
the Colony’s population it was all the more important for future
constitutional change. The alliance of Fijian chiefs and
Europeans, both privileged groups, might have been expected. But
it seemed that even educated Fijian opinion found similarity of
interest with the Europeans; this was based on fear of the Indians.
But the press, both English and Hindi, was hostile; racial
and sectarian interests were temporarily shelved in the united
condemnation of the proposed changes and. these occurred even before
27Fletcher had delivered his address in the Legislative Council.
The Governor’s amendments were unanimously rejected as retrogressive
because ratepayers were to be deprived of a voice in the choice of
their nominees though they would continue to foot the bill. Those
deprecating change referred to the excellent record of the Suva
Municipal Council in reducing rates: from 10;gfl in the £ during
1927-30 to 10d in 1931, 9\£ in 1932 and 83;d in 1933« A council
that was progressively charging lower rates was efficient and
28economical, therefore, it was argued, it required no change.
Later Fletcher was to explain:
It is unnecessary for me to say that the Government has no 
fault to find with the manner in which the Municipalities 
have hitherto been catered for. The two Councils have 
done admirable work, and their long record of efficient 
and economical administration will not be lightly emulated. 29
The Suva Municipal Council which was to be directly affected at a
private meeting on 28 August 1933 voted against Government take-over
although it remained silent on the alternative of a wider franchise. °
27 III« ^  Sept. 1933, Vriddhi-Vani 16, 30 Sept.1933, Fiji- 
Samachar 9, 16 Oct.1933«
28 ibid.
29 L.C.Debates 1933:157.
30 C. A. 8/30.
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Then early in October at a special meeting the Council reso?Lved to 
inform the Colonial Secretary:
(a) that the scheme in the form proposed is not acceptable,
(b) the majority of official nominees is not acceptable,
(c) that an official chairman is not acceptable.
With both support and disapproval behind him Fletcher made his
announcement of 13 October 1933» It is essential to examine his
31speech in its entirety because of its significance. He referred 
to Section 19 of Ordinance IV (1909) which confined the municipal 
electorate to those able to read, write and speak English and 
mentioned that the 1927 Committee by a 5 to h majority recommended 
no change. Shortly after his arrival in Fiji the Secretary of State 
had asked him to consider permitting recognition of those Indian 
languages sanctioned by the 1929 Letters Patent because if these 
wore sufficient to qualify for the Government of the whole colony 
then there was no reason why anyone with a knowledge of one of these 
should be debarred from the affairs of a town or district. To 
allow this would mean equal recognition of Fijian, Chinese and 
Samoan languages and ’it was plain that this broadening of the 
literacy qualification would in effect introduce a municipal 
common roll’. So he had informed the Secretary of State that while 
local self-government was valuable training for citizenship, 
the absence of racial homogeneity in Fiji made this step 
undesirable in the Colony; it would mean Indian domination and 
would be resented by Europeans and Fijians. From the incomplete 
figures, as he admitted at his disposal he deduced that the 
extension of literacy franchise would mean an Indian majority in 
the Suva roll, something unwanted by both Europeans and Fijians.
In his opinion Indians would not press for common roll when 
confronted with Fijian-Europeah opposition. Therefore he advised 
against ’advance in the direction of self-government in respect of 
the more important institutions of the Colony. . . . and could 
see no alternative for the municipalities other than
31 L.C.Debates 1933:156-157.
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Government control on the lines of the constitution of the
Legislative Council'. Translated into practical terms, it meant
a municipal council with a majority of civil servants and a
minority of Indians and Europeans elected on a communal franchise
and Fijians nominated by the Governor on the recommendation of the
Council of Chiefs. Thus the Europeans and Indians would still
separately elect their own representatives and not leave it to the
Governor to nominate them. Equal representation of each race was
'an integral part' of the proposals. However, any system of
government 'should be as far as possible in accordance with the
wishes of the governed'. Consequently Sir Philip Cunliffe-Lister,
the Secretary of State, sought the views of each community
separately and each elected member was asked, to explain the issue
to his constituents and report their decision at the February 193U
session of the Legislative Council. The Governor directed:
The issue is easily defined. It is the choice between on 
the one hand the introduction of a bill to establish a 
municipal common roll and on the other acceptance of central 
Government control.
Considered within the context of the whole announcement 'central 
Government control' did not necessarily mean the loss of the 
elective principle in favour of nomination. In the Legislative 
Council the Government had control despite elections by secret 
ballot f^r the choice of six Europeans and three Indians and. no 
civil servant could cast even a single vote for the purpose. But 
in its letter to the Municipal Council of Suva on 30 August 1933 
the Government interpreted 'Government control’ to mean that 
unofficial representatives would be nominated by the Governor. 
Fletcher aimed to deprive the citizens of Suva and. Levuka of any 
voice in the selection of those who would direct the expenditure of 
their rates.
The interlude between October 1933 and March 193U when the 
municipal constitution was debated, in the Legislative Council was 
used to test opinion. The representatives of the people had been 
requested to explain the issues to their constituents and to obtain 
their response.
From the Council of Chiefs meeting during November at historic 
Bau, the Governor received encouraging support:
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R eso lu tion  17: That t h i s  Council i s  em p h atica lly  and
unanimously in  favou r of th e  c o n tro l of th e  M unicipal 
Councils of Suva and Levuka being  taken  over by the  
Government; of th e  Mayors being Government nominees; 
of a nominated o f f i c i a l  m a jo rity  on th e  Council and of 
th e  n o n - o f f ic ia l  m in o rity  c o n s is tin g  o f F i j i a n ,  In d ia n , 
and European members, w ith  equal re p re se n ta tio n  of each 
of th e  th re e  ra c e s .
R eso lu tion  16: That t h i s  Council re co rd s  i t s  s tro n g  and
unanimous op in ion  th a t  F i j i ,  having been ceded to  Her M ajesty 
th e  Queen of G reat B r i ta in  and I r e la n d , Her H eirs and 
S uccesso rs, th e  im m igrant In d ian  p o p u la tio n  should n e i th e r  
d i r e c t ly  nor in d i r e c t ly  have any p a r t  in  th e  c o n tro l or 
d ir e c t io n  of m a tte rs  a f f e c t in g  th e  i n t e r e s t s  of th e  F i j ia n  
r a c e . 32
This coupled w ith  th e  r e s o lu t io n s  e a r l i e r  passed by th e  V it i  
Cauravou stren g th en ed  th e  Governor’s hand to  th e  p o in t of making 
v ic to ry  c e r ta in .  The paramountcy of F i j i a n  i n t e r e s t s  had been the  
o f te n -re p e a te d  p roclam ation  o f th e  c o lo n ia l  regime and th e  F i j i a n  
people were g iv ing  t h e i r  b le s s in g  to  F le tc h e r 's  recommendations.
The a t t i tu d e s  of th e  o th e r  communities could  n o t be accep ted  i f  
th ey  appeared to  th re a te n  th e  F i j i a n  p o s i t io n .
Of th e  e le c te d  members S c o tt was th e  f i r s t  to  go to  h is  
c o n s t i tu e n ts  p u b lic ly  th rough a m eeting on 10 November 1933 in  the  
Suva Town H a ll under th e  chairm anship of th e  Mayor o f th e  town. I t  
was w e ll-a tte n d e d , though n o t to  th e  e x te n t of 700 people as S c o tt
33l a t e r  a s s e r te d ,  f o r  th e  c ap a c ity  of th e  h a l l  was no more th an  4OO.
Though S c o tt made h is  u su a l remarks on th e  is s u e ,  th o se  he was to
re p e a t again  and again  l a t e r ,  i t  i s  w orthw hile to  no te  th e
in fo rm atio n  th a t  he d ivu lged  f o r  th e  f i r s t  tim e . 4 He to ld  h is
e le c to ra te  th a t  a f t e r  F le tc h e r ’s a r r i v a l  in  F i j i  th e  new Governor
had sen t fo r  Maynard Hedstrom and h im se lf and to ld  them: th e
S e c re ta ry  o f S ta te  had req u ested  th e  G overnor's op in ion  on common
fra n c h is e  in  th e  M unicipal Council and th e  in c lu s io n  of f iv e
In d ian  d ia le c t s  as a  q u a l i f i c a t io n  to  v o te  as e x is te d  in  th e  case
of th e  L e g is la tiv e  C ouncil. F le tc h e r  wanted to  know? how he could
perm anently f o r e s t a l l  any such s te p s . And he r e f e r r e d  to  th e
memorandum th a t  he (S c o tt)  and Hedstrom had subm itted  to  F le tc h e r
33to  support th e  Governor. S c o tt to ld  th e  audience th a t  F i j i  was a 
B r i t i s h  coun try  and had to  be kep t so , by B r i t i s h  he meant
32 P roceed ings, 1933. C .P .8/ 3I1.
33 L.C. Debat es 193U:12l|..
3h F .T . 11 Nov. 1933.
33 See p .2 1 9 .
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of Anglo-Saxon parentage. Certain that Government control would 
come, Scott named officials whom he would recommend to the Governor 
for nomination. It was not that he did not want Indians 
represented, he claimed, but he did not think they were fit to 
manage the affairs of the community. Moreover, Fijians looked to 
Europeans for leadership and concessions to the Indians would be a 
betrayal of this trust. To press his point that Indian domination 
was a reality he quoted (out of context) from the British Labour 
Party’s avowed policy of rapid self-government for the colonies.
This had the desired effect upon his audience, which unanimously 
resolved that democracy was impracticable in a plural society and 
therefore the alternative of Government control of the municipality 
of Suva was preferable to that of popular control through common 
roll. So the Europeans had decided, at least publicly but, more 
important, in the presence of Sir Henry Scott; and it was done 
not by secret ballot but by a show of hands whereby each knew of 
his neighbour's action. Criticism of the meeting was not 
unexpected in the local Indian press. Scott was accused of 
frightening his audience with 'a harrowing picture of imaginary 
domination by Indians’ aimed at arousing anti-Indian feelings which 
would carry the meeting with him.'5
The Fiji Times joined the Indian press in the attack on Scott
37and described the meeting as futile as a test of public opinion."
It accused Scott of being an echo of the Governor who, and not the 
Secretary of State for the Colonies, had decided that the choice was 
either Government control or common roll, and it called on Fletcher 
to clarify the issue with Whitehall. Was it reasonable merely on 
the Governor’s vague statement of likely Indian domination to hold a 
quick meeting and then decide hurriedly to hand over the reins to the 
Government? Indian domination’ and the Labour Party were both 
designed, said the editor, ’to consolidate executive control by 
officials of the country and a few select individuals’.
3b Fiji Samachar 18 Nov. 1933.
37 F.T. 13 Nov. 1933.
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Scott and Hedstrom were collaborating with the Governor to ensure 
the permanence without menace of their own influence in the running 
of the Colony. Power they could not have, for the constitution of a 
Crown Colony precluded this danger. But paramount influence they 
did have, especially when Governors came to the Colony without 
special knowledge of its problems and relied for advice upon that 
minority of the marginally socially acceptable and financially 
successful who wove a protective cocoon around Government House 
and shielded, it from the squalor and dreams beyond. The Governors 
of Fiji, in the twentieth century, with the possible exception of 
Sir Eyre Hutson, on arrival were singularly ignorant about the 
Colony, its needs, its conflicts, the aspirations and fears of the 
plural society there.
Though from the proposed amendment Suva and Levuka were the 
towns to be affected, political action was not confined to them. A 
great deal of agitation took place elsewhere in Viti Levu, especially 
in the North-West, the argument being that what affected Suva, the 
capital, and the important centre in the country would have 
reverberations beyond its boundaries. J.P.Bayly, European member 
for the Western division, held meetings at Sigatoka, Nadi and 
Lautoka for his electorate who wTere told to choose between common roll 
and Government control. All chose the latter; at Sigatoka there was 
one dissentient, but at Nadi there was none; in Lautoka a bigoo
majority favoured Government c o n t r o l . H u g h  Ragg, representing
Europeans of the Northern division, found Ba and Penang unanimous in
30repudiating common roll and choosing the alternative. European 
public opinion would, albeit reluctantly, surrender their right to 
favour and concentrate power into the hands of officialdom rather 
than risk Indian domination. Common roll meant Indian rule, and 
for European opinion, public or otherwise, this was intolerable.
Again these views were expressed in public and voting was by a show 
of hands. Given the choice between common roll and. Government 
control there is no reason to believe that Europeans even by secret 
ballot would not have preferred the latter. Throughout, from when 
it first reared its head to thereafter, Europeans generally had been
38 L.C.Debates 1933:136.
39 ibid.
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consistent in remonstrating against common roll and there is no 
reason to believe that they had -undergone a volte face; even men 
such as Alport Barker, who now opposed Scott and Hedstrom, had no 
wish for this monster ever. The division lay in the contention of 
some that the alternatives offered were not the correct ones, and 
that common roll was not the alternative to the present situation.
The Indians, too, held their public meetings but, unlike their 
European counterparts, the two Indian members of the Legislative 
Council were not able to dictate terms. Indian politics was still 
very much under the thumb of Vishnu Deo and the Arya Samajis, as 
Government was completely aware.^ The Secretary of Indian Affairs
emphasized this, but added in January 1931* that though Arya Samajis 
were publicly antagonistic to the nomination system, Vishnu Deo had 
privately voiced acceptance of Government control either by election 
or nomination provided, the principle of equality was present; this 
attitude could be taken both as the moderate Indian viewpoint
expressed through Mudaliar and K.B.Singh and as representing the
) 1masses in so far as they understood equality. McGusty went on that 
moderate Indian opinion was on the side of settlement of racial 
differences by Government control while advanced Indian opinion led 
by Vishnu Deo desired power for its leaders regardless of all other 
considerations.
The first Indian public meeting was held at Ba on 3 December 
1933, with neither of the Indian members of the Legislative 
Council present. The chief spokesman, CrC.Singh, stated that 
Indians did not seek domination over other races nor did they want
representation in proportion to their numbers, all they desired was
' ). pto enjoy the citizenship of Her Majesty's Government. They 
vigorously opposed nomination as retrogressive and asked the Governor 
to call a conference to discuss’ the issue. They reiterated that 
their desire for common roll was ’to prevent bureaucracy being 
substituted for democracy’.
1*0 C.S.O. CFS/2.
1*1 ibid.
1*2 C. A. 8/1*2. C.C.Singh, Ba, to Gov. 6 Dec. 1933;
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The next meeting also took place in North-Western Viti Levu, at 
Lautoka on New Year’s day under the chairmanship of S.B.Patel. Both
K.B.Singh and Mudaliar were present. According to the former - 
who made many references to the point - the meeting was not a 
representative one because no representatives of Muslims, South 
Indians or the Sanatani sect of Hindus participated, and those
“  j ^
attending did so in their individual capacity. Discussion of 
representation in the Legislative Council was dropped and time 
devoted to the issue of land (the difficulty of Indians in obtaining 
enough of it under satisfactory tenure), an issue particularly 
relevant to the C3ne-farmers of the region.^
The meeting was well-attended and Hugh Ragg was present during 
the afternoon session. Resolutions were passed to be transmitted 
to the Governor of Fiji and the Viceroy of India
(1) A Commission be appointed with adequate Indian 
representation to examine the land question.
(2) District committees with S.B.Patel as chairman were to be 
set up to investigate the land question and to submit 
their findings to the Governor.
(3) A Planters’ Association should be formed to unify Indian 
planters in Fiji to safeguard their interests.
(L) The Conference adhered to common roll as communal
representation was not in Indian interests and unanimously 
protested against the attitude of the Indian Members of 
the Legislative Council and called for their resignation.
(3) The Conference was satisfied, with the municipal
constitution and supported the petition of the citizens 
of Suva.
(6) The Conference called for a monster petition to be sent to 
the Secretary of Starte for the Colonies.
The idea of setting-up farmers' associations originated with Vishnu 
Deo after he had been unsuccessful in forming a colony-wide 
organization which he wished to name the Indian National Congress of 
Fiji.
ii3 C.S.O. CF5/2.
hh Vrlddhi-Vani 2? Jan. 193U-
Ü3 Fiji Sana char 6, 19 Jan. 193U; 6 Feb. 193U.
1*6 Fiji Samachar 6 Jan. 193U.
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The meeting, designated All-Fiji Indian Conference, served as an 
expression of essentially Arya Samaj attitudes on local politics. It 
certainly found no favour with the two Indian members of the 
Legislative Council for K.B.Singh, in a letter to, and later in an 
interview with, the Governor, branded it as hostile and propagandist. 
He suggested that henceforth Government officials be present at all 
such meetings to refute false allegations, that an intelligence 
network be established immediately for Indian affairs, court action 
be taken against ringleaders who incited people to disrupt peace, 
and that conveners of meetings should submit their agenda to the
) 7police or the District Commissioner.4
Since both the above meetings had repudiated the Governor’s
scheme a third was called especially to approve them, with
assistance from Hugh Ragg and. the Manager of the C.S.R.Company in 
) ftBa/4 The chairman was one John Bairagi, a Fiji-born Indian
formerly a minister of the local Methodist Church who had broken
away with a group of followers out of opposition to the European
hierarchy of his Church. The meeting was held at Ba on Sunday
7 January ‘\93h with about 1;00 people present and its resolutions
li9indicate that it achieved what it set out to accomplish.
(1) it expressed gratitude to the Government for talcing steps 
to provide land for Indians and extending the term of 
tenure;
(2) the meeting representing all sections of the community 
maintained that the Lautoka conference was not 
representative of Indians as Muslims and Sana.tanis did 
not participate;
(3) the Indian M.L.Cs. should co-operate with the Government 
in the interests of the whole Colony;
(ii) the Indian community of Ba requested that Government take 
steps to discourage civil servants from talcing part in 
public meetings of a political nature.
hl C.S.O. CF£/2. C.A.8/U7.
1|8 K.B.Singh wrote to the Governor on 9 Jan. '\93hi ’This meeting 
was arranged to repudiate the resolutions passed by the Lautoka 
meeting.’ C.S.O. CF5/2.
h9 Vriddhi-Vani 27 Jan. '\93h* C.S.O. CF5/2.
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Significantly there was no outright condemnation of common roll or
overt appeal for Government control and nomination. Its condemnation
of the Lautoka conference as non-representative did not imply
automatic denunciation of its resolutions. Nor did a call for
co-operation by the Members of the Legislative Council mean approval
of Fletcher’s designs. But its vagueness left it open to
interpretation by K.B.Singh, Mudaliar and Fletcher as support for
their ends. However, the meeting was not without incident and
methods advocated by K.B.Singh and Mudaliar were even less democratic
than the constitution they sought to abrogate. During the meeting
C.C.Singh was denied permission to speak as he was from the opposite
camp. When C.C.Singh persisted in being heard, Mudaliar ordered
one Ram Jag, variously referred to as a police clerk and police
constable, to arrest him. Ram Jag retaliated by not only refusing
but threatening to disperse the meeting and put K.B.Singh and
50Mudaliar in gaol instead. Later K.B.Singh sought the punishment of 
Ram Jag and wanted him made an example to other civil servants, who 
he claimed, were encouraging attacks on the Indian councillors.
The Governor did not respond.
No such meetings were held in Suva, the town to be affected.
No attempt was made to ascertain what Suva Indians, who comprised 
anywhere from 36% or h2% to hh% of the population thought. As 
his constituency was also the stamping-ground, of Vishnu Deo,
K.B.Singh did not desire an open confrontation which might prove 
disadvantageous to himself. In fact, he was now in conflict with 
the Arya Samaji faction which had previously ensured his election. 
Later Indians in Suva were to sign a petition against Government 
control of the municipality. In view of the neglect, K.B.Singh 
could hardly be said to have a mandate to speak for his electorate 
on this particular issue. /mother factor needing comment is the 
interest generated among politically aware Indians outside Suva.
They seem to have seen the Governor’s intentions as having 
ramifications beyond the municipal constitution and striking at the 
root of what they championed as their right as citizens, that is,
50 K.B.Singh to the Governor, 9 Jan. 193U; Mudaliar to the Governor, 
7 and 8 Jan. 193U in C.S.Ö. CF5/2.
236
common franchise, which alone to them spelled true equality.
According to the public meetings the European community 
favoured Government control while Indians were generally opposed to 
it. There were no public meetings for the Fijians; their chiefs 
by birth possessed the right to speak for their people, a right 
upheld, by British law. Fijians had without ambiguity pronounced, 
their stand on the threat of Indian domination which Fletcher 
thought a possibility.
In response to the Indian meeting at Ba in December 1933* the 
Governor and the Colonial Secretary met a deputation of Indians,
K.B.Singh, M.Mudaliar, John Grant, Dune Khan, Nawaz Khan (Ba), at
which Sir Henry Scott and Hugh Ragg were also invited as
91representatives of the European community. The Governor gave his 
by now familiar excuses for intended Government control which along 
with equal representation could alone provide lasting peace while 
the widening of the franchise would degenerate into 'constant 
friction with other races'. K.B.Singh, though not disagreeing
entirely, said that an argument (not necessarily his own) for 
common roll was that recently in Mauritius a predominantly Indian 
electorate had returned to council only Europeans. John Grant 
pointed out that Indians neither sought to dominate nor wished to 
be dominated by others, so Government control with equal representation 
would satisfy all and there appeared t^ be consensus on this among 
the deputation. This was an Indian view but how widely it was 
held, is debatable; the deputation did not claim to represent anyone, 
least of all John Grant who appeared at Government House with any 
deputation that invited him; he measured his stature by the number 
of times he could rub shoulders with Anglo-Saxons; when, where, why 
and how were immaterial to him. Two of the intended delegation 
were unable to be present - one' C.C.Singh from Ba, an opponent of 
nomination, and. the other Dr. C.M.Gopalan, a South Indian who 
originally came to Fiji in the service of the British Government.
Both no doubt found a way of being absent from Government House 
because their views clashed with those of the establishment and they 
did not wish to be part of any settlement which would compromise them.
91 C.S.O. CF9/2.
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With this background and the atmosphere created by it, the
debate on the municipal constitution commenced on 28 March 193h.
It was a debate which never rose beyond race baiting; minds were
already made up well before the exercise, no one was influenced by
what another said, all spoke their set pieces and voted, accordingly.
At the outset the Governor stated: ’This motion is definitely not
toa Government proposal.’ Hence officials were not to participate
33in the debate. And the mantle of introducing the motion felltj.
upon the Senior Elected Member, Sir Maynard Hedstrom. Again no 
new arguments were put forward and. Hedstrom admitted, that what he 
said was his personal view only, for his recent absence from the 
Colony prevented his consulting his constituents. But he 
revealed that the Levuka Municipal Council, which was in his 
electorate, had written to inform him that they wanted no change as 
in their opinion the choice did not lie between common roll and 
Government control. This strengthens the contention that 
reference to the xiishes of the people was a sham and that the 
Governor merely sought corroboration; disagreement he ignored. 
Hedstrom sought to emphasize that Fiji could not stand still; if 
it did not decide now, there might not be another chance; he too 
feared for the future under a Labour Government at Westminster. 
Continuing with the existing literacy qualification would only 
postpone the day of a non-European Municipal Council, with Indians
52 L'fC. Debat es 193U: 120.
53 Minutes Ex..Co. 26 Mar. 193U.
51; The full motion read: ’That whereas His Excellency the Governor,
in his Address delivered on October 13, 1933, stated, that the 
choice before this Colony with regard to Government of 
Municipalities is:
(a) the introduction of a bill to establish a Municipal Common 
Roll;
(b) the acceptance of Central Government Control. In the 
opinion of this Council the acceptance of alternative (b) 
will be in the best interests of the Colony.’
(L.C.Debates 193U s120•)
55 L.C.Debates 19314:120-122.
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multiplying rapidly and acquiring a knowledge of English.
Sir Henry Scott, the seconder, was more lengthy in his
56exposition. He agreed with Hedstrom’s comments and added that 
since 1915 Indians had pressed for a greater voice in the 
Municipality of Suva and if the present system continued the result 
would be domination by:
that one section of the community unused to Government by 
tradition and custom, not able to carry on the trials and 
difficulties of Government, unused by environment and 
education or by upbringing to be able to control the rest 
of his fellowmen. 57
That here was an inaccurate comment on the Indian past is irrelevant; 
what matters is that it clearly amplifies the racial bigotry and 
arrogance of the speaker. And on such a mind the British Governor 
placed complete faith for guidance. Scott contended that 99% 
of the Europeans were -with him and the residue comprised ’an odd 
crank or two’. In a country of different races 'with different 
outlooks, with no affinity of race or creed, with no environment 
the same, with no upbringing the same', the only solution was to 
put power in the hands of the Government which was independent and 
acted with fairness and honesty. What Scott envisaged was a 
racially segregated country doininated by a European government; 
he wished for no merger, no mixing, the pure must be undefiled.
Only Barker and Major Willoughby Tottenham disagreed among the 
Europeans. The Major spoke sense, although he changed his mind 
later, in arguing that the existing system would enable Fijians to 
acquaint themselves with politics and their increasing involvement 
wTould dissipate any danger of Indian domination and they need fear 
no danger at the hands of any British Government, not even one led by
58the Labour Party." Barker said he opposed both common roll and
59Government control." With a mandate from the Suva Municipal Council 
and as its Mayor, he preferred no change. Besides, it was only a 
matter of opinion that in a few years the Municipal Council would 
fall into non-European hands. If such a contingency arose, and the 
Government discovered irregularities, it had ample powers to 
intervene as all by-laws needed approval of the Governor in Council; 
the annual report of proceedings and annual estimates had to be 
submitted to the Governor who could, even dissolve the Council in case
56 ibid-.122-128.
57 ibid:125.
58 ibid:137.
59 ibid:128-132.
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of irregularities. Fletcher, however, was unconcerned whether a 
non-European council would or would not be able to run the 
municipality efficiently, what he sought was to avoid any likelihood 
of control slipping out of European hands into those of non-whites.
Nor did Barker’s attempt to discount the Labour Party bogey have any 
effect. But two shots of Barker’s did hit the mark; first he 
pointed out that the public knew nothing of the proposals till 
30 August 1933 when a letter from the Colonial Secretary was sent 
to the Mayor referring to the recent Government House conference 
and the proposals, and secondly Barker accused the Governor of being 
the initiator. However, it was not till November of the following 
year that the Governor divulged his real motives and attempted to 
untangle the devious web of secrecy around the subject.
Considering that it was their community which was under attack 
the Indian members might have been expected to refute the charges. 
Mudaliar spoke a bare few lines: that Indian opinion was divided,
and a large section in his constituency was willing to accept any 
constitution which provided equal representation for all races.^
His lack of performance indicated the lack of constructive leadership 
in the Indian community. Usually he spoke after K.B.Singh and 
merely echoed him. K.B.Singh spoke for much longer and declared his
c
preference for common roll as it existed, in the municipal constitution?
Most Indians he thought were satisfied with the literacy
qualification,and the idea of equal representation was good, but not
so the methods of attaining it. He denied that the Indian
population would increase beyond. 38% because only business men and
the better class of Indians could afford to reside in Suva, the rest
favoured the cheaper outskirts. If there was any risk of
domination by any one race, then two or three of each community
62should be elected on a common roll. Here was worthwhile suggestion 
but the speaker was thirty years before his time and under the
60 ibid:128.
61 ibid :132-135». 
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circumstances it is doubtful if Fletcher, Hedstrom or Scott would have 
given it more than a thought. That it came from K.B.Singh was 
sufficient to ensure it oblivion. He added that the right to choose 
one’s own counsel was not denied even the most hardened criminal 
among British subjects and here the privilege of choosing one’s 
representatives was being denied to the people. The principle of 
no taxation without representation was being discarded. Why should 
a constitution hitherto in accordance with the Deed of Cession 
suddenly conflict with it? Ho answer was given. He suggested 
adoption of Sir Henry May’s scheme of 1912 of a nomination system 
under Government supervision only, as he agreed with that Governor 
that to deprive the people of the franchise once it had been granted 
was a serious matter. The nomination system was being used as a 
threat but Indians would prefer it to communal franchise. The 
reason for the second half of his statement K.B.Singh did not give.
At least under communal franchise people elected their own 
representatives, but under nomination even this limited opportunity 
was absent. Nomination was also made on the basis of race, but by 
someone else, and it precluded the development of popular leaders. 
Communal franchise permitted limited political development, 
including the rise of parties with their own platform and policies 
which though tending to be racially orientated were not without the 
possibility of some inter-racial accommodation given the right 
leadership. None of these was possible under a system whereby the 
Governor chose an equal number of ’leaders’ from each race; these 
were usually prc-Governmcnt men, not likely to form coalitions 
against those that had elevated them lest they find themselves 
omitted at the next roll call.
The Fijian members, nominees of the Council of Chiefs as much as 
of the Governor, spoke as expected. They were aligned with the 
Government; Sukuna said that democracy might carry them ’to a point 
where we would rather not go’.  ^ Before the vote was taken the 
Governor once more predicted certain peril if the alternative he 
offered were not accepted and denied that he was the initiator. 
Hedstrom and Scott made pathetic attempts to assist Fletcher in his
63 ibid: 133'-136.
efforts to shift responsibility from himself. The motion carried,6honly the two Indian members and two Europeans voted against it.
But the battle was not yet over; it was to drag on until the end of
1935.
The two Indian members had voted against the motion because, as
they informed Fletcher, they had been elected on a common roll ticket
6dand could not openly abandon it. " They added that they had come 
to the conclusion that Government control and equal representation 
for each community was the best solution for Fiji and in their 
opinion Indians of influence supported them. In a letter shortly 
afterwards (dated. 15 April 193U) they advocated the imposition of 
the nomination system for both Municipal and Legislative Councils 
until common roll was attained.^ Both thought nomination would 
remove fear from Fijian minds and that of minorities about
/ 7
domination by any particular race and racial co-operation as well.
A few days before writing the letter they had, in yet another
interview, informed the Governor that Indian opinion was moving
towards acceptance of the nomination system. Fletcher expressed
pleasure with the information.^ Fletcher was always willing to
receive Indians for he minuted? ’I think it is generally wise to
grant an interview to a leading Indian, if asked for. The Indians
69in my experience set considerable store by this.’ From their 
earlier statements Fletcher knew thaw Hedstrom and Scott already 
favoured the nomination system. In fact as early as 1923, even 
before the Indian had been enfranchised, the Europeans had made it 
explicit that they would be prepared, to revert to the nomination
rj r\
system and accept the abrogation of the elective principle.
6J4 Sukuna, Seniloli, Deve Toganivalu, J.P.Bayly, H.H.Ragg, H.M.Scott, 
J.M.Hedstrom voted for it,- and K.B.Singh, M.Mudaliar, T.W.A.Barker 
W.E.Willoughby Tottenham opposed it.
65 C.S.O. CF5A.
66 ibid..
67 ibid.
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69 C.S.O. F51/1.=
70 Rodwell to C.O.Tel. A  June 1923; C.0.83/165.
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Already the process was -under way to erect safeguards against 
Indian domination in the municipalities through giving the Government 
the power to select the representatives of the various communities*
And the Indian representatives themselves advocated an identical step 
for the Legislative Council which with the Governor and his Council 
exercised jurisdiction over the whole colony. Fletcher could not 
refuse such an offer. Why take half a step when the opportunity 
existed for a complete one.
By May '\93h Fletcher was prepared to initiate moves to eliminate
the elective principle altogether from Fiji. Already the process
was undeway for the municipalities and it became linked with similar
steps for the Legislative Council. With these intentions the
Governor wrote to the Secretary of State and enclosed with his
despatch two letters in support, one from K.B.Singh and Mudaliar
71another from Scott and Hedstrora. Fletcher stated that there was a 
growing resentment against the Arya Samaj party and the Muslims 
were pressing for a separate roll. The Europeans were alive to 
rapid Indian progress and recognized that some degree of concession 
could not be indefinitely postponed. They considered they would be 
adequately compensated by the substitution of nomination in place 
of the elective principle as they would thus be freed from the 
growing danger of control of the European electorates by people of 
mixed blood. Some remedy was essential as Europeans would never 
tolerate this domination. Moreover, Indians would not desist from 
agitating until they obtained equal status. Europeans and Fijians 
would unite and go to extreme lengths to oppose common roll.
Equal representation with nomination was the only solution. He 
could not recommend that Government take the initiative in the matter. 
Europeans were prepared to do it if they were certain of official 
support. They would combine with Fijians to support equal 
representation with nomination but would together defeat this measure 
if the elective principle were retained. Indians had assured him 
they would accept equal representation with nomination. There 
would be criticism. Indians politically were still insisting on
71 C.A.8/71.
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common roll and would be sensitive if it were ridiculed. Some
Europeans too would be . averse to nomination because they were
unaware of the ’half-caste* danger which could not be announced
publicly. An alternative might be election for Indians and
nomination for the others but he could not advocate this step.
After careful consideration the Secretary of State found himself
72unable to express an opinion on the solution offered. But this 
was not a rejection of the Governor's plan. At least it left 
the situation undecided and Fletcher could state his case personally 
when he visited England early the following year on leave.
The Governor's plans for the Legislative Council Constitution
remained a secret. In the meantime political activity was largely
devoted to organizing opposition to Fletcher's scheme for the
municipalities. During the year his opponents devoted much of their
time to preparing petitions to be sent to London. From Levuka
7h signatories petitioned the Governor that Section 19 of Ordinance IV
of 1909 should not be altered in any way whatsoever; and the
petitioners included. Indians to whom the contents had been explained
by an interpreter.1 The Levuka Council, still being pressured by
Maynard Hedstrom to join him, seemed unconvinced. The Mayor of
Levuka, Robinson, wrote that control of the municipality should
remain in the hands of ratepayers but if the Secretary of State
thought that there was no other alternative then they would prefer
7}
Government control. According to him the racial composition of 
the Levuka Council roll was Europeans and Part-Europeans 92,
Indians 13* Chinese 6, Samoans 1;, Fijians 2,a total of 117 . With 
Levuka no longer having any economic attraction and. its population 
tending to be stable or to show a decline, the racial preponderance 
of Europeans was unlikely to alter unless in some distant future, 
the 'pure' whites came to be outnumbered by the Part-Europeans - this 
too was a dangerous demon.
The Municipal Council in Suva continued to be adamant and on 
22 March 193U resolved once more that it did not wish to have the 
constitution altered in any way. It complained to the end that it
72
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had not been consulted on the new Bill nor its arguments taken into 
consideration.^ A petition wras submitted asking that the franchise 
be widened to include the five Indian languages recognised by the 
Letters Patent and that the municipal constitution be not amended
7  /■
in any other way. There were 376 signatories: 1]*0 out of the
li25 Europeans on the roll being civil servants were not asked to 
77sign. The Governor commented that a large number of the
petitioners belong to the group known as the ’Beach* who opposed all
Government proposals. Barker, the instigator of the petition,
was ’inclined to be obsessed with the dignity and importance of his
office as mayor, to a. point where, preferring not to see, he is
78deliberately blind’. And Barker was accused of being the first
to resent the election of an Indian to the Municipal Council, an
event which was very probable as the proportion of Indian to
European electors had risen from 1/16th in 1927 to 1/U in 193k.
There was some reason for doubt about the petition. Just as a
public meeting which made decisions by a show of hands exposed to
all the behaviour of the audience, so too did a public petition.
Open refusal to sign would have given offence to the Mayor, an
important social creature in a small community. In fact, the mover
and seconder of the motion at Scott’s meeting on 10 November 1933,
A.H.Marlow and Thomas Horne, had both attached their signatures to
the petition - Marlow because he felt that his action would be
insignificant as the Secretary of State was going to order the
nomination system, while Thomas Horne claimed to have signed without
reading the petition and on discovering its purport wanted his name 
79removed from it. Another said he did not believe in the memorial
75 L.C.Debates 1935:219-268.
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but being a business man had attached his name to it at the Mayor’s 
personal request and as a result received a good contract from the 
Council.
There were other petitions from Indians. One with 106 signatures
sought the continuance of the status quo* another from 86 ratepayers
and occupiers wanted a change because under the present constitution
with European domination Indian residential areas were discriminated
against and roads and streets there received scant or no attention,
80while requests for lighting and improvements were ignored.
Further, there were no toilet facilities for women who came to the
Suva market from the rural areas; Indian municipal baths were
inferior to those reserved for whites only. This petition was
endorsed by one with I4.OO names from the Northern and Western
divisions.^ 1 Yet another petition was sent later by John Grant
and kb? others favouring Government control because of the
82unsatisfactory treatment of Indians. While too much emphasis 
cannot be put on these documents, they illustrate at least a cleavage 
of opinion in the community. Of course, the point to remember is 
that if any particular petition were sponsored by socially prominent 
men in the community it was difficult for their brethren to refuse 
support if directly approached.
While the fate of the municipal franchise hung in the balance 
an even more important constitutional issue was emerging. It saw 
light when on 2b October 193U during the debate on the Appropriation 
Bill K.B.Singh made the request that if an undertaking were given 
that common roll would be introduced ultimately then he and many others
O o
would accept an equal number of seats for each community. He went 
on to refer to a petition from UOO Indians from Northern and Western 
Viti Levu who favoured nominated representatives in the Legislativepi
Council/n  Later in the same debate he explained:
There are some people who prefer the elective system, but there 
is a number of leading Indians who advocate the nominative 
system with an equal number of seats in the Legislative
80 L.C.Debates 193U:389.
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Counci]., p rovided th e  Government i s  p repared  to  take  one 
of th e  In d ian s  on th e  E xecutive C ouncil. 85
Singh who in  June 193U had been made a J .P .  was by the  end of th e
y ea r re c e iv in g  co n sid e rab le  p ra is e  from th e  Governor. In  December
F le tc h e r  desc rib ed  him to  th e  S e c re ta ry  o f S ta te  as a staunch
government su p p o rte r , a man of some p e rs o n a li ty  and independent
86o u tlo o k , and c e r ta in ly  no sycophant. Singh now stood on th e  
o p p osite  po le  from where he had been when he f i r s t  en te red  th e  
C ouncil. And th e  y e a r  193U ended on th e  n o te  of Singh and 
M udaliar having re lin q u is h e d  t h e i r  advocacy of common r o l l .
Perhaps even more s ig n i f ic a n t  was th e  lik e lih o o d  of a double 
c o n s t i tu t io n a l  change, in  th e  M unicipal C ouncils of Suva and Levuka 
and in  th e  L e g is la t iv e  C ouncil: a  change th a t  was to  be re t ro g r e s s iv e .
Concerning th e  m unic ipal f ra n c h is e  th e  Government had a lre ad y  
s ta te d  i t s  case and th e  s te p s  i t  in tended  to  tak e  though i t  had. 
no t y e t ( in  193k) b rought forward th e  b i l l  to  amend th e  e x is t in g  
o rd inance . With t h i s  change a c e r ta in ty  in  th e  fo llo w in g  y ea r 
ano ther a f f e c t in g  th e  L e g is la t iv e  Council was in  th e  making. For 
th e  c o n s t i tu t io n a l  fu tu r e  of F i j i  1935 could be a c ru c ia l  y e a r .
85 i b i d : 396.
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THE STEP BACKWARDS
IN the new year it was K.B.Singh who took the initiative when he
intimated to the Governor that he hoped to introduce a motion
1favouring four nominated members for each race. Maynard Hedstrom
offered to be seconder, and Henry Scott and Hugh Ragg agreed to 
2give support. Singh discussed, his plans with the Governor who 
claimed the Government could take no part in such a motion or cast
3its vote. It would observe strict neutrality. Nor could he give 
any indication of how the Secretary of State might react. The 
interview, however, threw some light on K.B.Singh's real motives.^1 234 
According to Singh all fair-minded Indians wanted a nominated body 
instead of an elected one dominated by the Arya Samaj. At the 
next election Vishnu Deo and his party would try to return 
candidates to all three seats and after a while would raise the 
common roll issue. Singh's own success and that of others at the 
polls would depend on their ability to turn Indians away from common 
roll to other issues. To attain this he would move a motion in 
the final session on the land question which was uppermost in Indian 
minds. He even wished the present Council could adopt this 
measure if he required time to consider a change in the next 
Legislative Council. It seemed that by this stage Singh was 
thinking of his own political future.
Before K.B.Singh could bring his motion in the Council two 
Indian deputations led by Vishnu Deo and A.D.Patel saw the Governor 
on successive days. They argued that K.B.Singh and Mudaliar had 
lost touch with their electors and nomination was their only means of
IX
1 C.A.9/1.
2 C.A.9/2.
3 C.A.9/3. 
h C.A.9/U.
C.S.O, CF3Ö/3.5
retaining this seats. Patel stated that a Muslim candidate had an 
equal chance with anyone else in an election for Hindus and Muslims 
lived harmoniously - either he was ignorant of recent events or 
glossing over the facts. In condemning nomination as an ’anti­
democratic and retrogressive step’, the deputation stated:
the people nominated by the Government will be on the whole 
the people who will be acquiescent to Legislative and Executive 
measures irrespective of whether they will be in the interest 
or against the interest of the community.
Any proposed change ought to be deferred until the new Council sifter
the election, which could be used to ascertain the wish of the
electors who would certainly favour the elective principle. To
strengthen the case of the deputation Vishnu Deo organized
petitions opposing nomination as contrary to British ideals.^
On 16 May 1935  ^ K.B.Singh moved:
That in the opinion of this Council it would be in the best 
interests of the Colony and the various races resident therein 
if the European and Indian Members as well as the Fijian 
Members were nominated and not elected - an equal number „ 
of seats to be reserved for each of the three communities.
There was nothing new or outstanding in the mover's speech. Though
he still expressed his preference for common roll as the panacea,
he maintained that, in lieu of this system, nomination would be the
best alternative. Hedstrom, who seconded, appeared to adopt a more
liberal view: he conceded that there was a good deal to be said for
equality of status for Indians; if it were not granted then pressure
for common franchise would continue from India. He admitted that
nomination would be criticized by sections of the European and
Indian communities but would receive the support of the more
moderate and. the thinking section of the European community, and also
the support of the more moderate and loyal section of the Indiang
community. By the 'loyal section' he meant those Indians who 
agreed with him. This was borne out by the remarks of Scott who 
argued that nomination was a retrogressive step. His remarks 
implied that a certain section of the Indian community despite its
6 C.A.9/6.
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ability was politically unacceptable to him and nomination would 
ensure that this group did not dominate. He was referring to the 
Arya Samajis, about five thousand in an Indian population of about 
80,000. If 6% could dominate, then the remaining 9h% was permitting 
them to do so. Besides, the majority, except for Muslims, 
preferred them as leaders because they -were able to serve their 
community. The whole argument was specious. Scott had no 
objection to domination by Europeans although they were a minority. 
Further, he wished to ensure that the Europeans controlled and 
dominated their own electorate without having their influence 
diminished by an increasing number of ’half-caste’-voters.
Equally dubious was his argument that the Government should listen 
to K.B.Singh and M.Mudaliar as the constitutionally elected 
representatives of the Indian community. He did not advise this 
step when these two earlier sought common roll, nor did he take 
this view in 1929 when three elected Indians advocated the same 
measure.
Neither the officials nor the three Fijians nominated members
took any part in the debate. Opposition came from three elected
Europeans, Barker, Bayly and Willoughby Tottenham. The European
representatives split equally and the motion was carried by the
support given by the two Indian members to the more reactionary
element. In his despatch the Officer Administering the Government,
A.A.Wright, suggested that the Colonial Office accept the motion.
He mentioned that the very important argument that change was
necessary, because of possible Part-European domination of the
European electorate, was not used in the Council for reasons of 9expediency. He also asked that the present Council which expired 
on 27 July be extended for another year because it was highly 
undesirable to hold elections that year if a constitutional change 
was contemplated. The reason was obvious. Those who opposed 
nomination wished the proposal to be tested during the election. 
Officialdom preferred not to succumb to this test for fear of defeat. 
If there was overwhelming support for nomination as officials 
believed then there should have been no reason for the anxiety.
9 C.A.9/9*
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An affirmative vote would have strengthened the Government’s hand and 
scotched opposition.
On the day after K.B.Singh’s motion, the Chief Police Magistrate
introduced the Municipal Institutions (Amendment) Bill. Its aim
was twofold: the Levuka Municipality was to be abolished from
1 July 1935 and the town was to come under the Townships Ordinance
of 1928 and Suva from 1 January 1936 was to have a Town Board. The
new Board was to consist of 13 members, 7 of these were to be
officials and the remaining 6 were to be nominated from the Indian,
Fijian and European communities - two from each ethnic group. The
Chairman and Deputy Chairman were to be officials. The debate on
the Bill revealed no new arguments for or against the amendments;
these had been voiced earlier. Its opponents argued that the
10proposed changes were either unnecessary or unwanted. K.B.Singh 
claimed that under the existing system Indian interests were
receiving inadequate treatment by the Council and this inequality
11would be remedied by Government control. Speaking in favour of
the amendment, the Officer Administering the Government and Chairman
of the Legislative Council reiterated that the reason behind the
changes was Indian domination. He stated:
As far as I am aware the only new circumstances affecting this 
question which have occurred, in the last eighteen months have 
been i. • • a large number of Indian ratepayers have been added 
to the electoral roll in Suva, and that means that the possibility 
- if it is a possibility - of Indian domination of the Council 
under the present constitution has been brought a step nearer.
The Indian members have, I think very wisely, changed their 
minds because they realise that if there should, be Indian 
domination in the Municipal Council it would never be accepted 
by the two communities. The European community whose brains, 
enterprise, and capital have made the town of Suva what it is 
today would never accept it, and the Fijian members would regard 
it as a breach of faith. The Fijians handed over this Colony 
to Queen Victoria with their tacit approval of the European 
community being associated with the Government in the task of 
government, and they would very strongly resent Indian 
domination in the Municipal Council of Suva whish is the chief 
town and the only town of importance in the Colony. 12
10 See for instance the speeches of T.W.A.Barker (L.C.Debates 
1935?137-38 ) and J.P.Bayly (ibid:139-UO).
11 L.C.Debates 1935:138-139. This was denied by T.W.A.Barker who 
was then also the Mayor of Suva. (ibidilUO.)
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He made i t  eq u a lly  c le a r  th a t  th e  B i l l  was n o t being  in tro d u ced  as a
consequence of any d e fic ie n c y  on th e  p a r t  o f th e  p re se n t o r p a s t  
1 3c o u n c il lo rs .  The B i l l  was passed  w ith o u t any d i f f i c u l t y  and 
became Ordinance XV of 1935. There were two im portan t a ttem p ts  
( a lb e i t  u n su cc e ss fu l)  to  amend th e  b i l l  as o r ig in a l ly  p re se n te d .
S c o tt wanted th e  C ouncil to  be reduced to  s ix  members a l l  nom inated 
by th e  Governor; th re e  were to  be o f f i c i a l  and one from each of th e  
th re e  communities ( i . e .  In d ia n , F i j i a n ,  European). He wanted th e  
Chairman and Deputy Chairman to  be chosen by th e  Governor though n o t 
n e c e s s a r i ly  from th e  o f f i c i a l s  o n ly . 1 T his was supported  only  by 
th e  s ix  European e le c te d  members. Barker though s t i l l  opposed to  
th e  p r in c ip le  of change, favoured  S c o t t ’ s su g g es tio n  because in  h is  
view the  Governor would, be unab le  to  f in d  two F i j i a n  u n o f f ic ia l
members. L a te r Kedstrom proposed a s im ila r  change excep t th a t
15w hile  S c o tt sought th re e  o f f i c i a l s ,  Hedstrom favoured  fo u r .
The Ordinan.ce had been passed  bu t b e f o r e / i t  could become law i t  
had to  re c e iv e  th e  a s se n t o f th e  Crown. As t h i s  took tim e , i t s  
opponents f e l t  th a t  a l l  -was no t l o s t  y e t .  T his was no t th e  
Government’s a t t i t u d e .  For i t  th e  o rd inance was th e  f i n a l  s te p  in  
th e  is su e  of th e  m unic ipal f r a n c h is e .  H alf th e  war had been won.
I t  was tim e f o r  th e  n ex t b a t t l e  to  make success com plete. And on 
1 November 1935 d u rin g  th e  Budget S ess io n , F le tc h e r  introduced, th e
16is su e  of amendments to  th e  c o n s t i tu t io n  o f th e  L e g is la t iv e  C ouncil.
Again p o s s ib le  In d ia n  dom ination and th e  o b lig a t io n  to  safeguard
F i j i a n  i n t e r e s t s  were em phasized. He m ain ta ined  th a t  F i j ia n s  were
a f r a id  th a t  ’th e  r a p id ly  ■ « in c re a s in g  In d ian  p o p u la tio n  and th e
demand fo r  a common r o l l  may b rin g  about c o n s t i tu t io n a l  changes
under which re p re s e n ta t io n  in  th e  L e g is la t iv e  Council w i l l  pass
1 7la r g e ly ,  i f  n o t w ho lly , in to  In d ia n  h a n d s .’ T herefo re  th e  F i j ia n s  
considered  ’th a t  nom ination /"w as 7 th e  on ly  p r a c t i c a l  means of 
secu rin g  adequate r e p re s e n ta t io n  in  th e  L e g is la t iv e  Council of both
13 ib id .
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European and Fijian opinion, and the only means whereby Fijian
18interests will be permanently safeguarded.1
Though this reason was an important factor in the attempt to
abolish the elective principle there was another. Since it was
being voiced publicly for the first time it is worth quoting Fletcher’s
reference to it in full so as not to misrepresent them:
In 19*10 the position of the Half-Caste community was discussed 
in the Council, upon a motion introduced by the European 
Elected Members, and it was recommended that Half-Castes should 
be eligible for admission to the European roll, subject to the 
conditions that:-
(a) One parent must be of European descent.
(b) A candidate must be able to speak, read, and write 
the English language.
(c) He must possess the property qualification required 
of Europeans.
(d) He must pass an educational test.
At the date of this proposal the number of Half-Castes able to 
comply with these requirements was strictly limited, but during 
the ensuing twenty-five years circumstances changed. The 
spread of education and an improved wage position have brought 
it about that the restrictive effect of conditions (b) and (c) 
has been greatly diminished. Condition (a) is not observed, 
and condition (d) has never been adopted, and is not included 
in the Letters Patent. There are on the present roll, as 
nearly as can be ascertained, 1,036 European electors and k%9 
Half-Caste electors. The Half-Caste population numbers 
approximately 1,000 less than the European population.
Certain responsible Europeans have intimated their serious 
concern that the representation of their interests should have 
passed so largely under the control of electors who are not 
members of their community, and they express the fear that 
before long the so-called European roll may become in practical 
effect a Half-Caste roll. These Europeans claim that the 
Colony’s major industries have been established by European 
capital and owe their prosperity to European management. They 
point to the fact that the leading business houses and banks are 
European in constitution and. control. They argue that the 
newly discovered gold-fields depend for their development upon 
the introduction of European money and skilled European 
personnel. They refer to- the right of racial representation 
which has been granted to the Fijians and Indians, and they 
ask that the similar right, which the Europeans formerly 
possessed, should be restored to them by means of nomination 
of Members by the Governor.
18 ibid.
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There is another angle from which some Europeans view this 
question of nomination. T1 show that in all tropical
Colonies Europeans form a v small fraction of the population -
in Fiji the percentage is s oximately 2^ - and they contrast 
the present European positii in, for example, Ceylon on the one 
hand, where there is now a common electoral roll, and in the 
Straits Settlements on the other, where the Legislative Council 
is nominated. They point out that in Ceylon a European has 
scant prospect of success at the polls, whereas in the Straits 
Settlements European interests have a strong majority 
representation in the Council. In the Straits Settlements the 
Europeans number less than one per cent, of the population.
The Medical and Health Report, which is laid, on the Table 
to-day shows the rate of natural increase per thousand in 193U:- 
Indians, 27*02; Fijians, 18.08; Half-castes 15*29; Chinese, 
10.8li; Europeans, 1.87* There are many who apprehend that, 
if the electoral system is maintained, the rapidly increasing 
preponderance of the Indians must inevitably result, sooner or 
later, in the merging of the present communal rolls in one common 
roll, and they urge nomination as the only permanent safeguard 
of the important stake which European interests possess in the 
country. They regard nomination as the only means by .which the 
balance can be kept permanently even between the communities. 19
The indication is clear, Fletcher also wished to protect the influence 
in Fiji of the pure Europeans not merely from the Indians but from 
the part-Europeans as well. It would be self-deception to pretend 
that Fletcher was motivated, solely by high-minded principles of 
protecting the Fijians.
Fletcher also emphasized the divisions within the Indian
community and the anxiety of the Muslims with the existing franchise.
Again he was largely motivated by his distrust of Indian aspirations:
The supporters of non-cooperation have convened meetings and 
sponsored memorials in which they strongly oppose nomination, are 
emphatically in favour of the franchise, and urge the continuance 
of the present system of election; but at the same time they 
state that the failure of the present constitution to bring about 
harmony and goodwill between the different communities is due 
to the fact that the constitution is not liberal and wide enough. 
The politicians, who make these professions, will hardly be 
surprised that, when they urge the continuance of the present 
electoral system, their sincerity is questioned. Their record 
of the past six years, and the seat which remains empty to-day, 
cause very many to believe that their party do not in fact 
desire the continuance of the present electoral system, and. that 
they have not abandoned, and have no intention of abandoning, 
their pursuit of the common roll. 20
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He referred to his refusal to sanction a referendum to test
European and Indian opinion as had been suggested by three European
members of the Legislative Council: T.W.A.Barker, Major W.E. Willoughby
Tottenham and J.P.Bayly. He found this would be futile for three
reasons. First, uhe present Legislative Council with its extended
tenure would test opinion. Secondhand to quote Fletcher again:
I have explained that there is no longer a European roll, and 
therefore European wishes cannot be separately ascertained.
There is also the point, that, for example, the Colonial Sugar 
Refining Company’s stake in the Colony is greater than that 
of the latest joined mechanic in one of their mills. By 
counting heads due weight would not be given to the relative 
importance of various interests. 21
Third, argued Fletcher ’the vast majority of the population /"had 7
not'.even an elementary conception of the true nature of the issue'.
The importance of pure European opinion and interest was again
repeated in the second reason given above. And in a referendum
(to be discussed later in the chapter) which had already been
conducted by the Municipal Council of Suva, European opinion of the
kind that Murchison Fletcher followed had been contradicted. However,
he did try to sound local opinion as will be illustrated shortly.
The Fijian chiefs were the first to respond to Fletcher's call.
At the very first meeting of the Legislative Council (6 November 1933)
after the Governor's Budget Speech the Fijian members tabled a
22letter on the constitution. They agreed with the sentiments
expressed by the Governor. They outlined the reasons for the Cession
of Fiji to the British and their fears of Indian domination and
democracy. The document elegantly written was essentially the work
of the Oxford-educated and Middle Temple lawyer and chief, Ratu J.L.V.
Sukuna. It was both an expression of loyalty and faith in the
Crown and an unambiguous statement of the Fijian position as seen by
the traditional leaders of the indigenous people. For the purpose
of this study the following four paragraphs are noteworthy:
After years of Crown Colony government, there is nothing 
natives desire better than to be governed, by the King's 
Representative with the help and advice of his senior officers 
and such European members of the Legislative Council as are, 
as far as possible, above the influences of local interest and
21
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prejudice. This was, we understand, the native attitude in 
1903 when the elective system was first introduced. But far 
reaching political changes have supervened and the Colony, as 
we see it, is now threatened with the imminent peril of having 
in its councils men of low attainments, without instruction in 
the art of government and without the sense of responsibility 
that comes from great inherited traditions.
The elective system of 1903 contained within it both 
elements of weakness and seeds of self-destruction as an 
enlightened political force. If the European electorate of 
to-day be analysed, it will be found to consist of three groups. 
First we have the pemanent settlers, a small minority, for Fiji 
is not a white man’s country. Then there is a numerous class 
composed of people that may be described as those that are here 
to-day and gone to-morrow. The majority of these two groups 
come from the neighbouring Dominions of Australia and New 
Zealand. Thirdly we have persons of European descent. Though 
permanently settled, and. deeply concerned in the present and 
future form of government for this Colony, these people have 
an education very little higher than our own; and, unfortunately 
they lack leaders. Barred socially by the two former groups 
they are easily carried away by appeals based on equality, 
whether it be political or social. Being a numerous and, 
relatively, a rapidly increasing community, the weight of their 
vote is steadily rising. At no distant date the European 
electorate will be white only in name, enlightened only in memory
But from the Indian electorate comes the insistent cry for a 
wider franchise, for a form of government based on the theory of 
political equality as between the Indian and European. On the 
principles of democracy it is impossible to see how the demand 
can be resisted. For what are the facts? Indians number 
nearly half the total population of Fiji. They are increasing 
at a faster rate than any other community. They pay in taxes, 
in the aggregate, about as much as the Europeans. Their 
interests in the Colony, already vast, grow apace. Their 
electorate is larger than the white. Now, here, we have all 
the factors, all the qualifications, that should, on the 
popular theory of government, secure for them at least equal 
representation. And with India, the brightest jewel in the 
Imperial Crown, a Dominion, with equality a faith, and with the 
voice of the people regarded as the last word in political 
wisdom, for how long can a handful of whites justify a system 
of representation that tried by popular tests must be condemned 
as being utterly undemocratic? In the development of democracy 
then lies the danger we must all dread - the predominance of 
ignorance and prejudice in the councils of the Colony, forces 
just as nefarious and ruinous whether they be in alliance with 
Europeans, Indians, or Fijians.
Such are the perils that lie ahead of the elective system 
and such are the grave dangers that threaten not only our 
landed interests but also the wider interests of the Europeans. 
Listening to the democratic clamour of the past months one 
question repeatedly comes up in our minds, for what did our 
fathers cede this country? They did so in order to secure 
for themselves, their people and posterity, a form of government 
that would ensure peace and happiness, justice and. prosperity.
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Systems or institutions that fail in human experience to 
produce these things are not for us. For after all, the 
moral justification of representative government lies in its 
power to do good, and to achieve something of this the elements 
that constitute it must all be present. We have come to the 
parting of the ways and, looking ahead in the light not only of 
our own interests but also of those to whom we handed over this 
country, we choose, with the full support of native conservative 
and liberal opinion, the system of nomination believing that 
along this road, and along it alone, the principle of trusteeship 
for the Fijian race can be preserved and the paramountcy of 
native interests secured. 23
Earlier in October 1933 in reaction to K.B.Singh’s call for 
equality in treatment for Europeans and non-Europeans Ratu Sukuna 
had made the comment:
The question of equality has been raised and I should like to 
say publicly that, so far as Fijians are concerned, we think 
we are very well treated, and for the next two or three or four 
generatins we look to European leadership and expect the 
Europeans to lead us, until such times as we are able to guide 
ourselves, ph
When these words of Sukuna are considered, together with the letter of 
the Fijian chiefs it becomes explicit that their aims did not 
conflict with those stated by the Governor. Both the pure European 
minority and Fijian paramountcy could, be protected simultaneously.
The two had become complementary and this tended, to isolate even 
more Indian opinion that demanded common roll and denounced government 
control of the municipalities and the reintroduction of the 
nomination system. It also left on a limb those Europeans like 
Barker and Bayly who disagreed with Fletcher on the constitutional 
issue.
Yet the path of the Governor and his supporters did not prove
easy. The opposition was equally determined to fight. Though the
ordinance to alter the municipal franchise had. been passed during the
May session, the Mayor, Barker -who was also Junior Member for the
Southern Division, brought a motion:
That the date for the coming into operation of Ordinance No .15 of 
1935 be postponed in order to enable the Mayor to proceed to 
London early in 1936 for the purpose of placing the views of 
the Suva Municipal Council personally, before the Secretary of 
State for the Colonies. 25'
23 L.C.Debates 1935:175-77
2U L.C.Debates 1933:320.
25 L.C.Debates 1935:218.
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The e f f o r t  was f u t i l e  as th e  S e c re ta ry  of S ta te  had a lre a d y  r e je c te d
a re q u e s t from th e  Mayor and h is  Council to  de lay  th e  im plem entation
26 27 of th e  new o rd in an ce . ' The debate  proved to  be a le n g th y  one.
Yet i t  rev ea led  no new argum ents. But i t  a ffo rd ed  an o p p o rtu n ity  f o r
both  s id e s  to  r e s t a t e  n o t m erely t h e i r  cases bu t a lso  to  d e t a i l  th e
s te p s  each had ta k en . For F le tc h e r  i t  a ffo rd ed  th e  chance to  s t a t e
p u b lic ly  much of what he had no t p re v io u s ly . E s p e c ia l ly , i t
b rought in to  l i g h t  h is  c r u c ia l  ro le  in  ad v is in g  th e  S e c re ta ry  of S ta te
to  a sse n t to  th e  s tep  backw ards, from e le c t iv e  f ra n c h is e  to
28nom ination of r e p re s e n ta t iv e s  by a c o lo n ia l  governor. Because th e
correspondence between th e  S e c re ta ry  of S ta te ,  P a s s f ie ld  and F le tc h e r
on th e  su b je c t has been d iscu ssed  a t  th e  o u ts e t  o f th e  p rev io u s
ch ap te r th e re  i s  no need to  re p e a t here  th e  b e la te d  d is c lo s u re s  o f
th e  Governor. N onetheless c e r ta in  p o in ts  need to  be made.
F le tc h e r  s ta te d  th a t  he had decided  th a t  a w idening o f th e
m unicipal f ra n c h is e  would be unaccep tab le  to  n on -Ind ians e s p e c ia l ly
as i t  would, u l t im a te ly  le a d  to  In d ian  c o n tro l of Suva. For t h i s
F le tc h e r  cannot be damned as th e  evidence h i th e r to  examined, in d ic a te s
h is  assessm ent was c o r r e c t .  But he was in c o r r e c t  in  h is  assum ption
't h a t  th e  In d ian s  as a whole had no q u a rre l  w ith  th e  Crown Colony 
29
s y s te m '. But he was j u s t i f i e d  in  h is  claim s th a t  th e  In d ia n  
community was d iv id ed  on th e  f ra n c h is e  q u e s tio n . Nor could  anyone 
argue a g a in s t th e  s t a t i s t i c s  th a t  F le tc h e r  m arsh a lled  to  i l l u s t r a t e  
demographic changes in  Suva:
At th e  31st March, 1932, th e re  were in  Suva:- Europeans, 1918; 
In d ia n s , h>557; C hinese, 311; H a lf -c a s te s ,  939; F i j i a n s ,
1, 500; O th ers , 600; t o t a l ,  9*825> o f whom 1,918 were 
Europeans. In  th e  suburbs th e re  w e re :-  Europeans, 700;
In d ia n s , 55500; C hinese, 70; H a lf -c a s te s ,  350; O th e rs , 300; 
F i j i a n s ,  2 ,000; t o t a l ,  8 ,920 , of whom 700 were Europeans.
Out of a t o t a l  in  Suva and th e  suburbs of 18,7L5, 2618 were 
Europeans. I  may no te  t h a t  in  1927, when t h i s  q u e s tio n  f i r s u  
came in to  prom inence, th e re  were 355 European e le c to r s  and 22 
In d ian  e le c to r s .  In  1935 th e  in c re a se  on th e  European r o l l  
has been 16.90 p e r  c e n t. and. th e  in c re a se  on th e  In d ian  r o l l  
has been kOh p e r  c e n t. 30
26 C.O. to  Gov. T e l. 19 O ct. 1935. L.G .D ebates 1935:21)4.
27 L.C .D ebates 1935s218-2ÜÖ; 251-268.
28 i b i d : 255-265.
29 L.C .D ebates 1935:258.
L .C .D ebates 1935:260. For p o p u la tio n  changes in  Suva 1911-36 
a lso  see Appendix I I I .
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VJhen Fletcher’s statistics are analysed the number of Indian 
electors rises from 22 in 192? to around 89 in 1935 while the 
European increases approximately by 56 from 355 to 1*01. One can 
again concede that Fletcher’s fears were long-term and thus perhaps 
justified. Yet it ought to be noted that he emphasizes the 
European numbers vis a vis the others. He showed no concern for
the fact that after sixty years of British rule there was not a
31single Fijian elector on the Suva municipal roll.' Surely the
paramountcy of Fijian interests obliged the Governor to ensure
Fijian political advancement? On the municipal issue Fletcher was
greatly concerned to protect the European, and what he considered
the prospects of Indian domination provided him with the pretext:
I do not desire to take control of the Suva Municipal Council.
I do not wish to nominate members to the Legislative Council. 
These irksome responsibilities are not of my choosing. It 
is patent that a common municipal roll will put the Government 
of Suva largely into Indian hands. I think we cannot safely 
entrust to any one of the three communities the task of 
governing the other two. I believe that the Central Government 
alone is able to exercise that judicial impartiality without 
which the holding of the balance even is impossible. I have 
been afraid - I am afraid - for the very small white minority, 
lest overwhelming weight of numbers should crush them to the 
wall. If, when I say farewell to Fiji, I leave that very 
minority more firmly established - more safe, I shall not have 
spent myself in vain. 32
These remarks bear examination for what they reveal, Fletcher 
linked the Legislative Council and municipal franchise showing that 
the amendments proposed for both were not isolated issues.
Secondly, the fear of Indian control was again there. Thirdly, 
he spoke of the Government as the only impartial arbitrator in 
the plural society of Fiji. Fourthly, having made the third point 
he singled out the European community for special mention. And 
fifthly the European position was not merely to be preserved but 
consolidated, i.e. made ’more safe’. If the Government were to be 
the neutral arbiter then its task was to ensure an equitable treatment
31 During the debate on the Municipal Institution Amendment Bill 6n 
17 May 1935* Alport Barker (then also Mayor of Suva) commented: 
’At present there is not one Fijian ratepayer, or elector, in 
the town of Suva.’ (L.C.Debates 1935s 1U5-)
32 L.C,Debates 1935s261}.. The underlining is mine in order to add 
emphasis.
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of all ethnic groups, not the perpetuation of the privileged status
of the European minority. The racism, implicit and explicit, in
Fletcher’s motives cannot be denied nor should they be underplayed.
They are obvious as much from the publicly stated case of his goals
as in his correspondence with Whitehall. Indeed, the principle of
the paramountcy of indigenous interests was observed in Fiji perhaps
with greater fidelity than elsewhere but this did not mean that the
white racism that was part of the European colonial ethos, both in
the settlers and many officials, was totally absent from the Fijian
scene. Its worst features, as evidenced by the White Highlands
of Kenya or the racist practices prevalent in Central Africa were
certainly not present but privileges such as the primacy of place
for Europeans in the ’natural’ order of the social world were
33conspicuous, some to the last days of British rules.
The motion to delay the change in the municipal franchise 
proved of no avail, it was overwhelmingly defeated, only Barker 
and Bayly voted for it. Even in defeat Barker made two telling 
points. He contended that people who had ’only small interests 
in Suva and who / were 7 ratepayers may have the interests of the
-  ' OK
town at heartas much as those who hold large interests’. This 
was a jibe directed at Fletcher's reliance on the merchant-prince
33 Many examples can be cited. Indians and Fijians were excluded 
from using the Sea Baths of the town council in Suva till 1956. 
There were clubs throughout the colony (e.g. Royal Suva Yacht 
Club, the Fiji Club in Suva, the various planters’ clubs in 
Vanua Levu, the Northern Club in Lautoka) which excluded non- 
Europeans. The Union Club in Suva in the fifties, the first 
multi-racial club emerged as a reaction to the above. The 
Fiji Golf Club which was financed initially through a government 
loan (in 1936) and other golf clubs excluded non-Europeans till 
1961 and even then raised membership dues as a restrictive bar. 
The Grammar Schools in Suva took only Europeans (and part- 
Europeans, only a few and very reluctantly). The first 
non-Europeans were accepted, in its sixth form in 1957* thereafter 
its pupil intake was slowly made non-racial despite opposition 
though its staff was almost wholly expatriate Europeans 
(mainly New Zealanders employed under privileged conditions 
including the payment of New Zealand scale salaries). In the 
C.S.R.Company compounds and. in those of the Emperor Gold Mines 
in Vatukuula, residential segregation was evident. The 
European employees (overwhelmingly Australian) of the C.S.R. 
Company lived in their own social world and objected to 
'their Indians’ speaking in English to them. The list can be 
continued.
3U L.C.Debates 1935:267.
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Hedstrom, wealthy lawyer and property-owner Scott and pi perous
businessman Marks. • Barker's remarks sprang from his
acceptance of the referendum held by his municipal council. There
was some conflict over the procedure and in fact the validity of the
exercise. The Governor had refused the invitation to appoint
official observers. Later he accused the Mayor of failing to inform
the ratepayers that the Secretary of State had already assented to
the proposals about which they were voting. Fletcher regarded this35;a crucial factor; the Mayor thought it inconsequential. The 
referendum held in Suva on 26 October 1935» resulted as follows:
Against Government Control 295
For Government Control 61*
Majority against Government
Control 231
There were 570 electors on the Suva municipal roll, 97 of these were
37absent from the town and 113 did not record their opinion. Of 
those who voted 266 were Europeans, 77 Indians, 13 Part-Europeans 
and 1* Chinese. Even if we assume that all non-Europeans and 
Part-Europeans voted against Government control, we are still left 
with 201 Europeans who sided with them. Also over 50% of those on 
the roll were against a Government takeover; of those who voted 
around 80% fell into this category. The decision made by secret 
ballot contradicted Fletcher and his friends. Strategically, the 
referendum had come too late. Besides, it is questionable if the 
results would have been the same had the ratepayers been asked to 
choose between government control on the one hand and the existing 
municipal franchise on a common roll on the other either with the 
existing literacy test of with one including certain Indian 
languages. It was the latter which was the crux of the issue, at 
stake.
The defeat of Barker's motion was the death knell of the 
municipal franchise, which except for the introduction of the stringent 
literacy test introduced, in 1915 and the updating of the Municipal 
Institutions Ordinance in 1909* had been originally granted in 1877» 
Those who had fought for its removal saw the battle only half won with
35 L.C.Debates 1935:218-227.
36 Ibid:22l*.
37 ibid.
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its abolition. Immediately they embarked on their next campaign.
After the vote on Barker’s motion had been taken, Maynard Hedstrom
seconded by Henry Scott successfully requested the suspension of the
Standing Orders to enable him to begin debate on his motion."
Hedstrom’s motion as he himself* stated was in response to that section
of the Governor’s last budget speech wherein he had spoken of
39constitutional change. Hedstrom's motion, seconded by Scott read:
That in view of the changed and changing conditions of the 
Colony the opinion of the unofficial members of this Council is 
that a system of nominated unofficial representatives will be 
better suited to the present and future interests of the Colony 
than the existing system of elected representatives. I4.O
The leading speakers were Hedstrom and Scott and they spoke their now
familiar pieces, in a lengthy debate full of repetitions of fears of
domination and future spectres that would destroy the privileged
) 1
minority if nomination was not achieved. Though Fletcher had been 
an instigator of this backward step, he and his officials did not 
participate in the debate which was meant to be a test of unofficial 
opinion.
Hedstrom argued that though the Indian had voiced his 
repudiation of common roll there was no guarantee that this was a 
permanent decision. He also thought that most Europeans in any 
secret ballot would favour the present system but 'an important 
minority' sought nomination. The majority was being told to bow 
to the minority; in Hedstrom's terms there was nothing unethical 
in it. For him too, pure and Part-Europeans were different and 
he feared the day when Fiji might become Dike the West Indies, where 
in certain colonies, no pure white could be found in either the 
Legislative or Municipal Council. Then came the now familiar 
equation of European and Fijian interests and the claim that 
European members had. never endeavoured to exploit the Fijian people. 
His memory was short. Those past speeches of Scott on land and
38 The Standing Orders had to be suspended because K.B.Singh had 
introduced a substantially similar motion barely six months ago in 
May.
39 L.C.Debates 193^:268-269. 
hO ibid:269.
hi ibid:269-312.
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segregated residential areas in Suva, Hedstrom's own flirtation with 
the federation movement and demands for settler rule were all now 
forgotten. For Hedstrom the Indians were still 'Indian immigrants' 
but this drew no criticism from K.B.Singh who, unlike most of those 
whom he claimed to represent, was alien born. Scott, the seconder, 
was his old. self. He was still uncertain whether Indians ought to 
have been enfranchised in 1929; many of them thought it premature by
h2years. Again Singh and Mudaliar remained silent. Like Hedstrom, 
Scott deprecated the trend in the West Indies where he believed the 
Europeans were raeing the day that the elective principle was 
introduced.44
Bayly and Barker stood alone in their opposition to the 
resolution before the Council. Bayly asked why everyone questioned 
the sincerity of the Indians in their disavowal of common roll and 
no one doubted the sincerity of K.B.Singh who had also discarded his 
past. He accused Ratu Sukuna of living in the past and not doing 
right by his people. Barker was critical of the references to the 
Part-Europeans who were inferentially branded as being not European. 
The fathers of these men had colonized Fiji and now their descendants, 
through no fault of their own, were being disfranchised. Though 
Willoughby Tottenham was for nomination he too took umbrage at the 
remarks made about Part-Europeans.
Of the two Indian members Mudaliar said nothing beyond 
seconding Singh's amendment. But K.B.Singh was devious. First, 
he proclaimed himself a firm believer in common roll, in lieu of 
which he would have nomination. This was excellent strategy. The 
more he favoured common franchise, the more he supported the case of 
those who paraded, this bogey as the ultimate danger and thereby 
assured that nomination would come. Yet in one breath he was for 
common roll, in another he was denouncing democratic institutions 
and elections as blackmail and sham.^ Here was inconsistency par 
excellence and it exposed Singh as a self-seeker interested only in 
ascertaining a future seat for himself in the Council.
The outcome of the debate was a foregone conclusion; apart from 
Barker and Bayly, the three Fijians, the two Indians, and four
hZ ibid:27U-275.
U3 ibid:277.
Ui ibid:300-301.
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Europeans supported the motion. The Governor could once more inform 
the Secretary of State that the elected representatives of the people 
had agreed to their own liquidation.
Having obtained the view of the elected representatives the 
Governor set out to test opinion outside the Council. The District 
Commissioners were asked to sound feeling in their areas. Also the 
Government asked prominent institutions for their attitudes. This 
information was sent to the Secretary of State.
The investigations of the various District Commissioners through 
interviews with available voters revealed that Europeans were 
overwhelmingly in favour of the nomination system because they feared 
other alternatives would lead to Indian domination. Among the 
Indians opinon was divided though a majority favoured the retention 
of the elective principle with the hope of common roll in the future. 
Minority groups such as Muslims and the Madrasis preferred nomination 
as a protection against the Hindu majority.
The two commercial banks (New South Wales and New Zealand.) 
strongly advocated the nomination system as did the newly established 
gold mining company at Vatukoula and Burns Philp (South Seas Company 
L t d . T h e  C.S.R.Company informed the Governor that its Board of 
Directors had come to the conclusion that Fiji would be best served 
by a nomination system having 6 European members and 3 Indians and 
3 Fijians. It would not concede equal reprsentation between black 
and white races. Its argument was that P’iji's development, past, 
present and future, was dependent upon European capital and
) 7guidance for economic survival.
The Christian missions, Anglican, Methodist and Roman Catholic 
all advised nomination and government control as a guarantee for 
progress and against the possibility of Indian domination.^
The opponents of Fletcher and his supporters were no less active.
Both the Fiji Times owned and edited by the Hon.T.W.A.Barker and
the Fiji Samachar, mouthpiece of Vishnu Deo and the Apya Samajis,
during the year published editorials and correspondence and reported
h9every meeting opposing nomination. There were many public meetings
U5 C.A.9/US.
U6 C.A.9/U6.
U7 C.A.9/U7.
U8 C.A.9/U8.
U9 F/T.17, 29, 31 May 1935; 28 Sept. 1935; 2,6,13,18 Nov.1935.
26U
and numerous petitions against nomination. Though it will serve 
no purpose here to examine each one as some have already been 
discussed in the previous chapter certain points ought to be made. 
First, too much emphasis must not be put on petitions as sometimes 
individuals attached their signature to what they did not fully 
comprehend, or did so to get rid of a persistent pleader. Second, 
mention must be made of a meeting in Suva in May 1935, where 
Europeans rejected nomination by 65 to 35 votes and denied that the 
existing communal franchise was either democratic or likely to lead
50to Indian domination in the near future. The Muslims seemed the 
only group totally in support of nomination. The South Indians,
Mudaliar's own community, were divided though the majority were not51with him. The Indians were strongly against nomination and 
Singh and Mudaliar were thoroughly incorrect in their assessment of 
their own electorate. These expressions of attitude did not vary 
to any significant degree from those canvassed by the Government.
The Government of India as was its habit submitted its views. 
Neither was this a novel step nor was this a practice that India
followed as regards Fiji alone, it did likewise with Indian problems
52in Kenya. As earlier, the Government of India expressed grave
concern with the proposed changes. Fletcher replied that the
Government of India had been purposely misled about true Indian
53opinion in Fiji by Vishnu Deo. India strongly opposed the
5!i *constitutional amendments advocated by Fletcher. The Indian
Council of State resolved unanimously to convey to Westminster
55its repudiation of the Governor's proposal as retrogressive.
Though these protests did not deter Fletcher they might have had a 
useful impact in the Colonial Office in that they added to the weight 
of opposition against Fletcher. They were ineffectual as far as the
U9 cont’d: Fiji Samachar 1 June 1935; 7>1U,28 Sept.1935; 5,12
Oct.1935; 2 Nov. 1935.
£0 FVT.29 May 1935.
£>1 Enel.Fletcher to C.0.320, 19 Dec. 1935=
52 For a study of Indian relations with Kenya see R.G.Gregory 1971, 
Mangat 1969 and Hancock 19371166—2lt9.
53 Fletcher to C.O.Conf. 13 Jan.1936.
5U Enel. C.O. to Fletcher, Conf. 8 Apr.1936.
55 Enel. C.O. to Fletcher, Conf. 15 July 1936.
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m unicipal f r a n c h is e  was concerned, f o r  th i s  had a lre ad y  been a b o lish ed  
bu t they  were n o t w holly w o rth le ss  in  th e  case of th e  L e g is la tiv e  
Council c o n s t i tu t io n  fo r  W h iteh a ll had n o t given i t s  f i n a l  judgem ent.
For th e  S e c re ta ry  o f S ta te  th e  ta sk  was no t easy . But d i s ta n t  
from th e  Colony and u n a ffe c ted  by th e  emotions p re v a il in g  th e r e ,  he 
was ab le  to  see th e  is su e s  in  b e t t e r  p e rs p e c tiv e . He recogn ized  th e  
co n sid e rab le  d iv i s io n  of op in ion  concerning th e  abandonment of th e  
e le c t iv e  p r in c ip le  and th e  wide measure of agreem ent on equal 
re p re s e n ta t io n .  I f  th e  su b je c t had been r e fe r re d  to  the  
e le c to ra te  th e  c o n te s t would have been b i t t e r ,  and th e  r e s u l t  
m ight no t have been co n c lu s iv e . Thus he could no t san c tio n  a 
referendum . In  th e  i n t e r e s t s  o f th e  Colony he decided  th a t  a 
compromise would be b e s t .  I t  was im portan t th a t  he recognize 
F i j i a n  o p in ion  which d id  no t wish f o r  d i r e c t  e le c t io n s ;  F i j i a n  
r e p re s e n ta t iv e s  would con tinue to  be chosen, as p re v io u s ly , by th e  
Governor from a p an e l of names subm itted  to  him by th e  Council of 
C h ie fs . W ith in  th e  In d ian  and European communities th e re  was 
d iv is io n ;  hence he had decided th a t  each of them should e le c t  
3 r e p re s e n ta t iv e s  ana 2 would be nominated by th e  Governor.
S e c tio n a l i n t e r e s t s  would th u s  be p ro te c te d . The P art-E uropean  
problem could  be d e a l t  by t ig h te n in g  th e  d e f in i t io n  o f a European 
e le c to r ,  and any su g g es tio n  on t h i s  count would be considered  
sy m p a th e tic a lly  by him, b u t he would b ear in  mind th o se  a lre ad y  
en fra n ch ise d . F in a l ly ,  th e  e x is t in g  c c u n c il was extended t i l l  th e  
end o f 1936 o r any o th e r  d a te  n o t l a t e r  than  1937*
In  F i j i ,  th e  a c tio n  was taken  f o r  what i t  was, a compromise, 
though th e  F i j i  Samachar s t i l l  branded i t  as a case of d iv id e  and
57r u le .  For th e  advocates o f th e  e le c t iv e  p r in c ip le  th e  S e c re ta ry  
o f S ta te  had r e tr ie v e d  an alm ost l o s t  cause. At th e  same tim e he 
could no t f u l l y  o b lig e  them because t h i s  would have im p lied  a 
condemnation o f h is  own r e p re s e n ta t iv e .
56 C.O. to  O.A.G.1ii9j 20 Ju ly  1936.
>7 FJT.21 Ju ly  1936; S han ti P u tt  25 Ju ly  1936; F i j i  Samachar 
Ju ly  1936. ‘ — ’ t "  ------
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THE s te p  backw ards i n  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  change d isc u sse d , i n  t h i s  and  
th e  p r e v io u s  c h a p te r  a ro s e  from  f e a r s  o f  I n d ia n  d o m in a tio n  and  th e
d a n g e r  i t  po sed  b o th  f o r  th e  E uropean  p o s i t i o n  and th e  d o c t r i n e  o f  
th e  p a ram o u n tcy  o f  F i j i a n  i n t e r e s t s .  To advance  t h i s  a s  an 
e x p la n a t io n  i s  to  f a i l  t o  fa th o m  th e  a n x ie ty  o f  n o n - In d ia n s  and  th e  
r u l e r s .  T h ere  i s  n eed  to  e x p la in  why I n d ia n  d o m in a tio n  a p p e a re d  a 
p r o b a b i l i t y .  The answ er l i e s  i n  th e  dem ograph ic  and econom ic 
changes w hich  began  i n  th e  n in e te e n  tw e n t i e s  and a p p e a re d  t o  be 
r e a c h in g  a  c lim a x  i n  th e  t h i r t i e s .
The m ost s a l i e n t  f e a t u r e  i n  p o p u la t io n  g row th  i n  F i j i  i n  th e  
tw e n t i e th  c e n tu r y  was th e  n u m e r ic a l  i n c r e a s e  o f  th e  I n d ia n  
com m unity. D u rin g  t h e .1881-1936  p e r io d  th e  I n d ia n  p r o p o r t io n  i n  
th e  c o lo n y 's  p o p u la t io n  in c r e a s e d  from  0.1*6% to  1*2.85% and t h e r e a f t e r  
th e  t r e n d  c o n tin u e d  u n t i l  i n  th e  n in e te e n  f o r t i e s  I n d ia n s  becam e th e  
dom inan t com ponent and l a t e r  n u m e r ic a l ly  g r e a t e r  th a n  a l l  o th e r s  ta k e n  
t o g e t h e r .  The n u m e r ic a l  u p s u rg e  o f  th e  I n d ia n  was a  c a u se  o f  
c o n s te r n a t io n  p a r t i c u l a r l y  f o r  th e  in d ig e n e s  who by 1936 c o n s t i t u t e d  
1*9.22% o f  th e  t o t a l  p o p u la t io n ,  a  c o n s id e r a b le  d e c l in e  from  th e  90.10%  
o f  1881. The 1921 Census had shown t h a t  w h ile  th e  F i j i a n  b i r t h - r a t e  
was 3 2 .1 0  p e r  1000 t h a t  o f  th e  I n d ia n s  had re a c h e d  3 8 .0 0 . T h e r e a f t e r  
I n d ia n s  m a in ta in e d  t h e i r  h ig h  b i r t h - r a t e  and th o u g h  th e  F i j i a n  one 
im proved  i t  d id  n o t  o f f s e t  th e  a d v a n ta g e  th e  I n d ia n s  had g a in e d . '
CRUDE BIRTH RATE PER THOUSAND
FIJIAN INDIAN
1928 3 3 .5 31*.0
1929 31.91 31*. 86
1930 36.1*3 3 6 .0 2
1931 3 5 .3 3 3 3 . 1*1*
1932 3U. 32 38.1*1*
1933 3 5 -1 0 3 8 .6 7
1931* 3 7 .5 3  ' 3 7 .1 9
1935 3 6 .5 3 3 7 .7 0
1936 3 7 .8 0 1*0.15
1937 3I4 .U6 3 7 .5 8
1938 3 7 .6 3 3 9 .5 2
( S o u rc e : R e p o r ts  o f  S e c r e t a r y  f o r  F i j i a n  A f f a i r s  (192 9 -1 9 3 9 ) and
R e p o r ts  o f  S e c r e ta r y  f o r  I n d ia n  A f f a i r s  (1929—  ^9 3 8 ).
58 See A ppendix  I I  f o r  p o p u la t io n  ch an g es and  f o r  a  d i s c u s s io n  on th e  
s u b je c t  se e  M cA rthur 1 9 6 7 :1 -6 7  and Ward 1965:78-111*.
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Further the Indian death rate was considerably lower then that of the 
Fijians as the following table amply illustrates.
DEATH RATE PER THOUSAND
FIJIAN INDIAN
1928 25.00 10.80
1929 21;. 66 9.06
1930 31.21* 12.30
1931 22.22 10.10
1932 17.88 8.I4O
1933 17.72 11.37
193!* 19-78 10.15
1935 21.79 8.10
1936 28.03 12.32
1937 21.37 10.09
1938 20.29 11.20
(Source: as for the previous table.)
Infant mortality which posed a considerable problem for Fijian society
do
was again comparatively low among the Indians. The Indian 
population was also augmented by migration from India. And an 
increasing proportion of the Indian population was Fiji-born^ which 
meant that more and more Indians were going to regard Fiji their 
native land where they found a place in the sun for themselves. The 
implications for the Fijians were clear* though they were the 
indigenes they were no longer the only ethnic group for whose benefit 
the natural, resources of their orginal homeland would, be utilized. 
Admittedly this situation had been altered prior to the arrival of the 
Indians with the influx, earlier of Europeans but these always remained 
a small minority when compared to the Fijians. By the beginning 
of the nineteen thirties Fiji had been transformed into a multi­
cultural colony -where even if the interests of the indigenes remained 
paramount they had to share what they might have a century before 
cherished as only their patrimony. Having thus relinquished some
59 The Secretary for Native Affairs in his report for 1935 (C.P.3U/ 
36) gave the following figures as percentages of deaths of 
Fijian children under one year of age for the years 1930-1935s 
1930* 18.61+%; 1931 , 11 .33%: 1932, 10.00%; 1933,9-78%;
193U, 12.61;%; 1935, 12.65%. In 1935 the Indian infant
mortality under 5 years of age was 8.30% of live births and 10.15% 
in 1931*. (C.P.16/36 and 2U/35•)
60 See Appendix II (c).
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The manner in which the Indians had extended and diversified their
original economic role in Fiji is evident from a comparison of
statistics on occupations of the various races in the years 1911* 1921
and 1936 as summarized in Appendix V. Yet certain features require
emphasis here. First the Indians had come as agricultural labourers
62and quickly moved not only into commerce but become small planters.
By 1911 there were already 530 unindentured Indians involved in
commerce compared to 511 Europeans, in 1921 the numbers had risen
85U and 513 respectively and in 1936, 1,011 and 202.^ In
agriculture too the European position had progressively weakened.^
The labour shortages from 1917 onwards,followed by industrial disputes
in 1920 and 1921 as well as the slump in the world price in sugar in
1922 meant the end of the plantation era in the sugar industry and
’within a few years most of the large sugar estates had been cut up
65into small holdings'. Similar problems 'caused the failure of 
rubber estates in south Viti Levu while storm damage and high 
production costs hit cocoa and tea estates'.^ The banana industry 
fared no betters 'war conditions curtailed shipping, and exports 
fell off; and when in 1921, Australia imposed a protective tariff,
67the industry received a blow from which it has not since recovered'.
The period after 1920 was characterized by 'the withdrawal of 
Europeans from active farming except for coconut growing and dairying*. 
Again it was the Indians who bridged the gap caused by European 
withdrawal. And in sugar cane cultivation the Indian farmers were 
aided by the introduction and implementation in the nineteen twenties 
of the 'small-peasant-farmer scheme' of the C.S.R.Company which leased
land to Indians and bought their cane. In fact in 1921 the Fiji
62 C.S.0.1731/1887, 333/97, 1-730/99; C.P.22/97.
63 Census Reports. See summary in Appendix III. 
category was designated 'Commerce and Finance'
In 1936 the
•
6h See Preface pp.3-U.
65 Derrick 1965:135«
66 Ward 1963:33.
67 Derrick 1965:171.
68 Ward 1963:35.
68
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Government was of the opinion the C.S.R.Company desired the elimination
of the European planter so that it could purchase cane exlusively from
69the Indians at cheaper rates.
While the economy of Fiji was experiencing these changes it
was drawn into that catastrophe, the world depression which began in
1929 and continued into the early thirties. These years might be
generalized by the comment that ’in Fiji throughout the thirties
70times were hard and living standards low’. Again it was the
Europeans who were hit the hardest. As those who monopolized Fiji’s
export trade they reaped the ill-harvest of the rest of the commercial
world; their businesses were unlike the small Indian concerns run
largely by an extended family system with employees who were kinsmen.
Also again the European planters found themselves facing ruin, and in
the Legislative Council the future of the copra industry was discussed
with gloom even when the worst effects of the depression seemed 
71declining. In her reminiscences Lema Low, A Family in Fiji (1962 )
has shorn the difficulties that faced European copra planters in this
period. The Fijians for whom copra was the chief money earner and
who had even greater involvement in it than the Europeans found their
72meagre financial resources rapidly diminishing. In 193U the copra
73prices opened with £10 per ton and during the year fell to £h.
In the banana industry the Fijians were saved by the introduction of
a quota system in 1933 otherwise their position might have been
7)eroded by Chinese participation. Though the Fijians' purchasing 
power was greatly reduced they could rely on their communal system 
to insulate them from the worst impact of the depression - their 
communal gardens provided them with food and. their village with 
shelter. Besides their wants were fewer than those of the 
Europeans.
69 Rodwell to C.O. Conf. 19 Apr. 1921; Fell to C.O. Conf.lli Nov.1921.
70 Dixon 1956 *57.
71 L.C.Debates 193)4:88 and 95*
72 The floods and hurricane of 1929 had severely damaged the two main
commercial products of the Fijians: coconuts and bananas.
(C.P.37/31.) A similar disaster in 1931 again caused extensive 
havoc to Fijian villages and plantations. (C.P.15/32.)
73 C.P. 17/3i;.
7h C.P.17/3U.
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Consequently the Europeans suffered more than the Fijians. Derrick 
makes the point well:
When, in 1938 the price of copra dropped to ££.5.6 a ton, 
plantations employing paid labour could not afford as much 
as to collect the fallen nuts, while at the same time Fijian 
growers were able to make copra with a margin of profit. 75
While the Fijians and Europeans were disadvantaged and distressed
the Indians with their involvement in the sugar industry under the
aegis of the resourceful C.S.R.Company appeared secure .' The
contrast was not overlooked. Officials frequently referred to the
prosperity of Indians in Fiji and how they were much better Off than
they would have been in India. Fletcher contended that Indians
remained, in Fiji because of the rich material rewards that colony
77offered, otherwise they would leave. Some years earlier to 
illustrate that their situation in Fiji was better than that in India, 
Fletcher had stated that in Fiji 5.63% of the Indians were at school 
compared with only 3-h7% in India.^ Later in that year (1930) 
Fletcher pointed out that during the previous five years 1,627 Indian 
adults had been repatriated and these on an average left Fiji with 
£l;2 each while during the same period all the other colonies
79repatriated 7,359 adults who on an average left for India with £16. 
According to A.A.Wright, who acted as Governor during Fletcher's 
absence from the colony in the early part of 1935 and was a strong 
advocate of the nomination system, the Indians were the 'mostgoprosperous community in Fiji'.
During a debate on the depressed state of the copra industry 
Sukuna spoke:
Fijians, as a whole would support any measure the Government 
proposes to palliate, ease, or relieve, the position of the 
European planter. It is not entirely sentiment; for that class 
in the past has been of great benefit to us. We have drawn
75 Derrick 1965:166.
76 L.C.Debates 193U:268. In a letter to the Governor Scott and 
Hedstrom wrote that the only fortunate people in Fiji at the time 
were those in the sugar industry and those employed, by the 
Government.
77 L.C.Debases 193^:395.
78 L.C.Debates 1930:9.
79 L.C.Debates 1930:1U3. Fletcher added that Indians in Fiji had 
'the habit of remitting considerable sums to India’.
80 L.C. Debat es 19314:369. When Wright made these remarks he was the 
Acting Colonial Secretary.
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thousands and thousands from them. We are  s t i l l  drawing 
thousands of pounds in  th e  form of wages. I f  t h i s  c la s s  goes 
to  th e  w a ll, we f e e l  th a t  we stand to  lo s e .  I f  th e  e s ta te s  
a re  l o s t  to  them, they  may get in to  hands from which we cannot 
expect th e  same tre a tm e n t in  th e  f u tu r e .  81
The S e c re ta ry  fo r  N ative A ffa irs  (A.A.W right) added th a t  though he had
n o t m entioned them by name, Sukuna was f e a r f u l  of Europeans f a l l i n g
82in to  In d ian  hands. Once more Sukuna had a lig n e d  h im se lf and h is  
people  on th e  s id e  o f th e  Europeans in  a s i tu a t io n  where he co n sid ered  
th r e a t s  of an In d ian  ta k e -o v e r  e x is te d . There was a lso  th e  sen tim en t 
t h a t  th e  In d ian s  were c o n tr ib u tin g  le s s  in  ta x a t io n  th an  o th e r s .  The 
A cting  S e c re ta ry  f o r  F i j i a n  A ffa irs  (H.C.Monckton) told, th e  L e g is la t iv e  
C ouncil:
S i r ,  th e  n a tiv e  F i j i a n  pays a good d e a l more in  d i r e c t  ta x  th an  
o th e r  members o f th e  p o p u la tio n , p a r t i c u la r ly  th e  In d ia n s . The 
F i j i a n  pays £1 Government ta x ;  he a lso  pays a P ro v in c ia l  Rate 
from 11s. to  23s. That means t h a t  he pays 31s to  li3s in  d i r e c t  
ta x a t io n .  In  a d d itio n  to  t h a t ,  in  th e  case o f a F i j i a n  who has 
l e f t  h is  town f o r  more than  tw elve months, he pays Absentee Tax 
of £1. He i s  r e a l l y  h e a v ily  taxed  in  p ro p o r tio n  to  h is  a b i l i t y  
to  pay when he pays up to  £ 3 .3 .0 . S i r ,  I  would c a l l  a t t e n t io n
to  th e  p re fe re n ce  to  th e  In d ian  who pays only  £1 when th e  
F i j i a n  pays approx im ate ly  £3. 83
Among non -In d ian s  in  F i j i  th e re  was a consensus of o p in ion  th a t  
th e  In d ian s  were a th r iv in g  community n o t in  want and in  an 
environm ent f a r  more conducive to  success th an  any th ey  would 
have encountered  had th ey  remained in  In d ia . Hence o th e rs  found i t  
d i f f i c u l t  to  u n d ers tan d  why th e  In d ian s  ought to  com plain so much and 
make such excessive  demands as th e  common r o l l .  1 There was some t r u t h
81 L .C .D ebates 193^:93.
82 ib id :9 iu
83 L .C .D ebates 1935:199. K.B.Singh d u ring  th e  same deb a te  was to  
express h is  d isagreem ent w ith  th e  co n ten tio n  because he though t 
t h a t  In d ian s  did  n o t ge t th e  same tre a tm e n t as F i j i a n s .  He c a l le d  
on th e  co u n cil to  r e f r a in  from drawing com parisons between 
In d ian s  and F i j i a n s  o r In d ian s  and Europeans. ( ib id :2 0 1 .)
8i| F le tc h e r  very  e a r ly  in  h is  governorsh ip  had made e x p l i c i t  t h a t  
common r o l l  d id  n o t e x i s t  in  In d ia . In  h is  ad d ress  to  th e  
Council (13 May 1930) he s ta te d  th a t  a p e ru s a l o f th e  In d ian  
Year Book fo r  1929 showed th a t  in  th e  su b -c o n tin en t e le c to r a te s  
were a rranged  la r g e ly  on th e  b a s is  of g iv ing  se p a ra te  
re p re se n ta tio n  ’to  v a rio u s  ra c e s , com m unities, and se p a ra te  
i n t e r e s t s ’ in  th e  d iv e rse  In d ian  p o p u la tio n . Thus in  Bengal 
th e re  -were 7 d iv is io n s :  Non-Muslim, Muslim, European, Anglo-
Indian., L andholders, U n iv e rs ity  and Commerce. (L .C .D ebates 1930:
8 . ) .
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t r u t h  in  th e  a s s e r t io n  th a t  In d ian s  in  F i j i  had o p p o rtu n itie s  f o r  
m a te r ia l  advancement th a t  they  m ight n o t have had in  In d ia . But 
w ealth  was co n cen tra ted  in  th e  hands o f only a few w hile  th e  bulk  o f 
th e  p o p u la tio n  as th e  Government i t s e l f  knew had to  contend w ith  
d i f f i c u l t i e s  such as in d eb ted n ess , sh o rt- te rm  le a s e s  w ith  th e  c o n sta n t
u n c e r ta in ty  about t h e i r  renew al, th e  need f o r  more land, and b e t t e r
83e d u ca tio n a l f a c i l i t i e s .  On th e  is su e  o f la n d , th e  F i j ia n s  were 
w il l in g  to  le a se  i t  p rovided  t h e i r  fu tu re  needs were adeq u a te ly  
safeguarded . The freq u e n t p o in t a t  is su e  was th e  le n g th  of le a s e s ;  
In d ian s  wanted. 99 y ea r le a s e s  w hile  l e g i s l a t i o n  in  F i j i  p rovided  
21 y ea r le a s e s  w ith  p o ss ib le  ex ten s io n s  o f 10 y e a r s . l e t  d e sp ite  
th e se  d i f f i c u l t i e s  th e  In d ia n s  as  a whole were n o t in  m a te r ia l  want 
o r  p lagued by d ir e  p o v erty ; th ey  had no cause to  d e sp a ir . N onetheless 
th ey  were b e d e v il le d  by a sense o f in s e c u r i ty  which th ey  thought 
could only  be removed by th e  a r r i v a l  of common r o l l  and. th e  p ro v is io n  
of s o c ia l  and p o l i t i c a l  e q u a li ty  w ith  Europeans. The m edicine t h a t  
th e  m a jo rity  of th e  In d ian s  demanded as the  panacea, was anathema to  
o th e rs .
Thus p e r s i s te n t  In d ian  p o l i t i c a l  a g i ta t io n  f o r  common r o l l  a roused  
s tro n g  re a c tio n s  in  the  o th e rs .  For th e  F i j ia n s  and t h e i r  B r i t i s h  
guard ians i t  s p e lle d  th e  doom of th e  p r in c ip le  of th e  paramountcy o f 
F i j ia n  i n t e r e s t s .  For th e  Europeans i t  im p lied  economic danger, 
th e  end of p o l i t i c a l  in f lu e n c e , th e  in v as io n  of t h e i r  s o c ia l  
p r iv i le g e s .  Under th e se  c ircum stances th o se  who f e l t  th re a te n e d  
found i t  n ecessa ry  to  seek p ro te c t iv e  d ev ices  even i f  they  were 
re tro g re s s iv e  and meant s te p s  backwards r a th e r  th an  a march fo rw ards 
tow ards p o l i t i c a l  developm ent. Moreover th e  a b o l i t io n  of th e  
m unicipal f ra n c h is e  and th e  r e - in tr o d u c t io n  of th e  nom ination system 
a longside  communal e le c t io n s  f o r  th e  L e g is la t iv e  C ouncil were th e  
s a fe ty  m easures so chosen.
Yet Europeans had sought p ro te c t io n  n o t from In d ian s  on ly . They 
had expressed  f e a r s  of P art-E uropean  dom ination of t h e i r  e le c to r a te s .
The Part-E uropeans were th e  c h ild re n  of m arriages and l ia i s o n s  between
83 C .P .39/38. F le tc h e r  m ain ta in ed : 'They a re  bom  in  d e b t; th e y
l iv e  in  d eb t; and. th ey  d ie  in  debt*’. (L .C .D ebates 193^:393). He 
saw i t  as an in se p a ra b le  p a r t  of t h e i r  way o f l i f e .  See L.C. - 
Debates 1933:293-308 fo r  K.B.Singh 's  m otion on lan d  f o r  In d ia n s . 
C .P .38/31, 13/32, 2U/33, 16/36.
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European males and native women and tried to emphasize more their
European connection than their non-Earopean links. Yet the Europeans
were wary of them, When they were enfranchised, in 1910 it was the
86intention to 'lift them to the level of the white man'. Thereafter
they became the forgotten men politically for the next two decades.
Then in 1931 the Part-European population showed an increase of
113 while the Earopean population fell by 20; the next year the
former again rose by 102 (+2.9%) while the latter declined, by
195 (-3.8%).^ In fact in that year (1932) the European had shown
a natural increase of b5; their decline was due to emigration
88caused by the difficult economic conditions. The European
population was to continue to decline until 1935 when it registered
a growth of 3.6?% to the Part-European's 3.1;7%. During these years,
however, the Part-European population continued to grow; and its
crude birth-rate from 1928 to 1938 was always at least double that
of the Europeans - its highest point was 1931, when it registered8q
U3.82 per thousand to the Europeans' 17.20. In 1931; both reached 
their lowest point for the decade, the European births were 8.82 
per thousand while that of the Part-Europeans was 2U-21. Despite the 
decline the latter still registered nearly three times as many births.
86 L.C.Debates 1910, First Session:29.
87 C.P.W33.
88 ibid.
89 ibid.
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ESTIMATED POPULATION 1928-37
1928 3 ,1 5 8 a,i*58
1929 3,281 1*, 726
1930 3,333 5 ,0 7 8
1931 3,bU6 5 ,9 5 8 :.
1932 3,5U8 14,863
1933 3,661 h , 80U
1931* 3 ,7 1 7 1*,763
1935 3,8U 6 1*, 938
1936 ii,6U 6 1»,159
1937 1*3 756 1*, 238
(S ou rce : M edical D epartm ent R ep o rts  1929- 1 9 3 8 .)
PERCENTAGE INCREASE ( + ) o r  DECREASE ( - )  1929-37
PART-EUROPEANS EUROPEAN
1929 + 3 .8 9 +6.01
1930 + 1 .58 +7.81*
1931 + 3 .39 - 0 .3 9
1932 + 2 .96 - 3 .8 5
1933 + 3 .18 - 1 .2 3
1931* + 1 .53 -0 .8 5
1935 +3.U? + 3 .6 ?
1936 + 2 0 .5U -1 5 .7 2
1937 + 2.37 + 1 .9 0
(S ou rce : C a lc u la t io n s  b ased  on p re v io u s  t a b l e . )
For some tim e , E uropeans such as  S c o tt  and Hedstrom had been w o rr ie d
t h a t  pure w h ite s  would be outnum bered by th e  P a rt-E u ro p e an s  and. when
th e  M edical and H e a lth  R eport f o r  193i| r e v e a le d  t h a t  th e  P a r t -
Europeans had in c re a s e d  15.29 p e r  th o u san d  to  th e  E uropeans' 1 .8 7 ,
90th e  l a t t e r  became even more con ce rn ed .
S c o t t ,  Hedstrom  and F le tc h e r  found i t  im p e ra tiv e  t h a t  th e
nom ination  system  sho u ld  be in tro d u c e d  l e s t  th e  P a rt-E u ro p e an s  swamp
91th e  European e l e c to r a t e s  and c o n t ro l  th e  v o tin g  t h e r e in .  Those 
European le a d e r s  who f e l t  anx ious were a b le  to  conv ince  th e  G overnor 
t h a t  t h e i r  p o s i t io n  and i n t e r e s t s  in  F i j i  could  o n ly  be sa fe g u a rd e d
90 C .S.O . F38/2U.
91 C .A .9 /9 1 . For F l e t c h e r 's  comments on th e  is s u e  see  p p .252-53 .
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by th e  nom ination system and th ey  ob tained  s u b s ta n t ia l ly  what th ey  
sought. U n fo rtu n ate ly  th e  Governor d id  no t see f i t  to  recogn ize  th e  
P art-E u ropeans as a lso  having d i s t i n c t  g rievances and phobias th a t  
needed a t te n t io n .  To some degree th e  P art-E uropeans them selves were 
in  e r r o r ,  they  were f a r  too  in te n t  on ach iev ing  a s s im ila t io n  w ith  and 
in te g ra t io n  in to  European s o c ie ty . O therw ise, l ik e  th e  Muslims, 
th ey  might have been ab le  by p re ssu re  to  o b ta in  a s e a t  fo r  one of 
t h e i r  own group as a nominated member in  th e  new L e g is la tiv e  Council 
in  1937.
Europeans, or a t  l e a s t  th e  more i n f l u e n t i a l  among them, wanted
n e i th e r  lo s s  of t h e i r  id e n t i ty  nor d im unition  of t h e i r  p o l i t i c a l
in flu en c e  by in c u rs io n s  from P art-E u ro p ean s, Even a f t e r  the
S e c re ta ry  of S ta te  had decided n o t to  a b o lish  th e  e le c t iv e  p r in c ip le
in  th e  L e g is la tiv e  C ouncil, Europeans continued  th e  demands f o r
g re a te r  p ro te c tio n  from P art-E u ro p ean s. P ressu re  was ex erted  to
92t ig h te n  th e  d e f in i t io n  of a European. But the  Executive Council
re so lv ed  th a t  th e re  ought to  be no r e - d e f in i t i c n  of ’European E le c to r ’
in  th e  L e tte r s  P a te n t, m erely a more p re c ise  im plem entation o f th e  
93e x is t in g  one. There was th e  view held  by some o f f i c i a l s  th a t  th e
9hPart-European ’menace’ was g ro ss ly  exaggera ted . And th i s  was
borne out by th e  number o f e lec ted , v o te rs  of th e  two groups in  
gc
q u e stio n . Even a f t e r  th e  c o n s t i tu t io n  had been changed, in  1937
some European p o l i t i c ia n s  rem ained d i s s a t i s f i e d  b u t S ir  A rthur R ichards
made i t  e x p l ic i t  to  th e  S e c re ta ry  of S ta te  th a t  t h e i r  w ishes deserved  
96no c o n s id e ra tio n . The S e c re ta ry  of S ta te  f u l l y  concurred th a t  th e  
f a c ts  d id  no t in d ic a te  th e  need o r d e s i r a b i l i t y  of any a c tio n  e i t h e r
92 C.O. to  F le tc h e r  1ii9, 20 Ju ly  1936; C.S.O. F3Ö /22/1.
93 M inutes Ex.C o.l8  Dec. 1936; C.S.O. F3Ö/2U.
9h M inute, J .R u s s e l l ,  D ire c to r  of E ducation , 21 S e p t .1938; C .S .O .F38/2lu
93 See Appendix IV.
96 R ichards to  C.O.Conf. 3 Nov. 1937; C.S.O.CF38/23: ’I t  i s  . . .
c le a r  th a t  th e  immediate danger of th e  European D iv is io n s  being  
e n t i r e ly  con tro lled , by th e  h a l f - c a s te  vo te  has been g re a t ly  
exaggera ted . In  a d d itio n  th e  f e a r  o f th e  h a l f - c a s te  vo te  i s  
based on an o th er f a l la c y  -  t h a t  i t  i s  o r ever could be 
homogeneous. There i s  no l ik e l ih o o d  w hatever of th e  h a l f - c a s te  
vo te  being c a s t as such on one s id e  o r an o th er and I  cannot 
v is u a l iz e  a good European can d id a te  n o t o b ta in in g  a f a i r  
p ro p o rtio n  of h a l f - c a s te  v o te s  even a g a in s t  a h a l f - c a s te  opponent.
I f  a good h a l f - c a s te  cand ida te  emerged he would have a f a i r
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97to exclude the Part-European vote or to extend European franchise.
The attempt to raise the Part-European bogey was an illustration 
of the racist attitudes of a section of the European community.
There was no other reason why the Part-Europeans should be dragged in
98as a pretext for constitutional change. They were a small group, 
neither wealthy nor politically vocal but they were feared by some 
Europeans simply because their numbers might someday enable them 
to elect one of their onw and thus deprive some pure European of 
a seat in the Legislative Council. By colluding with Europeans of 
this view on the subject Fletcher was as guilty as they were of racial 
prejudice. The Part-Europeans could not be said to threaten the 
principle of the paramountcy of Fijian interests as the Indian 
advocates of common roll did.
The Part-European episode is significant in that it reveals 
that the step backwards was not recommended purely for motives of 
high principle of safeguarding the Fijian people. Fortunately the 
Secretary of State had wisdom enough to assess the circumstances 
prevailing in Fiji for himself. Thus he did not succumb to the 
pressures calling for the total abolition of the elective principle in 
Fiji. Though he re-introduced the nomination system he did so 
without rescinding the right to vote for one’s representatives in the 
Legislative Council. His compromise placated anxious minorities as 
well as saved Fiji from being plunged into constitutional darkness.
96 cont'd: chance of success in the Eastern Division only and I
cannot personally feel that it would be a bad thing for one 
Division to be represented by a half-caste of suitable education and 
ability. There is not one at present in sight.’ When Richards 
wrote this despatch he was aware from the Medical Report for 1936 
(C.P.27/37) that during that year the Part-European population had 
increased by 20.$h% (b,61|6) while the European one had declined by 
15.72% bo \x,l59* The difference between the two totals here and 
those of the Census Report of 1936 is due to the Medical Report
98 Two European Legislative Council members, Barker and Major
Willoughby Tottenham strongly deprecated, the manner in which the 
Part-Europeans had. been mentioned by the Governor in his Address. 
(L.C.Debates 1935:290-and 29b.) Willoughby Tottenham unlike 
Barker, however, favoured the nomination system because of the 
Indian danger although initially he had opposed the idea.
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X
CONCLUSION
THE period 1900-37 in Fiji witnessed both constitutional progress and 
retrogression. There was progress in that the franchise was 
introduced in 190U for the European settlers and extended to the 
Indians in 1929- while for the Fijians the Council of Chiefs was 
permitted to nominate representatives to the Legislative Council.
There was retrogression in that the municipal franchise was restricted 
for racial reasons in 1915 by a severe education test and then in 
1937 finally abolished and replaced wholly by the nomination system.
In the Legislative Council too the elective principle was diluted 
when partial nomination on the baais of ethnic groups was 
re-introduced in 1937 to exist alongside communal elections. These 
arrangements were the outcome of the dilemma that confronted the 
colonial regime ii: its efforts to remain true to its obligations 
to the Fijian people on the one hand and to accomodate the demands 
of reactionary Europeans and assertive Indians on the other.
Constitutional advance owed its origin to the pressures exerted by 
European settlers who sought for Fiji British representative 
institutions to which they considered themselves rightful heirs.
But Britain having undertaken to safeguard the rights of the Fijian 
people found itself unable to grant its sons in Fiji the political 
forms they enjoyed in Australia -and New Zealand. It was unwilling 
to cede its responsibilities in Fiji to a minority settler regime.
And the communal franchise of 190L was thus a compromise between 
British obligations and settler demands.
Though they accepted this constitutional concession the Europeans 
refused to admit at that stage that their hopes of turning Fiji inuo 
a white colony were in vain. Consequently they proceeded to
consolidate their political status: they obtained representation on
the Executive Council in 1912; through persistent and concerted 
pressure they guaranteed their grip on the municipalities of Cuva 
and Levuka by the introduction of a rigid literacy qualification into 
the municipal franchise in 1915- But by 191?, the more perceptive 
among the European leaders abandoned their quest for democracy in Fijj
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when th ey  re a l iz e d  th e  dangers of such a system fo r  them selves* a 
t in y  m in o rity  am idst a non-European m a jo r ity . They were p a r t i c u la r ly  
concerned about ra p id  in c re a se s  in  th e  In d ian  p o p u la tio n  and i t s  
clam our fo r  s o c ia l  and p o l i t i c a l  e q u a l i ty  w ith  them, C urrent r a c ia l  
d o c tr in e s  of the  Europeans made t h i s  re q u e s t d i s t a s t e f u l  enough but 
th ey  sensed g raver consequences. In  t h e i r  pa th  to  improvement 
In d ian s  had been invad ing  European economic p re se rv es  and p rov id in g  
su c c e ss fu l com petition  th e r e in ,  i f  t h e i r  p o l i t i c a l  am bitions were no t 
checked then  European in flu en ce  in  F i j i  could be reduced to  minimal 
s ig n if ic a n c e  and f i n a l l y  e lim in a te d . European c a p i ta l  and s a c r i f i c e  
in  th e  p io n ee rin g  days had helped  to  develop F i j i  and th ey  saw no 
reason  why they should  be supp lan ted  in  th e  country  th a t  was 
r ig h t f u l ly  t h e i r  home by t h e i r  e rs tw h ile  s e rv a n ts . W hile e a r l i e r  
Europeans had chafed ag a in s t- the au to cracy  o f c o lo n ia l Governors and 
t h e i r  p o lic y  of paramountcy of F i j ia n  i n t e r e s t s ,  they  now found i t  
conven ien t and im p era tiv e  fo r  su rv iv a l to  d isc a rd  o p p o s itio n  and 
seek an a l l ia n c e  w ith  th e  c o lo n ia l reg im e. Since th ey  were B r i t i s h  
th ey  could s ta t e  th a t  th ey  too were le g a te e s  to  whom th e  F i j ia n s  had 
en tru sted , t h e i r  co u n try . Once they  had abandoned o h e ir form er 
p o l i t i c a l  a s p i r a t io n s  and accep ted  th e  crown colony system th ey  could 
s u c c e s s fu lly  fo rg e  an e n ten te  w ith  th e  Government. Once they  equated 
t h e i r  i n t e r e s t s  w ith  th o se  of th e  regime e s ta b lis h e d  to  p ro te c t  th e  
fu tu re  of th e  F i j i a n s  t h e i r  own p o s i t io n  would become u n a s s a i la b le .  
Together th ey  would w ith s tan d  th e  In d ian  o n s lau g h t. Such 
r a t io n a l iz a t i o n  enab led  S c o tt ,  Hedstrom and t n e i r  co lle ag u es  to  
co -o p era te  w ith  Governors such as Sw eet-E sco tt and Murchison F le tc h e r .  
They were a ided  by th e  F i j i a n s ’ w illin g n e s s  to  accep t them as t h e i r  
b e n e fa c to rs .
Enjoying economic p ro g ress  and d ec id in g  to  make F i j i  t h e i r  new 
homeland and th a t  o f t h e i r  d escen d an ts , th e  In d ian s  sought p o l i t i c a l  
e q u a l i ty .  On t h e i r  p e t i t io n  th ey  were g ran ted  a nom inated 
re p re s e n ta t iv e  in  1916 but they  were n o t overwhelmingly happy w ith  the  
choice o f 3 a d ri M ahraj. In  o rd e r to  ensure a re g u la r  lab o u r supply 
from In d ia ,  th e  Government was p repared  to  bestow communal f ra n c h ise  
upon th e  In d ia n s . But th e  is su e  was fra u g h t w ith  problem s and i t  
was n o t t i l l  1929 th a t  i t  became a r e a l i t y .  One of th e  m ajor causes 
of th e  d e lay  had been th e  a t t i tu d e  o f th e  Government of In d ia  to
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whose insistence on a common franchise neit-her the Fiji Government 
nor the Colonial Office was prepared to bend.
The entry of the three Indian representatives into the 
Legislative Council brought controversy. They asked lengthy and 
detailed questions aimed at highlighting Indian grievances (as 
conceived by the community) and embarrassing the Government. The 
climax, came with the introduction of the Indian motion calling for 
common roll, its unanimous rejection by the official, Fijian, and 
European members, followed by the withdrawal and resignation of 
the three Indian councillors. Thereafter the Indians remained 
unrepresented till 1932. In their behaviour they had obtained 
inspiration from compatriots in a similar position in Kenya and 
were encouraged by Gandhi. The consequences were threefold.
Firstly, the Indian community became politically divided into those 
wishing to utilize the new-found franchise and those who preferred 
boycott or non-cooperation. Secondly, the Indian community, 
particularly the non-cooperationsists were ranged against the other 
ethnic groups. Thirdly, Indian agitation and intransigence 
provoked a protective reaction in the other racial camps which 
brought about major and retrogressive constitutional changes in 1937-
Since the Indian seats in the Legislative Council remained 
vacant till 1932 one might argue that the Indian community supported 
non-cooperation in order to obtain common roll. Why were the Indians 
so single-minded and stubborn in their request, especially when they 
might have exploited their enfranchisement by seeking redress of 
their more practical problems such as land by obtaining the sympathy 
and assistance of other groups? The answer lies in the Indians5 
feeling that first and foremost they must, obtain equality as a matter 
of their izzat or self-respectThey considered communal franchise a 
stigma of inferiority. Their obsession with equality blinded them 
to all else. In the pursuit of their own goals they chose to ignore 
the regime’s obligations to the Fijian people. Indians saw common 
roll as the only guarantee of the security they so desperately sought.
Encouragment from India increased the Fiji Indians' stubbornness: 
in the past, India's intervention had achieved the abolition of the 
indenture system, further pressure had resulted in the enfranchisement 
of Indians in Fiji; it had acted continually as a vocal watchdog over
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th e  p l ig h t  o f In d ian s  abroad. By l i s te n in g  to  In d ia , e sp e c ia l ly  to  
i t s  n a t io n a l i s t  p o l i t i c i a n s ,  F i j i  In d ian s  hoped to  o b ta in  re d re s s . 
B esides, In d ia  was s t i l l  b h a ra t mata (Mother In d ia )  even though F i j i  
had become th e  new home where a permanent p lace  in  the  sun was 
d e s ire d . F i j i  Ind ian s  viewed In d ia  as New Zealanders and A u stra lian s  
u n t i l  q u ite  re c e n tly  regarded  England as w itn ess  t h e i r  freq u en t 
re fe re n c e s  to  ’home' o r ’th e  o ld  co u n try ' o r 'm other c o u n try '.
In d ia  was th e  source of th e  F i j i  In d ia n s ' c u l tu re ,  the  land  of t h e i r  
gods, the  s o i l  of t h e i r  s p i r i t u a l  su sten an ce . Those th a t  came out 
of th e re ,  e sp e c ia l ly  the  educated ones, were accorded a d u la t io n . This 
i s  what made In d ian s  look w ith  awe upon M an ila l, S r i K rishna, B as is t 
Muni, S .B .P a te l, A .D .P a te l,-; K.3 .Singh as w e ll as the  Hasan 
b ro th e rs  and e a r l i e r  M irza M uzzaffar Beg among th e  Muslims. The same 
sen tim ent of f a i t h  and t r u s t  had in  1922 le d  th e  In d ian s  to  open th e i r  
h e a r ts  to  Raju and h is  c o lle ag u e s . Sven G.F.Andrews, a European, 
had won t h e i r  confidence because of h is  l in k s  w ith  In d ia . Because 
In d ia  had been sym pathetic , F i j i  In d ian  p o l i t i c ia n s  were
s u sc e p tib le  to  d ire c t io n  from th e re .  The freq u e n t in v o ca tio n  of 
I n d ia 's  a id  and that, c o u n try 's  re ad in ess  to  in te r f e r e  undermined 
r a th e r  than  s treng thened  th e  In d ian  cause in  F i j i .  O ther groups had 
no such o u ts id e  su p p o rte rs  and re sen te d  t h i s  advantage of t h e i r  
In d ian  c o u n te rp a r ts . B esides, In d ia  was during  those  y ears  in  the 
th ro e s  o f rampant n a tio n a lism  which th re a ten e d  th e  Empire, and to  
those  who p laced  t h e i r  f a i t h  in  th e  im p e ria l m ission of th e  B r i t is h  
race  Gandhi and h is  fe llo w s were in to le ra b le  u p s ta r t s  and re b e ls ,  
d is s id e n t  m alcon ten ts fom enting m isch ie f . The Government, Europeans 
and F i j ia n  le a d e rs  th u s  viewed su p p lic a tio n  to  In d ia  w ith  grave 
m is tru s t .
Not a i l  In d ian s  appealed to  In d ia . Those who d id  were u su a lly  
Arya Sam ajis le d  by Vishnu Deo; Some p re fe rre d  co -o p e ra tio n  w ith  th e  
government o r o p p o sitio n  through c o n s t i tu t io n a l  means through e le c t io n s  
and e n try  in to  the  L e g is la tiv e  C ouncil. Judging from th e  rep ea ted  
v ic to ry  o f th e  Arya Samaji group a t  th e  e le c t io n s ,  th e  c o -o p e ra t io n is ts  
were e i th e r  in  a m in o rity  or were no t as w e ll-o rg an ized  as t h e i r  
opponents o f i f  th e y  were in  a m a jo rity  p o l i t i c a l  apathy negated  t h e i r  
num erical s tr e n g th . One group among them were th e  M uslins who, as 
in  In d ia  a t  th e  tim e and no doubt in  em ulation , appealed  f o r  sep a ra te
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re p re s e n ta t io n . O thers inc luded  Ind ian  C h ris tia n s  l ik e  John G rant
and John B airag i who, because they  had abandoned th e i r  a n c e s tr a l
r e l ig io n  and acquired  ano ther o ffe re d  by the  European m is s io n a r ie s ,
o fte n  found them selves cu t o ff  from th e i r  fe llo w  Ind ians." ' In d ia n
C h r is t ia n s , moreover, tended to  be more d e siro u s  of equating
them selves w ith  European ways and mode of l iv in g .  Like th e  M uslims.
they  found Arya Samaji t a c t i c s  f u t i l e .
There were o th e rs  who p re fe r re d  co -o p e ra tio n  w ith  the  Government
and Europeans because i t  was p r o f i ta b le .  The Government- m ight appo in t
one to  an adv iso ry  board where one came in to  c o n tac t w ith  Europeans,
who, i f  im pressed , might a s s i s t  in  o b ta in in g  b u s in ess  c o n tra c ts  or
lan d  or jobs fo r  sons o r help  in  some o th e r  way whereby an am bitious
2
in d iv id u a l hoped to  gain  w ealth  o r s ta tu r e .  J u s t  as some In d ia n s  
hoped to  advance th e i r  own le a d e rsh ip  claim s by c re a tin g  a g i ta t in g  
fa c t io n s  so d id  some o th e rs  wish to  o b ta in  p e rso n a l gain  through ' 
c o -o p e ra tio n .
But the  f a c t io n  most a r t i c u la te  and b e s t  o rg an ised  was th e  
Arya Samaj and i t s  p o l i t i c a l  su p p o rte rs . And th e se  fo llow ed  th e  
In d ian  campaign fo r  th e  f ra n c h is e  in  Kenya as c lo se ly  as th e  news 
sources in  F i j i  p e rm itte d . In d ian s  in  F i j i  l ik e  In d ian s  in  Kenya 
used t a c t i c s  of non-cooperation  popu lar w ith  n a t io n a l i s t s  of th e  
Gandhian school in  In d ia . However, European s e t t l e r s  and o f f i c i a l s  
a lso  watched even ts in  Kenya c lo se ly  fo r  they  too  were concerned l e s t  
th e  C olon ial O ffice  succumb to  In d ian  p re ssu re  th e re  and then  do 
lik ew ise  in  F i j i .  They too were s e n s i t iv e  to  tre n d s  in  th e  Empire 
a t  la rg e .  Thus Rodwell was quick to  draw a comparison between 
Ind ian s  in  Kenya and F i j i  in  h is  su c c e ss fu l e f f o r t s  to  veto  th e  
re p re se n ta tio n  of the  l a t t e r  on the  Executive C ouncil. He contended 
th a t  the p o ss ib le  in c lu s io n  of an In d ian  in  th e  Kenyan Executive 
Council was no argument fo r  the  im position  of the  same concession  in  
F i j i :
The Ind ian  in  F i j i  i s  m ainly of the  co o lie  c la s s .  The Kenya 
In d ia n , I  b e l ie v e , i s  of a much h ig h er c la s s  both  s o c ia l ly  and 
e d u c a tio n a lly  and th e re fo re  b e t te r  q u a l i f ie d  fo r  p a r t i c ip a t io n  
in  th e  in n e r co u n c ils  of th e  government. 3
1 This comment on In d ian  C h ris tia n s  i s  based on d isc u ss io n s  w ith  
F i j i  In d ia n s , both  C h ris tia n  and n o n -C h ris tia n .
2 Based on o ra l  ev idence .
3 Rodwell to  C.O.Conf. 18 A p r.1922.
263
Since precedents in one part of the Empire could be used elsewhere
it was important for all concerned to take note of political problems
in other colonies especially if they seemed relevant.
Of the two major antagonists, Europeans and Indians, in the
contest for constitutional rights in Fiji, it can be said that both
exhibited similarities with counterparts abroad. For the Indians
(as stated, earlier) it was not just the franchise it was an issue of
izzat and race equality in the Empire as emphasized by Indians at the
Imperial Conference in London in 1921 and again in 1923.^ For the
Europeans, Indians in the various parts of the Empire were becoming
a threat and had to be warded off. Professor Hancock’s description
of the South African situation can be equated with Fiji:
There was too big a crowd of Indians jostling for places on the 
lower ranks of the economic ladder. The white settlers believed 
that the Indians, in their struggle to ascend, would thrust 
their way into positions which should be reserved for Europeans. 
For the Indians had a far less expensive standard of living than 
the Europeans, and therefore a greater power to thrust and cling. 
And what would be the fate of the unfortunates who were pushed 
from their foothold? A dominant race which had built its 
homes precariously on the broken ground of African society 
could not even ask such a question without feeling a shiver of 
panic. 5
The only difference was that the Europeans in Fiji had not been able 
to acquire the position of dominance they had achieved in South Africa 
and Rhodesia and to a lesser degree in Kenya, but Fiji Europeans felt 
the same * 5shiver of panic’ when confronted by Indian economic 
improvement and political claims.
In Fiji,the Europeans viewed the Indians, in the nineteen twenties 
and thirties, with the same sense of threat that they had earlier 
regarded the policy of the paramountcy of Fijian interests as expounded
h Hancock 1937:186-37.
5 ibid:190-191. The same can be said about the Kenya Europeans. This 
is illustrated by Gregory 1971:U9U-: ’The Kenya Europeans feared,
with considerable justification, that political concessions would 
lead, to proportional representation through which the Indians, by 
weight of number, would control the Government in-the same way 
that they dominated business and commerce, Many were obsessed 
with the dangers of the ’Indian menace’.’
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and implemented by Gordon and his successors. Both imposed restraints 
on settler aspirations. It was the paramountcy of Fijians interests 
that had denied them cf an endless supply of cheap land and the 
abundant availability of indigenous labourers. It had, moreover, 
thwarted them from obtaining the political institutions which in 
neighbouring New Zealand and Australia established the primacy of 
European interests over those of the indigenes. As a result 
European settlers in Fiji found themselves under many constraints 
not imposed on their counterparts in other parts of the British Empire. 
Having conceded to these restrictions, although with opposition, they 
found themselves menaced by the Indians who coupled economic 
diversification and versatility with calls for a type of political 
reform that would put power into their hands. The former servants 
and their descendants were clamouring for concessions which in their 
state of illiteracy and inexperience they lacked the ability to 
manage. Besides, the wielding of political power in Fiji was a 
British prerogative not to be surrendered to lesser men. For their 
part, the Indians saw the Europeans as obstacles to uhe achievement 
of what they considered their promised rights: political parity,
social equality and economic progress without restraints. Their 
inability to obtain these they blamed on a collusion between European 
settlers and a European regime. They saw themselves deprived 
solely for racist reasons. And in their determination they ignored 
the paramountcy of Fijian interests as the Europeans themselves had 
earlier ignored it. Out of this European fear and Indian assertion 
the political conflict which developed and has been examined in 
previous chapters may be termed a struggle for political ascendancy 
between Indians and Europeans. It was in this contest that the 
colonial regime had to adjudicate.
Yet there was an important'difference in the external influence 
for the Europeans and Indians. The Europeans were stauch defenders 
of Empire and colonialism. The Indians, particularly in India wore
its critics and opponents. The nationalists in India epitomised
forces seeking the dismemberment of the British Empire. It was from 
these that Indian politicians drew their inspiration. However, 
whereas the Europeans in their stand for the consolidation of their 
position were united, the Indians were divided and this disunity 
expressed in communal terms was exported.
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In  In d ia , Hindu-Muslim r e la t io n s  in  th e  n in e te en  tw en tie s
6
d isp lay ed  a marked d e te r io r a t io n .  Muslim an x ie ty  and th e  f a i lu r e  
to  p la c a te  t h i s  r e l ig io u s  m in o rity  even in  th e  Nehru Report (1928) 
led  Jirm ah in  1929 to  make s remark th a t  Hindus and Muslims had 
come to  th e  p a r t in g  of th e  ±.ys. At th e  Muslim League conference 
a t  A llahabad in  December 1980, th e  concept of a sep a ra te  Muslim 
s ta t e  was en u n c ia ted . T h e re a fte r  th e  two stream s of In d ian  
n a tio n a lism  fo llow ed d iv e rg en t co u rses . In  F i j i  too  th e  Muslims 
were a m in o rity  and a f t e r  the  d e fe a t of K h a lil Sahim in  th e  1929 
e le c t io n  (d iscu ssed  in  Chapter V) th ey  became f e a r f u l  of t h e i r  own 
p o l i t i c a l  fu tu re  and d i s s a t i s f i e d  w ith  th e  tre n d  o f Arya Samaj- 
dominated In d ian  p o l i t i c s .  A lready Muslim o rg a n iz a tio n s  had been 
in  e x is ten c e  fo r  some tim e (see C hapter VII) to  c a te r  f o r  lo c a l  
Muslim needs and a s p i r a t io n s ,  among them was th e  F i j i  Muslim League 
organ ized  to  c o -o rd in a te  th ese  in  1926. In  th e  s t r i f e  th a t  ensued 
the  League in  F i j i  copied i t s  co u n te rp a rt in  In d ia :  in  F i j i  th e re  was
no q u estio n  of a s e p a ra te  s t a t e ,  in s te a d  sep e ra te  re p re s e n ta t io n  
became th e  o b je c t iv e . But t h i s  was no t to  be . In d ia  p ro te s te d  and 
i t s  view was upheld  a lthough th e  regime in  F i j i  was w il l in g  to  
accede to  Muslim w ish es . The S e c re ta ry  of S ta te ’s acceptance of 
th e  advice o f In d ia  on th i s  account was commendably f a r s ig h te d  
because i t  thw arted  th e  permanent d iv is io n  of In d ian s  on r e l ig io u s  
l in e s  in  p o l i t i c s .  To have granted th e  Muslim demands might have 
paved th e  way fo r  s im ila r  re q u e s ts  from o th e r  groups such as P u n jab is , 
M adrassis o r G u je ra tis  o r even In d ian  C h r is tia n s .
Of those  who opposed common r o l l  th e  F i j ia n s  were th e  most 
im portan t group. They had e n tru s te d  t h e i r  coun try  to  th e  B r i t i s h  and 
were q u ite  s a t i s f i e d  w ith  them as guard ians and d id  no t w ish them to  
be supp lan ted  by o th e r s .  I n i t i a l l y  they  had remained s i l e n t  but w ith  
th e  emergence of In d ian  demands-they awoke and a s s e r te d  them selves.
From th e  1920’s onwards t h e i r  r e p re s e n ta t iv e s  s ta te d  t h e i r  case .
And w ith  the  O xford-educated Ratu Sukuna a t  th e  helm from th e  1930’s ,  
F i j i a n  goals acq u ired  p o s i t iv e  and p re c ise  ex p re ss io n . The c a l l  
was c le a r :  th e  param cuntcy o f F i j ia n  i n t e r e s t s  must no t be d i lu te d .
Yet he was no t u n reaso n ab le ; h is  e f f o r t s  in  1936 won F i j i a n  w illin g n e s s  
to  t r u s t  th e  Government w ith  th e  le a s in g  of t h e i r  la n d . But i t  i s
6 Comment on th e  s i tu a t io n  in  In d ia  i s  based on a s tudy  of the  
fo llow ing  t e x t s :  D.A.Low (1963), Pandey (1969), P h i l ip s  and
W ainwright (1970) and Sayeed (1968).
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worth noting here the remarks of a Fijian writer:
Whereas in the land question, the Fijians, -under the guidance 
and advice of Ratu Sukuna, had voluntarily surrendered the 
control of tneir land to the Government and thereby conceded 
to the demands of the Indians, no such voluntary concessions 
were maae with regard to political development. 7
The resolutions of the 1933 Council of Chiefs on the franchise
and the letter of their members tabled in the Legislative Council in
1935 reaffirmed their faith in the British and the Crown Colony system.
And in the situation of Indian agitation, European reaction and
Fijian faith and anxiety, the colonial regime occupied a crucial
position; it made the decisions. Of supreme importance was its
convenant in 1S?U with the Fijian Chiefs enshrined in the Deed of
Cession. Sir Arthur Gordon and his successors had all interpreted it
as an explicit pronouncement of the pre-eminent position of the
Fijian in his native land.. And from this stand there was no
vacillation. Though the colonial regime was guilty of colluding
with European settlers in 1915 when it restricted the municipal
franchise, though Fletcher expressed publicly his concern for the
European minority, on neither of these occasions was Fijian wish
subordinated to the European will. Admittedly by resorting to
paternalism and by choosing to rule through the chiefs the British
slowed the growth of individualism and checked egalitarian tendencies
in Fijian society. They pursued this policy without malicious intent.
It, moreover, saved the Fijian race both from extinction and becoming
serfs of others. Their separate institutions, suen as provincial
councils and the Council of Chiefs, not only sustained Fijian
communalism but also provided Fijians at various levels with training
in administering their own affairs albeit with official interference.
Where Gordon had hoped for adaptation, fossilizaticn occurred
instead. And the Fijians themselves grew reluctant to relinquish
what habit had taught them to cherish. Despite its shortcomings the
system had saved the Fijians first from the political designs of
European settlers and later from the ambitions of the Indians. Here
the British could claim the credit. What Gordon had established for
Fiji in 1Ö7U was uttered for Kenya in 1923. And since Kenya and Fiji
were both part of the same Empire, the declaration that in Kenya
7 Bole 1968:79.
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A frican  in t e r e s t s  were paramount meant th a t  in  F i j i  th e  F i j ia n s  
possessed  the  same gu aran tee . The 1923 p roclam ation  b u ttr e s s e d  the  
p ra c t ic e  e a r l i e r  e s ta b lis h e d  in  F i j i .  Thus In d ian  demands f o r  common 
r o l l  in  F i j i ,  as in  Kenya, had no chance of su ccess . The In d ia n s  were 
no more trium phant than  the  European s e t t l e r s  befo re  them when th ey  
had sought fe d e ra t io n  w ith  New Zealand o r V ic to r ia  o r hoped fo r  
re p re s e n ta t iv e  i n s t i t u t i o n s .  But th e  s e t t l e r s  were B r i t i s h  and a f t e r  
th ey  had abandoned t h e i r  e a r l i e r  hopes they  clim bed onto th e  band­
wagon of F i j ia n  i n t e r e s t s  and helped  th e  Government and F i j ia n s  
f r u s t r a t e  th e  In d ia n s . Where th e  Europeans sensing  a danger from 
th e  In d ian s  had changed t h e i r  c o n s t i tu t io n a l  co u rse , the  In d ia n s , o r 
a s e c tio n  of them, d id  n o t.
The In d ian s  sought democracy through common r o l l  and l ik e  th e
Europeans e a r l i e r  th ey  found i t  e lu s iv e . In  so f a r  as i t  e x is te d  in
th e  Empire i t  was found in  those  co lo n ies  where European s e t t l e r  w i l l
p re v a ile d  and n a tiv e  w e lfa re  was of secondary im portance; South
A fr ic a , Canada, A u s tra l ia  and New Zealand were exam ples. Even in
th e se  cases t h e i r  dem ocratic p o s i t io n  in  r e la t io n s h ip  to  t h e i r
B r i t i s h  m otherland was no t c l a r i f i e d  t i l l  th e  fo rm u la tio n  o f th e
B alfour D ec la ra tio n  (1926) and th e  enactm ent of the  S ta tu te  of
W estm inster (1931). For th e  co lo n ie s  o f su b je c t peop les such as
F i j i  democracy was a f a r  o ff  tn in g . And a f t e r  tn e  1923 d e c la ra t io n
f o r  Kenya i t  was an Im possible demand and th e  In d ian s  were re fu s in g
to  face  r e a l i t y .  There was no in te n t io n  in  th e  1920’s o r 30 ’s o f
succumbing zo such a re q u e s t. As Kenneth Robinson has p u t i t :
I f  B r i t i s h  p o lic y  was c e r ta in ly  no t opposed in  p r in c ip le  to  any 
id e a  of ev en tu a l self-governm ent i t  eq u a lly  c e r ta in ly  d id  n o t 
du ring  th e  in te r -w a r  y ears  conceive i t  as p a r t  o f i t s  du ty  
’o f f ic io u s ly  to  s t r i v e ’ to  b rin g  self-governm ent, in to  e x is te n c e .
A s u b s ta n t ia l  p ro p o rtio n  of th a t  r e la t iv e ly  sm all group who were 
c lo se ly  and a c t iv e ly  concerned w ith  c o lo n ia l p o lic y  was w holly 
s c e p t ic a l  of any id ea  t h a t 5 in  tne  C olonial Empire, s e l f -  
government was l ik e ly  to  be achieved by th e  development of 
p a rlia m e n ta ry , s t i l l  l e s s ,  dem ocratic , i n s t i t u t i o n s .  8
To t h i s  may be added P ro fe sso r M cIntyre’s conclusion  th a t
B r i t i s h  p o lic y -  makers during  th e  in te r -w a r  y ea rs  were vague 
and u n h u rr ied . They new adhered r e l ig io u s ly  to  t h e i r  d o c tr in e  
of t ru s te e s h ip  . . . bu t they  were convinced th a t  th ey  had 
end less  y ea rs  to  f u l f i l  t h e i r  ta s k .  9
Ke f u r th e r  p o in ts  ou t th a t  the  d ep ress io n  of th e  1930’s and th e  1939-1j5
war le d  to  ’a tem porary s tren g th en in g  of a u to c ra t ic  ru le  in  many
8 Robinson 1965:89.
9 M cIntyre 1966:209.
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crown colonies'.
Fiji, indeed, was an example. British colonial policy existed 
on an imperial dimension and precedents and experiences in one colony 
influenced decisions in others. Fiji was no exception to this rule, 
though its peculariaties were not made subservient to generalities.
In these matters Governors exercised considerable influence. Just 
as Gordon in the beginning had been guided by what his earlier 
governorships had taught him so Murchison Fletcher found his days in 
the constitutionally more rigid Hong Kong dictating greater 
governmental control. Within Fiji he found considerable support 
from some of his advisers. Neither European stalwarts like Hedstrom 
and Scott nor Fijian chiefs led by Sukuna cared for democracy which 
for them was synonymous with the danger of Indian domination. Here 
then lies the explanation for the willingness on the part of Fletcher 
and his allies to retreat from the elective principle which smacked 
of democracy. Both the Fijian position and European minority 
interests could be secured by the device of abolishing the municipal 
franchise and asserting greater control in the Legislative Council 
through nominated members sitting alongside elected ones: this would
buttress the strength of the existing official majority.
An important factor was the communal franchise itself. Since 
each politician aspiring for victory had to appeal exclusively to his 
own race it was inevitable that he should capitalize on the fears and 
hopes of that group. Consequently too much emphasis was given to the 
interests of communal segments. And each community considered the 
fulfilment of its own parochial aspirations as essential for the 
general well-being. Europeans, for instance, had repeatedly called 
for more Indian labourers because these would have served their 
economic interests, and in their concern for their own profit they 
failed to comprehend the social and political implications of this 
element for the Fijian posit-ion. Indians, in their passion for their 
rights forgot the rights of others: they could not appreciate the
genuine alarm of Europeans and Fijians at their numerical increase and
10 ibid:210.
11 As late as 193U the Secretary for Indian Affairs wrote in hisreport for that year: ;... those European planters who have
suffered immense losses during the recent depression ... 
advocate the introduction in large numbers and chiefly in families 
of Indians as a means to reduce the working expenses of their 
plantations.' (C.P.2U/35.)
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clamour fo r  common r o l l .  F in a lly  a co n d itio n  was reached w here,
as P ro fe sso r Davidson has summed up:
The L e g is la tiv e  Council ten d s  to  re v e r t  to  i t s  o r ig in s  as a 
b a s ic a l ly  ad v iso ry  body; and th e  d i f f e r e n t  groups of members 
become le s s  concerned wiuh convincing each ox-ner and more warn 
making t h e i r  sep a ra te  a ttem p ts to  persuade th e  Governor. 12
The l a s t  i s  tru e  even o u ts id e  th e  Council as i s  borne ou t by th e
behav iour of S c o tt and Hedstrom, K.B.Singh and Munsami M udaliar; and
th e  Council of C h ie fs.
Communal f ra n c h is e  was f i r s t  fo rm alized  in  Cyprus in  1882 and 
then  in tro d u ced  in  In d ia  in  1909 and in  Ceylon in  1910. I t  f a i l e d  to  
h e a l Hindu-Muslim d if fe re n c e s  in  In d ia  and s a t i s f i e d  none excep t 
communal-minded p o l i t i c i a n s  on bo th  s id e s  who e x p lo ite d  i t  to  th e  f u l l  
to  f u r th e r  t h e i r  own p o l i t i c a l  c a re e rs .  In  Ceylon i t  was c r i t i c i z e d  
by th e  c o n s t i tu t io n a l  commissions in  1928 and 19U5• M artin  Wight 
who contends th a t  'communal re p re se n ta tio n s  c r y s ta l l i z e s  and 
p e rp e tu a te s  d i f f e r e n c e s ' quotes from the Soulbury Report on Ceylon 
(19u5) as th u s  d e sc r ib in g  th e  system : 'though  s u p e r f ic ia l ly  an
a t t r a c t iv e  s o lu tio n  o f r a c ia l  d if fe re n c e s  and to  some e x te n t th e  
l in e  o f l e a s t  r e s is ta n c e  / ^ i t  7 w i l l  be f a t a l  to  th e  emergence of 
th a t  un q u estio n in g  sense o f nationhood which i s  e s s e n t ia l  to  th e  
e x e rc ise  of f u l l  s e lf -g o v e rn m e n t'. The p o in t has a lre a d y  been made 
th a t  B r i t i s h  po licy-m akers envisaged self-governm ent as ex trem ely  
d i s t a n t ,  th u s  a ffo rd in g  them in d e f in i te  tim e f o r  t r a in in g  tow ards 
se lf-governm en t. But i t  ought a lso  to  be noted  th a t  in  F i j i  th e  
communities were n o t brought c lo se r  by th e  communal n a tu re  of th e  
f r a n c h is e . Though n o t th e  so le  f a c to r ,  i t  was an im portan t 
c o n tr ib u to r  to  d is s e n s io n .
While th e re  i s  no d isagreem ent on th e  d isad v an tag es  o f communal 
f ra n c h is e  one s t i l l  needs to  co n sid er w hether th e re  was any o th e r  
a l te r n a t iv e  to  i t  f o r  th e  p lu r a i  s o c ie ty  of F i j i  in  i t s  p a r t i c u la r  
s tag e  of development in  th e  1920's  and 30»s .  Could B r i ta in ,  in  f a c t ,  
have in tro d u ced  common r o l l .  Had B r i ta in  done so i t  would have 
brought upon i t s e l f  th e  i r e  o f both  F i j ia n s  end Europeans. B esides 
i t  was a dem ocratic  m easure, and as mentioned e a r l i e r ,  th u s  o u t o f th e  
q u e s tio n . I t  w ould, in  f a c t ,  have meant san c tio n in g  In d ian  c o n tro l ;
12 Davidson 19U8:129.
13 Wight 1952:28.
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this too was not feasible. Most important it would have been a 
betrayal of the Deed of Cession. Given the accumulated British 
colonial experience, communal franchise was the only method with which 
British policy makers were conversant at the time. One might argue 
that Britain might have experimented by having both alongside an 
official majority as a guarantee of the Fijian position. Again even 
the slightest concession to common roll would have been opposed on 
the grounds that this.would in fact be acknowledging its validity for 
a multi-racial society. And in Fiji, once accepted, pressure would 
be exerted for its extension. If we contend that British policy 
and the racist nature of colonialism rendered Britain inadequate for 
the task, we must add that the task was gargantuan and hitherto no 
government had grappled with the constitutional complexities of a 
plural society, such as Fiji, and arrived at a decisive and stable 
formula. For the problem Britain was responsible in so far as her 
citizens had invaded Fiji's shores and forced Cession upon Cakobau 
and then had introduced Indians as labourers as part of the British 
mission to save the Fijians. This had created the complex plural 
society. And in any evaluation of the British roJe one needs to 
bear in mind the complicated character of the problem. In Fiji, the 
disparities of number, economic power and potential, wealth, land 
ownership, levels of education and facilities for its improvement 
all compounded tne difficulty. These made for tension and distrust.
Each race existing in its own social compartment typical of 
hierarchically structured colonial societies was jealous of its own 
rights and privileges. Where possible each attempted an extension 
of these but resisted and protested against their attenuation. When 
Indians wished to improve their position and it appeared to Europeans 
and Fijians that it would be at their expense, the latter objected 
vehemently. The British regime, obligated to Fijians and sympathetic 
to Europeans would not satisfy Indian ambitions to the detriment of 
the former communities so the latter could not find complete contentment. 
Its sense of persecution bred in the brutalizing experience of the 
indenture days and transmitted to later generations deepened with each 
refusal.
As the Fijian community, through its members in the Legislative 
Council, its Council of Chiefs, and through the new elite as found in
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th e  V it i  Cauravou, grew s e n s i t iv e  to  th r e a t s ,  r e a l  and im agined, i t  
wras quick to  remind the  Government of i t s  o b lig a tio n s  to  them.
Though th e  B r i t i s h  had d isp layed  no tendency to  renege on t h e i r  
prom ises to  th e  F i j i a n s ,  t h e i r  ta sk  was f a c i l i t a t e d  by th e  change in  
d i r e c t io n  of European p o l i t i c s  a f t e r  1917 tow ards acceptance o f th e  
Deed of C ession, as the  p o licy  d i r e c t iv e  of prime concern . That t h i s  
was m otivated  by s e l f - i n t e r e s t  r a th e r  than  by the  acceptance o f new 
v a lu es  of high p r in c ip le s  i s  given credence by th e  p re s su re s  o f S c o tt 
and Hedstrom to  safeg u ard  the  'p u r e ’ European p o s i t io n  from 
encroachm ents by even th e  F art-E uropean s.
U nlike th e  In d ian s  who s t i l l  adhered to  common r o l l  when common 
•sense should have adv ised  o th e rw ise , th e  European le a d e rs  d isp lay ed  
g re a te r  t a c t  and a s tu te n e s s . Once th e  im p o s s ib i l i ty  of t h e i r  e a r l i e r  
demands as w ell as i t s  dangers fo r  them selves were recognized  th ey  
abandoned them. T h e ir s tra te g y  towards the  m u n ic ip a li t ie s  wras no le s s  
sag ac io u s . W ithin  th e  ju r i s d ic t io n  of the  m unicipal co u n c il came 
s a n i t a t io n ,  ro a d -b u ild in g  and m aintenance, perm its  f o r  th e  e re c t io n  of 
b u ild in g s , l ic e n c e s  fo r  b u s in e sse s , e l e c t r i c i t y ,  a l l  m a tte rs  th a t  
could  determ ine th e  s tandard  of l iv in g  o f a town. By i t s  a l lo c a t io n  
of funds th e  Council decided  which s t r e e t s  ought to  be developed as 
f i r s t  c la s s  r e s id e n t i a l  a reas  and which could be n e g le c te d ; by 
d ec id in g  upon rav es  i t  would impose r e s t r i c t i o n s .  In  a colony where 
r e s id e n t i a l  seg reg a tio n  was no t p e rm iss ib le  through l e g i s l a t i o n ,  
c o n tro l o f .th e  m unicipal co u n cil could achieve an unusual degree o f 
ex c lu s io n  of th o se  u n d esired  in  an a re a  fo r  one reason  o r a n o th e r .
Hence in flu en c e  in  th e  m unicipal co u n c il was e s s e n t i a l .  C onsequently 
to  have p e rm itted  a l i b e r a l  f ra n c h is e  in  th e  m u n ic ip a lity  w hile  being  
s t r in g e n t  w ith  th a t  fo r  the  L e g is la tiv e  Council would have been f o o l i s h .  
I f  p ro te c t io n  was to  be adequate th en  i t  must be p re s e n t in  bo th  c a se s . 
In  1915 th e  m unicipal f r a n c h is e •had been a means o f c o n so lid a tin g  
th e  European p o s i t io n  and i t  was lo g ic a l  th a t  i t  should  be a p p ra ise d  
and amended in  th e  1930 's when th e  is su e  of European s e c u r i ty  in  
F i j i  was re c o n s id e re d . The m unicipal c o n s t i tu t io n  in  th e  p re se n t 
c a p i t a l ,  Suva, as w e ll as in  the  o ld  c a p i t a l ,  Levuka,was based on 
common fra n c h ise  though hedged w ith  a l i t e r a c y  t e s t .  To have amended 
th e  requ irem ents f o r  th e  l i t e r a c y  t e s t  by th e  in c lu s io n  of In d ia n  
languages would, in  f a c t ,  have meant conceding to  th e  In d ian  demand 
f o r  common r o l l .  I t  would have im plied  an accep tance o f th e  p r in c ip le
1U See Chapter IX .
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of common roll. But this was contrary to the wishes of the majority 
of the colony's population and the Government. To have conceded 
would have meant Indian domination and this was no more tolerable in 
the principal town than it was in the colony. If it were imperative 
to resort to the nomination system in the Legislative Council then it 
was equally essential to do likewise with the municipal constitution. 
The two were linked. If Fijian paramountcy as well as minority 
interests were to be safeguarded then they ought to be given complete 
security. This could not be achieved without amending both the 
constitution ef the Legislative Council and the Municipal Council.
In sum then, by 1937 Europeans were aligned on the side of the 
Government in acceptance of the Crown Colony system of government with 
partial nomination and communal franchise in the Legislative Council. 
They also acquiesced to -wholly government nominated municipal councils 
in Suva and Levuka in lieu of elections on a common franchise as had 
prevailed from 1883 till its abolition in 1937* The justification 
was the avowed British policy of the paramountcy of Fijian interests. 
Though this was so, the object had also been to safeguard the 
position of the European minority. But Indians who had been 
enfranchised in 1929 were unhappy. A majority had rejected the 
constitutional changes of 1937. Guided by the Arya Samaj leadership 
and encouraged by forces in India they clamoured for common franchise.
A minority though favouring common roll wished to continue their 
struggle through constitutional means from the Legislative Council. 
Another segment, the Muslims, were willing to accept communal franchise 
with a separate seat for themselves. Indeed the Indian community 
had become permanently divided. Given the divergent nature of 
Indian society this was not wholly unexpected.
Yet despite these occurrences, the goal of British policy had 
been preserved. Its aim was to protect the Fijian people from 
disruptive influences and to enable the race to survive. The 
political remedy prescribed by the various Governors from Gordon to
15Fletcher, and beyond, did not deviate from this end. Besides,
15 For a trief comment on significant constitutional developments in 
Fiji after 1937 see Appendix X.
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Fijian political awakening made those who formulated and articulated 
opinion in their community sensitive to the tenor of constitutional 
change demanded by these others. Fijian leaders reacted by 
reaffirming their hope and trust in the Crown whose representatives 
reciprocated by abiding in their frequently professed objective that 
in Fiji, Fijian interests were paramount.
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APPENDIX l a
GOVERNORS AND ACTING GOVERNORS OF F I J I
1897- 1939
March 1897 - S i r  George O 'B r i e n
J u l y 1 901 - W .L .A l l a r d y c e  ( A c t i n g )
September 1 902 - S i r  Henry J a c k s o n
March 1904 - C .M ajor  ( A c t i n g )
O c tobe r 1904 - S i r  E v e r a r d  im Thurn
O c tobe r 1 908 - C .M ajor  ( A c t i n g )
August 1909 - S i r  E v e r a r d  im Thurn
August 1910 - S i r  C h a r l e s  Major  ( A c t i n g )
F e b r u a r y 1911 •- S i r  F r a n c i s  Henry May
June 191 2 - S i r  C h a r l e s  Major  ( A c t i n g )
J u l y 191 2 - S i r  Bickham S w e e t - E s c o t t
August 1915 - Eyre Hutson  ( A c t i n g )
May 1916 - S i r  Bickham S w e e t - E s c o t t
O c to b e r 1918 - C.H .R odw el l
May 1 920 - T . E . F e l l  ( A c t i n g )
June 1 920 - S i r  C e c i l  Rodwell
May 1 921 - T . E . F e l l  ( A c t i n g )
March 1 922 - S i r  C e c i l  Rodwell
J  anua ry 1 924 - T . E . F e l l  ( A c t i n g )
A p r i l 1925 - S i r  Eyre. Hutson
November 1 927 - A.W.Seymour ( A c t i n g )
A p r i l 1928 - S i r  Eyre. Hutson
A p r i l 1929 - A .¥ . Seymour ( A c t i n g )
November 1 929 - S i r  M u rc h i son  F l e t c h e r
June 1 930 - I.McOwan ( A c t i n g )
August 1930 - S i r  M urc h i son  F l e t c h e r
November 1932 - AoV.Seymour ( A c t i n g )
August 1933 - S i r  M u rc h i son  F l e t c h e r
March 1935 - A o A . W righ t  ( A c t i n g )
August 1935 - S i r  M urc h i son  F l e t c h e r
May 1936 - C . J . J . T . B a r t o n  ( A c t i n g )
November 1936 - S i r  A r t h u r  R i c h a r d s
J u l y 1938 - C . J . J . T . B a r t o n  ( A c t in g )
September 1938 - S i r  H a r ry  Luke
March 1939 - C. J .  J . T .  B a r to n  (-Acting)
A p r i l 1 939 - J . C r a i g  ( A c t i n g )
May 1939 - S i r  H a r ry  Luke.
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APPENDIX lb
SECRETARIES OF STATE FOR THE COLONIES 
1895-1940
J u l y
O c tober
1895 - J o s e p h  Cha m b e r l a i n
1903 - A l f r e d  L y ttelton
D e c ember 1905 - The Earl of Elgin and Kincardine
April 1 908 - The Earl (later Marquess) of Crewe
N o v e m b e r 1 910 - Lewis Harcourt (later Viscount 
Harcourt)
M a y 1915 - A . Bonar Law
Decem b e r 1 91 6 - W. H . L o n g  (later Vi s c o u n t  Long)
J anuary 1 91 9 - V i s c o u n t  Milner
Fe b r u a r y 1 921 - W . S . C h u r c h i l l  (later Sir W i n s t o n  
Churchill)
October 1 922 - The Duke of D e v onshire
J anuary 1 924 - J . H . T h o m a s
N o v e m b e r 1 924 - L .C .M .S .A m ery
June 1 929 - L o r d  P a s s f i e l d  (Sidney Webb)
August 1 931 - Sir Philip Cunliff e - L i s t e r  
(later Viscount Swinton)
June 1935 - M a l c o l m  M a c d o n a l d
N o v e m b e r 1935 - J . H . T h o m a s
Ma y 1936 - W . G . A . O r m s b y - G o r e  (later Lord Harlech)
M ay 1 938 - M a l c o l m  M a c d o n a l d
Ma y 1 940 - Lord Llyod
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APPENDIX I I
THE POPULATION OF F I J I
( a)  Numbers o f  C om ponen ts  1881 -  1936
Component 1881 1891 1 901 1 911 1 921 1936
F i j i a n 114,748 105,800 94,397 87,096 84,475 97,651
I n d i a n 588 7,468 17,105 40,286 60,634 85,002
E u ro p e a n 2,671 2,306 2,459 3,707 3,878 4,028
P a r t - E u r o p e a n 771 1 ,076 1 ,516 2,401 2,781 4,574
C h in e s e + + + 305 ' 910 1 ,751
Roturnan 2,452 2,219 2,230 2,176 2,235 2,816
O th e r  P a c i f i c  
I s l a n d e r s 6,100 2,267 1 ,950 2,758 1,564 2,353
O t h e r s 1 56 314 467 81 2 789 204
TOTAL 127,486 1 21 ,180 1 20,124 139,541 157,266 198,379
+ N ot g i v e n .
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APPENDIX II
THE POPULATION OF FIJI
(b) Proportions of Components 1881 - 1936
Component 1881 1891 1 901 1911 1921 1936
Fijian 90.01 87.31 78.58 62.42 53.71 49.22
Indian .46 6.16 14.24 28.87 38.56 42.85
European 2.1 1 .9 2.05 2.66 2.47 2.03
Part-European .6 .89 1 .26 1 .72 1 .77 2.31
Others 6.83 3.74 3.87 4.33 3.49 3.59
(c) Fiji--born and Alien-born among Indians, Europeans
and Part-Europeans 1911 - 1936
1 911 1 921 1 936
Component Fiji- Alien- Fiji- Alien- Fiji- Alien-
born born born born born born
Indian 27.48 72.52 44.22 55.78 71 .59 28.41
European 28.82 71 .18 33.94 66.06 36.67 63.33
Par t-European 95.58 4.42 92.05 7-95 92.61 7.39
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APPENDIX I I I
THE POPULATION OF SUVA AND LEVUKA 
( a )  S u v a :  N u m b ers o f  C o m p o n e n ts  1911 -  1 9 3 6
Component 1911 1921 1936
Town Suburbs Town Suburbs Town Suburbs
F i j ia n 7U5 501 872 1 ,1 0 9 2 ,3 7 2 1 ,0 9 9
In d ian 993 2 ,3 2 7 3,01*0 U,206 2 ,8 6 2 1(,959
European 1,171 205 1,1*36 317 1 ,5 0 9 351»
Part-European 367 3k 393 189 731 202
Chinese 55 18 278 65 1(25 69
Polynesian 699 278 15o 1(19 332 11JU
O thers 319 76 269 237 163 331
TOTAL l(,3l*9 3,1*39 6,W±0 6,5U2 8,391* 7,128
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APPENDIX I I I
THE POPULATION OF SUVA AND LEVUKA 
(b) Suva: P ro p o rtio n s  of Components 1911 -  1936
Component 1911 1921 1936
Town Suburbs Town Suburbs Town Suburbs
F i j ia n 17.13 11*.57 13.51* 16.95 28.25 15.1*2
In d ian 22.83 67.67 1*7.20 61*. 29 31*.10 69.59
European 26.93 5.96 22.30 U-85 17.98 U.97
Part-European 8.UU .99 6.13 2 .89 8.71 2.83
Chinese 1.26 0.52 U.32 0.99 5 .06 .97
Polynesian 16.07 8.08 2.33 6.1*1 3 .9 6 1.60
O thers 7.31* 2.21 I|..18 3 .6 2 1 . 91* U.62
APPENDIX III
THE POPULATION OF SUVA AND LEVUKA 
(c) Levuka: Numbers of Components 19*11 and 1936
Component 1911 1936
Fijian 3U8 25U
Indian 78 196
European 352 99
Part-European 320 302
Chinese 29 91
Polynesian 212 61
Others 82 16U
TOTAL 1,1(21 1,083
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APPENDIX IV
EUROPEAN AND PART-EUROPEAN VOTERS 1936
SOUTHERN
DIVISION
NORTH-WESTERN
DIVISION
EASTERN
DIVISION
D i s t r i c t E u r o p e a n P a r t - E u r o p e an T o t a l
S u v a 332 81 41 3
Rewa 63 36 99
C o lo  E a s t 9 - 9
N a v u a 11 -1 1 2
K a d a v u - 1 1
1 
^
 1 
1 
^
 1 119 534
Ra 19 11 30
C o lo  N o r t h 16 2 18
Ba 130 94 224
L a u t o k a 103 69 172
N a d i 27 1 28
S i g a t o k a 24 11 35
319 188 507
L o m a i v i t i 34 23 57
L au 5 3 8
T a v e u n i 38 16 54
S a v u s  a v u 31 61 92
Bua 6 9 15
L ab  a s  a 39 28 67
R o tu m a 9 3 14
______t__ _ _ _ . -
162 143 307
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APPENDIX V
OCCUPATIONS 1911, 1921, 1936
(a) 1911
Occupation Fijians living Unindentured Europeans Part-
outside their Indians Europeans
villages
Agricultural 991 10,357 411 96
Commercial 14 530 511 66
Industrial 392 1 ,896 542 323
Professional
(includes clerks) 166 20 447 13
Shipping 223 - 1 58 32
Domestic
(includes
housewives) 970 3,846 723 572
Sundry 711 106 9 -
Unemployed* 
(includes
children and
men of independent
means) 1 ,353 7,731+ 863 1 ,151
Occupation
not stated 601 1 ,490 27 123
TOTAL 5,421 25,976 3,691 2,376
+ Children under ten years of age returned as unemployed.
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APPENDIX V
OCCUPATIONS 1 91 1 , 1 921, 1 936
(b) 1 921
Occupation Fijians living 
outside their
Indians Europeans Part-Europeans
villages
Agricultural 414 19,433 412 144
Commercial 32 8 54 513 87
Industrial 1 ,354 3,179 379 395
Professional 184 54 550 13
Shipping 245 - 82 28
Domestic
(includes 
housewives) 506 13,492 741 446
Sundry 1 ,453 336 19 9
Unemployed 
(includes
children 
and men of
independent
means) 1 ,989 20,078 983 1 ,352
Not Stated 720 3,1 93 169 255
TOTAL 6,897 60,619 3,848 2,729
3QU
APPENDIX V
OCCUPATIONS 1911, 1921, 1936 
(c) 1936
Occupation Fijians Indians Europeans Part-Europeans
Fishing 1 51 16 3 1 2
Agriculture 1 ,477 17,335 234 209
Mining 1 ,002 13 168 74
Quarrying 7 20 7 1
Manufac turing 765 1 ,728 358 541
Transport Sc 
C o irunun i c a t i on 436 775 89 53
Commerce Sc 
Finance 11 3 1 ,011 202 52
Public Adminis­
tration & Defence 382 90 99 3
Professional 1 ,098 369 251 22
Personal 441 1 ,148 25 6
Other Sc 
Indeterminate 1,350 2,685 232 23
TOTAL 7,222 25,190 1 ,668 996
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APPENDIX VI 
LITERACY RATES
(a) Ability to Read and Write at least ONE language
% of Total of Component
Component 1 911 1 921 1 936
Fijian 53.85 47•57+ 51 .82+
Indian 9.44 16.17+ 13.32+
European 86.53 ++ 100.00+++
Part-European 54.00 ++ 43.53+
+ Refers to those aged 15 years and over.
++ Europeans and a great majority of Part-Europeans were enumerated
on a schedule which did not request literacy particulars.
+++ The 1936 Census assumed that all Europeans were literate.
(b) Ability to Speak English 
1936
Component Number % of Total of Component
Fijian 5,822 5.96
Indian 6,273 7.40
Part-European 2,731 59.71
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APPENDIX VII
LETTERS PATENT 1929 and 1937: CLAUSES DEFINING QUALIFICATIONS FOR
ELECTED MEMBERS OF THE LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL AND VOTERS
1929
C la u se  17: Q u a l i f i c a t i o n s  o f  E uropean  E l e c t e d  Members
No p e r s o n  s h a l l  be q u a l i f i e d  to  be e l e c t e d  as a European  
E l e c t e d  Member o f  th e  C o u n c i l ,  o r ,  h av ing  been  so e l e c t e d ,  to  s i t  o r  
v o t e  i n  th e  C o u n c i l  u n l e s s  h e -
(1 )  I s  q u a l i f i e d  to  be r e g i s t e r e d  as  a European  e l e c t o r ;  and
(2 )  Has been  c o n t i n u o u s l y  r e s i d e n t  f o r  two y e a r s  i n  the
C olony; and e i t h e r
(3 )  ( a )  P o s s e s s e s  and h as  p o s s e s s e d  f o r  a t  l e a s t  tw e lve
m onths n e x t  b e f o r e  th e  e l e c t i o n ,  i n  h i s  own r i g h t  
o r  in  r i g h t  o f  h i s  w i f e ,  f r e e h o l d  p r o p e r t y  in  th e  
Colony o f  th e  c l e a r  v a lu e  o f  f i v e  hund red  pounds , 
o r  o f  th e  an n u a l  v a lu e  o f  f i f t y  pounds o v e r  and 
above a l l  c h a rg e s  and incum brances  a f f e c t i n g  th e  
same; o r
(b )  Has been  i n  o c c u p a t io n  f o r  a t  l e a s t  tw e lve  m onths 
n e x t  b e fo r e  th e  e l e c t i o n ,  i n  h i s  own r i g h t  o r  i n  
r i g h t  o f  h i s  w i f e ,  o f  f r e e h o l d  o r  l e a s e h o l d  
p r o p e r t y  i n  th e  Colony o f  th e  e x t e n t  o f  f i v e  hund red  
a c r e s ;  o r
( c )  R en ts  and has  r e n t e d  f o r  a t  l e a s t ,  tw e lv e  months 
b e f o r e  th e  e l e c t i o n  f r e e h o l d  o r  l e a s e h o l d  p r o p e r t y  
i n  th e  Colony o f  th e  y e a r l y  v a lu e  o f  one hund red  
p o u n d s ; o r
(d )  I s  p o s s e s s e d  o f  a  n e t  an n u a l  income from a l l  s o u r c e s  
o f  n o t  l e s s  th a n  two hund red  pounds.
C la u se  18: Q u a l i f i c a t i o n s  o f  I n d ia n  E l e c t e d  Members
No p e rs o n  s h a l l  be q u a l i f i e d  to  be e l e c t e d  as  an I n d ia n  
E l e c t e d  Member o f  th e  C o u n c i l ,  o r  h av in g  been  so e l e c t e d ,  to  s i t  o r  
v o t e  i n  th e  C o u n c i l  u n l e s s  h e -
(1 )  I s  q u a l i f i e d  to  be r e g i s t e r e d  as  an I n d i a n  E l e c t o r ;  and
( 2 ) Has been  c o n t i n u o u s l y  r e s i d e n t  f o r  two y e a r s  i n  th e
Colony; and
(3) Is able to speak and understand the English language to 
the satisfaction of the Registration Officer subject to 
an appeal from the decision of the Registration Officer 
to the Supreme Court; and either
(4) (a) has resided in the Electoral Division for which
he is a Candidate for twelve months previously 
preceding the date of election and is in 
possession of a net annual cash income of one 
hundred and twenty pounds; or 
(b) possesses a net annual cash income of one hundred 
and fifty pounds arising from lands in that 
Division belonging to him in his own right.
Clause 25: Qualifications of European Electors
Every male person shall be qualified to be registered as a 
European elector, and when registered to vote at the election of 
European Elected Members of the Council, who -
(1) Is the son of parents of European descent, or, being the 
son or lineal descendant of a European- father, can read, 
write and speak the English language;
(2) Is a British subject by birth or naturalisation having 
effect in the Colony;
(3) Is of the age of twenty-one years or upwards;
(4) Has been continuously resident in the Colony for twelve 
months; and
(5) Is possessed either -
(a) Of freehold or leasehold property, or both, within 
the Colony, of the total yearly value of twenty 
pounds over and above all charges and incumbrances 
affecting the same; or
(b) Of a net annual income, from all sources, of not 
less than one hundred and twenty pounds.
Provided that no person who is in receipt of salary payable 
out of the public revenue of the Colony shall be capable of being a 
European Elector.
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Clause 26: Qualifications of Indian Electors
Every male person shall be qualified to be registered as an 
Indian Elector and when registered to vote at the election of Indian 
Elected Members of the Council, who -
(1) Is the son of parents of Indian descent;
(2) Is a British subject;
(3) Is of the age of twenty-one years or upwards;
(4) Has been continuously resident in the Colony for twelve 
months;
(5) Can read and write a simple sentence and sign his name in 
any one of the following languages to the satisfaction of 
the registration officer:-
English,
Hindi,
Urdu,
Tamil,
Telegu,
Gurmukhi; and
(6) Has, for a period of not less than six months immediately 
preceding the date on which the Electoral Roll is closed, 
either -
(a) been in possession of freehold or leasehold 
property in the Colony of a total yearly value 
of five pounds over and above all charges and 
incumbrances thereon; or
(b) been in possession of a net annual cash income of 
seventy-five pounds; or
(c) been and remains the holder of a Government or 
Municipal licence issued under any Ordinance, the 
annual cost of the licence being not less than five 
pounds.
Provided that no person who is in receipt of salary payable out 
of the public revenue of the Colony shall be capable of being an 
Indian Elector.
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APPENDIX VII
LETTERS PATENT 1929 and 1937: CLAUSES DEFINING QUALIFICATIONS FOR 
ELECTED MEMBERS OF THE LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL AND VOTERS
1937
C la u se  25: Q u a l i f i c a t i o n s  o f  E uropean  E l e c t e d  Members
No p e r s o n  s h a l l  be q u a l i f i e d  to  be e l e c t e d  as a European  
E l e c t e d  Member o f  th e  C o u n c i l ,  o r ,  h a v in g  been  so e l e c t e d ,  s h a l l  s i t  
o r  v o te  i n  th e  C o u n c i l ,  u n l e s s  a t  th e  d a te  o f  h i s  n o m in a t io n  he -
(1 )  i s  q u a l i f i e d  to  be r e g i s t e r e d  as a European  e l e c t o r ;  and
( 2 ) has  been  c o n t i n u o u s ly  r e s i d e n t  f o r  two y e a r s  i n  th e
Colony; and
(3 )  ( a )  p o s s e s s e s  and has  p o s s e s s e d  f o r  th e  p r e c e d in g
tw e lv e  months i n  h i s  own r i g h t  f r e e h o l d  p r o p e r t y  
i n  th e  Colony o f  th e  c l e a r  v a lu e  o f  n o t  l e s s  th a n  
f i v e  hund red  pounds, o r  o f  th e  an n u a l  v a lu e  o f  n o t  
l e s s  th a n  f i f t y  pounds, ove r  and above a l l  c h a r g e s  
and incum brances  a f f e c t i n g  th e  same; - o r
(b )  i s ,  and has  been  f o r  th e  p re c e d in g  tw e lve  m on th s ,  i n  
o c c u p a t io n  i n  h i s  own r i g h t  o f  f r e e h o ld  o r  
l e a s e h o l d  p r o p e r t y  i n  th e  Colony o f  th e  e x t e n t  o f  
n o t  l e s s  th a n  f i v e  hund red  a c r e s ;  o r
( c )  r e n t s ,  and has  r e n t e d  f o r  th e  p r e c e d in g  tw e lv e  
m on ths ,  i n  h i s  own r i g h t ,  f r e e h o l d  o r  l e a s e h o l d  
p r o p e r t y  i n  th e  Colony o f  the  y e a r l y  v a lu e  o f  n o t  
l e s s  th an  one hund red  pounds; o r
(d )  i s  i n  p o s s e s s i o n  o f  a n e t  an n u a l  income i n  h i s  own 
r i g h t ,  o f  n o t  l e s s  th a n  two hund red  pounds .
C lau se  26: Q u a l i f i c a t i o n s  o f  I n d ia n  E l e c t e d  Members
No p e r s o n  s h a l l  be q u a l i f i e d  to  be e l e c t e d  as an I n d ia n  
E l e c t e d  Member o f  th e  C o u n c i l ,  o r  h a v in g  been so e l e c t e d ,  s h a l l  s i t  
o r  v o te  i n  th e  C o u n c i l ,  u n l e s s  a t  th e  d a te  o f  h i s  n o m in a t io n  he -
( 1 ) i s  q u a l i f i e d  to  be r e g i s t e r e d  as an I n d ia n  E l e c t o r ;  and
( 2 ) h as  been c o n t i n o u s l y  r e s i d e n t  f o r  two y e a r s  i n  th e  
Colony; and
i s  a b le  to  speak  and u n d e r s t a n d  the  E n g l i s h  la n g u a g e  to  
th e  s a t i s f a c t i o n  o f  th e  o f f i c e r  p r e s c r i b e d  by law f o r  th e
( 3 )
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purpose or, on appeal from the decision of that officer, 
of the Supreme Court; and
(4) (a) has resided in the Electoral Division for which he
is a candidate for the preceding twelve months 
and is in possession of a net annual income of not 
less than one hundred and twenty pounds in his own 
right; or
(b) is in possession of a net annual income of not less 
than one hundred and fifty pounds arising from lands 
in that Division belonging to him in his own right.
Clause 33; Qualifications of European Electors
Every male person shall be qualified to be registered as a 
European elector, and when registered to vote at the election of 
European Elected Members of the Council, who at the date on which the 
electoral roll is closed -
(1) is the son of parents of European descent, or, being 
the son or lineal descendant of a European father, can 
read, write and speak the English language;
(2) is a British subject by birth, or by reason of 
annexation of territory, or by-naturalisation having 
effect in the Colony;
(3) is of the age of twenty-one years or upwards;
(4) has been continuously resident in the Colony for the 
preceding twelve months; and
(5) is in possession in his own right either -
(a) of freehold or leasehold property, or- both, within 
the Colony, of the total yearly value of not less 
than twenty pounds over and above all charges and 
incumbrances affecting the same; or
(b) of a net annual income of not less than one hundred 
and twenty pounds.
Provided that no person holding any office of emolument 
under the Crown in the Colony shall be qualified as aforesaid.
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C la u se  34: Q u a l i f i c a t i o n s  o f  I n d i a n  E l e c t o r s
E very  male p e rs o n  s h a l l  be q u a l i f i e d  to  be r e g i s t e r e d  a s  an 
I n d ia n  e l e c t o r  and when r e g i s t e r e d  to  v o te  a t  th e  e l e c t i o n  o f  I n d i a n  
E l e c t e d  Members o f  t h e  C o u n c i l ,  who a t  th e  d a te  on which th e  e l e c t o r a l  
r o l l  i s  c l o s e d  -
(1 )  i s  th e  son  o f  p a r e n t s  o f  I n d ia n  d e s c e n t ;
(2 )  i s  a B r i t i s h  s u b j e c t ,  o r  a n a t i v e  o f  th e  t e r r i t o r i e s  o f  
any I n d ia n  P r in c e  o r  C h ie f  u n d e r  Our s u z e r a i n t y  
e x e r c i s e d  th ro u g h  th e  G o v e rn o r-G e n e ra l  o f  I n d i a  o r  
th ro u g h  any Governor o r  o t h e r  o f f i c e r  s u b o r d i n a t e
to  th e  G o v e rn o r -G e n e ra l  o f  I n d i a ;
(3 )  i s  o f  th e  age o f  tw e n ty -o n e  y e a r s  o r  upw ards;
( 4 ) has  been  c o n t i n u o u s l y  r e s i d e n t  i n  th e  Colony f o r  th e  
p r e c e d in g  tw e lv e  m onths;
( 5 ) can  r e a d  and w r i t e  a s im p le  s e n te n c e  and s ig n  h i s  name
i n  any one o f  th e  f o l l o w in g  la n g u a g e s  to  th e  s a t i s f a c t i o n  
o f  the. o f f i c e r  c h a rg e d  w i th  th e  d u ty  o f  r e g i s t e r i n g  
e l e c t o r s : -
E n g l i s h ,
H i n d i ,
Urdu,
T a m i l ,
T e le g u ,
Gurm ukhi,
G u j a r a t i ;  and
(6 )  h a s ,  f o r  th e  p r e c e d in g  s i x  months -
( a )  been  i n  p o s s e s s i o n  i n  h i s  own r i g h t  o f  f r e e h o l d  o r  
l e a s e h o l d  p r o p e r t y  i n  th e  Colony o f  a t o t a l  y e a r l y  
v a lu e  o f  n o t  l e s s  th a n  f i v e  pounds o v e r  and above 
a l l  c h a rg e s  and incum brances  a f f e c t i n g  th e  same; o r
(b )  been  i n  p o s s e s s i o n  i n  h i s  own r i g h t  o f  a n e t  a n n u a l  
income o f  n o t  l e s s  th a n  s e v e n t y - f i v e  pounds; o r
( c )  b een ,  and r e m a in s ,  th e  h o ld e r  i n  h i s  own r i g h t  o f  
a  Government o r  M u n ic ip a l  l i c e n c e  I s s u e d  u n d e r  any 
O rd in a n c e ,  th e  an n u a l  c o s t  o f  th e  l i c e n c e  b e in g  
n o t  l e s s  th a n  f i v e  pounds.
P r o v id e d  t h a t  no p e rs o n  h o ld in g  any o f f i c e  o f  emolument u n d e r  
th e  Crown in  th e  C olony s h a l l  be q u a l i f i e d  as a f o r e s a i d .
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APPENDIX V I I I
RESULTS OF EUROPEAN COMMUNAL ELECTIONS 1905 -  1932
1903
Suva
H.Marks
V.McRae
S . L .L a z a r u s
L.E.Brown
A .H .O g i lv i e
L .E .B e n ja m in
G.Fox
J . C a l l a g h a n  
G . L . G r i f f i t h s
I n f o r m a l
P l a n t e r s '  R e p r e s e n t a t i v e
J . B . T u r n e r  
J .M u r r a y  
A.A.Coubrough 
E . F . P o w e l l  
H.Shaw 
J . H . G a r r i c k  
J .M cC onne l l
I n f o r m a l
Levuka
D.Robbie
74 E l e c t e d  
59 E l e c t e d  
57 
28 
20 
8 
6 
6 
3
__ 6
265
127 E l e c t e d
118 E l e c t e d
86 E l e c t e d
77 
73 
32 
22 
11 
546
E l e c t e d  u n o ppose d
B y - e l e c t i o n  f o r  P l a n t e r s '  R e p r e s e n t a t i v e  on r e s i g n a t i o n  o f  J . M u r r a y
105
62
4
S . L .L a z a r u s  
H.Shaw
I n f o r m a l
171
313
1908
Suva
H.M.Scott 8U
G.Fox 72
S.L.Lazarus 70
H.Marks 60
Levuka
J.M.Hedstrom 29
D.Robbie 25
F.Volk 7
ST
Planters* Representative
L.E.Brown 159
A.H.Witherow 155
A.A.Coubrough 152
J.B.Turner 1U8
J.McConnell 60
STS
1911
Suva
H.Marks 139
H.M.Scott 85
G.Fox 7k
29%
Levuka
J.M.Hedstrom Uo
D.Robbie 3k
Informal 1
7 T
Eastern Division
A.A.Coubrough 70
J.McConnell 23
Informal 115
Southern Division
J.B.Turner 80
L.E.Brown 58
E.F.Powell 2k
Informal 2
16L
Elected
Elected
Elected
Elected
Elected
Elected
Elected
Elected
Elected
Elected
Elected
Northern Division
C.W.Thomas 55 Elected
E.Dunean 37
92
191U
Suva
H.M.Scott 221 Elected
H.Marks 210 Elected
C.A.Brough 96
^ 2 7
Vanua Levu-Taveuni
E.Duncan 99 Elected
J.McConnell 26
7 2 ^
Northern Division
H.L.Kennedy 53 Elected
L.Davidson 38
91
Western Division
C.W.Thomas 89 Elected
J.C.Doyle US
Eastern Division
J.M.Hedstrom Elected unopposed
Southern Division
R.Crompton
1917
Elected unopposed
Suva
H.Marks 187 Elected
H.M.Scott 179 Elected
F.E.Riemenschneider 123
Informal 2
Vanua Levu-Taveuni
J.A.Mackay 78 Elected
J.McConnell 5
T. A. Montgomery 70
Informal 3
T%6
Northern Division
F.C.Clapcott 67 Elected
H.L.Kennedy 30
Informal 3
100
Western Division
R.A.Harricks 66 Elected
C.W. Thomas 27
Informal 1
J R
Southern Division
R.Crompton Elected unopposed
Eastern Division
J.M.Hedstrom Elected unopposed.
Vanua Levu-Taveuni (By-election)
J.A.Mackay 
J.Ha;rper 
J.MeConnell
8U50
3
Informal __1T3H
Elected
This election was held, after the Supreme Court had ruled Mackay 
earlier election invalid.
1920
Suva
H.M.Scott 
H .Marks 
S.H.Ellis 
J.B. Turner
2b2
19U
123
107
666
Elected
Elected
Southern Division
F.E.Riemenschneider 
R.Crompton
Informal
80 Elected 
63 
1
Vanua Levu-Taveuni
H.Y.Tarte 62 Elected
W.C.Fisher 38
E.Duncan 33
Informal 3
"O B’
Northern Division
F.C.Clapcott 60 Elected.
L.Davidson h2
N.S.Chalmers 1
w
Western Division
C.W. Thomas 63 Elected
J.P.Bayly h9
Informal h
Eastern Division
J.M.Hedstrom
1923
Elected unopposed
Suva
H.Marks 273 Elected
H.M. Scott 23U Elected
G.F.Grahame 193
700
Eastern Division
J.M.Hedstrom 82 Elected
C.A.Brough 23
Informal 1
T o S
Vanua Levu-Taveuni
A.H.Roberts 92 Elected
W.E.Willoughby Tottenham 90
J.McConnell 3
Informal h
191
Southern Division
T.W.A.Barker 96 Elected
J.L.Hunt 76
Informal 1
T73
317
Western Division
P.W.Faddy 9h Elected
C.W. Thomas 65
Informal k
TS3
Northern Division
H.L.Kennedy
1926
Elected unopposed
Eastern Division
J.M.Hedstrom 73 Elected
C.de Mouncey 11
Informal 1
n
Vanua Levu-Taveuni
W.E.Willoughby Tottenham 129 Elected
G.Garrick Sh
Informal 8
191
Northern Division
H.H.Ragg 76 Elected
H.L.Kennedy U3
Informal 2
121
Western Division
P.W. Faddy 10U Elected
C.W. Thomas 83
Informal 7
W l
Suva
H.Marks Elected unopposed
K.M.Scott Elected unopposed.
Southern Division
T.W.A. Barker Elected unopposed
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1929
Suva
H.M.Scott 1*71
T.W.A.Barker U38
H.Marks 313
Informal 7
1,229
Sleeted.Elected
Western Division
J.P.Bayly 
C.W.Thomas 
P.Costello 
P.W.Faddy
Informal
Vanua Levu-Taveuni
W.E.Willoughby Tottenham 
E.Hathaway
Informal
Eastern Division 
J.M.Hedstrom
59 Elected 
50 
b9 
2h 
7w
120 Elected
15
32
W
Elected unopposed
Southern Division
H.H.Ragg Elected unopposed
1932
There were no European communal elections held, the following 
were all returned unopposed.
H.M.Scott 
T.W.A.Barker 
J.M.Hedstrom 
J.P.Bayly 
H.H.Ragg
W.E.Willoughby Tottenham
Suva
Suva
Eastern Division 
Western Division 
Northern Division 
Vanua Levu-Tavcuni
APPENDIX IX
RESULTS OF INDIAN COMMUNAL ELECTIONS 1929 -  1933
S o u t h e r n  D i v i s i o n
Vishnu  Deo 
Jo h n  F. G ra n t
I n f o r m a l
1 929
419 E le c te d  
162 
13 
594
N o r t h e r n  & W este rn  D i v i s i o n s
Parmanand Singh 309
C.M.Gopalan 222
Inform al 57
588
E l e c t e d
E a s t e r n  D i v i s i o n
James  Rao Ramchandar 
K h a l i l  Sahim
I n f o r m a l
63 E le c te d  
20
__5
88
1 932
S o u t h e r n  D i v i s i o n
K .B .S ingh 341 E le c te d
N arbahadu r  S ingh 92
I n f o r m a l 38
471
N o r t h e r n  & W este rn  D i v i s i o n s
M.M udal ia r  E l e c t e d  unopposed
E a s t e r n  D i v i s i o n
No n o m in a t i o n
BY-ELECTION 1933
S o u t h e r n  D i v i s i o n
K .B .S in g h  
N arbahadu r  S ingh
I n f o r m a l
382 E le c te d  
25 
31 
438
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APPENDIX X
CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGES POST-1937: A BRIEF NOTE
FROM 1937 to 196'}. there was no change in the constitution of Fiji
except for the introduction cf comua.no! franchise in the elections of
the Suva Town Board in 19U8. ^ But in those years events occurred that
had a significant bearing on later political development. Perhaps
most important was the setting up of a separate Fijian administration
in 19Uli- with Sukuna as Secretary for Fijian Affairs. This was
finally institutionalizing a separate state within a state based on
the principles of Lugard and. Cameron at a stage when they had become
out of date elsewhere. The demand and pressures for this
administration had come from the Fijians themselves and had been made
possible by the presence in Fiji as Governor of Philip Mitchell, a
disciple of Cameron. The aim of the administration was to preserve
the Fijian way of life and to improve the economic condition of the
Fijians. Again separate development was fostered. In a plural
society where integration was essential a policy of comparmentalization
was being entrenched. Also important was that European officials,
and non-official European legal and financial advisers of the
Fijian Affairs Board could ascertain that European influences
percolated into Fijian deliberations. But the Indians and Fijians,
the two largest components of the population were growing further
apart instead of coming closer. There was no forum for dialogue let
alone rapprochement. They met only in the Legislative Council where
the chief aim was to score political points from set pieces decided
in isolation and well in advance. But this separatism, fraught with
grave economic consequences for the Fijians and -with political
implications for the whole colony, enhanced the political position
2of the Fijian people.
1 Also it is important to note that from 19Uli Sukuna sat on the 
Executive Council. In 19UÖ Indians were also granted nominated 
representation on the Executive Council. The Governor chose the
Hon.K.B.Singh.
2 The economic consequences were that the Fijians continued to 
remain subsistence agriculturalists and were ccnspicucus by their 
absence from the cash economy. For a discussion of this point see 
Fisk 1970 particularly and Watters 1969. The best study on post­
war Fijian problems is still the work of Professor Süate (C.P.13/59.) 
(C.F.13/59.).
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The second s a l i e n t  fe a tu re  o f th e  1937 to  1963 p e rio d  was th e  
behaviour of uhe In d ia n s . At the  ou tbreak  of th e  Second World War 
In d ian s  re fu sed  to  e n l i s t  f o r  s e rv ice  overseas u n le ss  p a id  equal r a te s  
and given th e  same co n d itio n s  of s e rv ic e  as th e  w hite  man. B r i t i s h  
co lo n ia lism  su s ta in e d  as i t  was by double s tan d a rd s  w herein uhe 
Anglo-Saxon was on top  and th e  b lack  below could n o t p erm it th i s  
con cessio n , even d u ring  an emergency. The In d ia n , th e r e f o r e ,  decided  
to  s ta y  a t  home. On th e  o th e r hand th e  F i j i a n s ,  f r e q u e n tly  to ld  
th a t  they  were th e  most lo y a l  of s u b je c ts ,  v o lu n tee red  r e a d i ly  and 
served  c re d ita b ly  in  th e  P a c if ic  a g a in s t th e  Jap an ese .
Not only  d id  th e  In d ian s  f a i l  to  e n l i s t  in  19-U3 th e y  embarked on
3
a sugar cane s t r ik e  which undermined th e  war e f f o r t .  The cause of 
th e  d isp u te  between th e  m il le r s  (C.S.R.Company) and th e  growers was 
cane p r ic e s .  Consequently th e  a l ie n a t io n  between th e  In d ian s  and th e  
o th e r  races  was ag g rav a ted . Then in  19U? B r i ta in  w ithdrew  from 
In d ia ,  h e ra ld in g  the  beginning of th e  end o f th e  B r i t i s h  Em pire.
In  F i j i  Europeans in te r p r e te d  i t  as a f u r th e r  example of In d ian  
in g r a t i tu d e ,  arrogance and presum ption.
In  1939 an o th er s t r ik e  occu rred ; t h i s  tim e a g a in s t  th e  o i l  
companies and in  Suva r i o t s  fo llow ed d ire c te d  m ainly a g a in s t  th e  
Europeans.^ The s t r ik e  was a consequence of i n s u f f i c i e n t  wages f o r  
lo c a l  employees d e sp ite  in c re a s in g  p r o f i t s  f o r  th e  fo re ig n  com panies. 
The r i o t s  were th e  outcome of lo c a l  f r u s t r a t i o n  w ith  the c o lo n ia l  
system  which upheld  European p r iv i le g e s  and to le r a te d  economic 
in e q u a l i t ie s  by ig n o rin g  th e  c a l l s  of lo c a l  working men and tra d e  
u n io n is ts  fo r  r e d re s s .  T h e re a fte r  Europeans saw t h e i r  p r iv i le g e d  
p o s i t io n  in  F i j i  s e r io u s ly  th re a te n e d . A nxiety coupled w ith  th e  
evidence of d e co lo n iza tio n  abroad made F i j i  Europeans even more 
re a c tio n a ry  in  t h e i r  e f f o r t s  to  p ro te c t  one of t h e i r  l a s t  b a s t io n s .  
They were encouraged by o f f i c i a l s ,  e s p e c ia l ly  th o se  t r a n s f e r r e d  from 
independent A fr ic a , and by th e  European p re s s .  The l a t t e r  w ith  an 
in flu en c e  ex tend ing  beyond th e  European community p a in te d  th e  
b la c k e s t p o s s ib le  p ic tu re s  of newly independent s t a t e s  in  i t s  e f f o r t s ,  
rem arkably su c c e s s fu l, to  c re a te  f e a r  about th e  p o s s i b i l i t y  o f
3 For t h i s  d isp u te  see Shephard 19U3j Caiman 1932:162-160.
U This paragraph  i s  based on a read ing  of th e  E n g lish  language p re s s  
and d isc u ss io n s  w ith  ey e -w itn esses . See a lso  Mayer 1963:11U-113«
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independence.
And in the vanguard for political reform were still the Indians. 
What aroused greatest indignation was the contimaing Indian clamour 
for common franchise. let another strike in 1960 in the sugar 
industry, led by Indian politicians discredited not, only them ana 
their supporters but also their ideals of constitutional advancement. 
The local jeremiahs of independence were quick to propagandize 
dangers of political progress with ’irresponsible politicians’.
Again the foreign-owned press and the Government in its anger with 
the strikers, ignored the causes of the strike.
Indian demands for political reform continued to be rejected by 
both Europeans and Fijians. To some degree the Indians by their 
intransigence over common roll were responsible for the reaction. The 
Indian population continued to grow in the 19U0’s and 1950’s and 
fears of Indian domination grew equally. When advised to consider 
family planning and birth control, Indian leaders denied that Fiji 
was plagued with over-population. They compounded their folly by 
arguing that more people were needed to develop the resources of the 
Colony and contending that Fijians ought to lease their lands more 
freely to absorb the rising population. The Fijians, always 
sensitive about their lands which were limited,’saw their protection 
to lie in the perpetuation of British rule.
Fijians made clear that they did not wish to see the end of 
colonialism and their link with the British Crown and in this they 
had the complete support of the Europeans. Fijians also made 
explicit that any transfer of political power must be returned to 
them as the community whose chiefs had entered into a covenant with 
Britain.
Britain, pressured by world opinion especially in the United 
Nations, found herself in an increasingly embarrassing position over 
a colony which refused to be released from her control. British 
suggestions in 1961 for constitutional change and the introduction of 
the membership system were rejected by the Fijians and Europeans as 
politically premature.^ But continuing official pressure forced
5 L.C.Debates 1961:129-198.
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the Fijians in 1963 to accept universal suffrage on a communal basis. 
And for the first time the Fijian people were able directly to elect 
their own representatives to the Legislative Council. But the 
nomination system was also retained as well as the official majority. 
Each race elected U of its members while two from each group were 
to be nominated by the Crown. The Legislative Councillors were 
permitted separately to elect two from each of their groups to be 
members of the Executive Council. In I96I4. the membership system and 
the concept of collective responsibility of Executive Council members 
were introduced. One Indian, one Fijian, and one European were 
created members and given portfolios. Fiji seemed to be on the path 
to self-government.
The elections of 1963 were significant in two wayss^ (1) the 
introduction of the ballot among the Fijians did not see the end of 
the chiefs as the people's representatives as some elements, 
especially Indians, had expected. Rather the elections consolidated 
the power of the Fijian establishment by returning to the Legislative 
Council chiefs and those commoners who accepted their patronage.
(2) the Indians in the sugar cane districts supported the 
candidates of the newly-formed Federation Party which comprised 
those who had led the 1960 strike. This group was branded as 
extremist. Also the Indian community was divided into two distinct
ngroups each unwilling to compromise or co-operate with the other.1'
Having imposed the membership system in Fiji, Britain decided 
after a year's trial to call al the Legislative Council members to a 
Conference in London. Again the force of world opinion was 
dictating the British haste.
In Fiji preparations for the conference were marred byQ
controversy. Indian members of the Legislative Council belonging to 
the Federation Party expressed the hope for independence and common 
franchise. They claimed that the European press and the Government,
6 For a study of these elections see Meller and Anthony 1968.
7 One group of cane growers belonged to the Kisan Sangh (founded 
1937) which later formed the Indian National Congress (i960) and 
became part of the Alliance. The other, the majority, were members 
of the Federated Cane Growers Associations, and later became the 
foundation of the Federation Party. Urban Indians joined one of 
these groups, the majority the latter.
8 Based on a reading of the Fiji Times, Pacific Review, Pacific 
Monthly of 1965 and discussions with politicians.
Public Relations Office were deliberating misrepresenting them to 
the public and therefore they would in future neither make public 
statements about their strategy nor discuss their plans with other 
groups.
The Europeans and Fijians, unanimous in their repudiation of 
common roll and independence, were joined by a group of anti- 
Federation Party Indians. The Fijians also wanted no discussion in 
London relating to Fijian land.
In London the strained atmosphere was not helped by the British 
delegation's wish to settle matters quickly without too much discussion. 
The real victors of the conference were the Europeans - judging from 
the number of seats they obtained in the new Legislative Council. 
Fijians with a population of approximately 228,000 obtained 1U seats - 
2 of these were for members chosen by the Council of Chiefs. The 
Indians with a population of about 256,000 or nearly 50% obtained 
two fewer seats with 12, while the Europeans who now had the Chinese 
on their electoral roll and given the designation of General Electors, 
numbering about 28,000 or almost 7% of the population obtained 10 seaus 
which represented nearly 28% of the total number of seats. Most 
importantly, they held the balance of power. The justification for 
European over-representation was given as their contribution through 
capital and skill to the well-being of the Colony. The Indians of 
the Federation Party left London thoroughly dissatisfied and were 
particularly irate at the number of seats given to the Europeans.
The new constitution was noteworthy for the introduction of cross­
voting by which an elector was given three votes and required to cast 
one for a candidate from each of three electoral groups - one for 
a Fijian, one for an Indian and one for a General Elector. But the
communal franchise was also retained, and each elector also had a
10vote to cast for a candidate in.his communal constituency.
Elections under the new constitution were held late in August.
The Federation Party made its chief plank common rolland independence 
and called for the destruction of the new constitution. The newly-
9 L.C.Debates 1965:627-798. Based also on an examination of a 
confidential report on the conference.
10 Also in 1966 common franchise was introduced in all town council 
elections except in Suva and Lautoka. And the Fijians were 
permitted to elect all their representatives to the III. Provincial 
Councils by secret ballot.
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formed Alliance, which was a loose coalition of communal parx s, 
made multi-racial co-operaticn its chief aim.
The Alliance gained a majority of the seats; it won 23 seats but 
the two Independents and two Council of Chiefs members also aligned 
themselves with it giving it 27 to the 9 of the Federation Party. It 
was interesting that the Alliance had won all 9 Fijian and 6 of the 7 
General Elector communal seats - the other General Elector communal 
seat went to an Independent. The Federation Party won all 9 Indian 
communal seats polling 65.26% of the votes there - the rest went to 
unsuccessful Independents and 3 Alliance candidates. The Alliance had. 
polled 67.36% of the votes for its 9 Fijian communal seats. The 9 
seats in the three 3-man cross-voting constituencies were all won by 
the Alliance simply because a significant number of Indians voted 
for its candidates while hardly any Fijians supported the Federation 
Party which they saw as an extremely pro-Indian and anti-Fijian 
organization.^ ^
Basically the voting pattern was racial; each community voting 
for the party which promised to safeguard its particular interests - 
aspiring politicians during their campaigns capitalized on and 
exploited communal fears. Generally the elections were peaceful and 
without violence. After the election political calm set in until 
September 1967 when the ministerial system was introduced. Thereupon 
the Federation Farty again condemned the constitution as undemocratic 
and walked out of the Council. Its members resigned their seats as 
a form of protest and thus forced the by-elections of August 1968.
For the by-elections the Federation Party carried out a vigorous 
and vituperative campaign and made the iniquities of the constitution 
the main issue; it warned the Indians that they must unite and
12support the Federation Party otherwise their security was in danger.
The Federation press and political meetings consistently criticized 
the privileged status of whites in Fiji as well as the Fijian chiefs.
The Alliance had difficulty in obtaining Indian candidates but
11 For a comparison between the 1966 and 1972 General Election see 
All 1973(a).
12 The author attended all the public meetings in Suva of both the 
parties before and during the election campaign. Also based on 
a reading of press reports.
326
succeeded in finding them by nomination day. It went to the 
Indian people on the basis of its record of the previous year.
Because it was completely out of touch with the Indian community it 
failed to appreciate that Indians were genuinely dissatisfied with 
the constitution. It was significant that the Alliance was still 
opposed to independence for Fiji in the future.
The by-elections resulted in a resounding victory for the 
Federation Party which retained the 9 seats as well as increased their 
Indian support. Their number and percentage of the votes rose despite 
the fact that fewer Indian voters went to the polls in 1968 than in 
1966. They obtained 7$ »55% of the Indian vote. This was not 
unexpected because they were able to communicate better with the 
Indians and their campaign, was more vigorous and co-ordinated than 
that of the Alliance.
The Alliance, especially the Fijian elements within it, took the 
defeat badly and reacted with unprecedented indignation. 4 Racial 
tension remained high for several weeks. Some of the leaders of the 
Fijian Association which was the largest constituent body of the 
Alliance, toured the country calling altogether about 18 well- 
attended meetings of Fijians. Several resolutions were passed:
(1) Fijians reaffirmed their loyalty to Britain and reiterated their 
wish to perpetuate their links with her. Independence and common 
roll were denounced. (2) The deportation of those Indian leaders 
of the Federation Party who were not Fiji-born was called for.
(3) The dismissal of Indian civil servants who had helped the 
Federation Party was demanded.
Despite the tension, violence was limited to isolated incidents 
involving individuals.
For the Alliance, the by-elections proved a turning-point.
During the initial anger some Fijian leaders suggested the dismantling 
of the Alliance and the Fijian Association standing alone as a 
communal party. They argued that they had offered the Indians their 
hand of friendship and this had been rejected. Therefore they had
13
13 The difficulty arose from the small following that the Alliance had 
at the time. All candidates were reluctant to stand because they 
recognized that their chances of success were remote. For a study 
of the 1968 by-election see Anthony 1969.
1U Based on personal observation. The author was appointed Secretary 
of tne Alliance at the beginning of May 1969 and remained in the 
position till February 1970 when he resigned to come to A.N.U. 
During that time he saw documents and heard discussions which
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come to the parting of the ways. But moderate counsel prevailed and 
the Alliance after introspection decided to reform its own political
structure and make increased efforts to woo Indian support.
It even offered to go to London for new constitutional discussions 
provided the Federation Party took a more conciliatory attitude. As 
a result constitutional discussions began in August 1969. But the 
Alliance made two firm stipulations: first only the elected
representatives of the people were to take part in these discussions. 
Thusth National Federation Party was unable to invite any of its 
Fijian members to participate, and claim to speak for any section of 
the Fijian people. The Alliance remained the sole voice of the 
Fijian people. Secondly, the Alliance had a significant majority 
on the constitutional committee and later at the Conference. The 
deliberations were to be secret; the public were informed of the 
results - not of the discussions. The purpose here seemed aimed 
at preventing elements such as the press, bitter about the slow but 
sure erosion of European privileges through political progress, from 
sabotaging the dialogue, particularly when Fijian-Indian amity brought 
rapid decisions.
In October, the leader of the Opposition and founder of the 
Federation Party, A.D.Patel died. The new leadership was less 
forceful and more conciliatory as well as disunited.
At the next meeting in November the Alliance announced that it 
was prepared to accept dominion status for Fiji. This meant 
independence. The Federation Party, taken aback, was delighted and 
reciprocated by offering to shelve common roll. The volte face of 
the Alliance on independence requires some comment. It was the 
result of decisions taken after much deliberation in the various 
institutions that governed the Fijian people. The reasons behind 
these decisions were:  ^ (1) There was a growing feeling that
decisions of the British Government on Fiji’s constitution were not 
wholly free from pressures exerted by the United Nations. It was 
argued that the Fourth Committee which dealt with the affairs of 
dependent territories might sympathize with the demands for common roll 
or proportional representation as well as majority rule - all 
unacceptable to Fijian opinion. If Fiji became independent
1U cont’dr cannot be cited, but he drew on this knowledge in writing 
the subsequent paragraphs.
Based on confidential material.
328
immediately such external pressures could be negated. (2) With the 
numerical superiority of the Indians steadily growing it would become 
increasingly difficult for political control of their country to be 
returned to the Fijians. Postponement of independence was contrary 
to Fijian interests. (3) With the Alliance having a majority in 
the Legislative Council, Fijians were in a strong position to 
negotiate for-independence. A future general election under the 
existing constitution,in view of the 1968 by-elections might diminish 
its power. Therefore it was best to approach independence from a 
position of strength. (i;) The existing political organization was 
only a short step from complete internal self-government and this 
step ought to be taken immediately to protect Fijian interests and to 
allow the Fijians control of Fiji’s internal political development 
to be taken over by the Fijians. This was dictated by the very poor 
position of the Fijians in the economy of their country. They were 
conspicuous by their absence in the commercial sector and the cash 
economy of their native land.
Whatever the reasons the Indians were generally delighted that 
the Fijians were prepared to accept independence. Despite their 
reservations on independence the Europeans given no other alternative 
accepted the Fijian stand rather than jeopardize their own position by 
quarrelling with the indigenous people, their staunch allies.
Without going into detail it should be noted that the 
constitutional discussions beginning in Suva in August 1969 and 
concluding in London in April-May 1970 proved peaceful and conciliatory. 
The following decisions were reached: (1) Fiji was to have a
bicameral system. In the lower and elected house Fijians and Indians 
were to have parity, 22 seats each (12 communal and 10 cross-voting) 
and the General Electors 8 (3 communal and 3 cross-voting). The 
Upper House was to be nominated. - 8 members to be chosen by the 
Council of Chiefs, 7 by the Prime Minister, 6 by the Leader of 
Opposition and 1 by the Council of Rotuma. (2) Matters affecting 
Fijian customs and land could not be passed by either House unless 
supported by 6 out of 8 of the Senate representatives of the Council 
of Chiefs. The Constitution recognized the special position of the
16 Based on a study of confidential material. For a study on the 
1970 Conference and Constitution see Vasil 1972.
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Fijians in Fiji. The rights of the other communities were not
specifically defined but seen to have been guaranteed by the general
Bill of Rights written into the Constitution. (3) Common franchise
was to be implemented immediately in the municipal elections of the
two largest towns, Suva and Lautoka. It had already been in
existence since 1966 in the other elected town boards. (U) Flections
under the new. constitution were postponed for no more than six
17months after independence.
Independence came on 10 October 1970, after exactly 96 years of 
British rule. But the new constitution was not necessarily final.
It was subject to investigation by a Royal Commission to be appointed 
during the lifetime of the first Parliament after independence.
The feasibility of common roll was to be one of its terms of reference. 
Yet the Commission’s decision would not be binding, it would be 
subject to approval, modification or even rejection by Parliament - 
a Parliament wherein the Alliance was assured of a majority. Equally 
significant, the National Federation Party, predominantly Indian in 
its power base, had voluntarily concurred to such a solution.
17 They wer^ held in April 1972. For a study on the 1972 General 
Election see Ali 1973(a) and on the position of Indians in Fiji 
after independence see Ali 1973(b).
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